PASCAL AND THE THERAPY OF FAITH by ROBBINS, CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM
 
 
 
PASCAL AND THE THERAPY OF FAITH 
 
Christopher William Robbins 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of York 
Philosophy 
 
July 2015 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
  This study of Pascal’s Pensées focuses on a central aspect of Pascal’s project: the 
application of philosophical therapy to humanist agnostics to instil and sustain Christian 
belief in them.   
 
  I identify four therapeutic phases:  
 Pascal says we fear suffering after death, so it is in our interest to investigate 
the Christian message.  However his account of the afterlife does not 
satisfactorily show in what way persons can live on after death and will not 
infallibly engage our interest in avoiding Hell or enjoying Heaven. 
 Pascal contends that earthly life is futile and that the Christian doctrine of the 
Fall is the best explanation of the human predicament, an explanation which 
points us towards dependence on God for the meaning of life.  Yet even if we 
accept Pascal’s pessimistic estimate of human life, he does not successfully 
show that Christianity provides the best explanation of it. 
 Pascal argues that there is no purely human morality because the 
philosophers’ successive attempts to show how to achieve peace of mind in 
the moral life have failed to find an objective basis for a truly altruistic ethic: 
only Christianity can do this.  But this risks conflict between Christian and 
other ideals. 
 We seek the tranquillity of faith yet Pascal rejects philosophical proofs of 
God’s existence: God is hidden; thoughtful aspirants to faith must rely on only 
suggestive evidence for the truth of Christianity.  Habituation can reinforce 
one’s determination to become a Christian but – because faith is God’s gift – 
we can never be sure we have it: ultimately there is no peace of mind to be 
had. 
 
  The Epilogue compares Pascal’s conception of religious belief with that of the 
Wittgensteinians: while Pascal embraces descriptive religious assertions, the 
Wittgensteinians discard them to protect Christianity from positivist attack. 
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FOREWORD 
 
Details of all publications cited more than once in the text are given in the 
Bibliography which also shows the abbreviations used in the text for them.  
 
I refer in the text to the Pensées using first the numbering of Lafuma as it 
appears in the Œuvres Complètes (Éditions du Seuil, 1963) and secondly that of 
Sellier as it appears in the Livre de Poche edition of Gérard Ferreyrolles.  These 
two numberings are used in the English translations made by Krailsheimer 
(Penguin) and Ariew (Hackett) respectively.  Hence ‘(86:120)’ refers the reader to 
pensée no. 86 in the Lafuma/Krailsheimer versions and to the same pensée, as no. 
120, in the Sellier- Ferreyrolles /Ariew versions. 
 
The most recent edition of Pascal’s Œuvres Complètes is by Michel Le 
Guern (Pléiade, 2 vols.: 1998 & 2000); there is no English translation of the 
Pensées following his numbering so I do not use it.  I frequently refer to other 
works by Pascal (and specific pages of the Pensées) as they appear in the Le Guern 
edition: thus ‘(OCG II 478)’ refers to page 478 of Volume 2 of the Le Guern edition 
of the Œuvres Complètes. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF PASCAL’S WRITINGS 
MENTIONED IN THIS STUDY1 
 
1623  Born in Clermont to Étienne Pascal and Antoinette Begon (dies  
  1626) 
 
1647  Récit des deux conférences condemning the rational theology of a 
  harmless and probably mildly mad priest, Saint-Ange, who had  
  claimed he could provide rational proofs for many Christian  
  doctrines, for  example the Trinity  
  Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide which argues that the  
  traditional doctrine of the horror vacui cannot explain the  
  behaviour of liquids in vertical tubes and other vessels. 
Correspondence with a Jesuit scholar, Père Noël, defending the 
hypothesis of the void. 
 
1648  Letter to his sister Gilberte about his talk with Antoine de  
  Rebours, a Jansenist priest and a member of Mersenne’s circle.  He 
  says that he believes he can show that Christian belief does not  
  contradict common sense.  But he gets no encouragement from 
  Rebours. 
  Letter to Le Pailleur commenting on the controversy with Noël. 
Récit de la grande expérience de l’équilibre des liqueurs, report 
of  the Puy-de-Dôme experiment suggesting that the weight of the 
air varies according to altitude. 
 
1651  Préface sur le traité du vide 
  Letter to Florin & Gilberte Périer on the death of Étienne Pascal 
 
1651 [or later] Traité de la pesanteur de la masse de l’air 
 
                                                          
1  Dating of works not issued in Pascal’s lifetime is conjectural.  I have drawn on the suggestions of 
OCM, OCG and Mesnard 1976 in compiling this chronology. 
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1652  Letter to Queen Christina of Sweden presenting his arithmetical 
  machine 
 
1653-4 Early Pensées reflecting conversations with several honnêtes  
  hommes, friends of the Duc de Roannez. 
 
1654  Correspondence with Fermat on the principles of probability. 
  Mémorial recording a spiritual experience during which he decides 
  to devote himself to the Christian faith and to renounce the world. 
 
1655  Entretien de M. Pascal avec M. de Sacy sur Epictète et   
  Montaigne 
1655 [or later] Pensée entitled Infini – Rien (the ‘Wager fragment’: 418:680) 
  De l’esprit géométrique (includes De l’art de persuader) 
  Comparaison des chrétiens des premiers temps avec ceux  
  d’aujourd’hui 
 
1656  Letters to Mlle Roannez 
  Pensées on miracles (830-912:419-451) drafted following the  
  Miracle of the Holy Thorn.   
1656[-7] Écrits sur la grâce 
 
1656-9 Lettres Provinciales and other tracts in which he argues (a) that 
the believer’s salvation is exclusively the result of God’s grace, and 
(b) that Jesuit moralists have debased Christian morality by using 
casuistry to excuse the misdeeds of their powerful patrons. 
 
1658  Writes an outline of his projected work on Christian faith for a  
  presentation at Port-Royal (149:182 & 122:155) and drafts or  
  dictates other pensées intermittently over the next four years 
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1659  Discours sur la condition des grands 
 
1659[-60] Prière pour le bon usage des maladies 
1660  Letter to Fermat 
1662  Dies after expressing regret at the non-completion of his project. 
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INTRODUCTION: PASCAL’S LIFE AND HIS FINAL PROJECT 
 
The aim of this introduction is very briefly to set the scene for a study of 
Pascal’s project – as it emerges from the Pensées – to persuade his readers to set 
out to become devout Christians.  Chapter I completes the picture by describing, 
largely from Pascal’s point of view, the intellectual context of the Pensées. 
  
Pascal’s project has two features which justify devoting a thesis to it: it 
tries to meet two challenges faced by Christian belief and moral values: first, from 
humanist thought and, secondly, from a related development: the nascent 
empiricist ideology sketched by a Hobbes or Gassendi which appeared alongside 
the emergence of modern science2; these two intellectual trends sometimes 
embraced a rationalist3 impatience with mystery and paradox.  The humanist and 
empiricist challenges turn on two aspects of the same point: if all we can know 
derives from sense experience, then there is no such thing as divine inspiration as 
a source of knowledge; similarly if morality can be based on our rational 
knowledge of human nature, then there is no need to posit a divine legislator as 
the only source of moral precepts.  Facing these challenges, Pascal’s project 
attempts to re-instate revelation as a source of supernatural as opposed to 
natural knowledge, but by meeting the humanist rationalists, empiricists and 
moralists on their own ground.  He also offers a path to faith which was novel in 
his day: it suggests that the process of sincerely approaching faith is therapeutic, 
as is faith itself.  
   
I will argue that Pascal’s project – which was unfinished at the time of his 
death – fails in its attempts to re-instate the supernatural as a sphere of human 
interest and is ultimately unsuccessful as therapy too.  But the project remains 
                                                          
2 See Woolhouse 1988, McKenna 2003, p 253 and Osler 2003, p 34.  Hume unfolds his fully-
developed empiricism (and his approach to ethics) partly in reaction to Pascal’s Pensées (see 
Vergez 1955, Penelhum 2000, Ch 13 and MacIntyre 2007, p 54).  I have found it useful on occasion 
to refer to several of Hume’s arguments in this study to illustrate the development of themes 
which, as Pascal recognized, were already emerging in his time. 
3 I do not mean by using ‘rationalist’ to recall the hackneyed history-of-philosophy use of the term.  
I mean to refer to the sort of person who recoils from the paradoxes of Christianity and rejects it 
because of them. 
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important to us today for the light it throws on religious belief and what faith is 
supposed to offer to us: so I devote an Epilogue to selective comparison of 
Pascal’s thinking with that of some recent philosophers of religion.  
 
There are many descriptive studies of Pascal’s writings, yielding historical 
and philological insights.  But, as I mention in Appendix III, there are few 
philosophically critical accounts of the Pensées and fewer still which mention the 
idea of faith as therapy.  I hope therefore that this study contributes new thoughts 
on an author who has too rarely been taken seriously – at least by Anglo-Saxon 
philosophers – in philosophical terms.   
 
1. Life 
Pascal was a precocious mathematician who was present in his late teens 
at meetings of Mersenne’s Academy (which his father joined at or soon after its 
inception in 1635).  He invented an arithmetical machine in 1642 when he was 
19, was a skilled designer of experiments in physics (especially on the barometric 
phenomena, 1646-8) and the inventor (with Fermat) of probability theory 
(1654).  By that time he had grown close to the Roannez family, a friendship 
which introduced him to the ideals of military gallantry and of honnêteté4.  
 
The worlds of science and society did not wholly possess him: he had 
developed a growing parallel interest in the foundations of Christian belief since 
his family had been converted to Jansenism in 1646.  He experienced a profound 
religious crisis in November 1654 which resulted in a resolve to follow the 
Augustinian Christian’s way of life, in particular to ‘forget the world and 
everything except God’5.   This change of heart was apparently prompted by his 
sister Jacqueline who was by then a Jansenist nun: she urged her brother to quit 
the world6.   
 
                                                          
4 See Mesnard 1965b.  
5 Pensée 913:742.  See Miel 1969, pp 118-122. 
6 And all conversations of which even the most innocent are futile. The source here is the 
biography written by Pascal’s other sister, Gilberte: OCG I 71-2.  On the importance of 
conversation in early modern France, see Fumaroli 2006. 
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But his resolve made in November 1654 to quit the world resulted only in 
a brief retreat in early 1655 at Port-Royal des Champs (the Jansenist stronghold 
outside Paris); after that he resumed many aspects of his worldly occupations, 
including the supervision of various investments (OCG I 26)7.  He paid further 
visits to Port-Royal and became ascetic in his domestic and eating habits; he 
partly withdrew from public life: he did not publish a scientific treatise he had 
prepared in the early 1650s (OCG I 466); nor seemingly did he continue to 
promote his arithmetical machine.  But he did not cut himself off from his non-
Jansenist friends or give up his scientific interests: in 1658 he challenged other 
mathematicians to resolve various problems relating to the cycloid (OCG II 319-
502), on terms which do him little credit: he gave other scholars too little time to 
devise solutions at which he (and in four cases – as he found out – Roberval) had 
already arrived.  He was uncharitably abusive to one scholar who happened to be 
a Jesuit.  It seems that on this occasion he could not wholly set his amour-propre 
to one side8.  The suggestion that he set up the competition to draw attention to 
his work on religion9 rings rather hollow.  
 
2. Pascal and Jansenism 
  Pascal’s Augustinianism had begun to form in the late 1640s, after his 
family’s adhesion to the Jansenist sect, when, as his correspondence reveals, he 
read works by Saint-Cyran (Jean Duvergier de Hauranne), Jansen, and Arnauld10.  
Jansenism was an Augustinian movement.  Augustine had engaged in several 
controversies in his lifetime.  Successive Councils of the Church had interpreted 
his prolific writings as their needs dictated.  The result was that there was, and is, 
no one Augustine; but the Jansenists claimed on the basis of Jansen’s unwieldy 
Augustinus that there was.  Jansen’s influence was perpetuated by the industrious 
Antoine Arnauld ‘Le Grand’ (1612-1694) who carried on a sort of family feud with 
the Jesuits by means of a series of publications; in them he promoted Augustine’s 
                                                          
7 See Davidson 1983, p 17. 
8 As his sister had urged, viz.  to renounce all intellectual pleasures ‘où l’amour-propre peut avoir 
part’ (see OCG I 71-2).  On the cycloid competition see OCG II 1256-7, Koyré in Béra 1956, pp 267-
8; and Adamson 1995, Ch 10. 
9 OCM I 651. See Davidson 1983, p 19, Jones 2006, pp 131-2 and, for another view, Cognet 1956, p 
20. 
10  See Le Guern 2003, p 19 & Gouhier 2005, p 115. 
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late doctrines on Original Sin, grace, election and salvation, which had originally 
been directed at Pelagius.  In their most ‘pessimistic’ version these doctrines 
assert that God’s omnipotence and omniscience make it impossible for us sinners 
to contribute to our salvation through good works: grace is ‘efficacious’, i.e. the 
necessary and sufficient condition of both virtue and salvation which is 
predestined for a small group of the elect.  Grace is not a continuous flow: it has to 
be renewed every instant and can be withdrawn by God at any instant.  Peter’s 
denial of Christ is cited as an example of the withdrawal of grace.  We are utterly 
dependent on God to escape from sin but must always fear that He will withdraw 
His grace and thus not preserve us from sin and damnation.   
 
Not all French Augustinians took the hard line of the Jansenists: Bérulle 
did not believe that grace was both a necessary and sufficient condition of 
virtuous action11.   But Pascal never doubted the orthodoxy of this extreme view 
despite the existence of a less pessimistic tradition12, and the fact that the Church 
has endorsed only some of Augustine’s doctrines on grace, most recently at the 
Council of Trent.   Pascal claims that the Jesuits have betrayed the Council’s 
doctrine on grace13.  But the Papacy had suspended the debate between the 
‘Augustinians’ and the neo-Pelagians in 1607 without deciding for either side14.   
 
Many Jansenists were sceptical about the role of reason in Christian 
thinking, suspecting that the confident exercise of reason in sacred matters would 
be to commit the sin of pride (see Chronology above for 1648 and 1655).   Other 
Jansenists, e.g. Saint-Cyran and Nicole, countenanced metaphysical proofs of God 
as paths towards belief15.  Pascal for his part soon concluded that rational proofs 
of Christian doctrine cannot produce faith in Jesus Christ, for – as he was to say in 
the Pensées – faith essentially consists in recognizing the corruption of human 
nature and the need for the Redeemer (449:690).  But this opposition to proofs 
                                                          
11 See d’Angers 1954, p 90. 
12 For example, St François de Sales wielded, despite his anti-Stoicism, substantial influence as a 
theologian who allowed for a contribution of each of us to our own salvation (see Gouhier 1987, p 
130).  The Salesians are targeted by the Provinciales as well as Jesuit writers. 
13 Provinciale II, OCG I 604. 
14 See Miel 1969, pp 45-53 and Gouhier 1987, p 79.  
15 See Russier 1949, pp 293 ff. 
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did not rule out, in his eyes, all reasoning about the Christian faith.  Despite 
Rebours’s negative reaction (OCG II 6), and Sacy’s expressions of reluctance to 
discuss Montaigne (OCG II 91)16, Pascal seems to have concluded that he could use 
rational considerations to persuade lukewarm17 or mildly sceptical Christians 
(often then under Montaigne’s humanistic influence) to adopt a devoutly 
Christian way of life.  From then on Pascal had an uneasy relationship with the 
anti-intellectual wing of the Jansenist movement. 
 
On the other wing of the movement, Arnauld fought long and hard to 
defend himself – and therefore his version of Jansenism – against the attacks 
emanating from the Sorbonne18.  This controversy took place just as Pascal (who 
had yet to meet Arnauld) was absorbing the Jansenist doctrines opposing 
Christian humanist confidence in the ability of mankind to contribute to its 
salvation, and condemning Jesuit casuistry designed to moderate the moral 
principles which the Church required its adherents to obey19. 
 
 By 1655, when Pascal became closer to Port-Royal, Arnauld was fighting a 
losing battle against the Jesuits.   Other Jansenists, above all Martin de Barcos (the 
Abbot of Saint-Cyran since the death of Duvergier de Hauranne in 1643), 
disapproved of those of his fellow Jansenists who entered the public arena to 
defend the sect against attacks from the Jesuits and others20.  But this is just what 
Pascal did, coming to Arnauld’s aid and collaborating with him and Pierre 
Nicole21, to write his clandestinely-published Provinciales and subsequent tracts.   
These highly popular writings centred on two topics: Pascal argued first that 
virtuous conduct and salvation were wholly dependent on God’s grace, and 
secondly (when the battle over grace seemed lost) that the Jesuit casuists’ 
relaxation of morality had led to a disastrous relaxation of Christian moral 
                                                          
16 See Le Guern 2003, pp 33-5, Scholar 2003, p 63, Gouhier 2005, pp 109-115 & Fumaroli 2006, p 
316.  
17 Pascal’s word for this attitude is indifférence.   See also Voltaire 2008, p 154. 
18 Bremond calls him a ‘syllogism machine, a theological machine-gun in perpetual motion’ 
(quoted in Kołakowski 1997, p 281). 
19  See Gouhier 1974, Épilogue.   
20 See Brunschvicg 1953, p 201 and on Barcos, Goldmann 1959, pp 287-8. 
21 (1625-1695). He was Arnauld’s main collaborator both in theological controversy and in the 
writing of La Logique, ou L’Art de Penser, the Port-Royal Logic. 
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principles.   Pascal’s moral campaign seriously damaged the Jesuits’ reputation 
among educated people.  But the Jesuits did secure broad agreement in their 
favour in the Church (above all in Rome) on the first point: their belief that human 
beings have the power to choose to act righteously (with God’s help) and thus 
contribute to their own salvation.  This became – and remains – the most widely 
accepted Catholic interpretation of the Christian tradition.  Pascal stuck to the 
Jansenist line that an omnipotent God could not be influenced to save anybody: 
salvation and damnation were wholly and exclusively in His power.  We shall see 
that this doctrine and its ramifications present serious difficulties for Pascal’s 
project. 
 
   Barcos, a pure fideist, also disdained Pascal’s project to bring lukewarm 
Christians or agnostics back into the Christian fold by showing that Christianity is 
‘not contrary to reason’22.  Hearing of this, Barcos rather uncharitably said that 
Pascal had been ‘thunderstruck by God like a pygmy [...] it was not for him to 
speak about religion’ (OCM I 893).  The outstanding clarity of Pascal’s speech and 
writing, and his ability to face up to particularly difficult aspects of doctrine, 
would also have disquieted Barcos.   In effect, Pascal never belonged to the 
‘extreme’ wing of Jansenism which advocated a more drastic withdrawal from the 
‘world’ than he himself desired, and revelled in the obscurity of some Pauline 
doctrines23.   
 
So Pascal did not ‘leave the world’, neither to become a Port-Royal Solitaire 
(a sort of high-class lay brother or priest) or a priest24:  his determination to find 
persuasive arguments in favour of the Christian life and faith entailed maintaining 
in balance his respective commitments to secular activities and to Christian faith:  
he stayed ‘in the world’ not just for financial reasons but also because he deeply 
desired to get under his subjects’ skin and to communicate his faith convincingly 
                                                          
22 Pensée 12:46. The recognition of the limits of reason is itself rational (188:220).  Barcos 
regarded ‘l’abandon de toute recherche d’ordre rationnel’ as the only valid approach for a Christian 
believer (Goldmann 1959, pp 223 & 287-8).  
23 Barcos opposed another person’s translating Paul’s Epistles into French, on the grounds that the 
Holy Spirit had wanted to make them obscure and difficult: see Mesnard, ‘Martin de Barcos et les 
disputes internes de Port-Royal’ in Mesnard 1992, p 278.  
24 Nor did he hand over his fortune to Port-Royal but lent it at interest (Cognet 1956, p 17). 
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to others25.  It was an important part of his method that he should gather ideas 
and reactions to them by talking to all sorts of educated people and noting down 
what they said26.    He was, in any case, utterly incapable of making a vow of 
silence on what he saw as the supremely important matter to be faced by all 
human beings.  
 
His sympathy with the main Jansenist doctrines, especially on original sin 
and grace, is obvious27.  So too is his opposition to humanism as a way of life 
alternative to devout Christianity, and to those Jesuits sympathetic to humanist 
ethics.  But he was at pains to distance himself publicly from Jansenism: in the 
Provinciales he asserts that he is alone ‘without power and without human 
support’ (OCG I 710) and that he is not a member of the community of Port-
Royal28.  The former statement is false: he had the support of Arnauld and Nicole 
who supplied him with doctrinal ammunition, especially at the beginning of the 
series.  The latter is strictly true: Pascal never took up residence at Port-Royal des 
Champs but he had close family ties with Port-Royal and in about 1658 gave 
theological talks there (OCG II 902-3 & 1371).    
 
These ties did not lead him to be a conformist, in relation either to 
Jansenism or to Augustinianism29, for he was invariably disposed to absorb and 
then transmute the thought of others.  He disagreed in practice with the extreme 
Jansenists’ rejection of all scientific pursuits as mere ‘curiosity’, even if, in a letter 
to Fermat, he recognises that science is much less valuable than leading the 
religious life (OCG II 43-4).  We can, he says in the Pensées, live without scientific 
knowledge but we can’t do without moral understanding30.   He disagreed with 
the moderate wing of the sect, especially Arnauld, as he gradually came to see that 
                                                          
25 See Goldmann 1959 and MacIntyre, A: Against the self-images of the age (London, Duckworth: 
1971), pp 77-81.   
26 See OCG I 105 & OCG II 907. See also Mesnard 1965b, p 251 on Pascal’s use of notebooks 
(tablettes) during conversations with honnêtes hommes.  
27 He however goes further than e.g. Arnauld would countenance in insisting that God’s 
hiddenness is a deliberate act by God (see Section 30 below). 
28 See OCG I 763 & 781. In what was probably a draft for one of these passages he says he is not a 
Jansenist (pensée 955:792). 
29 See Carraud 2007b. 
30 Scil. ‘la science des mœurs’ (23:57). 
24 
 
 
 
the former’s attitude to the Jesuits was uncharitably harsh31.  There is no 
evidence, on the other hand, that he shared Arnauld’s wish to soften the Jansenist 
doctrine that without grace we cannot be virtuous32, a point on which Nicole too 
had some doubts (OCG II 1487-8).  Their treatment of Pascal’s notes in assembling 
the first edition of the Pensées reveals many disagreements with Pascal’s 
Weltanschauung33. 
 
3. The Project 
  Pascal began in about 1655 (when he was 31) to discuss religion 
intensively both with his worldly acquaintances and with Jansenists.  It seems 
that it was at this time he tried out his Wager argument on people in the circle of 
the Duc de Roannez, i.e. before he began to think seriously about his project34.  
Over the next seven years, until his death in 1662, he developed several non-
linear arguments which, if he had had time to finish the project, would have 
resulted in a text designed to appeal to the interests of humanist sceptics and 
lukewarm believers and thus to persuade them to look again at the Catholic faith, 
and to begin to act according to its precepts35.   The notes he made for this project 
survive in the Pensées.  The project was not to be an apology either for Jansenism 
or for any of Augustine’s doctrines, even though the latter clearly influence the 
Pensées profoundly.  Pascal’s anti-humanism and anti-scientism form the key 
motivation for his project: he works for others’ salvation, not to promote a 
particular doctrinal tradition (see OCG II 912).  
 
Pascal’s project is not aimed at encouraging philosophers36 to seek 
solutions to our problems or to promote a return to piety.  He was not – and 
would never have described himself as – a philosopher.  For him ‘philosophers’ 
were either the Stoics or other ancient sages attempting to lay down the rational 
                                                          
31 See Le Guern 2003, pp 89-90, and pensée 786:645. 
32 Pensées 45:78 (error ineradicable without grace) and 824:665 (without grace we cannot obey 
the Law of God). But see Le Guern 2003, p 215 for a contrary view. 
33 See Vamos 1972. 
34 Pensée 418:680.  See OCG II 1450-1 and my Appendix II. 
35 Broome aptly describes the project as a rescue operation for those drowning in one variety or 
another of concupiscence (Broome 1966, pp 134 & 140-1). 
36 Who, as Descartes noted, are often less wise and less rational than those who have never 
studied the subject (Lettre de l’Auteur, Principes de la Philosophie, AT IX-2 4), and ‘can find 
difficulties in things which seem very clear to other people’ (Le Monde, Ch VI, AT XI 35). 
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foundations of ethics (with or without speculative natural science in the 
background), or certain contemporary metaphysicians, some aiming like 
Descartes to give a very general description of reality and an account of the 
foundations of physics37.  He rejected both sorts of philosophical ambition38.   
Most ‘professional’ metaphysicians of his day were scholastics.   He shares – with 
his humanist enemies – an antipathy to scholasticism, which manifests itself in his 
Molièresque sarcasm at the expense of the senior Jesuit Père Noël’s scholastic 
terminology39 and, possibly, inoculates him against Descartes’s use of scholastic 
terminology in the Méditations40.     
 
Pascal’s project was to a great extent a departure from apologetic 
practice41.   The Church Fathers’ apologetics consisted either in arguments 
showing the falsity of pagan religions and justifications of the Christian message 
(including proofs of God’s existence), or in refutations of heretical positions42.  
But Pascal’s project was not aimed at the adherents of other religions (as, for 
example, was Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles).  Nor did he believe that 
metaphysical proofs or appeals to universal consent (as employed by Augustine) 
would be effective43; Pascal rejected Augustine’s proof of God’s existence from 
eternal truths44, saying that anyone who used it would not have progressed far 
towards salvation (449:690).   He did not believe that the propositions of the faith 
could be demonstrated by ‘geometrical’ argument (OCG II 911).   
  
                                                          
37 This is how Descartes described the profession of philosopher to Mersenne (AT I 143-4). 
38 Pascal’s project involves a description of philosophical failure (see, e.g. Gouhier 1987, p 128).  
For a recent treatment of this theme, see Hunter 2013.   
39 Père Noël was principal of the Jesuit college of La Flèche (attended by Descartes and Mersenne).  
He opposed Pascal’s hypothesis that the vacuum existed.  The controversy between him and 
Pascal is at OCG I 373-425.  See Pascal’s sarcasm at OCG I 385: ‘one cannot refuse you [Noël] the 
glory of having upheld Peripatetic Physics as well as it can be done’.  See also OCG II 158. 
40 See OCG I 57 & 68 (on Pascal’s lack of scholastic training).  The Mersenne circle’s disparagement 
of scholastic learning, and Descartes’s promotion of the ‘practical philosophy’ in its place (Discours 
VI), would have influenced Pascal père et fils.    
41 See e.g. Russier 1949, pp 381 ff, who points out that Pascal’s attitude differed from some 
Jansenists’ approach to heresy. 
42 See Carraud 2013, pp 47-9. 
43 Pensées 176:207 & 504-5:672 and OCG I 436. See editorial comment at OCG II 1381-2, nn 4 & 5 
(and, for comparison with Charron, ibid. 1483, n1 infra).  
44 De libero arbitrio II.12, 33-4; EA, pp 123-5. 
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In the 16th Century the standard three-decker apologetics by French 
Catholics consisted in (a) proofs of God’s existence and of the soul’s immortality; 
(b) proofs that Christian revelation is from God and of the superiority of 
Christianity over other religions; and (c) determination of the choice between 
Catholicism and Protestantism45. This practice did not change much in Pascal’s 
lifetime.  There was still an emphasis on proofs: for example, Mersenne listed 36 
different proofs for the existence of God in his Quaestiones in Genesim46 but 
devoted most of his effort to the refutation of sceptical and impious views47;  
Descartes’s proofs in the Méditations earns him the title of ‘a part-time apologist’ 
(apologiste occasionnel);  in 1660 Samuel Sorbière (an associate of Hobbes and 
Gassendi , he became Catholic in middle age) discussed proofs of God’s existence 
and presented a universal consent argument based on the thesis that we all have 
a self-evident intuition of God’s existence48.  Humanist apologists, whether 
inspired by Thomist or Platonic thought, relied on proofs of God’s existence and of 
the soul’s immortality as much as did their traditional counterparts49. 
 
  The Pensées include expositions of doctrine and sketchy attempts (lacking 
sufficient information) to assert the superiority of Christianity over other 
religions.   But Pascal did not believe that defensive doctrinal arguments or proofs 
would on their own be effective with the type of sceptic he had come across.  His 
sister Gilberte reports that ‘he believed that everything he had to say about 
religion would be very clear and convincing, but he did not believe that it would 
be to those indifferent [to religion] [...] when he had to talk to certain atheists, he 
never started by arguing with them, nor did he try to lay down his own principles; 
but he did want to know beforehand whether they were sincerely seeking the 
truth’ (OCG I 78).   
 
                                                          
45 See Busson 1933, pp 515-6. Charron’s Les Trois Vérités has a similar structure (d’Angers 1954, p 
40).  See also Genet 2010, pp 319-320. 
46 See Dear 1988, p 31 and Gouhier 1987, p 58.  
47 See d’Angers 1954, p 35. 
48 See d’Angers 1954, pp 113-4. 
49 See Gouhier 1987, pp 56-57. Kołakowski comments that Pascal ‘never tried, as many 
theologians did, to convert faith into a second rate secular knowledge’ (Kołakowski 1982, p 206). 
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Much of the Provinciales are written on the basis that offence is the best 
form of defence; the same can be said of the Pensées’ offensives against 
complacent agnostics and the ‘philosophers’, against rationalist or empiricist 
certainties, against heresy and against other religions.  Given these points, and to 
avoid the risk of anachronism50, I will leave aside the semantic question whether 
the term ‘apology’ applies to his work (neither he nor his Port-Royal editors used 
the word) and refer to it as his ‘project’ throughout this study51. 
 
Pascal does not deserve to be called a ‘fideist’ or proponent of a ‘new 
fideism’, as has sometimes been suggested52.  If fideism is the view that ‘ faith is in 
some sense independent of, if not outright adversarial toward, reason’  as 
Amesbury proposes53, this is not Pascal’s position54: he aims to make sense of  
some religious beliefs, for example in miracles and prophecies, by reasoned 
argument, or rationally to reconstruct the historical content of the Scripture or 
the ‘perpetuity’ of the faith (i.e. its persistence as a faith since the Creation) or to 
bring forward prudential considerations in favour of the Christian way of life.  
The ineffectiveness of the traditional proofs (190:222), and the fact that some 
people resist the faith for emotional or other reasons (see, e.g., 418:680), do not 
imply for Pascal that there are no arguments in support of any element of the 
faith.  He may have been a fideist early on, under his father’s influence55, but later 
saw how to use reasoning to support belief.  He says that we are not expected to 
adopt a blind faith or to submit to faith without reason (149:182).  He recognises 
fideism as an implicit approach adopted by ‘simple’ believers to their faith, as I 
explain in Chapter V; but for him fideism provides no general account of religious 
belief.  
 
                                                          
50 In the 17th Century apologies were defensive works about particular people: see Aupetit 2013 
and Carraud 2013. The term apologétique was used to refer to an apology for the Christian 
religion (see Rey 2006, entry APOLOGÉTIQUE). 
51 Sainte-Beuve says that the term ‘apology’ probably does not apply to a work designed for 
Pascal’s restricted audience (Sainte-Beuve 1848, III, p 255).    
52 See Blanchet 1919, p 485 and Hunter & Wootton 1992, p 51. Opposing this ‘legend’: Baudin 
1946, Vol I, pp 238-243. 
53 See Amesbury 2012.  Penelhum says that fideists believe that ‘faith does not need the support of 
reason , and should not seek it’ (Penelhum 2010, p 441. 
54 See Lacombe 1958, pp 114-5. 
55 Who seems to have held that ‘tout ce qui est l’objet de la foi ne le saurait être de la raison’ – OCG I 
68 and this may have influenced his hard line against Saint-Ange (see Broome 1966, p 27).  
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The first three phases of Pascal’s therapy, as I shall describe them below, 
are all designed to show that it is irrational to ignore or reject the Christian way of 
life: to do so is to remain in fear of death or in a constant state of uneasy 
dissatisfaction or to cling to ethical systems which bring no peace of mind56.  
What Pascal does reject is the idea that we can rely on Reason, namely rational 
empirical knowledge57, to know God or His commands. 
 
It has been said that Pascal’s strategy amounts to discarding philosophy in 
favour of theology and in particular leaving the realm of argument for that of 
rhetorical persuasion: to humble the proud and stir up the defeatist58.  But 
rhetoric on its own cannot succeed if it deploys incomprehensible terms or 
conflicts with firmly-held beliefs.  At least in this limited sense, Pascal needs to 
deploy rational arguments, explanatory, critical and pragmatic.     
 
Pascal’s conception of the relation between Christian faith and reasoning 
is, as we shall see, complex.  First, he does not believe that any argument could on 
its own produce faith, for that is exclusively God’s gift.  Nor does he believe that 
there is a clinching argument which justifies belief in Christian doctrine as a 
whole.  Third, he advances piecemeal arguments (of varying strength) in favour of 
specific doctrines (e.g. the Fall) and to support various second-order doctrines 
(e.g. the ‘perpetuity’ of the Christian faith).  Fourth, he advances critical 
philosophical arguments, for example about the role of reason in belief (including 
Christian belief) and about the ineffectiveness of secular morality.  Fifth, he 
advances pragmatic arguments, for example in favour of investigating the 
Scriptures in the context of the Christian tradition59. 
 
  Pascal’s use of doctrinal arguments must be seen in the context of his aim 
to persuade his sceptical or apathetic readers to see how unsatisfying is their 
current way of life and how Christianity might transform their lives for the better.  
                                                          
56 See Peters 2009, pp 87-8, n 78 for a similar point of view. 
57 Which was gaining in confidence in his time as scientific and technical knowledge developed 
using quantitative methods, the testing of hypotheses and deductions from them. 
58 See Pucelle in Goyet 1979, p 447.   
59 As I outline in Chapter II.  On the Wager as a prudential argument, see Appendix II.  
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He aims to demonstrate the therapeutic60 (or perhaps, in our contemporary 
parlance, psychotherapeutic) role of conversion to Christian belief: we are beset 
with error, doubt and anxiety which no secular system of thought or activity – or 
other contemporary religion – can cure, but devout adherence to Christianity can 
give us tranquillity61.  The notion of therapy can be found applied to the Pensées 
as early as 192362 .  It encapsulates Pascal’s preoccupation63 with curing us of our 
contempt and fear of religion (12:46) or of our fear of death (133:166) or of the 
false assumptions of Stoicism or Epicurean-Pyrrhonism (208:240), and with the 
remedies for our ills (149:182).   It assumes that we instinctively seek happiness 
in external goods (143:176) to escape misery but also that at a deeper level we 
know that in fact happiness lies only in tranquillity (repos) (136:168 at OCG II 
585)64. 
 
The project is thus to arouse the interest65 of lapsed or indifferent 
Catholics (or, equally probably, humanist agnostics) in the project of transforming 
their lives, and to indicate how Christian faith solves their profound unhappiness 
and moral uncertainty.  Pascal also targets deists who, in his eyes, are guilty of 
pride in believing they have a metaphysical understanding of God but are 
otherwise indifferent to Him66.  Sacy, who had initially been shocked by Pascal’s 
approach to ethical debate, came to see him as a spiritual doctor ‘who knew how 
to effect miraculous cures’67.  It is crucial to note here that there is nothing 
necessarily irrational or ‘non-rational’ about Pascal’s therapeutic approach: a 
therapist can lead his subject towards a resolution of her problems using more or 
                                                          
60 Russier 1949, pp 40 & 44 refers to the ‘cure mentale [...] ce travail de purification intellectuelle’ 
which Pascal effects, using Montaigne’s pyrrhonism, to rid us of our confidence in rational 
morality and in the findings of the sciences (OCG II 97).  Montaigne compares scepticism to the 
laxative action of a dose of rhubarb which ‘evacuates everything and itself’ (Montaigne 2002, II, p 
307, echoing Sextus 2000, pp 52 & 118).  See also Miel 1969, pp 174-7 and Aupetit 2013, pp 40-1. 
61 Pascal quotes Augustine: ‘Ô sainte Sion, où tout est stable’ (918:748); ‘[…] dans les porches de la 
sainte Jérusalem’ (545:460). 
62 Blondel 1923, p 25. 
63 This of course draws on the biblical notion of Christ as a healer. 
64 On philosophical therapy as a way of seeking tranquillity and an integrated personality, see 
Ganeri & Carlisle 2010. 
65 Pascal’s word for this is échauffer (298:329). 
66 Pensée 449:690 and see Carraud 2013, pp 58-9. 
67 See Wetsel 2009, p 136. 
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less informal arguments which appeal to rational ideals bearing on consistency of 
belief and pragmatic considerations.   
 
The notion of philosophical therapy68 is thus central to Pascal’s project.  It 
is the teaching of wisdom: there are no cast-iron philosophical proofs of the truth 
of Christianity but Pascal sets out to show that it would be wise to follow the 
Christian way of life69.  Therapy requires both techniques of persuasion (which 
Pascal explored in his L’Art de persuader) and a theory of how we can, and can be 
disposed to, change our way of life70.  Pascal offers both of these types of 
philosophical equipment, as we shall see. 
 
The sister of the term ‘therapy’ might be ‘resistance’ as used in 
psychotherapy in the last century to denote the way patients in therapy may 
oppose either discussing or changing their behaviour.  Pascal is acutely aware of 
this phenomenon in relation to religion: our escapist behaviour (divertissement: 
136:168), our deliberately superficial reading of Scripture (427:681), our 
excessively intellectual approach to religion (deism: 449:690) and our emotional 
reluctance to submit to faith (418:680) would all be manifestations of resistance. 
 
His project was probably unprecedented as an anti-humanist attempt to 
win converts to his brand of Catholicism71.  It was a reaction to contemporary 
intellectual currents which seemed to constitute an epidemic of ‘atheism’ (i.e. 
heterodoxy of many kinds: the term ‘atheist’ covered sceptics, Humanists, passive 
or indifferent adherents of Christianity and a very few outspoken deniers of the 
existence of God72).  Pascal used Charron’s Les Trois Vérités and Grotius’ De 
veritate religionis christianӕ as sources from which he could gather those ideas of 
                                                          
68 This idea may shock those who focus on the technical domains of the modern subject of 
philosophy but there are others who see that, for example, ‘Philosophy itself is a value- and 
attitude-driven enterprise’ (van Fraassen 2002, p 17). 
69 Pensée 577:480.  Pascal’s Wager (418:680) was an early attempt to do this for the benefit of his 
gambling friends (see my Appendix II). 
70 See Williams 2014, pp 339-345. 
71 See Gouhier 1987, pp 93 ff. 
72 See Gouhier in Villaneix 1962, p 96, Berti, S: ‘At the roots of unbelief’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 56 (1995), No. 4, pp 555-575 and Rey 2006, article ATHÉISME (by Paul Clavier), esp. p 600.  
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classical and Renaissance authors which inspired libertin thought73, but not as 
examples of effective Christian apologetics: as with his use of Montaigne, Pascal’s 
technique is often to turn humanist authors on their heads: to use their material 
for purposes alien to them.   
 
As for lukewarm believers, he would have counted his honnête homme 
friends, and perhaps also thinkers in Mersenne’s circle, e.g. Gassendi74, among 
them.   The resulting project was Jansenist in its anti-humanism, its candid 
disapproval of the Jesuits and its espousal of Augustinian doctrines.  But there is 
no evidence Pascal aimed to recruit his subjects to Jansenism: he was more 
concerned to persuade them to change their lives than to absorb them into a 
small and embattled religious movement75.  As with the Provinciales, the aim was 
to point out how not to live, and to promote a Catholic Weltanschauung on 
Augustinian lines. 
 
To redirect the lives of lukewarm, misguided, and agnostic subjects, he 
devised philosophical considerations which would lead his subjects towards a 
reformation of the self.  Some Jesuits and others assured sinners that the Catholic 
faith could accommodate their personal morality, however puny their efforts to 
lead better lives76.  But Pascal’s project was to substitute for the scholastics’ arid 
proofs, and for Christian humanist re-assurance, ‘a dramatic analysis of religious 
Angst’77 coupled with a denial that we can solve our predicament unaided, a line 
of thought implicit in his attacks on Jesuit casuistry in Provinciales.  
  
But that very denial suggests a paradox: if we can do nothing to achieve 
our salvation which rests wholly in God’s hands, why construct a project to get us 
to change our lives?  Pascal would give three answers to this question: first, as a 
                                                          
73 See Orcibal 1956, pp 165-176 on Pascal’s copious use of Les Trois Vérités  (the ‘most 
representative’ work of Christian apologetics in Pascal’s time: OCG II 1303) especially in ‘Infini 
rien’ (418:680), Wetsel 1994, pp 193-211 on his use of Grotius, and generally Pintard 1962, pp 
112 & 117 n1, Blanchet 1919, pp 481-498 and OCG II 1310-12. Bail’s Théologie affective seems to 
have been a useful source of information about contemporary theologians (see Carraud 2007, p 
186, n1). 
74 See Bloch 1971, Ch IX & pp 480-1.  On Mersenne’s anti-atheism, see Pintard 1962, p 111. 
75 See Voltaire 2008, p 256, n 258 (remark by R Parish) and OCG II 1303-4. 
76 See Blanchet 1919, pp 498 ff. 
77 This is my translation of a phrase in d’Angers 1954, p 229. 
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Catholic, he is obliged to act as if he will be saved and to work for the salvation of 
others, if only by persuading them to live as if they are members of the Elect (OCG 
II 262); secondly, the truth of the human predicament needs spelling out and the 
humbug of humanism exposed; thirdly, the true faith needs to be expounded in 
the face of so many unorthodox and heretical versions in circulation.  Since God is 
omnipotent, scholars’ claims that an apologist ‘assists’ God when He bestows faith 
on someone or that Pascal’s ‘proofs’ are used by grace in the bestowal of faith78, 
are unconvincing. 
 
4.  Method: the phases of the therapy 
Pascal’s originality lies in avoiding direct, linear arguments to prove – or at 
least establish the probable truth of – the main tenets of Christianity79, and in 
refusing to use humanism as the basis of a reformed Christianity.  He aims to 
persuade by ‘digression’ (as he puts it), by circling round key human problems 
and their solution to be found in his version of Augustinian Christianity.  Pascal’s 
method is, as this description of his ‘therapy’ implies, oblique.  Instead of relying 
mainly on the deployment of doctrines or direct arguments supporting them, he 
aims to show why his subject needs religious belief and in particular Christian 
faith, i.e. that his subject’s beliefs have an element of truth in them but also to 
bring him to see a more complete picture – the Christian picture – of human life 
(701:579)80.  So, in the Entretien and the Pensées, he finds some element of truth 
in both Epictetus and Montaigne and proceeds to construct a dialectically 
superior view which conserves the truths they established81.  The confrontation 
between dogmatists and Pyrrhonians in the Pensées is to be resolved similarly 
(131:164)82.      
 
This approach, addressed to someone claiming to be uninterested in 
Christianity, appeals to ordinary desires and aspirations, e.g. not to be miserable 
                                                          
78 See e.g. Gouhier 1986, p 99, Bouchilloux 1997, p 27 and Genet 2010, pp 289-90. 
79 See El Yadari 2013, p 127 and Carraud 2013, pp 64-6. 
80 In ‘Infini rien’ Pascal does not expect the interlocutor to accept the folly of Christianity then tries 
to supply him with (prudential) reasons for adopting the Christian way of life (418:680 at  OCG II 
677).  See Heller 1979, p 299. 
81 The Entretien also shows Pascal appreciating Sacy’s point of view, while retaining his own (see 
Scholar 2003, p 60). 
82 He calls this approach ‘Renversement continuel du pour au contre’ (93 :127). 
33 
 
 
 
at one’s own futility, to harness one’s energies more purposefully and to achieve 
something of lasting value83.  It demonstrates that the non-Christian way of life is 
futile or absurd84:  it is absurd to fear death but to do nothing to understand the 
implications of death itself (427-8:681-2); it is self-defeating to live by 
imagination (44:78); it is absurd to use activities not to get results but to conceal 
our true condition from ourselves, to run blindfold towards the precipice 
(166:198);  it is futile to spend one’s life looking for an objective foundation for 
morality in the world and human nature when we can discover God’s law only by 
attending to Christianity (148:181).   
 
This obliquity85 in practice suits the domain in which Pascal mounts his 
case: the data at his disposal are often suggestive rather than compelling; 
Scripture is often obscure or apparently self-contradictory and requires 
interpretation in terms of types and antitypes or in terms of signs and symbols 
(figures)86.   Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition many doctrines ‘can be 
grammatically expressed only in the form of metaphor’ and attempts at literal 
interpretation of them tend ultimately ‘to fade away and the original metaphor 
reappears, as intransigent as ever’87.   The content of religion, especially as it 
appears to someone who is approaching belief from ‘outside’, is not without 
elements of mystery, paradox and folly88.    
 
 Conversion to a system of belief of this sort has, oddly enough, similarities 
with scientific and other conceptual revolutions as described by Kuhn and 
others89.  These relatively abrupt changes are characterised by an asymmetry: 
from the point of view before the change, the world view adopted as a result of the 
                                                          
83 See Garber 2007, p 35. 
84 On the test of absurdity, see OCG I 382 and OCG II 164-5. 
85 See Kay, J: Obliquity (London, Profile: 2011) and Enthoven 2009, pp 67-8. 
86 ‘Typology is a figure of speech that moves in time: the type exists in the past [e.g. in the Old 
Testament] and the antitype in the present [e.g. the New Testament], or the type exists in the 
present and the antitype in the future. […] typology really is as a mode of thought […] a theory of 
history, or more accurately of historical process’ (Frye 1982, pp 80-1).  So, for example, Adam or 
Jonah are types prefiguring Christ as antitype. 
87 See Frye 1982, p 55. 
88 Pensées 835:423 (‘proofs’ not convincing); 185:217 (the supernatural is necessarily beyond the 
perceptible world); 253:285 (Old Testament events as pre-figuring New Testament events); 
173:204, 418:680, 810:656 & 842:427 (religion inevitably contains mysteries and follies).  
89 See van Fraassen 2002, Lecture 3 where the comparison is applied to Pascal’s Wager Argument. 
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revolution, the posterior point of view, looks absurd and unjustifiable.  But from 
the posterior point of view the prior point of view is intelligible and the change to 
the posterior point of view justifiable.  Although the change happens because the 
prior point of view cannot continue to be held without discomfort or strain (e.g. 
because observations or experiments tend to falsify its theoretical stance), there 
is no wholly rational path from the prior to the posterior position.  This analogy is 
not wholly satisfactory because of course Pascal is not setting out to persuade a 
group of thinkers to adopt a new scientific discipline.  Nor does metaphor play 
such a central role in natural science as it does in religious texts.  But it is arguable 
that, since Pascal thinks that ‘the heart has its reasons of which Reason is 
unaware’ (423:680), his project is a journey from one narrower conceptual 
domain to another broader domain which explains and surpasses the narrower 
domain.  His doctrine of the ‘three orders’, which I discuss in Chapter IV, points in 
this direction. 
 
Pascal aimed to present a case in which the following features were 
present: the discomfort or strain is found in our fear of death and our inability to 
find lasting and profound happiness; the prior position relies on secular 
moralities – or a version of Christianity infused with them – which promise the 
good life, or eudaimonia (or else a Cartesian confidence that modern empirical 
science will cure our ills90).  The posterior position includes as a part of its own 
doctrines an explanation of the prior position, i.e. why we came to endorse such 
an unsatisfactory view of human life and were almost unable to escape from it.  
Concretely: Pascal’s ultimate epistemological position is not to reject empiricism 
but to include it as one of a set of epistemological principles; he does not sweep 
hedonism or eudaimonism away: he incorporates them in his moral psychology91. 
 
Pascal believed that, once the ‘outsider’ had ceased to resist the idea of 
Christian belief, he could show that the Christian religion had as many tokens of 
                                                          
90 See Discours VI (AT VI 61-3). 
91 Unlike Gassendi—who, in Boyle’s phrase ‘baptized’ Epicurus—Pascal does this while rejecting 
all types of secular morality (on Gassendi’s Christianisation of Epicureanism, see Osler 2003, pp 
39-41).   
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its certainty as did the things commonly regarded as certain92.   His method was 
not, however, to obey a supposed standard of scientific rationality across the 
board.  In matters of faith, of intuition (coeur or sentiment), the argument does not 
proceed from principles to demonstrate a conclusion: the method is digressive 
(298:329), accumulating assertions which are not entailed one by another but 
together form a world of thought.  Pascal mentions Christ, Paul and Augustine as 
practitioners of this method, but he may also have Montaigne in mind, whose 
style and approach he admires93.  His method is to create a dialogue – he writes a 
sort of mini-drama in various pensées94 – or another form of conversational 
dialectic like an exchange of letters, thus reproducing the way in which talking to 
others often, therapeutically, leads them to refine their views (or give them up).  
Such a conversation may typically proceed by the collection of examples which 
support a thesis and equally a search for counter-examples to force us to amend 
or reject it.  Pascal’s description of divertissement would be a good example of this 
in practice (see Chapter III). 
 
A distinction between the order of the intellect (esprit) and the order of the 
heart (coeur) underpins Pascal’s view that there is more than one form of 
expression, and religious beliefs are best treated as matters of the heart 
(298:329).  This seems to be the same distinction which appears in Pascal’s well-
known account of the spirit of geometry and the spirit of finesse, where again 
there is a methodological contrast between reasoning from principles to a 
conclusion and, on the other hand, perceiving the truth of a matter irreducible to 
the mathematical method.  These two approaches do not inevitably result in the 
emergence of distinct conceptual domains: for example, moral thinking can 
appear on either side of the divide95.  In mathematics, the principles are far from 
common usage but – for skilled mathematicians – they can be clearly understood.  
In contrast, in the sphere of finesse the starting-points are within common usage 
                                                          
92 See OCG I 76. 
93 Pensée 745:618; in contrast, he find’s Charron’s attempted systematisation of Montaigne in De la 
sagesse ‘depressing and tedious’ (780:644).  
94 For example pensées 418:680, 427-429:681-2, 2:38, 5:39. He was well-practised in this: 
Provinciales I-X deploy extended dialogues to great effect. 
95 Pensée 513 :671.  See Harrington 1979. 
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and visible to all96.  But they are numerous and missing one out can lead to error.  
They require a discriminating mind to identify them; they are sensed rather than 
analysed.  It is more likely that one will reach a conclusion on the basis of a global 
view of all of the starting-points rather than by strict demonstrative reasoning 
(512:670).   Pascal does not describe induction explicitly, except as a mechanism 
of the mind (660:544)97; as for physics, he apparently thinks that it involves a 
third approach in which the reasoning starts from very few principles (the results 
of observations and experiments) but needs great powers of finesse or 
discrimination in drawing hypothetical conclusions from them98.  His idea here 
seems to be that successful physicists have to abstract from experience the key 
hypotheses to be tested experimentally using measurement99. 
 
If finesse is in play in the Pensées this is because of the subject matter: it is 
indefinitely complex; not all meanings are literal; our knowledge of both human 
nature and the supernatural is incomplete; the risk of error is much greater than 
in a closed intellectual system like geometry.   The result is, in Silhon’s words, 
demonstration morale, a loose assemblage of observations, considerations and 
isolated apercus which together may convince someone to change her way of life, 
partly on the grounds that the fact that several independent observations etc. 
imply the same conclusion reinforces their plausibility100. 
 
                                                          
96 See Sainte-Beuve: Pascal [volume of Port-Royal] (Paris, Le Monde en 1018: 1962), p 155. 
97 He extracts from Montaigne a Ciceronian observation that ‘what we often see is not surprising 
for us’ (506:673). He gets no further, in other words, than the commonplace emerging from 
controversies about causation between sceptics and dogmatists, the former conceding that they 
use ‘nature’s guidance’ (see Sextus I.23).  On Galen, see Franklin 2001, pp 167-9; on Sextus and 
Avicenna, pp 202-3.  Aristotle says in On Memory: ‘For as one thing follows another by nature, so 
too that [recollection] happens by custom; and frequency creates nature’ (Complete Works of 
Aristotle (ed. J Barnes), Princeton, Princeton UP: 1984, pp 718-9.  
98 Pensée 511:669; also OCG I 455 & 458.  It seems to some (e.g. Ravaisson 2008, p 34) that the 
esprit de finesse is Pascal’s key method for physics but this ignores the role of mathematical 
reasoning in the development and testing of physical hypotheses. 
99 Mersenne’s influence on Pascal here seems clear: he regarded natural science as composed of 
‘intrinsically uncertain possible explanations’ and saw expériences as the principles of the new 
science.  See  Crombie, A C: ‘Marin Mersenne and the Seventeenth-Century Problem of Scientific 
Acceptability’, Physis, XVII, 3-4 (1975), pp 192 & 187.  For comparison see OCG I 382, 457-8 & 455.  
On the difficulty of avoiding induction in the hypothetico-deductive procedures favoured by 
Pascal and Gassendi, see S. Fisher: Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science (Leiden, Brill: 2005), 
Ch 5.  
100 See Jovy 1927, pp 67-84 and Blanchet 1919, p 625. 
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The process of bringing people to aspire to faith is, I suggest, a form of 
therapy which implies three types of reflection: on what the subject lacks but 
profoundly desires, on what would motivate the subject to change her goals and 
on the choice of the new goals.  Crudely put, Pascal’s subject lacks peace of mind: 
she fears death; she pursues nugatory activities to put that fear from her mind 
and indeed to subdue all her tendencies to reflect on her life as it is; she deeply 
desires tranquillity so – if she is given a chance to reflect – she may be motivated 
to consider adopting new life goals.  Notoriously those who pursue tranquillity of 
mind as a goal in itself do not achieve it: so, in Pascal’s view, Christian faith 
centrally involves submission to God, and to the ritual of religious life, not 
continual striving after the apparently incoherent or after unattainable certainty. 
The therapist presents the subject with the framework for, and the content of, a 
new life. 
 
This study singles out four therapeutic phases, without thereby implying 
that there are no other ways of reconstructing Pascal’s project on the basis of the 
Pensées: 
 
Pascal plays on our fear of what will happen to us after bodily death and 
argues that we cannot rationally ignore the Christian account of the afterlife (and 
its risks) and should seek out the evidence for the truth of the religion in 
scriptural history (Chapter II). 
 
He describes human nature, and the human condition, to stress our 
apparent inability to escape from our profound unhappiness and the futility of 
our activities but also to instil the idea that Christianity offers the only 
satisfactory explanation of our plight (Chapter III). 
 
He believes secular morality cannot solve our predicament: only Christian 
morality can do this, guiding us towards the prospect of secure tranquillity: we 
shall achieve this desired state only with God’s intervention in our lives (Chapter 
IV). 
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He also argues in parallel that Christianity – though difficult to decipher – 
is not contrary to reason: we have to recognize, through the tradition of 
philosophical scepticism, the limits of ‘Reason’ (i.e. our system of knowledge 
based on experience and reasoning) and the place religion occupies beyond 
rationality.  Faith, as we see it in others, is not irrational but a coherent feature of 
their lives.  There are two sorts of believer, those for whom faith is not at all based 
on reasons and those for whom the ‘proofs’ (in Pascal’s sense of the term) are 
important, if not decisive.  (Chapter V). 
 
There remains much of philosophical interest in the journey taken by the 
Pensées despite their incompleteness and some dubiously cogent arguments.  
Pascal occupies the borderland between philosophy, social observation, natural 
science and religion from which fruitful insights often emerge101.   He is, as I will 
show, indebted to philosophers, ancient and modern and an influence on his 
successors.    This study will critically examine the therapeutic moves which 
Pascal makes.  In my Epilogue, I investigate the importance of some of his key 
assumptions to some of today’s philosophical discussions of religious belief. 
 
                                                          
101 See von Wright’s comments on this borderland, and on the ‘parallelism’ between Wittgenstein 
and Pascal: quoted by Drury in Rhees 1984, p 85. 
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CHAPTER I: THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF THE PENSÉES 
  
In this Chapter, I first give an account of the Augustinian framework within 
which Pascal designed his project and then an account of the intellectual milieux 
or trends likely to have influenced the subjects of his therapy.  For the latter, I will 
focus on his perception102 of contemporary threats to devout Christian belief and 
morality, not all of which came from unbelievers: his targets ranged from lax or 
lukewarm Christians to humanist Christian thinkers103, to deists and to ‘atheists’; 
his knowledge of the various attitudes to Christian belief current in his time came 
from talking to a wide range of people.   
 
This Chapter is less about influences or sources than about Pascal’s 
unrivalled ability to challenge and use other thinkers’ doctrines for his own ends: 
their writings function more as fertilisers than as seeds: a good example of this 
would be Pascal’s doctrine of the Hidden God104 which is nourished by orthodox 
Christian belief and some Augustinian ideas on sin, grace and understanding, yet 
is completely his own.  
 
5. Augustinian Catholicism 
  The Jansenists’ extreme Augustinian doctrines of grace and salvation, as 
described in Section 2, moulded Pascal’s conceptions of human nature, of 
knowledge and belief, of motivation and free will, of morality and of faith.  Pascal 
adhered to the strictest interpretation of these doctrines in his Écrits sur la grâce 
written in the 1650s but was less extreme in the Provinciales105.  For the project 
sketched in the Pensées he probably aimed to take a different approach again, by 
                                                          
102 I will not summarise existing surveys of free thought or libertinage: as will become clear, they 
are not wholly relevant to Pascal’s project.  It is thought probable that he was ignorant of most 
libertin thought (Mesnard 1962, p 155 and Wetsel 1994, p 118). 
103 Étienne Périer says that Pascal ‘wanted to declare war [...] not only on atheists, unbelievers and 
heretics [...] but even on Christians and Catholics who, despite being in the body of the true 
Church, nevertheless do not live according to the pure maxims of the Gospel’ (OCG II 912). 
See d’Angers 1954, p 52 & Gouhier 1987, p 99. 
104 See Section 29 below. 
105 On degrees of Augustinian pessimism: Mesnard 1976, pp 133. On the Écrits, see OCG II 1210-
16. 
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starting with the observation that we are paradoxical beings: we aspire to the 
highest ideals but invariably fall short of them; we have the power of thought and 
thus the ability to see beyond our daily failures, but we are too weak to rise above 
them106.   In Augustinian terms, this translates into two fundamental and extreme 
doctrines: first, that humanity is radically corrupt as a result of the Fall107, a 
historical event.   The second major doctrine is that only God – known only 
through the mediation of Jesus Christ – can through grace save those whom He 
arbitrarily selects for eternal life108.  God’s bestowal of eternal life is not on merit: 
it is an incomprehensible and secret act109 so we can never know if we are saved 
or not.   There is no Divine promise that the virtuous will be saved as is commonly 
held by Christians today110. 
   
  God’s arbitrariness has severe consequences:  the coming of Christ is not 
for the salvation of all111: God’s intention to save only a small number pre-dates 
the coming of the Messiah112: He could not consequently save everyone.  The 
statement that salvation is, for Augustine and Pascal, ‘universel en droit’113 is 
therefore meaningless: there is no right to salvation and no law governing whom 
God saves. 
 
                                                          
106 This picture of human nature survives in the Enlightenment: ‘l’homme est composé de force et 
de faiblesse, de lumière et d’aveuglement, de petitesse et de grandeur’ (Diderot 1964, p 65). 
107 Pensées 117:149, 148:181, 149:182 & 430:683. See Miel 1969, p 31.  Pascal sees the Old 
Testament as a historical narrative which, coupled with the New Testament, shows that Jesus was 
indeed the Christ (see Miel 1969 pp 76,152 & 182-4).   A modern theologian argues that ‘there is 
no need to accept the historicity of the Genesis narrative’ (Wood 2013, p 20).  I will discuss this 
problem further in the Epilogue. 
108 Pensées 226:258 & 449:690.  It is crucial to note that the bestowal of grace is never a response 
to virtuous or pious conduct, pace Garber 2009, pp 15-16 (who however notes the hard-line 
doctrine too). 
109 The laws of God’s wisdom are ‘impénétrables’ (OCG II 234).  See also OCG II 251-2 & 262. The 
remark that ‘Augustine lacks the conceptual resources to distinguish omnipotence from 
arbitrariness in God’; his account of salvation is ‘ultimately incoherent’ (Rist 1994, p 286 and also 
pp 307-8) applies to Pascal: he holds both that we cannot by acting virtuously cause God to save 
us and that our sinfulness causes God to damn us. 
110 See, for example: . ‘God has promised to take those who follow the Christian way with full 
dedication’ to Heaven which however ‘is not primarily a reward for good actions but a home for 
good people’ (Swinburne 2005, pp 83-8 and 204-205). 
111 See Pascal’s tortured discussion of this point in the Écrits sur la grâce (OCG II 289, 311-6 and 
pensées 911-2:451). 
112 Who came to blind those with clear sight and to give sight to the blind: pensée 235:267 
113 Mesnard 1976, p 156. 
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  The Fall – and the consequent transmission of corruption and guilt to the 
human race – did not remove all trace of man’s first nature.  Although he 
sometimes describes human beings as ‘full of in-built (naturelle) error’ (45:78), 
Pascal is not wholly pessimistic: he believes that our ‘first nature’ remains 
potentially in us: we are all ‘capable of grace’ i.e. of submitting to God as 
receptacles of irresistible grace114.  Our still having a ‘secret instinct’ to seek 
tranquillity is also a trace of our pre-lapsarian state115.    
 
  For Pascal, mankind is not essentially depraved116 but is radically 
corrupt117 because our ‘second’ nature’s plasticity has, since the Fall, allowed 
accretions of bodily and mental habits, and of custom and other forms of 
socialisation, which have obscured or usurped the ‘first’ nature: in our ‘second’ 
nature or state we are blind to God and blighted by ‘concupiscence’118 even 
though we have retained an obscure idea of divine wisdom and of what, in our 
‘first’ nature, was true happiness119.   
 
  Pascal cannot explain how Adam, wholly God’s creation and full of grace, 
fell (431:683)120.  Augustine’s position is that it was ‘expedient’ to give Adam the 
freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) but people will enjoy greater freedom 
(libertas) in Paradise without the capacity to sin. Adam could not have remained 
sinless without God’s grace but received a less abundant degree of grace than that 
bestowed on the elect now (EA, pp 185-7).  This raises the question why God did 
not award the better version of freedom straightaway without exposing Adam 
and his descendants to millennia of misery121. 
 
Augustine’s account of the will, to which Pascal adheres, is that the 
attribution of an action A to free will does not imply that A was uncaused but only 
                                                          
114 Pensées 208:240 & 427:681 at OCG II 686-7. 
115 Pensées 136:168, 149:182.  
116 Pace Voltaire 1964, p 160 & Wilson 2011, p 409. 
117 Bénichou 1948, p 104. 
118 Pensées 149:182 & 616:509.  This Augustinian doctrine was expounded by Jansenius, in a work 
translated into French by Arnauld d’Andilly (PF p 138 n 1).  
119 Pensées 149:182 & 131:164. 
120 See Comte-Sponville 1997, pp 138-40. 
121 See Rist 1994, pp 278-9. 
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that the agent performed A because she consciously wanted to perform A and was 
not subject to any external constraint (EA, pp 183-5).  This account elides two 
possibilities: (a) that the agent’s desire’s causation is attributable to impersonal 
causes (e.g. upbringing, habit or training), and (b) that the agent’s desire to 
perform A had been caused in him by another person.  The doctrine of grace 
raises a problem in relation to case (b).  Augustine attempts to depict grace as not 
simply an external intervention in a person’s life which forces her to act 
virtuously: God puts an irresistibly attractive option before the agent who is 
motivated by délectation to take it up122; grace also makes one want to be 
virtuous (case (b)).  Pascal attributes to St Paul the view that ‘it is God who 
Himself operates this desire [to persevere and be saved] in us and he operates 
this desire not in conformity with the disposition of our will, but following His 
own good will’ (OCG II 253).  So, since the omnipotent God is responsible for both 
presenting the object and causing the motive of the action, this doctrine fails to 
preserve the notion of choice or spontaneity.  God is a manipulative Svengali, not 
a Being which just puts options to human beings.   
 
On this account, it may seem that the recipient of grace is no freer than a 
heroin addict who has been introduced to heroin by someone intending to make 
her addicted; she now chooses, without being coerced, to take the drug offered to 
her.  We are always in one of two states: either we are unconditionally disposed 
to sin (as a result of the Fall and God’s abandoning us123), or God’s grace now 
disposes us unconditionally to act virtuously124. Pascal uses Paul’s phrase: each of 
us is, at any given moment, a ‘slave of sin or a slave of righteousness (justice)’  and 
‘the liberty of the slave of sin [is] that he finds his delectation in sinning’125. 
                                                          
122 See Miel 1969, pp 27-8.  MacIntyre claims that ‘Augustine affirms both the necessity of grace for 
the redirection of the will and the necessity of the will’s freely assenting to the divine grace’ but 
also notes that ’faith  [...] initially moves and informs the will’ (MacIntyre 1988, pp 157-8) so grace 
causes faith which causes the will to assent to grace...   
123 Pensée 149:182 at OCG II 595, and see OCG II 289. 
124 Pascal tries to set up the Jansenist view as the middle position between the Calvinist ‘no choice’ 
position and the Molinist ‘free choice’ position (see Davidson 1983, p 69) but in my view he does 
this by equivocating between what is logically possible and what is actually possible for concrete 
individuals in concrete situations, and by ignoring Augustine’s doctrine that virtuous behaviour 
cannot be spontaneous. 
125 See Romans VI.15-19, OCG II 272 & 301; also Brunschvicg 1953, pp 189-90 &  Miel 1969, pp 99 
ff.  ‘C’est Dieu qui opère le vouloir et l’action [du juste] selon son bon plaisir’ (OCG II 220, quoting an 
Augustinian source). 
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We can see – if we ignore the problem of the manipulating God – why 
Augustine believed his theory of the will preserved the idea of the freedom of the 
agent.  No one126 denies that human motives and actions have a causal 
background, and that very often we do not choose the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves needing to act.  Nor can we be said coherently to choose our own 
characters127.  The agent herself, in judging her own actions, ignores this 
background and focuses on whether she could have acted differently.  The 
external view of what she does often focuses on the causal background and thus 
whittles away her apparent room to manœuvre.  Pascal’s use of the doctrine of 
grace and délectation hints at this contrast: we can see the workings of grace in 
another person but not in ourselves.  This, of course, leaves us with the apparent 
paradox that an agent can appear not to be responsible for an action for which 
she claims or admits responsibility128. 
 
The doctrine of our post-lapsarian corruption entails two sorts of 
pessimism in the Pensées: first, that our intellects are finite and our attempts to 
understand the natural world are doomed to incompleteness and error (199:230 
& 44:78); and if we try to deduce that God exists from the attributes of Nature, we 
shall inevitably fail (427:681).  Secondly, any unaided human attempt to found a 
secular morality is bound to fail: our corrupted powers of reasoning cannot 
identify the Natural Law; the claim that we can strip away the accretions of 
custom to reveal the original, fundamental Law is bogus and dangerous (60:94).  
Human reason can be twisted every which way129 to frame a ‘morality’ which just 
accommodates self-indulgence and egoism130. 
 
                                                          
126 Apart from Leibniz, perhaps: see Guitton 1951, Ch VIII. 
127 See several chapters in G. Strawson: Real Materialism (Oxford, Clarendon: 2008). 
128 See Nagel 1979, Ch 3. 
129 Pensée 530:455.  Compare: ‘Reason is every bit as pliable as sentiment’, Blackburn 2010, p 307.  
130  Pensées 210:243 & 597:494.  The theme of moral incapacity or ignorance is not unique to 
Pascal: Locke is sceptical about our ability to understand the ‘Law of Nature’ in its completeness 
because the Fall led to the exposure of Man ‘to the drudgery, anxiety, and frailties of this Mortal 
life’ so that most people do not have the time to be ‘perfect in Ethicks’ (Locke 1999, pp 153, 9 & 
157). 
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Thus, as a result of the doctrines of the Fall and of grace, Christian faith is 
inseparable from Christian morality: without God’s grace we can neither have 
faith131 nor achieve virtue: only a Christian can be virtuous132: pagan virtue is 
impossible.  Submission to the authority of revelation is thus essential to faith and 
morality.  The latter comprises membership of a circumscribed community, the 
body of Christ133.   
 
Augustinian doctrine lays down the framework of history for Pascal: the 
Pensées adhere to the accepted Biblical chronology dating the Creation at 4,404 
BC134.    This is the framework for all human history 135 and the foundation for his 
attempted proof that Christianity is the only historically credible religion136, a 
proof which was essential to his project in more than one respect.  Montaigne, in 
discussing the limits of our current knowledge, mentions the classical world’s 
perception of the age of the Earth derived from its encounters with other 
civilisations, notably the Egyptians, Chaldeans and Persians: Egyptian priests told 
Herodotus that their dynasties went back 11,000 years; Cicero and Diodorus 
mention Chaldean records going back 400,000 years (!); Plato, Aristotle et al. date 
Zoroaster 6,000 years before their time137.  But Pascal follows Augustine in 
abruptly dismissing pagan chronologies and is particularly hostile to other 
revisionist hypotheses current in his own century138.    
 
                                                          
131 Augustine: Enchiridion, 31 (EA, p 182).  See d’Angers 1954, pp 119-121. 
132 See Augustine’s Enchiridion, 32 (EA, pp 182-3) and pensée 416:35.  We shall see in Chapter IV 
how this account of virtue generates some extraordinary paradoxes.     
133 City of God XIX.23.  On the tradition of the Church as the Body of Christ, see Frye 1982, pp 99-
101. Jansenists rejected the idea of a universal or natural moral conscience in human beings and 
insisted that their exercise of conscience was the path to truth: this claim for moral autonomy 
thereby challenged the authority of the Church, despite Jansenist claims to be upholders of its 
authority (see Bénichou 1948, pp 153-4). 
134 Pensées 332:364, 456:696 & 793:646.  See PF p 118n and Gouhier 2005, pp 220-4 on Jansenist 
influence on Pascal in this respect. As a young man Pascal seems to have taken a less orthodox 
view: in his confrontation with Saint-Ange, he and his companions estimated the age of the world 
as ‘at most 7,000 or 8,000 years’ (OCG I 564-5). 
135 Pensées 317:348 & 451:691.   
136 For Augustine’s version of this, see EA, pp 225-and see Rist 1994, pp 294-6, Wetsel 2003, p 169 
and Popkin 2003, p 223.   
137 Montaigne 2002 II, pp 376-7. 
138 The 1647 Récit on Saint-Ange mentions his view that Chinese history goes back 36,000 years 
with the implication that it is so absurd as to need no refutation (OCG I 565). 
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6. Christian humanism:  the Jesuits 
The Jansenist war on (in their eyes) heterodox opinion had many targets.  
These included the originally Thomist tradition of using ‘pagan’ texts, especially 
Aristotelian writings139, to illuminate questions unanswered or incompletely 
answered by Christian doctrines and tradition.   When drafting the Provinciales, 
Pascal is careful to respect – and to some extent use – the Thomist doctrine of 
grace140 but is otherwise hostile to a philosophical orientation which, in his view, 
opens the way to naturalistic ethics by saying that the secular virtues have a 
certain value even when they are not inspired by Christian charity141.   
 
Of some Jesuits’ moral teaching, many of whom were Christian 
humanists142, Pascal says it ‘is wholly pagan: [following] nature is sufficient for it 
to be upheld’ (OCG I 628).  These Jesuits say, for example, that he who practises 
the ‘natural’ virtues without any thought of, or love for, Christ, can be saved143.  
Their deepest mistake is to rely on ‘human authority’ (i.e. the ‘probable opinions’ 
of Jesuit writers) as the basis of their maxims.   They flout (Augustinian) Christian 
tradition by regarding natural reason as a guide to morality (769:634).  
  
The Lettres Provinciales V-XVII attack the moral laxity of some Jesuit 
casuists (much of the mud thus slung attached to the whole order).  Their 
casuistry consists in the general argument that circumstances alter cases and 
more particularly that the nature of the agent’s intention can transform the moral 
character of an act (OCG I 648-9 & 679): for example, killing in defence of one’s 
honour is to be regarded not as homicide but just as the defence of one’s honour 
and this is excusable, even if the occasion was a trivial insult or a slap in the face 
(OCG I 654).  Some Jesuits used, when it suited them, the additional device of 
                                                          
139 See Brunschvicg 1953, pp 183-4.  At the end of Provinciale IV Pascal with heavy sarcasm shows 
that the Jesuits are flouting Aristotle’s principle that ignorance of what one ought to do is no 
excuse: it is what wickedness is (Nicomachean Ethics, III.1, 1110b 28-30) a principle echoed in 
Augustine’s Retractiones (OCG I 623-4). 
140 See also his unfinished Écrits sur la grâce which have been annotated by Le Guern (OCG II 1219, 
1220, 1225 and 1252). 
141 See Gouhier 1987, p 33. Unadapted Aristotelianism, after the use to which it had been put in 
Padua, is not an option for the devout Christian thinker (see d’Angers 1954, p 81 & Blanchet 1919, 
p 483).  Gassendi similarly opposed Aristotelianism (OCG II 1387). 
142 See Blanchet 1919, pp 498-516. 
143 Blanchet 1919 on Cellot and Sirmond, pp 512-3. 
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citing the ‘probable opinion’ of other theologians (it was ‘probable’ only in the 
sense that it was available to be tested).   Whether or not he was manipulated by 
Arnauld in this respect144, Pascal argued for the complete rejection of casuistry 
and of ‘human authority’ (916:746) which in his eyes contravened or undermined 
the authority of the Christian moral law.  He seemed thereby to downplay the 
importance of intention in moral psychology, to rule out the possibility of moral 
conflict and to imply that truly moral rules never need adaptation to 
contemporary circumstances.  This approach, leads – as we shall see in Chapter IV 
– to the disintegration of the moral life in Pascal’s hands. 
 
In practice, Pascal – at Arnauld’s prompting – takes examples of Jesuit 
laxity which sink lower than the pagans’ own standards: he accuses them of 
keeping ‘the most dissolute’ people in the Church whom the synagogues and even 
the ‘sects of the [pagan] philosophers’ would have excluded (923:499).  It is thus 
an inevitable element of Pascal’s Augustinian approach that the Jesuits should be, 
for him and his Jansenist friends, ethically beyond the pale145. 
  
7. Montaigne: Christian scepticism 
A wholly separate tendency of thought in Pascal’s time came, as he 
recognises, from Montaigne’s exercise in scepticism. In his Apologie de Raimond 
de Sebonde Montaigne, setting aside his own beliefs, undertakes to see what a 
rational morality would be like without the light of faith; to do this, Montaigne 
adopts an extreme sceptical stance according to which he is not certain of 
anything, not even that everything is in doubt, and has therefore adopted the 
motto ‘Que sais-je?’146:  he exposes the ‘vanity’ of received opinion, the 
pretensions of natural science and our lack of knowledge of our own minds.  
During his account of these thoughts in the Entretien, Pascal adds some from 
Descartes (without attribution): that error necessarily is not aware that it is 
error; there can be doubts about the truth of ‘2+3=5’ and more general doubts 
about my origin and therefore my nature: a veracious God, or chance, or an evil 
                                                          
144 See Le Guern 2003, pp 87-90. 
145 See Gouhier 1987, p 110.  
146  OCG II 87-8.  
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being could have formed it; and doubt whether our ‘common notions’ of time, 
space, extension, motion and unity are shared by all human beings (OCG II 89-90). 
     
  Pascal applauds Montaigne’s use of rational criticism to devalue Reason 
itself (OCG II 97) and thus to deflate confidence in metaphysics and natural 
science147.  He suggests in the Pensées that many of our supposedly certain beliefs 
are not more certain – and perhaps even less certain – than the main tenets of 
Christianity148.  However he accepts that, if it is to convince the uncertain or 
lukewarm subject, religion has to show that it is not contrary to reason (12:46) 
which I take to mean that it has to rest on a consistent body of doctrine149 and 
have a method for resolving conflicts between its tenets and those of other 
systems of belief.  It has to be able to show the limits of scepticism and to defend 
the acceptance of some degree of paradox in doctrine. 
 
  Montaigne’s response to scepticism is to state baldly his allegiance to 
Catholicism on the basis of authority, not reasoned argument.  He recognizes that 
faith varies according to customs and geography.  He believes the source of faith 
lies not in human reasoning but in divinely inspired authority; faith is miraculous; 
the most human reason could do is to embellish and clarify the faith150. 
 
For Pascal, however, Montaigne’s Christian scepticism represented a 
challenge to religious faith151.  A bald statement of faith does nothing to rebuild 
certainty of belief in those who have been exposed to sceptical argument; and the 
nature of scepticism itself, particularly when reinforced with Descartes’s 
Méditation I arguments, is such that it is impossible to banish definitively152.   So 
Montaigne’s apparent ‘fideism’153 leaves us with no epistemological bearings at 
                                                          
147 This was, after all, much the same as the opinion adopted by Saint-Cyran in his quarrel with 
Garasse (see PH I, pp xi-xii, n4, Popkin 2003, p 221 and McKenna 2003, p 255). 
148 See e.g. pensées 131:164; 182:213; 188:220; 577:480. 
149 See Russier 1949, p 33: libertins set reason as the supreme standard (OCG I 68) but is 
Fontaine’s record correct in saying that Pascal concedes that Stoicism and Montaigne’s ethic are 
‘conformes à la raison’ (OCG II 94)? 
150 Montaigne 2002, II, pp 263-4, 179-80, & 173-4. 
151 While calling atheism ‘monstrous’, Montaigne did not declare it false and did not claim that 
God’s existence could be proved (see Brahami in Desan 2007, pp 81-83). 
152 ‘Pascal doute sans cesse, mais sans cesse aspire à ne pas douter’ (Faure 1978, p 275). 
153 This may mask his atheism (see Brahami in Desan 2007, pp 459-461). 
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all, whereas Pascal aims to show us the way to tranquil dependence on God for 
the True and the Good. 
 
Pascal knew that Montaigne’s influence – regardless of his actual beliefs –
encouraged rational criticism of religion, resulting in some followers in deism or 
even atheism154 by making belief in the Christian God seem an impossible 
mountain to climb.  Pascal intends pace Montaigne’s followers to show that there 
is a path back to belief.  But we will see in Chapter V what serious problems are 
posed for Pascal’s project by the scepticism he endorses in the Entretien and in 
the Pensées.  
 
Deism needs a special mention.  It is often thought of as an English 
movement in the 17th Century which influences the 18th Century movement –
Diderot says of deism that it is a better way to combat atheism than 
‘superstition’155 – but as a current of thought it began in France in the 16th 
Century and was sufficiently developed for Silhon to suggest that deism lay 
behind the sort of rational morality which we shall encounter in the ideology of 
the honnête homme156.  The movement refrained from identifying Jesus with God 
and discounted the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation and Resurrection as 
incompatible with rational religion.   Mersenne believed some deists were 
atheists in disguise; his L’Impiété des Déistes combats the deism of the anonymous 
Quatrains du déiste, a picture of an unemotional, imperturbable and nonchalant 
deity157 not unlike Epicurus’ gods.   In the background is another deist text, Les 
Trois Imposteurs, perhaps of the mid-17th Century, which suggests that Jesus, 
Moses and Mohammed were all fakes.  Pascal, perhaps with this imputation in 
mind, targets deism in pensée 449:690 by insisting on the indispensability of 
Christ as mediator between God and man. 
 
                                                          
154 See Entretien, OCG II 98, on Montaigne’s bad influence on those with a propensity to impiety 
and vice; also PH I, p x, Busson 1933, pp 180-1, Popkin 2003, p 61 and Wetsel 1994, especially Ch 
I.  Mersenne’s suspicions about Charron’s ‘atheism’ amount to doubts about Montaigne too 
(Busson 1933, p 183). 
155 Quoted in Rey 2006 under DÉISME. 
156 See Busson 1933, pp 92-3. 
157 See Busson 1933, pp 94 & 102-3 and Wetsel 1994, pp 90 ff. 
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8.  Montaigne’s influence on humanist moralists 
Montaigne is a Humanist158 in the sense that he has studied a wide range 
of classical texts closely and drawn on them for his account of human life and 
nature in the Essais.  He is ‘naturally pagan’159.  But he is not a humanist in the 
sense which will predominate in this discussion: he does not believe that man can 
unaided achieve moral perfection or indeed any knowledge involving 
reasoning160.  But neither is he anti-humanist: he accepts mankind in the light of 
the ancients’ teaching161.  He argues that a morality based on the threat of 
everlasting punishment and the promise of eternal reward has been accorded 
excessive respect by Scholastics: what counts in morality is that it can sustain 
itself ‘born in us from its own roots, from the seed of universal reason imprinted 
in all normal men’ although it is perfected by laws and religion162.  He thus 
considerably influenced the growing number of humanists in the first half of the 
17th Century163 some of whom were called libertins or free-thinkers164.  His own 
intellectual development went from early sympathy with neo-Stoicism to 
disillusion as he wrote the Essais165.  He read Lucretius carefully and became 
sympathetic to the Epicureans.  But, by the time he wrote the Apologie de 
Raimond de Sebonde, he had moved on to a sceptical, somewhat eclectic moral 
position.   
 
In the Entretien Pascal says that two most celebrated sects ‘in the world’ 
(i.e. in society as he knew it), are the Stoics and the Pyrrhonians; Epictetus and 
Montaigne are respectively these sects’ most illustrious protagonists (OCG II 94).  
Montaigne’s prominence hardly needs confirmation here; as for Stoicism, it did 
indeed enjoy a popular revival in the 16th Century, and Epictetus was translated 
                                                          
158 See Nicholas Mann: ‘The origins of humanism’ in Kraye, J (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to 
Humanism (Cambridge, CUP: 1996). 
159 PH I, p x. 
160 For a discussion of humanism with a small H, see Gouhier 1987, pp 20-21.  It resembles but is 
not identical with the humanism of the last and this century. 
161 See Gouhier 1987, p 68. 
162 Montaigne 2002, III, p 443. (I translate ‘non dénaturé’ by ‘normal’.) 
163 For example La Mothe le Vayer: Blanchet 1919, p 490. 
164 See Wetsel, pp 49 ff, Gouhier 1986, Ch VII and Popkin 2003, p 89 on the libertins érudits.  On the 
‘adoption of the Essais...by the libertins as their private handbook in matters philosophical’, see 
Wetsel 1994, p 60. 
165 See Larmore in Garber & Ayers 1998, p 1147, Tarrêtte in Desan 2007, pp 1095-97 & Cave 2007, 
p 37. 
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into French more than once.   Pascal regards the two ‘sects’ as illustrative of a 
broad distinction between a philosophical standpoint which stresses our moral 
self-sufficiency, our ability to be virtuous without external help, and – on the 
other hand – one which claims we are unable to do more in ethics than work out 
how to maximise our (lasting) pleasure and happiness166 and minimise pain and 
unhappiness (these two positions are caricatured in 410:29). 
 
8.1 The Stoics 
Stoicism in one form or another was a live option for humanists and some 
theologians in the first half of the 17th century167.  For Christians, Stoic ethics with 
its emphasis on duty and on God as our principal end (as Pascal puts it: OCG II 86) 
is prima facie attractive; it had, after all, influenced Augustine168.  Yet some 
Christian writers attacked Stoicism as soon as humanist and other Christian 
writers saw merit in it169. 
 
Montaigne ended the Apologie with a scornful dismissal of Seneca’s 
‘absurd’ call to us to ‘rise above humanity’170 .  Only with the extraordinary help of 
God171 can we rise above our human limitations to undergo a ‘miraculous 
transformation’.   A revival of Augustine’s anti-Stoicism ensued: Augustine’s bête 
noire, Pelagius, was sympathetic to Stoicism. Jansen’s Augustinus argues against 
more moderate Catholics who accept that the Stoics’ virtues have some merit.  On 
the contrary, says Jansen, they are wholly corrupt172.  
 
In the Entretien and the Pensées, Pascal sticks to the Jansenists’ doctrine on 
Stoicism using a recent translation of Epictetus’ Handbook and Discourses as his 
                                                          
166 In the Pensées he tends to elide the Pyrrhonians and Epicureans (208:240). 
167 Exponents of Christian Stoicism included Justus Lipsius and Guillaume du Vair (see Gouhier in 
Villaneix 1962, p 96, d’Angers 1954, Ch VII and Brooke 2012).  There are elements of Stoicism in 
the writings of Charron and Jean-Pierre Camus.  
168 See Rist 1994, pp 168 ff. 
169 Even accusing them of self-love (see Mesnard 1992, p 63 and see Kraye, J: ‘Conceptions of 
moral philosophy’ in Garber & Ayers 1998, pp 1287-8 and d’Angers 1954.  On Arnauld’s attacks on 
the neo-Stoics of his day, see Gouhier 1987, p 126.  
170 ‘O quam contempta res est homo, nisi supra humana erexerit!’ (Montaigne 2002 II, pp 423-4). 
171 Montaigne at first used then dropped the word ‘grace’ in successive editions of the Essais. 
172 See d’Angers 1954, pp 157 ff.  On Jansen’s influence on Pascal, see PF, p 132, nn 1 & 2. 
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text173.   Epictetus, says Pascal, made duty and virtue all-important; he 
distinguished between those things over which we have control – our thoughts, 
our beliefs and our will – and external things, e.g. possessions, family, personal 
circumstances and reputation; he preached that we should concentrate on doing 
what is in our power, on what we were free to do, as a way of reaching the Divine.  
For in this way we should come to recognise God’s Will and to follow it.  Pascal 
applauds the key rules enunciated by Epictetus: to shun being a ‘slave’ to external 
goods, to raise our sights above the mundane and to want what God wants174. 
 
Pascal nonetheless rejected Stoicism.  He attacked those who had in his 
view diluted Christianity by utilising Stoic metaphysics and ethics to adapt 
doctrine.  His critique operates on two levels: ethical (which I will discuss in 
Chapter IV) and theological.  As for the latter: he saw the Stoics or neo-Stoics of 
his time as deists175 who were, for him, almost as far from Christian faith as 
atheists (449:690)176.   Epictetus’ god – even if he is less impersonal than the early 
Stoics’ deity – is not the Christian God: for example, the Stoic god’s watching over 
us is just our rationality working in us, perhaps like Socrates’ daimōn177;  and the 
soul cannot, for Pascal178, be ‘a portion of Divine substance’ (OCG II 87).    
 
 Pascal accuses Epictetus of ‘diabolical pride’ (OCG II 87): the edifice of 
Stoic ethics is the work of the devil (960:796)179.  The devilish defiance of God 
first occurs in Adam180 and leads to the corruption of the human race: Milton’s 
rebellious angels while away their time in Hell trying to achieve Stoic calm:   
 
‘Vain wisdom all and false Philosophy’  
(Paradise Lost II.565). 
                                                          
173 See Courcelle, pp 87-93.   
174 Pensées 430:683 & 140:172 and OCG II 97 (external goods & see 100:133), OCG II 86-87 
(following God’s will).  
175 See Pintard 1962, p 113 and Mesnard 1965a, p 33. 
176 Charron says that deists may be even worse than atheists because they believe in the wrong 
God (Les Trois Veritez, 2nd Edition, Paris, Bertault: 1620, p 10). 
177  See Algra, K.: ‘Epictetus & Stoic Theology’ in Scaltsas & Mason 2007, pp 43-4. 
178  Following Augustine: see Sellier 1995, p 74, n 23. 
179 There is an echo here of Descartes’s attack in Discours I on the Stoics who, he says, have 
constructed an apparently splendid palace ‘on sand and mud’ (AT VI 7-8); see Gilson 1967, pp 
130-2.  
180 See Brooke 2012, pp 81- 82 on Senault’s debt to Augustine on this point.   
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The delusion of Stoicism is as much theological as moral: we cannot 
advance morally without God: we depend on Him for our salvation; the doctrines 
of the Fall and of grace imply both God’s separateness from us and His ability to 
give us eternal life.  The Stoic doctrine implies that the person of Jesus Christ is 
not the essential path to God (140:172).   It is just impossible honestly to combine 
Stoicism with Christian faith even though the former contains a kernel of truth, 
namely that duty is the only path to follow181. 
 
8.2 Pyrrhonian Ethics  
In the Entretien Pascal applauds, as noted above, Montaigne’s attack on the 
products of human reasoning and his condemnation of the pride of Stoics aspiring 
to be the companions of God (OCG II 87).  But he attacks Montaigne’s own ‘sect’ as 
morally pagan: Montaigne makes no attempt to rebuild Christian ethics after his 
sceptical explorations but leaves the task to others, trusting meanwhile to 
superficial appearances of truth and goodness (OCG II 93-4).  Pascal is equally 
unimpressed by Montaigne’s chosen principles: to trust his instinct in avoiding 
pain and death, to behave with moderation, to follow the customs and laws of his 
country, to be level-headed if these principles lead in practice to pain or trouble, 
and not to adopt the mournful principles of Stoic asceticism (OCG II 94).  Pascal 
leaps to the conclusion that these Pyrrhonian principles demote mankind to the 
level of beasts.  He deplores Montaigne’s failure to replace Pyrrhonian doubt by a 
robust assertion of Christian values (OCG II 93).  But he correctly notes that 
Montaigne ultimately questioned whether the unceasing search for truth 
preached by some Pyrrhonians would bring peace to the soul and suggested that, 
if one wanted tranquillity, one should leave endless enquiry to someone else 
(ibid.)182. 
 
Pascal concludes that Montaigne’s cardinal error is to regard human 
nature as ‘necessarily weak and irreparable’ and thence to fall into despair at ever 
discovering the Sovereign Good and into an extreme form of cowardly inertia 
(‘une extreme lâcheté’ – OCG II 95), accepting our weakness and ignoring our duty 
                                                          
181 See Brooke 2012, pp 84-86. 
182 Montaigne 2002 III, pp 457, 458 & 355.  See the discussion in Cooper 2012, pp 301-4.  
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(ibid. 96).  This ‘inertia’ would not be a stable state: we all have in us the instinct 
to strive to know the True and the Good (401:20).   Montaigne contemplated only 
slipping away to an easy death which he would not resist (680:559).  If the Stoics 
might deem Christian belief unnecessary for the achievement of virtue, so 
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonism would imply that Christian virtue was never attained. 
 
In fact, Montaigne’s ultimate moral advice to the readers of the Essais, 
which was extremely influential in the 17th Century, was to devise a purely 
secular code, drawn up by each thoughtful individual according to his conscience, 
prescribing above all that one should care for the welfare of others and carry out 
one’s civic duties while maintaining one’s integrity as an individual183. 
 
8.3 Honnêtes Hommes: secular moralists 
  Notes of conversations with honnêtes hommes184 on various linked topics 
seem to be among the earliest made by Pascal (PM, pp 21-7); they probably 
record points arising from conversations in 1653 and 1654 in the circle of the Duc 
de Roannez, where Pascal encountered the honnêtes hommes who made a great 
impression on him185.  They introduced him to a sociable way of life and a set of 
worldly attitudes which added significantly to his moral experience186.  They may 
well have encouraged him to look in Montaigne for ways of describing human 
activities and relationships. 
 
Pascal knew several honnêtes hommes well, especially the Chevalier de 
Méré and Mitton187. He refers to Méré, as having ‘a very good mind’ (OCG I 151) 
and being ‘excellent in everything’ [except for the mathematics of infinity] and 
‘very clever’ (OCG II 164).  He names Mitton in the Pensées as the proponent of 
                                                          
183 Montaigne 2002 II, p 453. On Montaigne’s moral individualism, see Panichi in Desan 2007, pp 
790-3 & Schneewind: ‘Montaigne on moral philosophy and the good life’ in Langer, U. (ed.) The 
Cambridge Companion to Montaigne (Cambridge, CUP: 2005), pp 207-228.  
184 The category of honnêtes gens overlaps with that of libertins, free-thinkers.  The latter term is 
hardly used by Pascal who had plenty of opportunity to meet libertins but does not, in the Pensées, 
go into the detail of their anti-religious arguments (see Pintard 1962, p 112). 
185 See Mesnard 1965b, pp 251 ff.  
186 Mesnard 1665b, p 987.  Fumaroli says that Pascal’s encounter with Méré ‘est un des grands 
moments du XVIIe  siècle français’ (Fumaroli 2006, p 311). 
187 On Méré, see Mesnard 1965b, Parts III and V and Mesnard 1992, pp 149-50.  See also d’Angers 
1954, pp 25 & 27, Harrington 1982, pp 121-3 and Moriarty 1988, Ch 3. 
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honnêteté188.  He praises the honnête homme’s ability to know something about a 
wide range of topics and professions: since we can’t know everything, it is better 
to have wide rather than narrowly focused knowledge (195:228).   
 
The honnête homme has good judgment not as a scientist devoted to 
geometrical reasoning but exercising finesse: he can make judgments, including 
moral judgments, by seeing ‘in one go’ to the heart of a problem189.  His 
intellectual range is as wide as his sociability is developed.  This kind of 
sprezzatura can’t be learnt: it contrasts starkly with ethical, rhetorical or 
philosophical specialisation which is merely learning for its own sake and not 
true understanding190.  These people achieve an intuitive understanding of a wide 
range of subjects and skills191.   
 
Pascal’s noble and bourgeois contemporaries, who saw themselves as 
honnêtes hommes, upheld a series of moral principles – close in effect to 
Montaigne’s192 – which were for them the foundation of the pursuit of social 
virtue: they would have said that virtue is in the end the most agreeable path to 
take:  Damien Mitton (whom Pascal mentions in the Pensées as ‘Miton’) said that 
the honnête homme fulfils all his duties equally well, however extensive or varied 
they may be; he is a loyal subject, a good husband and father, a good friend and 
citizen, and a good master; he is indulgent, humane, helpful and sensitive to the 
misfortunes of others; he neither says nor does anything disagreeable, unjust, 
unreasonable or against everyone’s happiness193.  He upholds these admirable 
principles without a supporting theological framework: conventional adherence 
to Christian practices and customs becomes just part of being a good member of 
society.   
 
                                                          
188 Pensées 597:494, 642:529bis, 853:433. 
189 Pensées 510-513:669-671. 
190 Pensées 605:502, 195:228, 587:486, 647:532, 778:643 & 513:671. (PM, p 22 associates a text 
marked as Ps. Inéd. XII with 513:671, which identifies the learning concerned as Scholastic 
learning.  (This text is included in Krailsheimer, p. 333 §11, but not in OCL or PF.)  
191 See Pintard 1962, p 124.   
192 Montaigne’s influence can be seen in Faret’s book (Mesnard 1992, p 148). 
193 OCG II 1456-8.  Philippe de Clérambault stresses the ideal of agreeableness: ‘exceller en tout ce 
qui regarde les agréments et les bienséances de la vie’ (PB, p 116). 
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The honnêtes gens were not all men in Pascal’s time.  The leading exponent 
of honnêteté, Méré, declared that the virtue of women differs not at all from 
men’s: he thought that honnêtes femmes have roughly (sic) ‘the same sentiments 
and thoughts’ as men194.   
 
Honnêteté was more congenial to Pascal’s class than the aristocratic ideals 
of inherited rank and honour195.   Occasionally, Pascal uses the term honnêteté to 
praise someone’s character: he addresses Fermat, for example, as ‘the most noble 
[galant] man in the world’ and tells him that he values his honnêteté more than 
his supreme mathematical skill (OCG II 43).  He describes the admirable qualities 
linked to honnêteté thus: there are worldly people who make sensible judgments 
about life and who know that the only way to prosper in the world is to appear 
honourable, faithful, judicious and able to be of use to one’s friends (427:681)196. 
 
But he came to have doubts about the honnêtes hommes’ secular morality 
and conventional attitude to religion197.  Pascal detested this attitude to virtue: for 
him, the virtuous Christian does everything for God.  True, if the honnête homme 
interprets the Good as happiness he does so partly with altruistic interest in the 
happiness of others: so he is agreeable, considerate, dutiful, civic-minded and 
socially conventional, attending Mass dutifully rather than devoutly.   Only by 
taking others’ happiness into account could one ensure the stability of one’s own 
happiness198.   Pascal castigates this complacency:   
 
                                                          
194 Du Bosc’s L’Honnête Femme (1632-6) appeared as a pendant to Faret’s L’Honnête Homme 
(1630). See Wolfgang & Nell: ‘The Theory and Practice of Honnêteté in Jacques du Bosc...’, Society 
for Interdisciplinary French Seventeenth-Century Studies, XIII, 2 (2011), pp 56-91.  See also 
Mesnard 1992 on Faret (p 145) and Méré (p 150), Viala, A.: Naissance de l’écrivain (Paris, Minuit: 
1985), pp 147-50 and Moriarty 1988, pp 99-102. 
195 ‘Your being a duke does not oblige me to esteem you, but it is necessary that I salute you’: Trois 
discours sur la condition des grands, II (OCG II 197). 
196 The ideology of honnêteté lived on after the 17th century: Hume’s ideal resembles the honnête 
homme: ‘By means of such compositions [of easy style and manner], virtue becomes amiable, 
science agreeable, company instructive and retirement entertaining’ (Hume 1902, p 8). 
197 This was usual among Jansenists: both Jansen and St Cyran saw honnêtes hommes as a threat to 
true Christianity (see O’Connell 1997, pp 42 & 67). 
198 See the quotation from Mitton in Pintard 1962, p 127.   
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‘Only the Christian religion makes men both happy and agreeable  
 [to others].  Honnêteté does not enable one to be both agreeable and 
 happy’ (426:680). 
 
The self is ineradicably egotistical, putting itself at the centre of things, 
unable to treat others fairly199, always desiring to dominate them (597:494); this 
is not stable happiness because there is always competition and conflict even 
among friends (210:243).  In fact, as Pascal records, Mitton himself recognised 
that people were ‘corrupt’, unable to rise even to the ideals of honnêteté, but 
Mitton didn’t understand why (642:529bis)200. 
 
8.4 Honnêtes Hommes: rationalists 
There is another aspect of honnêteté which Pascal opposes:  treating 
Reason (i.e. knowledge arrived at as the result of reasoning abstractly or from 
experience) as a supreme ideal, yielding the key rule-book for belief201.   Some 
honnêtes gens, influenced by Montaigne’s revival of the Socratic ideal of rational 
and critical thought202 adopted a cool disdain for both worldly activities203 and at 
least some aspects of religious faith204.   Montaigne, says Pascal, is indeed not a 
good influence: he is ‘nonchalant’ about his own salvation; the Essais were not 
written to encourage piety but they should not discourage it either by, for 
example encouraging ‘pagan’ views on death (680:559).    
 
As for Mitton himself, he attached great importance to the intellect but 
even more to the abstract ideal of Reason; he wants to know everything and does 
not pride himself on knowing nothing (as might an old-fashioned aristocrat)205.  
Pascal accuses him of cultivating an attitude of tranquil indifference to religion 
                                                          
199 Pascal said the self was injuste a term which, as well as denoting unfairness, had theological 
overtones: the self was not justified or saved (see Wetsel 1994 p 124 who cites 421:680). 
200 Pascal tells Mitton and the others: human nature runs counter to honnêteté (see Gouhier 1986, 
p 111). 
201 The honnêtes hommes of course share this rationalism with the libertins  érudits (Pintard 1962, 
p 118). 
202 See e.g. Montaigne 2002 III, pp 406-7.  Pascal’s criticism of Montaigne as an indolent sceptic is 
at OCG II 94.  
203 See Brunschvicg’s remarks, PB pp 117-8.  
204  See d’Angers 1954, p 25. 
205 See the (partially mistranslated) quotation from Mitton in Wetsel 1994, pp 120-1.  
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(853:433)206.  If such lukewarm individuals are honnêtes gens, Pascal exclaimed, 
let them at least realise that there are two sorts of reasonable person: those who 
serve God wholeheartedly... or those who seek Him because they don’t yet know 
Him; no one would choose as a friend someone who showed casual disinterest in 
religion (427:681).   The argument of this pensée, as we shall see in Chapter II, is 
at least in part that indifference to religion is ultimately incompatible with the 
rational prudence which characterises honnêteté. 
 
In sum, Pascal is (as I will mention in the Epilogue) concerned that rational 
scepticism is a threat to traditional Christian doctrine but he will make use of 
rational considerations where they suit his purpose.  The sceptic who finds 
Christianity illogical has the tables turned on him: religion has its paradoxes, 
Pascal wants to say, but it is irrational not to investigate its narratives and 
doctrine. 
 
8.5 Epicureans 
Pascal understandably did not regard Epicureanism as a celebrated sect in 
his time: it had comparatively few open supporters, no doubt because its denials 
of Providence and of the immateriality and immortality of the soul – and its 
doctrine that pleasure is the starting-point and the goal of blessedness – were 
impossible to align with Christianity207.  Gassendi’s efforts in the 1640s to revive a 
version of Epicureanism (mainly his interpretation of mechanistic physics) 
necessitated radical adaptation of the main doctrines: for example, he interpreted 
the Epicurean pleasure principle as part of a divine providential plan for the 
survival of mankind and – apparently forgetting his attacks on Descartes in the 
Fifth Objections – devised a number of proofs of the immortality of the immaterial 
soul in his Syntagma Philosophicum208.  
 
                                                          
206 See Pintard 1962, p 124 and Penelhum 1983, pp 68-9. 
207 See Wilson 2008a, pp 4-5, 8-9 and 255-6.  
208 See Wilson 2008a, pp 121-3 and Osler 2003, pp 38-9.  Gassendi assigned cognition, language 
and experience to the material soul (anima), so we’d be justified in wondering what the functions 
of the immaterial soul (animus) were (see LoLordo 2009, Ch 10). 
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Pascal seems to have read no Epicurean texts and to have gleaned 
relatively little about the ‘sect’ from Montaigne.  He may have believed mistakenly 
that Montaigne was an Epicurean (the Port-Royal Logic accuses Montaigne inter 
alia of being ‘full of [...] a great number of shameful infamies and of Epicurean and 
ungodly maxims’209).  He may have conflated Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism210.  
For example, pensée 410:29 seems to refer to Epicureans and not Pyrrhonians as 
the second of the two sects, as aspiring to ‘renounce reason and become bestial 
brutes.’  
 
 He made only cursory and sometimes inaccurate references to the 
Epicureans or their thought in the Pensées, apparently understanding little about 
them211.   For example, he says that the Christian God is not ‘merely the author of 
geometrical truths and of the order of the elements; that is the role assigned [to 
Him] by pagans and Epicureans’ (449:690); this bizarre and incoherent sentence 
(why ‘pagans and Epicureans’?) may refer to the idea of a deity who, once the 
framework of the universe has been laid down takes no further part in its affairs.  
This would be in line with Epicureans’ casual acceptance that there may be gods 
who, however, live happily apart from and take no interest in our world; but it 
may also be a pejorative reference to Descartes’s theology.   
 
In another context, as I will indicate in Chapter II, he was less certain than 
Descartes that he could explain, let alone prove, the immateriality of the soul 
(199:230 at OCG II 613-4) or its immortality (449:690). 
 
Finally, he may have shared Descartes’s apprehension212 that his espousal 
of the mechanistic world view (84:118) would lead others to think of him as a 
sort of Epicurean and be thus keen to reduce this risk by expressing 
condemnation of Epicureanism when the context permitted him to do so.   
                                                          
209 Logique, III.20.vi, pp 208-10. (The Jansenists could not forgive Montaigne for his admiration for 
Jesuit learning (see  Fumaroli 2006, p 315).) 
210 There are some affinities between the Epicurean and Pyrrhonian ways of life (see Cooper 2012, 
pp 277-8) which have misled some of Pascal’s readers (e.g. Mesnard 1965a, p 33).  See also 
Davidson 1979, p 124.   
211 See Pintard 1962, p 113, Gouhier 1986, p 157 and Carraud 2007, pp 104-5 & 189-94.   
212 See Wilson 2008a, pp 111-125 
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  As for Epicurean ethics, Pascal fell victim to the misconception (common 
since Seneca had distorted the Epicureans’ doctrine213) that ethical hedonism 
implies a life of bestial self-indulgence, the idea that Epicureans ‘renounced 
reason’ and either risked becoming, or even wanted to behave as, ‘bestial brutes’.  
(Pascal mentions the name of Des Barreaux, a notoriously crude pleasure seeker 
as an example of an ‘Epicurean’214 .)     His alternative view seems to be that the 
Epicureans would identify divertissement with the good life but again that is a 
misapprehension: how could hunting or gaming – which involve stress and 
suspense – be productive of ataraxia?  The caricature of Epicureanism which 
afflicted Pascal and others may have been picked up from contemporary sources 
or indirectly from Augustinian texts, or from Cicero215 but not from Montaigne.  
There was of course no question of either Epicureanism or Montaigne’s 
Pyrrhonism ‘renouncing reason’ (410:29); Pascal seems not to have read 
Montaigne’s defence of the moral rigour of Epicureanism – and his condemnation 
of the tendency of its critics to misrepresent it216. 
 
The anti-Epicurean Pascal shared several beliefs or attitudes with 
Epicureanism, no doubt because he took a – perhaps indirect – interest in 
Gassendi’s thought217.  His experiments designed first to disprove the notion of 
horror vacui and later to establish (as he saw it) the existence of the void (OCG I 
355ff.) were admired by Gassendi who may have influenced his account of 
space218 and his opinion (following Torricelli) that the air has weight, which 
recalls Lucretian cosmology219.   His picture of the infinite, mute universe of many 
                                                          
213 See Mill 1969, p 210-11 & Wilson 2008a, pp 13-6.  Pascal was perhaps unaware of Gassendi’s 
De vita et moribus Epicurii (1647), a defence of Epicurean morality (Osler 2003, pp 31-2).  
214 Pensée 410:29 and see 430:683. The biblical phrase bête brute (Psalm 99.13) occurs in 131:164 
in the plural and in the verse of Des Barreaux, a libertin who apparently applied the expression to 
his crude version of Epicureanism (Wetsel 1994, pp 54-60). 
215 See e.g. Cicero’s statement that ‘Epicurus scarcely differs from an animal’ in his Tusculanae 
Disputationes, Book V.24 [73] (Cicero: On the Good Life, transl. M Grant, London: Penguin, 1971, p 
91).  
216 Montaigne 2002 II, pp 144-5.  
217 See Le Guern 2003, pp 13-14, 24 & 159-60 and OCG II 1333. 
218 See OCG I 1079-80 and II 1387 and, on space, Letter to Noël, 29 October 1647: OCG I 384-5.  The 
indirect source would be accounts of ‘intangible space’ (locus intactus) and the equation of space 
with place (locus ac spatium) in Lucretius 2001, I.334 & I.955.  See Bloch 1971, pp 197-8 & 201. 
219 OCG I 489 ff. & 1107-8 and see Lucretius 2001, V.472-503. 
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cosmoi (199:230) reminds one of Lucretius’ account of physical reality:  the world 
appears not to have been made for us, a world in which we are tossed about on a 
sea of uncertainty220.  During the description of his experiments, Pascal refers 
readily to atoms and corpuscles (OCG I 363)221.   But he does not follow Lucretius 
in explaining the appearance of the world as the result of the evolutionary 
formation of ever more complex compound objects222:  he took Genesis to be a 
historical document written by Moses on the basis of the testimony of eye-
witnesses223, despite a venerable patristic tradition of interpreting the Creation 
story symbolically or typologically224. 
 
As for ethics, Pascal is a psychological hedonist and a eudaimonist who 
puts ataraxia or tranquillity (repos) as its ultimate goal (see Chapter IV below).  
Like Epicurus, he thinks that the pursuit of worldly renown is an absurdity 
(470:707) and he implies (as we shall see in Chapter II) that it is no misfortune to 
die, i.e. to leave behind the distress and dissatisfaction of earthly life.   These 
coincidences in no way bridge the gulf between Pascal’s and Epicurean ethical 
precepts225, as I will outline in Chapter IV. 
 
9.  Descartes 
9.1. Faith and Reason 
By far the most important impact on the young Pascal was made by 
Descartes’s writings.  An early example of Descartes’s influence is a mention of 
clarity and distinctness in his correspondence with Père Noël in 1647, though the 
discussion of these criteria is brief and never repeated (OCG I 377-8 & 1085).  The 
influence continued: Pascal absorbed Descartes’s account of the animal body as 
an ‘automate’ (OCG I 106) and seems to have derived much from Les Passions de 
                                                          
220 See Lucretius 2001, II.1048-68 & I.951-983 and then V.199.  Le Guern does not doubt 
Gassendi’s influence on pensée 199:230: OCG II 1387 & 1392. 
221 The results of the Puy-de-Dôme experiment in particular prompt Gassendi to reflect on 
scientific method (see Bloch 1971, p 52 and LoLordo 2009, Ch 6). 
222 Unlike Descartes, whose evolutionary cosmology Pascal is said to have likened to Don Quixote 
(reported remark, appears as pensée 1008 in OCL , & as IX in Krailsheimer; not in PF or Ariew.)  
Pascal was probably unaware of Descartes’s own characterisation of his evolutionary cosmology 
(with its Lucretian features) as dans les espaces imaginaires and involving nostre imagination and 
nostre fantaisie (Le Monde, Ch VI: AT XI 31-33). 
223 Pensées 436:688, 474:711, 296:327; and on the word-of-mouth transmission of history: 
290:322. 
224 Descartes was prepared to regard Genesis as ‘metaphorical’ (AT V 169). 
225 See Bloch 1971, pp 470-2. 
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l’Âme226.  His Esprit Géométrique seems in some respects close to some of 
Descartes’s assertions in the Second Replies and some of Descartes’s letters227.   
 
The influence lessened as Pascal grew more confident of his own views, 
and rejected some of Descartes’s.  By 1647 Pascal is already expressing doubts 
about the hypothesis of matière subtile, attributing it to Descartes – and he rejects 
Descartes’s rule of thumb that a hypothesis is to be retained if it entails all the 
observed phenomena228 – but some Cartesian ideas remained potent for him to 
the end.  Mersenne’s circle no doubt discussed the Discours de la Méthode, and, 
when he was no longer in Paris, Pascal read the Méditations and the Principes 
(probably in their French versions) as they came out between 1641 and 1647.  It 
is difficult to map precisely the extent of Descartes’s influence on Pascal because 
both are imbued with Augustinianism and influenced by Montaigne229.   For my 
present purposes, I need give only a selective account of the philosophical 
relationship between Pascal and Descartes, of which some elements represent 
this shared intellectual heritage.  I wish to answer the question why the 
epistemology devised by Descartes, who scrupulously tries to avoid theological 
controversy230, is a potential threat to the success of Pascal’s project.  
  
Descartes’s method of doubt (as discussed in Section 7) and his 
epistemology provided a framework for Pascal which he only gradually modified.  
Both assume that understanding the causation of belief is crucial to our 
understanding of rational certainty231.   But while Descartes sees the cogito as 
indubitable whatever its causation, and then uses his proofs of a veracious God’s 
existence to re-establish knowledge, Pascal does not.  He does not assign 
                                                          
226 See McKenna 1979, pp 500-1 & 504-5. 
227 And shows familiarity with the Discours de la Méthode and the Méditations  (see OCM III 378-9 
and OCG II 1178-1181).  Le Guern rules out Pascal’s having seen an MS of Descartes’s Regulæ 
(ibid.). 
228 See OCG I 385, 408 & 1086 & OCM I 1000 (matière subtile), OCG I 382 & 1085 (hypotheses in 
science). 
229 See Carraud 2007 & Le Guern 1971.  Gouhier 1978, Gilson 1983 and Wilson 2008b are useful 
reminders of Descartes’s indebtedness to certain currents of Augustinian thought.   
230 Discours I (AT VI 8).  He was particularly averse to scholastic theology (AT I 85-6 & V 176). 
231 For discussions of rationality, see Elster 1982, pp 16-19 and Kolodny 2005.   
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foundational epistemic status to the cogito232.  Instead (writing before the 
beginning of his project) he says only that the definitions and principles of 
geometry ‘are of extreme natural clarity such as to convince reason much more 
strongly than reasoning would’, and ‘precede’ all other ‘natural knowledge’ (OCG 
II 163-4).   
 
  In the Pensées, however, Pascal squeezes even this certainty out: he 
entertains the thought that the very naturalness of our assent to such 
propositions is not necessarily a sign of their truth: the hypothesis that ‘natural 
clarity’ is the same for everyone may turn out to be false, even if this thought does 
not ‘extinguish absolutely’ each individual’s experience of ‘natural clarity’233.    
Further, because our nature may have been ‘fixed’ by the malin génie, ‘natural 
clarity’ may mislead us about the nature of reality.  This scepticism is the 
antithesis of dogmatism, and faith supersedes both234.   But in what does the 
certainty of faith consist? 
 
  Descartes and Pascal agree that faith is a gift from God (7:41), the result of 
divine inspiration.  Descartes says that ‘when we are supernaturally illumined [by 
grace], we are confident (confidimus) that the things put forward for us to believe 
have been revealed by God Himself’; we believe them ‘by a certain inner light 
which comes from God’ and ‘the reasons for embracing the faith are not obscure 
but [...] are clearer than any natural light’235.  He says that we ought to have faith 
even if ‘the light of reason may, with the utmost clarity and evidence, appear to 
suggest something different’ from its propositions236.    Pascal speaks of those on 
whom faith has been bestowed as ‘justifiably convinced’ while others must 
depend, by means of reasoning, on merely ‘human’ faith (110:142).  Both make 
clear that religious certainty depends not on the propositions’ clarity and 
distinctness or ‘natural clarity’ but on subjective confidence about the causation 
of our faith.   For Descartes,   faith comes about as the sudden and complete 
                                                          
232 Pascal mentions but does not endorse, the cogito argument (De l’art de persuader, OCG II 179-
80). 
233 Pensée 109:141.  
234 Pensée 131:164, which will be discussed in Section 33. 
235 Second Replies, AT VII 147-8.   
236 Principles I.76, AT VIII-1 39.   
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emergence of a desire, not a conscious decision: ‘divine revelation [...] raises us at 
a stroke to infallible faith’237.  There are echoes of Augustine’s account: the 
acceptance of authority is apparently arbitrary at the moment of acceptance; 
entering into a relationship of trust in a supreme being does not depend on 
reasoning or choice of any kind238.  As we shall see in Chapter V below, Pascal 
would accept this account for ‘simple’ believers but, problematically, it does not in 
his scheme apply to believers whose faith would have more complex grounds.   
   
To distinguish between an imaginary inspiration from, for example, the 
Man in the Moon and a real divine inspiration, Pascal and Descartes have to tackle 
the problem of authority on the basis of the Augustinian doctrine239.  Both believe 
that there is an authority which yields the content of faith put in us by God.  The 
result is not supported by the sort of argument which generates the sort of 
certainty seen in a geometrical proof.  Arnauld and Descartes seem to have agreed 
that Christian faith is prudent belief  based on authority as opposed to rash 
opinion based on no or insufficient evidence240.  This has been taken to mean that 
faith ‘is prudent for the same reason that the faith or confidence that one’s food is 
not poisoned is prudent [...] a confidence for practical purposes that food procured 
in the normal manner will not kill us’241.  This seems mistaken: ‘prudence’ here 
refers to a kind of careful reflectiveness contrasted with the rashness of the 
opinionated, not to a hypothetical belief adopted to allow life to go on.  There is, 
as Augustine says, no ‘perhaps’ in faith242. 
 
  For Descartes, the problem is that, while a certain ‘inner light’243 excludes 
all doubt about the propositions of faith, the second-order belief that God has 
caused me to believe certain revealed truths is not itself clear and distinct. He 
                                                          
237 Lettre de l’Auteur, Principes, AT IX-2 5. 
238 See MacIntyre 1992, p 92.   
239 See De vera religione 24.45 (EA, p 31). Faith raises, as Arnauld – quoting from Augustine – 
makes clear at the end of the Fourth Objections, the question of authority (AT VII 216).  See also 
Logique III.20 Fallacies §VI, pp 220-1.  Augustine himself says that even if he met Moses face to 
face and understood what he said, he would still not know if Moses spoke truly (Confessions XI.3). 
240 AT VII 216. For a discussion of this part of the Fourth Objections, see Gouhier 1978, pp 33 ff. 
241 Menn 1998, p 332.  
242 Quoted by Gassendi: see OCG II 1496, n2. 
243 The ‘formal reason’ which leads us to assent to matters of faith consists ‘in lumine quodam 
interno’ (AT VII 148) and ‘une certaine lumière intérieure’ (AT IX-1 116). 
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admits that ‘with respect to the truths of faith, we ought to perceive some reason 
which convinces us that they have been revealed by God before deciding to 
believe them’244.  
 
    Pascal would not have disagreed: he saw that we should, before 
accepting propositions promulgated by an authoritative source, look for reasons 
independent of that authority (505:672); there are false prophets; other religions 
have their prophets too245.   Reasoning is, for both thinkers, an essential aspect of 
the background of faith.   Augustine thought at one time that, once an aspiring 
believer accepted the authority of the Church and Scripture, she would discover 
reasons to believe in the Christian God246.  Perhaps – but the risk remains to 
Pascal’s project: clarity and distinctness defeat scepticism, on Descartes’s view, 
and function as criteria of truth; moreover, we can at least attempt an explanation 
of the method to be used to attain them.  But there is no such method for 
producing the certainty of faith: neither respect for authority nor my personal 
conviction that I have received divine grace (and so have faith) are certain in the 
way that I am certain of clear and distinct propositions.  We shall see in Chapter V 
how this problem infects Pascal’s project. 
 
9.2. Pascal as a semi-Cartesian 
As for metaphysics, Pascal does not invariably disagree with Descartes’s 
account of the relationship between metaphysics and Christianity: they both 
agree that the cosmological argument is invalid.  He nowhere rules out 
metaphysical theology, as long as it can be shown to reflect the authoritative 
doctrine of the Catholic Church.    Theology’s only source must be tradition and 
authority; this does not rule out reasoning about the theological doctrines or 
working out their metaphysical implications, a position which Descartes would 
accept247.   
 
                                                          
244 Fifth Replies, AT IX-1 208. 
245 Pensées 150:183; 837:424 & 856:436.  The Jesuits are contemporary ‘false prophets’ (965:800 
& OCG I 947-951). 
246 See the discussion of De Ordine in MacIntyre 2009, pp 26-7. 
247 Descartes wants to strip away scholastic accretions and complications from theology (Gilson 
1967, p 133). 
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He also seems to agree with Descartes on the following points:  he does not 
separate metaphysical beliefs entirely from religion: for example, in defence of 
the idea that we survive bodily death, he rejects the Epicurean doctrine of the 
soul and assumes that the soul is in an unexplained way distinct from the body 
(as will be discussed in Chapter II).  His doctrine of the three ‘orders’ (308:339) 
sets up a bodies-minds-divinity ontology similar to Descartes’s hierarchy 
developed in Discours IV and Méditation III.  In addition both thinkers agree that 
God is not extended and therefore not corporeal (for then He would be 
divisible)248.       
 
But beyond this point, Descartes and Pascal diverge in four important and 
linked ways:  first, Descartes rebuilds his rational system of knowledge 
independent of faith.  There is no evidence that Pascal finds Descartes’s 
metaphysical reconstruction of human knowledge in the Méditations convincing.   
It is more likely that he thinks that the impasse between the sceptics and the 
dogmatists shows that human knowledge lacks any such foundation:  most of 
what we believe has no certain basis (44:78 & 577:480).  The only way out of the 
dilemma is to believe in God, for that belief drives out the hypothesis of the malin 
génie (131:164).  Only faith – which has to do the duty of Descartes’s proofs – can 
give us certain knowledge of any kind. 
 
Secondly, for Descartes, his proofs of God’s existence are both 
epistemologically vital and important for apologetics:  he says in the Epistre to the 
Méditations that he had an additional apologetic purpose in mind: non-Christians 
need to have a proof of God’s existence if they are to believe in revealed truths 
(AT VII 2).  But elsewhere he admits that rational conviction that God exists is not 
alone sufficient for salvation249 and that metaphysical proofs have a downside: if 
they fail to convince a person with faith, she may come to doubt God’s 
                                                          
248 See Descartes’s Letter to Mersenne, 21 January 1641 (AT III 287), Principes I.23 (AT IX-2 35); 
pensée 418:680 (at OCG II 677). Both he and Pascal are doubtless aware of Hobbes’ alleged view 
that, since all persisting substances must be corporeal, either God is corporeal or He does not exist 
(see Curley 1995, pp 106-9). 
249 Letter to Mersenne (March 1642), AT III 544.   
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existence250.   This risk inter alia leads Pascal to abjure the use of metaphysical 
proofs in his project and to distinguish between the ‘God of the philosophers’ and 
the Christian God (449:690).  In any case he regards metaphysical proofs as 
unpersuasive in general  (190:222).  But he leaves open whether some proofs of 
the existence of God are valid251. 
 
Thirdly, Pascal opposes the integration of God in metaphysics and 
cosmology.  Descartes said of the Méditations that they contained ‘all the 
principles’ or ‘foundations’ of his physics252.  But for Pascal Reason can determine 
neither God's characteristics nor His existence (418:680).  It is uncertain, given 
that scientific knowledge is ‘under-determined by the deliverances of 
experience’253, whether we shall ever be able to devise a comprehensive 
cosmology (199:230).  But, even if we could, God would not appear in it: He is 
hidden from this world: He may be present in the hearts of believers (through 
Jesus Christ) but He is absent from the world which a cosmology would 
describe254.  More generally, the context and source of beliefs is, for Pascal and 
other Augustinians, vital to any evaluation of their worth: there are beliefs based 
on what others have written, on authority, and beliefs based on what we know 
from experience and reasoning.  Theology falls in the first category and science 
and other philosophical subjects in the second (OCG I 452-5).  The Cartesian 
approach mixes two areas of discourse – our knowledge of God and our scientific 
understanding of the world – which should be kept separate255.  Whereas science 
proceeds by the invention, testing and refutation or refinement of hypotheses, 
theology is not to be adapted to modern experience: its basis is tradition and the 
authority of the sacred texts (OCG I 453).  Thus Pascal agreed with Hobbes and 
Gassendi in excluding God from physics256 although he would never have 
                                                          
250 We do not choose to doubt in this way because the intellect is not a faculty of choice (facultas 
electiva), Letter to Buitendijk (?1643), AT IV 62-3.   
251 His sister says he did not regard the proofs as ‘méprisables’ (OCG I 76).  It thus seems an 
exaggeration to say that he regarded the proofs as ‘impossible’ (Carraud 2007, pp 361 ff.). 
252 Letters to Mersenne, 11 November 1640 & 28 January 1641, AT III 233 & 298. 
253 Van Fraassen 2002, p 12. 
254 See Scholar 2003, p 70 and Chapter V below. 
255 There is a contrast between thinkers who try to unify reality in one system and those like 
Pascal who resist this tendency (Frye 1982, p 25). 
256 See Lolordo, A: ‘Epicureanism and Early Modern Naturalism’, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, XIX, 4 (2011), pp 647-664. 
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envisaged a world wholly free of God’s jurisdiction: physical science can never be 
an exhaustive description of what happens in the world. 
 
Fourth, Descartes appears to believe that we can come to love God through 
metaphysics, by coming to know that He is ‘un esprit, ou une chose qui pense’ 
similar to ourselves and to adore His marvellous attributes257.  This love, which 
presupposes intensive meditation and a sort of submission to God and to His 
will258, can be a sort of ‘rational love’ determined by ‘our nature’, i.e. by a 
judgment that we make by the natural light, while ‘detached from the commerce 
of the senses’259.  Pascal would reject this approach unhesitatingly: ‘Qu’il y a loin 
de la connaissance de Dieu à l’aimer’ (377:409): there is no path from 
metaphysical proofs to the love of God. 
 
In sum, Pascal draws on and then departs from Descartes’s thinking but 
there is no need to posit radical conceptual change to explain the evolution of his 
thought260.  Pascal regarded the Méditations as unsuccessful in their aim to found 
scientific knowledge, rejected Descartes’s attempted holistic approach to human 
knowledge and developed an account of faith which faces up to the problems of 
describing it but, as I shall argue, ultimately fails to solve them.   
 
 
                                                          
257 Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647 (AT IV 608) and Méditation III (AT VII 52); see Isabelle 
Wienand & Olivier Ribordy: ‘La conception cartésienne de l'amour pour Dieu : amour raisonnable 
et passion’, Dix-septième siècle, nº 265, pp 635-50. 
258 Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647 (AT IV 607) and Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 15 September 
1645 (AT IV 294). 
259  Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 609, 601 & 609-10. 
260 See Carraud 2007, esp. pp 451-2. 
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CHAPTER II: IS IT IRRATIONAL TO IGNORE CHRISTIANITY? 
 
10.  Persuading humanist agnostics to investigate Christianity 
10.1 Preliminaries 
Can someone indifferent to Christianity be motivated to investigate its 
doctrine as seen through Scripture and other traditional texts, without assuming 
the truth of the religion concerned?  In this Chapter, I will describe Pascal’s 
argument that it is in any rational person’s interest to investigate the Christian 
doctrine of the afterlife and to see how her behaviour in this life might affect her 
post mortem welfare.   This reflects his general belief that, as one commentator 
puts it, ‘the practical benefits of a belief can be relevant to its rationality’261. 
 
Pascal devised a striking image of the ‘human condition’: a room of 
chained convicts sentenced to death some of whom are slaughtered each day 
while the others look at each other’s predicament and await their turn262.  It is to 
this unhappiness and despair at the inevitability and unpredictability of death – 
and what follows it – that he addresses his therapy.  These emotions arise from a 
certain cultural context: current doctrines concerning our post mortem state 
range from annihilation and ‘an extinction of all particular perceptions’263 to the 
belief that God will ‘restore us to [...] Sensibility in another World [...] capable 
there to receive the Retribution [God] has designed to Men, according to their 
doings in this Life’264.  So Pascal tells the agnostic to fear that God exists and thus 
to fear suffering after death (or missing out on eternal happiness) and even 
annihilation265.  These fears may turn out to be self-contradictory or incoherent in 
a more complex way but, the argument goes, they have to be investigated.  Our 
post mortem welfare is at stake.  
                                                          
261 Foley in Jordan 1994, p 33.  This might be more precisely formulated as ‘the practical benefits 
of acting as if a belief is true can be relevant to that belief’s rationality’. 
262 Pensée 434:686.  Sartre changes the image to that of a condemned man preparing to be 
dignified on the scaffold but, before he can do this, he is carried off by a Spanish flu epidemic! 
(Sartre 1943, p 617). 
263 Hume’s phrase in the Appendix to the Treatise: Hume 2007, p 399. 
264 Locke 1975, p 542. 
265 See J. Barnes’ Nothing to be frightened of (London, Vintage: 2009). 
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The threat of the afterlife is not of course that it may be happy (although, 
as argued in Section 14 below, that idea, as an incentive to be virtuous, may lack 
force) but that it will be unendingly unhappy.  The robust empiricist’s answer to 
this is that there is no evidence for the existence of Hell, so fearing it is irrational: 
why add that fear – to which we can assign no probability – to the burden of 
apprehensions about events which have some probability attaching to them266?  
Pascal’s reply to this is that there is a living tradition according to which there are 
‘signs’ in Scripture which point out the risks attached to the afterlife267.  Some 
would agree with Pascal268 that, in the absence of conclusive empirical evidence 
either way, and given the prevalent popular belief in the afterlife, it is in the 
agnostic’s interest to know what is at stake.  This investigation need not entail 
giving up the life one leads now, although becoming a Christian believer would. 
 
  The informal argument I will discuss comes in two pensées: 427: 681 and 
428: 682269.  Pascal aims the argument at someone who has spent a few hours 
reading Scripture and consulted a priest about doctrine but, remaining unmoved, 
has then decided that he need look no further (OCG II 682).  Internal evidence 
suggests that Pascal had two types of target (both with a degree of sympathy for 
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian semi-Epicureanism) in mind: a carefree and iconoclastic 
religious and moral sceptic, or a person with sincere humanist values, an honnête 
homme270 with however lukewarm Christian belief.  Pascal’s first editors entitle 
this part of the Pensées ‘Against the indifference of the Atheists’ (OCG II 915), 
which implies that Pascal’s aim is to tackle what we now call agnosticism.   
                                                          
266 Hume concedes that fear of death (as fear of the afterlife) is real, though ‘artificially fostered by 
precept and education’ and anyway much less prevalent than fear of failure and unhappiness in 
life.  See ‘Of the Immortality of the Soul’, Hume 1963, p 599.   
267 We have inherited the story, as an heir inherits the deeds of the house as well as the house 
itself – wouldn’t he examine the deeds? (823:664) 
268 Similar arguments are to be found in Locke’s Essay IV.20.3-15 and offered by Draper in 
Howard-Snyder and Moser (eds.) 2002, esp. pp. 210-211.  In The Whole Duty of Man (of 1659) we 
read: ‘none knows, perhaps the next hour, the next minute the night of death may overtake them; 
what a madness is it then for them to defer one moment to turn out of that path, which leads to 
certain destruction, and put themselves in that, which will bring them to bliss and glory?’ (quoted 
in Herdt 1997, p 184). 
269 See Brunet 1956, pp 32ff, Wetsel 1994, pp 275-6 and PF p 478 n2.  Pensée 428:682 contains 
most of the key elements of the argument: it seems to be a revised version of 427:681. 
270 See the mentions of ‘l’honnêteté’, ‘bon air’ and ‘honnêtes gens’ (OCG II 686) and Pintard 1962, p 
124. 
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10.2 The Argument’s Assumptions 
In what follows I avoid any of Pascal’s purely Christian assumptions271, 
expressing his argument as far as possible as if he is not assuming the truth of 
that or any other religion.   
 
Pascal’s argument is prudential: to best protect one’s interest, one should 
investigate what can happen to us after death: this may reveal that there is action 
we can take now to prevent an unhappy afterlife.  His basic considerations are: 
first, that agnostics – including those who have done nothing to investigate 
Christianity – risk either annihilation or unhappiness after death (OCG II 688).  
Secondly, whatever happens to us after death will be forever (éternel), whatever 
form it may take (OCG II 687); there will be no second chance.  Thirdly, 
indifference to the question of our immortality is profoundly unnatural: the 
seemingly carefree sceptic272 who ignores religion is actually going against his 
own nature (OCG II 682, 685 & 686); in other words, it is ‘natural’ for the rational 
agent to protect his interest by investigating the choices open to him, because his 
future happiness may be at stake.  Only this fragile life lies between us and 
Heaven or Hell (152:185).  Fourthly, necessarily we live our lives according to our 
conception of what happens to us after death (OCG II 682).  He elaborates on this 
in another pensée: we can live with the illusion that our life on earth will continue 
indefinitely or realise ‘that we shan’t be here for long and uncertain whether we 
shall be here for even one hour more’ (154:187). 
 
 These four considerations together suggest that those who choose not to 
investigate the Christian account of the afterlife (in Scripture) and live just for the 
moment – thinking perhaps that Christians are credulous or that the proofs of the 
religion are weak (OCG II 688) – are irrationally negligent (déraisonnable).   
 
                                                          
271 One recent commentator has alleged that Pascal does beg the question because he assumes that 
all our pleasures are mere vanity and that death [without faith] inevitably leads to either 
annihilation or unhappiness (see El Yadari 2013, p 131).  But the first point (discussed in the next 
Chapter) is merely an encouragement to consider the argument, not an assumption essential to it.  
As for the second point, Pascal has only to warn of the risks of annihilation or eternal hellfire. 
272 Pascal puts an appropriate speech in his mouth at OCG II 683-4 (427:680).   
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  A common off-the-cuff response to this is that there is no certain 
knowledge of the afterlife, so there is nothing to investigate (Condorcet’s view273).  
To this Pascal has a complex answer: as I shall mention in Section 38 below, he 
believes that not all knowledge is straightforwardly empirical and that Divine 
revelation can sensibly be regarded as a source of supernatural knowledge, even 
if as a ‘proof’ it is not wholly convincing.  Since a supernatural force is needed to 
guarantee our existence after the complete dissolution of our physical remains, 
this must be the right path to investigate274. 
 
 The prior question behind Condorcet’s doubt is whether the afterlife is 
possible at all: is the concept of a person such that we can envisage personal 
survival of death?  This I discuss in Section 11.  We should also question whether, 
were the afterlife possible, our post mortem state would be permanent, as Pascal 
claims (Section 12).  There is, thirdly, Pascal’s accusation that agnostics are 
inexcusably short-termist275 and thus the question of our rational interest in the 
afterlife (Section 13).  Fourthly, I review the various post mortem outcomes: do 
we want to avoid annihilation and suffering? (Section 14); and is eternal bliss a 
sufficient incentive for adopting the virtuous life? (Sections 15 and 16).  
   
11.  Is there a risk we shall survive bodily death? 
 If the possible after-death outcomes are eternal bliss, eternal suffering or 
annihilation, Pascal’s argument presupposes in two cases that I may persist in 
being as a self-conscious person after death.  My sense of my persisting identity is 
clearly essential here: I have no interest in the existence of a person who has no 
sense of being me because the key to a happy afterlife is the avoidance of remorse 
and other sorrows. 
 
Montaigne’s marked influence on intellectuals and others gave rise to 
agnosticism about the afterlife: while urging us to prepare for death, Montaigne 
                                                          
273 Voltaire 2008, p 157, n (a).  
274 See Moser (2008). 
284 So ‘there is manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, 
when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification’ (Butler 1914, p 45).  See also Hume 
1993, p 122: ‘Consider [...] the attachment, which we have to present things, and the little concern 
which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain.’ 
73 
 
 
 
rarely if ever envisaged an afterlife276: when he mentioned it, he said it was 
indescribable in worldly terms, that he could not see how a Platonic soul would 
retain its identity and that ‘the separation [of mind from the body] would be the 
death and ruin of our being’277.   
 
Pascal also confronts Epicurean materialists278 who may have considered 
themselves Montaigne’s followers.  He is aware of their notion that the soul is 
physical: he implies that his agnostic subject might regard the soul as ‘a puff of 
wind and vapour’279.  We can assume that he would have wished, had he 
completed his project, to counter the Epicurean assertion that the soul dies with 
the body.  But we have only isolated thoughts suggesting what his approach might 
have been.   
 
The available evidence suggests that Pascal saw descriptions of the mental 
life as irreducible to descriptions of a person’s body or of changes taking place in 
it.   He designates the separate conceptual domains of mind and body: ‘It is 
impossible that the part which reasons in us should be other than spiritual [...] 
nothing is more unintelligible than to say that matter is conscious of itself’280. He 
says that our inability to localise sensations like pleasure (108:140) and the 
ability to master our passions (115:147) each show that our lives have an 
immaterial aspect.   
 
  Yet Pascal did not believe that, in this life at least, the soul functioned 
wholly independently of the body: he attributed certain features of the mental 
life, e.g. basic ideas, and desires, passions and habits, to the body: hence his 
remarks in Infini-Rien that the soul ‘finds [the concepts of] number, time, 
                                                          
276 Compare: ‘Everything is in common betwixt soul and body.  The organs of the one are all of 
them the organs of the other; the existence, therefore, of the one must be dependent on the other’ 
(Hume 1963, p 603). 
277 See Montaigne 2002 II, p 294. Death ‘est bien le bout, non pourtant le but de la vie’ (ibid. III, p 
429) but also ‘la mort est origine d’une autre vie’ (ibid. I, p 171).  Disembodied human existence is 
inconceivable, hence the doctrine of the resurrection of the body (ibid. II, p 480).   
278 And perhaps also from Pomponazzi (Voltaire 2008, pp 152-3) whose followers formed part of 
‘le courant libertin’ (d’Angers 1954, p 14). 
279 Pensée 427:681 at OCG II 685 infra.  See Descartes’s Méditation II (AT VII 26 and also Letter to 
Mersenne, 21 April 1641,  AT III 362) and Lucretius 2001, III.128-9 & 221-231, pp 71 & 73.  
280 Pensée 199:230 (at OCG II 613); see also 958:795. 
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dimensions’ in the body, and that habituation will reduce sceptical passions281: it 
is by means of changes in the body, i.e. the formation of habits, that beliefs firmly 
implant themselves in us (821:661).  Those sentiments which consist in memories 
and form the basis of what subjectively seem to be intuitions arise from this 
physical process282.  There is no evidence that Pascal regarded any intuitions as 
immaterial events occurring utterly independently of the body.  And sentiments 
are the indispensable starting-points for any reasoning, even though reasoning 
itself cannot distinguish between true intuitions (sentiments) and false (fantaisie) 
(530:455).  Here Pascal departs markedly from Descartes, in seeming to make 
reasoning, the function of the intellect, dependent on the body283 whereas his 
predecessor had regarded intellection as purely the immaterial soul’s work284. 
 
  In practice, Descartes notoriously had difficulties in describing the survival 
of the self as an immaterial substance285 to the extent that he may have ‘neither 
believed nor disbelieved’ in the immortality of the soul286.    It is not clear that 
Pascal thought of the soul as an immaterial thing: his assertions imply that  
(a) certain states and actions of human beings presuppose self-consciousness287 
and (b) that consciousness is conceptually distinct from corporeality.   His 
position seems to be to refuse to attribute consciousness to inanimate things288 
and to non-human animals but also to have no clear idea how we attribute 
consciousness to embodied persons.   The problem is that attributing 
consciousness to a person has no explanatory role in contemporary mechanistic 
science: hence his assertion that we cannot understand what the soul is or how 
                                                          
281 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 676 & 679-80. 
282 See McKenna 2004, pp 47-8.  As I will discuss in Chapter V, Pascal is far from certain that these 
basic intuition-like sentiments can be rescued from his sceptical arguments.  
283 In that it depends on memory (651:536) which is a sentiment comparable to joy (646:531) and 
thus a bodily state. 
284See McKenna 2004, p 51.  
285 See Fowler 1999, Gaukroger 1995, p 348 & Clarke 2003, Ch. 8.  
286 See Wilson 2000, p 660.  He was not alone: Nicole wrote a proof of the indestructibility of the 
soul in 1670, only to incur another Jansenist’s criticism for implying that God could not annihilate 
souls (see Fowler 1999, pp 303-6). 
287 It is theologically vital for Pascal to distinguish between the human species and other species 
by attributing self-consciousness to human beings: pensées 105:137, 107:139; 111:143 & 114:146. 
288 As a modern scientist, he insists on a sort of property dualism: on the horror vacui he says: ‘I 
have difficulty believing that nature, which is neither capable of sensation nor animate, could be 
susceptible to horror, because the passions presuppose a soul capable of feeling them’ (OCG I 427; 
see also ibid. 436 and pensée 958:795).  
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we are composed of both a soul and a body289.  So presumably we cannot describe 
what the persistence of a disembodied soul through time would consist in nor 
how a soul could retain consciousness of being the soul of a particular person.  
How could such a soul be capable of feeling proud of a virtuous life or – on the 
other hand – remorseful about a wicked life if those passions arise in the body?  
Hesitations aside, Pascal’s view seems, on the evidence available, to be closer to 
Aquinas’ reluctance to regard the soul either as a thing or to be identified with the 
person whose soul it is290 than to Descartes’s position in the Méditations291.  His 
theological concern is to retain a vague notion of the immaterial soul but, if asked 
whether a given type of mental event involved the body, he would be unable to 
give a definitive answer, rather as some ancients probably could or would not292. 
 
 Like Locke, Pascal was sceptical of the notion of substance as a carrier of 
identity.  In one fragment, he seemed to test the Cartesian doctrine of mental 
substance (insofar as that made sense to him) to destruction:   
 
‘What is the self?  A man goes to the window to see the             
 passers-by; if I go by, can I say he put himself there to see me?   
No, for he is not thinking about me in particular’ (688:567).   
  
This is an inverted echo of Descartes’s example in Méditation II where he is 
looking at passers-by and realising that, although he would usually say that he 
sees the men, in fact he sees only their hats and coats which could conceal 
                                                          
289 Pensées 199:230 (at OCG II 614) and 76:111. This denial that we can understand what the soul 
is sets Pascal apart from Descartes; but the latter did admit that the notion of body-soul union is 
‘primitive’ or ‘simple’ (Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, AT III 664-6) and just a basic 
element of experience, yet somewhat paradoxical (Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT 
III 691-4 & Conversation with Burman, V 163).  He famously says that phenomenologically the 
mind is not in the body as a pilot is in a ship (AT VII 81). 
290 See the discussion in MacIntyre 2009, pp 80-2.  Pascal may tend to move away from 
Augustinian dualism and the problems it poses for a notion of personal identity (on which see Rist 
1994, pp 301-3).  
291 Plausibly, Pascal would be unable to accept the dualism which Descartes attempts to establish 
in Méditation VI on the basis that God can create conceptually distinct things as separate entities 
(AT VII 789).  
292 See the discussion in Fine 2003, especially pp 196-7.  
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automatons293.  In contrast Pascal raises a doubt both about others’ perception of 
himself and about his perception of himself.  The fragment continues:  
 
‘...if someone likes me for my astuteness or memory, does he like me?  No, 
for I could lose these qualities without losing myself.  So where is this self 
if it is not in the body or in the soul? [...] would one like the substance of 
someone’s soul in the abstract whatever qualities it had?  Impossible and 
wrong-headed....’ (688:567).   
 
  Pascal’s inference – following Montaigne294 – is clear enough: the notion of 
substance as a substrate does not seem of much use in explaining the self as an 
object of my or others’ attention.  The introspective self consists in its 
consciousness (pensée) and as such is contingent (135:167).  It is a fundamentally 
unstable object of attention, from which we must move on to consider what is 
stable, namely God and the end of human life295.  (This thought is linked to a 
moral point in Pascal’s mind: the self is no more than a point of view, the centre of 
my world; but it is not the centre of the world for that has no centre (199:230 at 
OCG II 609): hence amour-propre, the all-pervasive human emotion296 which is 
the basis for our liking others, is founded on an illusion which Pascal’s therapy is 
designed to remove.) 
 
So it seems that Pascal did not intend to argue that the soul was an 
immaterial substance, let alone to prove its immortality297.  He rallies neither to 
Cartesian dualism nor to the materialism of Hobbes298.  But avoiding these two 
options still leaves him with the task of explaining how a person could continue to 
                                                          
293 AT VII 32.  For Pascal, ‘le moi est donc introuvable’ – Carraud 2007, p 322.  See also Enthoven 
2009, pp 109-133. 
294 See, e.g. Montaigne 2002 II, pp 14 & 17 ; and III 295: ‘Moi à cette heure, et moi tantôt, sommes 
bien deux’.  See also Brunschvicg 1945, pp 14-16. 
295 Pensées 620:513 & 148:181. 
296 Pensées 978:743 & 597:494. 
297 Pensée 449:690. But Nicole reported that Pascal considered the notion that matter is incapable 
of thought (199:230) to be a reason for believing in the soul’s immortality (see Busson 1936, p 
164, n 1).  Pascal’s intellectual contemporaries believed, as he did, that there was no rational proof 
of the soul’s immortality (Brunet 1956, p 30). 
298 Gassendi’s materialism is subject to the proviso that faith obliges us to believe in an immaterial 
soul but its relationship with the body cannot be understood (see LoLordo 2009, Ch 10).  This 
seems to be roughly Pascal’s position in some contexts (e.g. pensée  199:230). 
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have experiences after death and continue to have a grasp of her identity as a 
person.   
 
Pascal seems, on occasion to believe, like Aquinas, that personal identity 
cannot be maintained without a body.  There is one rather obscure note where 
Pascal is commenting on Descartes’s attempt to reconcile his dualism with the 
doctrine of transubstantiation.  Descartes said, ‘If a man’s soul is united with any 
piece of matter whatsoever, whatever its size and shape, we shall regard that 
piece of matter as the body of the man concerned’299.  Pascal seems to think this 
mistaken: he implies that the presence of the soul is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of personal identity; and that bodily identity requires 
continuity in space and time, in that sense it must remain the same piece of 
matter300.  In this way he seems ready to adopt the view that an identifiable 
person emerges in the afterlife only if the soul is re-united with that person’s 
body.  But he does not go further to say explicitly that the body supports the key 
feature of our grasp of our own identity: memory. 
 
Even so, Pascal may not be far in his thinking from Locke (according to 
some interpretations of his doctrine).  Suppose we use Locke’s requirement for 
the belief in the afterlife: after bodily death there must be, in some place and at 
some future time, a person identical to your present self301.  This assumption 
need not itself specify how personal identity is assured, i.e. whether the afterlife 
involves possession of a soul or of a body or both.  Nor need it presuppose that 
the surviving person can be classed as a human being302. 
                                                          
299 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV 167). 
300 Pensée 957:794.  See Le Guern 1970, pp 55-8, OCG II 1580-1, Ariew: ‘Descartes and Pascal’, 
Perspectives on Science XV.4 (2007), pp 397-409 and Alexandrescu: ‘Descartes and Pascal on the 
Eucharist’, Perspectives on Science XV.4 (2007), pp 434-449. 
301 See the discussion in Yaffe G: ‘Locke on ideas of identity and diversity’ in Newman, L (ed.): 
Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay concerning Human Understanding’, Cambridge, C U P 1994.  
Yaffe concludes that Locke did not put forward the theory that personal identity rests just on 
memory but rather on a web of overlapping conscious states including memories.  In the present 
context, as with Locke, the question is not what criteria of identity are needed by a court of law 
but rather what are the necessary conditions for ‘appropriating’ actions to oneself and thus for 
feeling pride in or remorse about one’s earthly life after bodily death.  The only judge then will be 
God and we can, Locke says, rely on His goodness to ensure that we are rewarded or punished 
only for actions correctly attributed to us. See also Forstrom, J K: John Locke and Personal Identity, 
London, Continuum 2010, p 126. 
302 See Belshaw 2009, p 197. 
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In his Letter of 17 October 1651, Pascal states the orthodox doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body at the Last Judgment, while maintaining that the soul 
survives death and persists during the period between bodily death and bodily 
resurrection  (OCG II 22).  This doctrine re-appears in different form in the 
Pensées where he says that all our sickness would be healed by God (supposedly 
at death) and that our bodies would be immortal (919:751).   
 
These hints suggest that Pascal might have subscribed to a variant of 
mortalism303 which would be reconciled with Catholic doctrine by assuming that 
the soul is not dormant or non-existent before the person receives a new body 
identifiable as hers, but persists in some form.  This possibility is akin to some 
Thomist accounts of immortality and seems to have been an acceptable option for 
Locke304.  The most plausible version of this supposition is that, at some moment 
after a death, God collects all the atoms which made up the dead person’s body 
when alive and re-assembles the body just as it was in life,  thereby endowing the 
resurrected person with the mental characteristics she had in (the previous) life.  
God would take measures to prevent the person dying again305.  He might not be 
able to do this for everyone since it is possible that the same atoms are ‘used’ in 
bodies at different times.  On the other hand, if He has been doing it since the 
beginning of the human race, this problem need not arise as long as the atoms 
which make up each body have been immediately recycled for the immortal body 
and thus removed from our world and not re-used for another body. 
 
  This doctrine can to a certain extent be reconciled with Geach’s well-
known argument – indebted to Aquinas – that a disembodied mind surviving 
death, incapable of perception and sensation without a body, would be but a 
remnant of the person whose mind it was.  He hesitates to ascribe personal 
identity to this remnant, even if per impossibile we had criteria by which to 
distinguish between one disembodied mind and another306.  The post mortem 
                                                          
303 On Hobbes’s mortalism, see Wilson 2008a, pp 143-4. 
304 See Locke 1979, II.27 and Locke 1999, pp lxxii-lxxiii. 
305 See Belshaw 2009, pp 193-4. 
306 Geach 1969, pp 23-24. 
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survival  of a thinking being could lead to survival of person A only if, on Geach’s 
view, the soul could enter ‘into the make-up’ of A at some later date307.   There 
might even be, to flesh out Geach’s account, a possible physical explanation of the 
survival of the mind between bodily death and resurrection of person A.  Just as 
information can be stored in a cloud separate from the computer where it has 
been generated it so, we may surmise, the mind of A could survive in physical 
storage. 
 
In addition to Geach’s proposed solution, Lynne Rudder Baker has 
advanced a parallel argument that ‘persons are constituted by bodies, but are not 
identical to bodies’ in the sense that every person ‘has intentional states some of 
which make personal reference to a biological body, or to a body suitably related 
to a biological body’.  This thesis avoids both monism and dualism and can posit 
bodily resurrection at some time after death, on the grounds that, if God can 
create a person, then He can recreate that person such that the new person has 
intentional states which make personal reference to the new body308.  
 
There are two difficulties with these suggestions: first, physical places are 
needed to accommodate the surviving persons, yet to posit a place for them after 
their deaths in the universe described by science would be paradoxical: the dead 
would then be both in the Universe and outside it309.  The second difficulty is that 
the possibility of post mortem personal survival presupposes action by God to 
ensure that survival.  Why should an agnostic accept such a hypothesis? 
 
I conclude, on the basis of incomplete and cursory remarks in the Pensées, 
that the least problematic version of an afterlife for Pascal would be initially the 
persistence after death of some thinking being outside the body, preserved in 
some as yet unspecified physical state of affairs but incapable of perception and 
agency in the usual sense, and its subsequent re-attachment to an embodied 
                                                          
307 Geach 1969, p 24. 
308 Lynne Rudder Baker: ‘Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist?’ Faith and Philosophy 1995 XII 
4, pp 489-504. 
309 ‘The afterlife, conceived as a condition that succeeds death in time, is an absurdity.  For 
succession in time belongs within the causal envelope, in the space-time continuum that is the 
world of nature’ (Scruton 2014, p 198). 
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person.  But such an account describes a possibility dependent on the miraculous 
and thus would have at best a most tenuous hold on the imagination of an 
agnostic. 
 
An empiricist reader would probably retort that this contrived account of 
an afterlife could scarcely be regarded as presenting a real prospect, either happy 
or unhappy.  Pascal’s rejoinder would be that only after examining Christian 
Scripture and doctrine will such a critic be able to assess the evidence for it.  We 
will encounter this problem again, especially in Chapter V and the Epilogue: the 
Pensées do not present wholly independent arguments for the adoption of the 
faith as a whole.  The therapy of faith is a matter of getting the subject involved in 
the form of life until it takes a hold on her. 
 
12. The permanence of the post mortem state 
Pascal advances no evidence that the state in which we find ourselves after 
death would be permanent310.  Yet it is a crucial assumption, for if my stay in Hell 
would be short, I might prefer not to investigate or take up Christianity and to 
continue my life of self-indulgence.  Similarly, if Paradise is not forever, and could 
be replaced by a form of suffering, I may see no point in giving up pleasures now 
for such an uncertain prospect. 
 
It is open to Pascal to argue that since there are no reports of people 
returning from the dead, or travelling between Heaven and Hell, it may well be 
permanent.  But this lack of evidence is a disadvantage to his overall argument, as 
we have already seen.  It is also, as I will now outline, a problem for his contention 
that our interest is at stake in this context. 
 
13. Is our rational self-interest at stake in the afterlife? 
  In stressing the unnaturalness of ignoring religion, Pascal assumes that our 
nature prompts us to seek to promote and protect our own interest; our welfare 
is at stake as long as we exist.  Pascal considers that it is irrational both to ignore 
                                                          
310 Nor does he, by the way, address the problem that infinite punishment for finite acts would be 
unjust and unworthy of a good God (see David Lewis in Antony 2007, pp 234-5). 
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risks of irreversible harm to our vital interests and to conduct our lives as if we 
have an indefinite amount of time to accomplish our ends311.   
 
  Pascal is not arguing just that it would be rational to investigate religion, 
but something stronger: the rational man would recognize that unexamined 
agnosticism is not an option.  He deploys his argument according to the principle 
he had set out the Art de Persuader: to persuade someone of a truth he has 
rejected ‘one must take account of the person one wishes to persuade, get to 
know his mind and his heart, what principles he agrees with, what things he 
likes’312.  In the same context he said that the basic factors involved in persuasion 
are ‘certain natural desires shared by all people, like the desire to be happy, which 
nobody lacks’313.  This is what he means by saying ‘the immortality of the soul is 
so vitally important [...] that one must have lost all feeling (sentiment) not to 
bother to enquire about it’ (OCG II 681-2)314.   
 
Pascal’s implicit conception of rationality emerges from this discussion: for 
him, it is irrational to ignore the situation we are in, which – given our basic needs 
(the long-term motivating factors in our lives, which are so often obscured by 
transient desires and emotions) – constitutes a reason for investigating the 
afterlife.   
 
But it is irrational to use resources to insure against any and all risks, 
however slight the evidence for them.  It is logically possible that giraffes might 
break into my garden.  But, since there are none on the island where I live, I 
would be foolish to use resources to build an anti-giraffe fence.  Insurance policies 
                                                          
311 See his use of such terms as ‘injustice’ (wrongheadedness), ‘sens commun’, ‘sens et jugement’, 
‘les principes de la raison’, ‘déraisonnable’, ‘raisonnable’ and ‘notre premier intérêt’ in 427-8:681-2; 
those who do not seek the truth about God are ‘mad and unfortunate’ (160:192).  At one point he 
makes the stronger claim (for which he offers no argument) that it is our indispensable duty to 
investigate the doctrine of immortality (427:681 at OCG II 683).  Locke apparently thought this 
duty lay especially on the educated and well-to-do: see his Conduct of the Understanding §8, in his 
Works  (London, Tegg, Sharpe et al: 1823), Vol III, pp 225-7.  See also Essay IV.xx.3-18. 
312 L’Art de Persuader, OCG II 173. 
313 OCG II 172. Compare: we ‘inevitably’ pursue our own happiness and that of those whom we 
care about: Mackie 1977, p 170. 
314 See also the beginning of 428:682 at OCG II 687 where Pascal talks of ‘les sentiments de la 
nature’.  Montaigne called atheism ‘une proposition, comme dénaturée et monstrueuse...et malaisée 
d’établir en l’esprit humain, pour insolent et déréglé qu’il puisse être’ (Montaigne 2002 II, p 181). 
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are evidence-based assessments of the probability of the insured risk.  But about 
the afterlife I have no empirical evidence at all.  On the other hand, the cost to me 
of investigating Christianity will not be exorbitant: it involves more than a few 
hours’ desultory study, but a course of seminars or a week-long retreat should 
suffice. 
 
If this is right, I would not give up very much in studying Christianity: my 
situation is thus very different from that of the person taking up Pascal’s Wager315  
who has to change his whole way of life, giving up customary pleasures and 
indulgences: he indeed wonders whether he is giving up too much316.   But in the 
present context he does not have to: his observation that our lives lack ‘real, solid 
satisfaction’317 is not an essential part of his argument as it is in the Wager. 
 
Nonetheless his case is weak: the multiplication of conjecture is 
considerable: we may survive bodily death; what then occurs may be permanent; 
so we may be well-advised to investigate Christianity: at each level, the absence of 
access to evidence, in the ordinary sense, is a major problem for the rational 
person. 
 
Perhaps sensing this, Pascal also appeals to our self-interest now: he 
implicitly claims that we shall be happier in this life if we investigate the afterlife: 
those who ignore religious belief are especially unfortunate and unhappy 
(162:194).  He implies they are self-deceived: if we ‘make them describe the 
feelings and reasons which inspire their doubts about religion: what they say will 
be so weak and so demeaning [...]’ because, we may assume, their self-deception 
conceals an understanding that their attitude is unnaturally self-neglectful (OCG II 
686).   The carefree sceptics know this ‘dans le fond de leur cœur’ (ibid.) but direct 
their attention to constructing a fine image of themselves in the world as people 
who do not need to obey the rules: the sceptic sees himself ‘comme seul maître de 
sa conduite’ (OCG II 685): role-playing replaces serious thought.  Pascal argues 
                                                          
315 Pensée 418:680 which I discuss in Appendix II. 
316 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 678.  I claim in Appendix II that Pascal equivocates about the value of 
earthly life in his Wager argument. 
317 Pensée 427:681 at OCG II 683.  
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that such a policy would be self-defeating: someone whose sole aim in life was to 
kick over the traces would not succeed in the world because others would not 
want as a friend someone so unreliable318.   
 
Pascal’s other target, the honnête homme, neither is nor pretends to be a 
moral sceptic.  He upholds principles of benevolence, consideration for others and 
so on (see Section 8.3).  Pascal admires those principles to some extent319 but 
regards them as a form of selfishness: there is, he believes, a type of person who 
believes that he has mastered the key elements of both knowledge and standards 
of behaviour, a person who perhaps also claims to see meaning in his life but puts 
to one side thoughts of the inevitability of his death.  He may worry ‘day and 
night’ about his social or professional position, much more than about what 
would happen to him when he died (OCG II 684-5).  Yet if he examined his 
behaviour without preconceptions he would see through this approach to life: all 
his activity aimed at achieving tranquillity leads nowhere.  So – superior though 
he is to the outright sceptic – the honnête homme stays afloat only because he 
does not look deeply into his way of life and his lack of interest in death.  He is 
prone to nagging feelings of self-doubt, however fleeting they may be, and is 
vaguely apprehensive about the afterlife. 
 
But is his post mortem future to be feared so as to motivate him to 
investigate Christianity now, and possibly change his way of life? 
 
14. The risks of annihilation and suffering 
There is plenty of empirical evidence that things cease completely to exist, 
so any empiricist can accept that we face the risk of annihilation, as Pascal claims.  
One can have no reasonable objection to the idea that we want to avoid eternal 
suffering (at least so long as theologians tell us that God will find a way to make 
masochists suffer).   But, as I briefly argued in Section 12, we have no evidence 
that Hell would be inescapable or annihilation permanent.   So, while Pascal 
                                                          
318 Loc. cit.  On the ‘smug unbeliever’s’ unhappiness, see Morris in Jordan 1994, pp 52-3. 
319 Hence his exclamation: ‘Qu’ils soient au moins honnêtes gens, s’ils ne peuvent être chrétiens!’ 
(OCG II 686) 
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would presumably agree that annihilation is preferable to damnation, he cannot 
show that we should avoid both on those grounds. 
 
In the light of the preceding discussion we may assume that Pascal 
opposes the Epicurean arguments that (i) since there is no consciousness after 
death, we cannot suffer regret: so death cannot affect our interests because we 
shall not know that we are dead when we are; indeed, we shall not know anything 
at all320; and (ii) we shall not exist and non-existent things can’t have interests321.  
 
 Against the Epicurean view it is commonly argued that death qua 
annihilation is a loss because it deprives a person of the opportunity to benefit 
from (unspecified) goods in this life whether or not she perceives that loss322.  
Pascal would not use this argument because, as mentioned above and to be 
further explored in the next Chapter, he does not believe that agnostics could 
achieve contentment in this life: an agnostic cannot, for him, be anything other 
than irrational and unfortunate323.  On the other hand, he would regard 
annihilation as a loss because it would remove the post mortem opportunity for 
happiness: he wishes to hold open the prospect of eternal bliss as an infinitely 
preferable alternative to either damnation or annihilation.  The plausibility of his 
argument thus rests on establishing eternal bliss as a desirable goal for any 
agnostic.  As we shall see however, it would be difficult to engage an agnostic’s 
interest in that possibility. 
 
15. Would the prospect of Eternal Happiness motivate the pursuit of virtue?  
Is it possible to assign a value to death as an escape from this Vale of 
Tears?  Pascal seems almost ready to do so, in that he argues, as I will discuss in 
the next Chapter (OCG II 683) that we can never find enduring happiness, 
whatever our position in life (148:181).   
                                                          
320 ‘Death is nothing to us.  For what has been dissolved [i.e. the soul] has no sense-experience, and 
what has no sense-experience is nothing to us’, Epicurus, Principal Doctrines, § II.  
321 Letter to Menoeceus, §§124-5.  For an account of these arguments, and discussions of them by 
inter alios Nagel and Feldman, see Warren 2004, pp 17ff. 
322 See Locke’s observation, ‘that such a temporary Life as we now have, with all its Frailties and 
ordinary Miseries, is better than no Being, is evident by the high value we put upon it our selves’ 
(Locke 1999, Ch I, p 10). 
323 ‘Fous et malheureux’ (160:192). 
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All this raises the question: what does death enable us to escape to?  
Descartes consoled Huygens (whose brother had died) by saying that our souls 
after this life are born to benefit from much greater pleasures and felicities than 
we enjoy in this world, a sweeter and more tranquil life which would include 
memories of the past324.  Clerselier added to Descartes’s text the idea that the 
disorderly will go to Hell, the fear on which Pascal plays.  But he wants equally to 
establish that we should investigate the Christian religion and then see that we 
should now be acting virtuously, aiming for and interested in eternal happiness.  
But would this prospect, either as Descartes’s optimism expresses it, or in Pascal’s 
more sombre orthodoxy, motivate us to study and then follow the faith?  The 
problem in recent philosophical discussions has not been the bliss so much as the 
eternity.  But I will focus first on the bliss and then consider endless and timeless 
existence. 
 
The first option to consider is a Heaven of disembodied souls, like Dante’s 
Paradiso.  We immediately see how little that life would resemble ours in this 
world: all the mental acts and events which depend on the existence of our bodies 
would not occur.  But then the prospect is scarcely enticing: as Diderot says, to 
find it so requires believing that one will see without eyes, hear without ears, 
think without a head, love without a heart, sense things without having any of the 
senses, exist without being anywhere325.  The resurrection of the body thus seems 
essential to link this life and the hereafter.  While most theologians have been 
reluctant to speculate, the tradition includes Augustine’s stress on the social 
nature of heaven and his (late) belief that the resurrected and transmogrified 
body would be recognisably the person’s body (reconstituted if previously eaten 
by cannibals)326, and Aquinas’ view that the blessedness of heaven will involve 
the body327:  so, for them, elements of the afterlife would be familiar.   
                                                          
324 Letter to Huygens, 12 October 1642 (AT III 580 and [corrected text] 798).   
325 See Diderot 1964, p 542. 
326 See EA, pp 190-2, also a 17th Century example, Browne, Sir T: Religio Medici in The Major Works 
(ed. Patrides, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) p 112 and discussions in Matthews, G : ‘Augustine 
and Ibn Sina on Souls in the Afterlife’, Philosophy, Vol 89, No 3 (2014), pp 463-476 and Freeman 
2009, p 295. 
327 See Swinburne 2005, pp 179-80. 
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Beatitude seems in any case to offer a more limited range of goals than on 
earth: no experiences can disturb the harmony and equilibrium of life in 
Paradise328.  That might at first be a relief not a limitation: at least we shall no 
longer suffer from conflicting desires and we should have perfect self-knowledge. 
But part of our hope of happiness, on the other hand, seems to lie in our 
experience of the freedom to choose to pursue, achieve and then abandon goals – 
doing so with no illusions.  If all our intentions were perfectly realised, with no 
risk of failure or disappointment, would we not find life intolerable?  The 
perfection of happiness would limit the scope of what we know: if the knowledge 
of others’ suffering, or of our inability to fulfil certain desires, would threaten our 
happiness, these types of awareness would be impossible in Paradise.  Our 
experience would be akin to watching the invariably unpopular good-news-only 
programmes.  As we are now, we have the capacity to assess our experiences and 
actions critically and sometimes to decide to avoid some of them in the future.  
The development of our lives in this way seems part of their interest to us.  Yet in 
Paradise we would choose only what is good to experience or to do.  Unless our 
critical faculties are anaesthetised, should we not find such a life intolerably 
zombie-like? These points suggest that the hypothetical future state would not 
engage our interest now. 
 
These puzzles were not unfamiliar to Pascal’s contemporaries: Hobbes’ 
discussion of Felicity concludes:  
 
 ‘What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly  
  honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, then enjoy; being joys, 
  that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of Schoolmen  
  beatifical vision is unintelligible’329.  
 
                                                          
328 We should therefore have no knowledge of any suffering on earth or in Hell (see Talbott 2014). 
329 Leviathan I.6.  See also Montaigne’s view that any comparison between our earthly lives and 
life after death would be absurd (Montaigne 2002 II, p 292) and Mersenne’s discussion of ‘la 
jouïssance que les justes auront [...] cet éternel et inexplicable plaisir’ in his L’Usage de la Raison  
[1623] (Paris: Fayard, 2002) II.5, p 91.   
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Pascal says nothing to allay these doubts: he thinks that the value system in 
Heaven would be nothing like the value system according to which we now live: 
his view seems austerely abstract (OCG II 99).  What we consider as evils now – 
suffering and so on – would appear as good; our present goods – earthly 
pleasures and the happiness they bring – would appear as evils330.   Thus in 
Paradise eternal felicity would bear no resemblance to happiness on earth: our 
minds would be occupied with God alone so we shall not seek or find happiness 
within ourselves (149:182).  He will be our sovereign good, replacing all the 
illusory satisfactions of our earthly life (148:181): an immortal soul cannot find 
happiness in perishable things (OCG II 100).  God is immutable for Pascal (OCG II 
183 & 148:181).  In sum, eternal bliss consists, for Pascal, in an inhuman 
prospect: the unending contemplation of an unchanging being. 
 
 This leads to the discussion of eternity.  The term is ambiguous: it can refer 
to endless life in time or to atemporal existence.  As for the former, Bernard 
Williams famously asserted that an endless life would be a meaningless one, that 
we could have no reason for living an eternal human life331.   These assertions 
rest, in the first place, on the assumption that the person I am now would be the 
person who would live forever, with the same character and set of desires.   It is 
necessarily – or non-contingently – true of human beings that their categorical 
(i.e. project-generating) desires are finite in number and in the time taken to fulfil 
them, so the immortal is doomed to repeat the same projects many times.  The 
endless repetitiveness of immortality would make it intolerably boring.  And 
‘boredom and distance from life kill desire and consist in the death of it’ (p 91).  I 
do not, incidentally see why we should rule out boredom altogether in 
immortality: Williams required boredom to be unthinkable in eternal life (p 95) 
but gave no reason for such a demanding requirement. 
   
                                                          
330 Letter to Mlle de Roannez, October 1656: OCG II 31. 
331 Williams 1973, p 89.  Other page references in parentheses in this and the following paragraph 
are to this volume.  Williams’ example was of someone living forever in a world of mortals, so it 
was not the same as immortality in the Christian Paradise.  His main points seem to apply to the 
latter, but see note 334 below. 
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Secondly, there is also an implication (brought out more recently by 
May332) that the knowledge that one had infinite time in which to accomplish 
one’s projects  would discourage one from attempting them.  Thirdly, Williams 
explores the effect of immortality on character: either the immortal’s experiences 
are unvaried in which case she shrivels up, as it were, or they are in effect a 
succession of lives, in which case the question arises how her character and 
identity can remain fixed – in that case ‘the experiences must surely happen to 
her without really affecting her’ (p 90).  Moore has put this point in these terms: 
‘the conditions of constancy that must be satisfied for a life to continue to count as 
mine militate against the conditions of variety that must be satisfied for it to 
continue to be worth living’333.  This confident assertion seems prima facie 
implausible: some people change profoundly during their lives: they radically 
change religion, sexual orientation, gender, nationality, profession and their 
environment (as, in some respects, did Gauguin, Williams’ own example).  These 
changes can be gradual enough for others to see me as still the same person and 
for me to see myself thus.  There is no evidence that these profound changes lead 
inevitably to a loss of interest in one’s life.  It seems more important – at least to 
some people – that others regard me as the person I always was, rather than that I 
feel that I retain any constant character traits334, although of course abrupt and 
complete changes in character – for example caused by an illness – would indeed 
lead me and others to lose our bearings. 
 
It has been argued recently that Williams conflates situational boredom 
(which does not cause people to give up on life) with habitual boredom (which 
does).  In other words, it depends what kind of person is subjected to endless life: 
those who tend to be bored in any situation are always prone to give up on life335.  
                                                          
332 See May 2009, p 63: ‘Immortality...threatens our engagements...by dragging them on forever, 
beyond the human capacity to remain involved... [and] through a sort of psychological 
debilitation.’ 
333 See Moore 2006, p 327. 
334 The Makropoulos problem is of course that everyone else dies off  while she lives on, so that 
she has continually to renew her circle: this would not happen in the Christian heaven where the 
sort of illness which wipes out a person’s personality will not afflict the just. 
335 But boredom is, the experts say, a function of character, not primarily of the repetitiveness of 
our activities: see Bortolotti & Nagasawa 2009, p 271.  Thomas Nagel has said he can’t imagine 
being bored with life (quoted in Moore 2006, p 314). 
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But those who merely get bored in certain situations can devise ways of 
increasing the interest of their lives. 
 
Williams did not make clear whether endless happiness is necessarily 
impossible, or just unlikely.  It is possible to think of counter examples to the case 
he describes336: for example, a creative artist might continue to develop her art, 
continually changing form and content, without getting bored.  But the risk 
remains that, for any individual agnostic, the prospect will seem either too thin in 
content or just unpleasant.  Again, in the present context, the danger is that 
imagining eternal life, insofar as this is possible, will not engage the agnostic’s 
interest.   
 
The believer in Paradise may reply that just as evolving Nature is 
indefinitely abundant in types of event and species, so a loving God would ensure 
that Paradise is a continuously rewarding place to exist337.  But for Pascal the 
solution would be different: it is not clear that his God is loving in this sense; and, 
since the human need for divertissement is an aspect of our fallen (and embodied) 
nature, he is likely to say instead that boredom will not be a problem for the 
immortals. 
 
  Now consider eternity as an atemporal form of existence.  Pascal followed 
Augustine in regarding time as integral to the created Universe and thus, for him, 
Heaven was outside time.  True repos is the opposite of movement and therefore 
outside time, for movement, space, time and number form a tightly bound 
conceptual network (OCG II 162)338.  It appears that the Day of Judgment would 
transform the saved from temporal to eternal beings (OCG II 187).  He linked our 
having a concept of time to our having a body  (418:680, second paragraph) with 
the implication that a disembodied soul would have no conception of time.  In this 
context, there is no need to discuss the complex issues surrounding a timeless 
Deity who intervenes in our world.  We might assume that such a state enjoyed by 
non-divine people in Heaven is minimally conceivable: unlike God, they have no 
                                                          
336 See Bortolotti & Nagasawa 2009, e.g. p 267. 
337 A suggestion raised in Talbott 2014.  
338 See Davidson 1988. 
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need to intervene in the world or to ‘re-enter’ time for any purpose.  But the idea 
of entering at a certain time a form of timeless existence is not easy to 
understand339.  We may think at first that at least timelessness avoids some of the 
problems associated with immortality: eternity does not pass: this rules out 
boredom which is an awareness of time passing in an unrewarding way: time 
cannot hang heavy on timeless hands.  
 
But the mental life of a timeless being is even stranger than that of the 
immortal in time.  If he knows about three events – say, the Battle of Hastings, the 
Gunpowder Plot and this week’s seminar – they are equally present to him.  But 
the notion of an observer outside time is barely conceivable, if at all.  The nearest 
one might get to it in our experience would be dreaming.  In a famous phrase of 
Proust’s, a person who is asleep ‘holds in a circle round himself the thread of the 
hours, the succession of the years and worlds’.  He is, at the centre of the circle, 
equidistant from all moments: he can dream about happenings past, present and 
future as well as purely imaginary ones.  Dreaming can be, in this sense, a timeless 
experience: the dreamer has, so to speak, no fixed abode340.  We can of course 
dream of being observers and of time passing.  But dreamers are not observers: 
the thought that they are is akin to the illusion that dreams are informative. 
 
But how unsuitable timelessness is for Pascal’s argument!  If my interest is 
at stake in the afterlife, then I must survive death.    Yet atemporal eternity would 
break the link between my character or desires now and my mental states in 
Paradise.  (It would also make the resurrection of the body with a memory of my 
atemporal experiences problematic to say the least.)  If there is no time, if eternity 
does not pass but just is, we cannot have hopes, desires, memories, or even 
emotions we would recognise as such.  It would seem also that – as in dreaming – 
we could never check the veracity of our experiences.  A sceptic looking at this 
doctrine as an outsider could reasonably say: if none of my present desires are 
relevant to my putative state after death, how can I regard a timeless post mortem 
state as desirable now?  Pascal just has to insist in reply that Paradise guarantees 
                                                          
339 See Wittgenstein 1980, p 22. 
340 See also Penelhum’s discussion of Price’s ‘Another World’ and ‘Next World’ (Penelhum 1970, 
pp 47-53). 
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bliss.  He may here be misled by his own eudaimonism which I will discuss in 
Chapter IV: if we say that ‘everyone seeks happiness’ that does not imply that we 
seek happiness without reference to our own wants and beliefs.  Only a person 
suffering greatly would agree to an injection which would make her happy for the 
rest of time by obliterating her memories of past pains and griefs.  Pascal’s subject 
cannot be expected to be interested in a future which answers to none of the 
desires, aspirations and expectations which she has now. 
 
Salvation thus appears as a sort of incomprehensible miracle.  But that 
does not help the agnostic to see how his interest is involved in the hope of 
immortality.  The most satisfactory course for Pascal is thus to stress the 
advantages of a post mortem state which avoids eternal suffering.  Hell, it turns 
out, is easier to envisage than Heaven because we are all aware of earthly 
analogues.   We may not all go as far as C D Broad’s assertion that the nearest 
earthly analogue to Hell  is a Welsh University so ‘that those that pass directly 
from the one institution to the other must often fail to notice the transition’341 but 
surely mental suffering must indeed be the main feature of Hell.  Unlike Joyce’s 
Father Arnall, Pascal does not dwell on the subject but it remains his trump card.  
For his argument is: study Christianity because that may help you to avoid eternal 
suffering.    But then the study of the faith becomes the study of an insurance 
policy.  One can imagine that many humanists would regard this as an unworthy 
approach to a lifelong commitment342.  In any case, according to Pascal’s 
Augustinian doctrine which I will now discuss, there is nothing anyone can do 
safely to avoid Hell: the ‘insurance policy’ is not worth the paper it is written on. 
 
                                                          
341 C D Broad: The Mind and its Place in Nature (Kegan Paul [& co.], London: 1925), p 518. 
342 As has been commented on the Wager: see Voltaire 1964, p 164 and Mackie’s phrase 
‘mercenary manipulators’ (Mackie 1982, p 203). 
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16. Should the prospect of the afterlife change my life now? 
Must343 we – religious or not – live our lives according to a conception of 
what happens to us after death, as Pascal insists?  Minimally we either take an 
active interest in the subject or live without considering it at all.  Of course even if 
we think little about the afterlife as a motivation for action, we do – perhaps 
rarely for most people – have apprehensions about death, as an interruption and 
a loss that can happen at any time.  And if we knew that we were never to die that 
would profoundly affect our outlook.  As we saw in the discussion on immortality, 
it is the limited duration of human life which impels many if not all of us to try to 
‘achieve something’.  Unlimited life would not contain this drive.  
  
But that is not all that Pascal is saying: Christianity’s doctrines of the 
afterlife incite us to consider how to live now.   We have a choice of ways of life 
between one of the ‘two main sects’ – humanist versions of scepticism, with 
elements of Epicureanism, and of Stoicism – and Christian morality.  Stoicism and 
Epicureanism both deny that there is any personal afterlife344 whereas Christian 
doctrine links (particularly virtuous) practice on earth to survival after death.  
 
This need not be on the basis of a cynical calculation of what has to be 
done to get to Heaven because, of course, that would not work anyway.  His point 
is more that ignoring Christianity is closing off an option and a way of life which is 
good in itself (Christians are happy: 357:389 & 418:680) and which may lead to 
eternal happiness or at least the avoidance of eternal suffering.   He can say only 
that it may lead to eternal life: God bestows grace and salvation arbitrarily on the 
human race with no regard for merit: we cannot know who will attain paradise 
and nothing we can do will help us to get there.  
 
Yet this awkward doctrine of the arbitrariness of grace is surely fatal to 
Pascal’s argument: why should I change my life if the nature of my afterlife is 
                                                          
343 Pascal’s uses the verb devoir to mean: we inevitably live our lives according to a conception of 
the afterlife, which we either assume to be true or deny.  This is similar to his remark in the Wager 
argument that agnosticism is just as much commitment to a position on the existence of God as 
belief: ‘vous êtes embarqué’ (418:680). 
344 See Cooper 2012, p 421, n38. 
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wholly in God’s hands?  I might be saved at the moment of death after a wholly 
sinful life345: that is just as likely as the salvation of a saint.  Not only is it hard to 
engage the unbeliever’s interest in the afterlife insurance policy but also, in truth, 
there is no need for him to change his way of life: that will not bring salvation any 
closer.   
 
Another way of looking at Pascal’s problem is to consider more broadly 
the rationality of Christianity: if the agnostic has already decided that religious 
observance is, as a whole, irrational – because it would be a way of life which 
would not give her fulfilment or contentment – then she will not be swayed by 
appeals to self-interest which depend for their cogency on the attraction of the 
religious attitude.  Hume’s attacks on religion start from the premise that ‘the 
same good sense that directs men in the ordinary occurrences of life, is not 
hearkened to in religious matters, which are supposed to be placed altogether 
above the cognizance of human reason’346.   
 
In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume develops the notion of artificial ways of life, by 
which he means ways of life which arise ‘when men depart from the maxims of 
common reason’; such men ‘are in a different element from the rest of 
mankind’347.   Hume chooses Pascal as an exponent of an artificial way of life: he 
stresses Pascal’s ‘constant profession of humility and abasement, of the contempt 
and hatred of himself’ whose austerities ‘were embraced merely for their own 
sake, and in order to suffer as much as possible’; ‘an extreme contempt of this life, 
in comparison of the future, was the chief foundation of his conduct’348.  If Hume 
is right, then Pascal’s project will fail if it appeals to our post mortem interest only, 
for the price we have to pay for this limitation is too high: no reasonable person 
                                                          
345 Mauriac describes such a conversion, of Louis, in Le nœud de vipères.   
346 Hume 1963, p 253. 
347 So Pascal is a dissident.  See MacIntyre 1988, pp 317-8. 
348 ‘A Dialogue’ (Hume 1902, pp 341-3). On the futility of asceticism, see also Hume 1993, p 181.  
Adam Smith assigned Pascal to the group of ‘whining and melancholy moralists, who are 
perpetually reproaching us with our happiness [...] who regard as impious our natural joy of 
prosperity’ (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Oxford, OUP: 1976, p 139 & n).  Note the word 
‘natural’ here.  The reference to Pascal’s views is not wholly accurate. 
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will adopt extreme austerity to implement a non-evidence-based insurance 
policy349.  
 
There are two ways of explaining Pascal’s dilemma.  First, our need for 
Christianity cannot be specified independently of Christian doctrine because, as 
Nietzsche observed, the religion’s practices and institutions generate, from within 
themselves, human needs which did not exist beforehand350.  Secondly,  
Christianity, like other religions, carries with it its own sense of its importance 
which cannot be conveyed to unbelievers, for it seems integral to doctrine and not 
bound up with our worldly interests but is separate from them351.  
 
In the argument discussed in this Chapter, Pascal faces two issues which 
the argument does not resolve: first, what is the value of human life as we live it 
now?  Is it ‘natural’ as opposed to artificial (as Hume argues) and does value 
reside in at least some of the things we normally do?  If our normal ways of life 
have no value, does Christianity offer a coherent value-system to replace them?  
In the next Chapter, I will examine Pascal’s argument that human nature, as it 
now is, prompts us to pursue futile activities and ways of life.  Christianity 
explains why we are in this mess.  Then in Chapter IV I will discuss Pascal’s 
conception of the necessity of Christian morality. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
349 Unless, that is, they come to see the worthlessness of all our worldly pursuits, i.e. end up not 
wanting to do anything and not valuing anything. 
350 See Geuss 2014, pp 13-14. 
351 There are several other moments in the Pensées which show that Pascal is dimly aware of these 
points; his awareness of them invites comparison with the ‘Wittgensteinian’ approach, which I 
will explore in the Epilogue.  
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CHAPTER III: THE FALLIBILITY, FUTILITY AND ABSURDITY OF 
HUMAN LIFE 
 
My discussion in the preceding Chapter implies that Pascal has more to do 
to convince his subject that her interest is at stake and thus to offer a way of life 
which can integrate her fear of death in a wider picture.  His argument was meant 
to lead the subject towards investigating and – desirably – adopting a life of 
Christian tranquillity: but it fails as long as it offers no motive for doing so.   
 
There are two challenges to be faced now: the first, Humean, challenge is 
to show why espousing a ‘natural’ way of life (in Hume’s terms) would not meet 
our need for contentment or tranquillity.  In other words, why repudiate a way of 
life in which most of our ‘natural’ desires are satisfied?  There are worldly choices 
to be made to reduce our discontent, but do we need to seek a wholly different 
way of life?  Pascal has two answers: our ‘natural’ way of life is irremediably beset 
with error and deep dissatisfaction; secondly, Christian doctrine explains why 
this is so. 
 
The second challenge (which I will discuss in the next Chapter) is for 
Pascal to go further, to explain why we cannot rely on a ‘natural’ ethical code to 
provide long-term happiness or contentment and must instead seek tranquillity 
through adherence to a transcendental value system.  Why, in short, do we need 
an alternative, i.e. Christianity, which – in Pascal’s hands – repudiates ethical 
systems founded on conceptions of human nature?  His answer is that secular 
ethical systems fail to give us tranquillity and fail to identify a firm basis for 
ethical principles. 
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17. The problems of our predicament: unhappiness and evasion 
Pascal says that the way we live now cannot yield anything valuable. For 
example, as we have already seen in the previous Chapter: 
 
‘You don’t need to be particularly perceptive to understand that here [in 
this life] there is no real and solid satisfaction, that all our pleasures are 
mere vanity, that our afflictions are infinite and that in the end death 
[...]threatens us at every instant’ (427:681, OCG II 683). 
 
  ‘Unable to find a cure for death, misery [and] ignorance, men have 
 resolved, so as to be happy, not to think about  them’ (133:166).   
 
So we thoughtlessly fall into error and self-deception and indulge in distracting 
activities to blot out sombre thoughts.  
  
Despite the efforts of educators and legislators to arrange a society which 
would enable people to lead purposeful lives, and despite the aim of individuals 
like the honnêtes gens to lead moral and honourable lives, human society is 
dominated by vanity and exploitation.  Vanity, the biblical word352 denotes error, 
emptiness, meaninglessness, futility and, that subject of well-known Renaissance 
works, folly353: as Montaigne says, ‘Everything we see without the lamp of [God’s] 
grace is just vanity and folly’354 .  Pascal’s therapeutic aims are thus to alert us to 
our error and ignorance and then to persuade us to detach ourselves from human 
life as it is restlessly lived: to seek a more satisfying way of life and to free 
ourselves from ‘vanity’355. 
 
This Chapter will examine Pascal’s diagnosis (Sections 18-21) and then his 
explanations which emerge on two levels: of the ‘science des mœurs’ (Section 22) 
and of Christian doctrine (Section 23).  I will, finally, point to reasons why, even if 
                                                          
352 King James Bible: Ps. xxxix. 5: ‘Euery man at his best state is altogether vanitie.’ 
353 See Heller in Goyet 1979, pp 297-8.   
354 Montaigne 2002 II, p 348.  Many scholars would say that Montaigne’s mention of grace is mere 
obedience to convention rather than evidence of theological belief. 
355 See Frye 1982, pp 123-4.  Seen in a therapeutic light, Pascal’s approach is no more 
‘misanthropic’ (see Voltaire 1964, p 160) than, say, Sigmund Freud’s. 
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Pascal’s picture of the human predicament is ultimately an unconvincing way of 
leading us to Christian belief, it is worth looking closely at Christian morality and 
faith (Section 24). 
18.  Error 
Pascal’s account of imagination (or occasionally opinion)356 – that is, of our 
tendency to error (44:78) – is essential to his account of the vanity of our lives.  
His use of the term imagination does not imply that the act of summoning up 
images of objects which are absent from our perceptual field is deceptive: the act 
presupposes that the object is not present, as Descartes saw357.  Nor – despite his 
use of the word once or twice – does he wish to describe the faculty of 
imagination as analysed variously by ancient and recent philosophers358.  He uses 
imagination to denote our capacity to conjecture, to guess when we lack sufficient 
evidence and then to believe in our own guesswork: thus a capacity for wishful 
thinking, consoling make-believe, intuition, habitual belief and tentative beliefs 
(including scientific hypotheses – OCG I 399) which harden imperceptibly into 
certainty359, particularly if we find others with the same beliefs.  Why 
imagination?  Because it can happen that something we merely imagined or 
suspected at time t´ becomes mixed up with perceptions of an actual state of 
affairs at t´´ and several such experiences could solidify into a lasting belief360.   
 
If the tendency of imagination is to deceive the mind361, that is not its most 
dangerous feature: although it is most often deceptive, the beliefs it generates are 
not always false: some guesswork, and some beliefs arrived at without sufficient 
                                                          
356 Pensées 44:78, 93:127, 427:681, 554:463, 665:546.  
357 Les Passions de l’Âme I.20 (AT XI 344). Pascal tends to disparage imaginative effort: Hazelton 
1974, p 85. 
358 For a review of Pascal’s Continental predecessors and contemporaries in this field, see 
Ferreyrolles 1995, especially pp 123-137 & 139.  Across the Channel, Browne says: ‘The first and 
father cause of common Error, is the common infirmity of humane nature’ (Pseudodoxia 
Epidemica, I.i [ed. Robin Robbins, Oxford, Clarendon: 1981], vol. I, p 5. (Browne drew on, inter 
alios, Charron, Mersenne and Descartes: see ibid., Vol II, pp 651 ff.)  And Hooke speaks of ‘deriv’d 
corruption’ (quoted in Harrison, P: ‘Original Sin and the Problem of Knowledge in Early Modern 
Europe’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 63 (2002), 2, pp 244-5).  See also Locke: Essay IV.xx.6 etc. 
359 See Hazelton 1974, p 84 and Magnard 2001, p 27.  
360 Montaigne’s notion of imagination includes fanciful belief (e.g. in miracles) but also empathy, 
suggestibility and nervousness (Montaigne 2002 I, pp 179 & 182 ff.).  He says it is the source of 
sin, illness, indecisiveness, distress and despair (ibid., II p 202).  Butler similarly calls ‘imagination’ 
the ‘parent of false presumptions’ (The Analogy of Religion, I.i.7). 
361 Compare Descartes’s Les Passions de l’Âme Art. 211  (AT XI 487). 
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evidence, turn out to be true.  Not all true beliefs are rational and not all rational 
beliefs are true362.  Imagination does not itself provide a criterion for 
distinguishing between true and false beliefs: intuitive solutions can be correct 
but are not subjectively distinguishable from incorrect intuitions363.     
 
Error creeps into many domains of life.  We make perceptual mistakes 
(44:68); we get things out of proportion, assigning weight to the trivial and 
minimising the thing of greatest importance, i.e. God (531:456 & 551:461)364.  Our 
conceptions of beauty raise the trivial to global importance: the length of 
Cleopatra’s nose changed ‘the whole aspect of the Earth’365.   (This judgment is, by 
the way, itself an example of the sort of sloppy thinking Pascal criticises: there is 
no evidence that, absent Cleopatra, Mark Antony would have continued to share 
power peacefully with Octavius for very long366.) 
  
 The damaging errors are not those momentary beliefs which we correct 
quickly by deliberate or instinctive checking.  Many errors are long-lasting and 
difficult to erase, especially beliefs held since childhood367: they are often 
rehearsed in our parents’ tone of voice; they become ‘second nature’ and in some 
cases the delusional foundations (folies) of our social arrangements368: people 
believe themselves to be happy or unhappy, healthy or sick, rich or poor.  If 
people feel at the height of their powers, they become unjustifiably self-confident 
and contented with themselves.  Chronic error (imagination) ‘can’t make fools 
wise but it can make them happy’ (44:78)369.   
 
                                                          
362 See Elster 1985, p 16.  
363  Kahnemann 2011, pp 12 & 185. 
364 For Descartes too, it is the imagination which exaggerates the importance of the objects of 
emotion: Les Passions de l’Âme, Art. 90 (AT XI 395).   
365 Pensées 413:32, 46:79 & 197:228.  
366 See MacIntyre 2007, pp 99-100.  The molehill which caused William III’s riding accident might 
be a better example of a tiny animal indirectly changing history. 
367 Compare Descartes’s Principes, I, 71-2 (AT IX-2 58-60).    
368 Pensée 14:48. See Ferreyrolles 1984, p 114.  Long-held beliefs and ideologies (often formed by 
the mechanism of ‘la contiguité coutumière’) tend to conceal their origin in arbitrary custom 
(Ferreyrolles 1995, p 29). 
369 Errors also arise from illness, bias caused by personal interest, perceptual mistakes and 
emotional states (44:78) and from believing something because everyone does (505:672). 
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As for the social context of belief, imagination makes reputations.  It is the 
basis of respect: of persons and their works, of laws and officers of the law, of  
medicine and doctors and of wealth and the rich.  It works by linking appearance 
to (an often false) belief in a person’s competence or incompetence.  Our beliefs 
about other people often arise from hasty or risky assessment of appearances.   A 
scruffy, hoarse-voiced preacher will not impress the listener, however good his 
sermon, especially if the listener is a magistrate whose appearance and dignity 
are essential to his own role.  Rulers, judges, lawyers, academics and doctors take 
advantage of this human weakness by creating an appearance of authority and 
power (ibid.).   
 
  Our social setting actually reinforces our errors by a reciprocal process: 
we gain respect by showing respect to others:  people in the same group tend to 
reinforce each other’s false self-image (806:653).  We do not wish to face the fact 
of our own smallness, unhappiness and imperfections, so we eliminate them as 
far as possible from our conscious life (connaissance) and from the knowledge of 
others: ‘la vie humaine  n’est qu’une illusion perpétuelle; on ne fait que s’entre-
tromper et s’entre-flatter’ (978:743 at OCG II 894).   We enter friendships to gain 
the respect of others but however agreeable they are to us, behind our backs they 
criticise our faults: ‘if everyone knew what others said about him, there would be 
not even four friends in the world’370.  So we fail to gain what we want from 
friendship.   
 
Pascal implies that most of us are unaware of our weaknesses and carry on 
in our allotted stations in life as if they were founded on reason and justice 
(33:67).  We waste our time without being conscious of the worthlessness of 
human activity in general371.  Seen through the prism of custom and habit, our 
activities appear sanctified by tradition or by the practice of the group(s) to which 
                                                          
370 Pensée 792:646.  Compare Hobbes’ De Cive, Ch.  I Art.  2: in society ‘we wound the absent; their 
whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged, condemned’. 
371 Pensées 16:50 & 36:70. 
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we belong or by fashion372 or, paradoxically, because they are new or 
unexplored373.  Hence our inability to see that divertissement is just vanity. 
 
Pascal does not claim that all our beliefs are false.  He is not in danger of 
self-refutation, since he stresses that we can pause to evaluate evidence and 
beliefs rationally.  The pensées on man’s grandeur point to our capacity to reflect 
and to be conscious of the state we are in, and thus potentially to correct 
epistemic and moral errors374.  Secondly, a distinction is necessary here between 
activities which are each constituted by a well-tested method using a basic 
amount of information, and those which are not.  If Pascal wished to go from Paris 
to Clermont, he did so successfully (though not necessarily on time) because there 
was a well-established means for so doing375.   In some spheres we have reached a 
level of practical knowledge which enables us individually and collectively to act 
effectively.  But he rightly lambasts physicians of his time who pretended to know 
how to cure diseases, but relied on custom and lore handed down from 
generation to generation376.  As for lawyers, the chaotic state of French law – 
which Montaigne lamented377 – seriously undermined their ability to ensure 
justice: their profession is based on an illusion378.  Pascal condemns political 
leaders and academics for analogous reasons (his skirmish with Père Noël on the 
void illustrated his disdain for the latter). 
 
It is noteworthy that Pascal attacks mainly privileged males, either 
aristocrats or professionals of his own social class, just as he does in the 
fragments on divertissement.  He would scarcely be able to maintain that the 
glassworkers who reportedly made huge tubes for his experiments in Rouen 
                                                          
372 Pascal’s attack on the doctrine of the horror vacui (OCG I 427) is an attack on customary theory.  
On the influence of custom on opinions, see Descartes’s Discours I (AT VI 10). 
373 Pascal concedes that he is attracted to novelty in mathematics (OCG I 281). 
374 Pensées 114:146 & 116:148. 
375 He emphasised the indispensability of experiment in physics so he would have appreciated this 
point.    
376 Within living memory, 70% of hospital procedures in England were not known to be effective; 
the figure today is between 20 and 30%.  See Colgrove, J: ‘The McKeown Thesis: A Historical 
Controversy and Its Enduring Influence’ (Am J Public Health, 2002, 92(5), pp 725-9, which points 
to a consensus among historians that ‘curative medical measures played little role in mortality 
decline prior to the mid-20th century’. 
377 Montaigne 2002 II, p 537 & III 452-3. 
378 See Entretien (OCG II 88) and, for comment, Enthoven 2009 pp 61-2. 
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lacked the requisite knowledge.  The most he would say about them is that their 
choice of profession was probably random, not rational379.  In sum, Pascal would 
have to concede that, insofar as it functions well, society rests on genuine 
knowledge and skills.  We are not completely immersed in error. 
 
Pascal’s various notes on imagination are themselves demonstrations that 
we are not prisoners of error.  He would not therefore be surprised to find the 
professions of law and medicine better administered today but he would still be 
able to show that the media in modern societies create illusions on an industrial 
scale through propaganda, advertising and news programmes380. 
 
The account of error has two functions in Pascal’s project: it is the 
explanation for our inability generally to see how futile our lives are, and it is an 
important prelude to his discussion of the nature of religious belief: Pascal aims 
to show that faith does not have to be put into the category of imagination.  He 
has to avoid any implication that it was a congeries of beliefs based only on 
custom, the accidents of birth and upbringing, and even on baseless conjecture or 
chance381.  Religious belief may have background features of these kinds.  But its 
truth can, in his view, be shown and there is a Christian explanation for the 
existence of diverse customs and of other religions. 
  
 19. Restlessness: seeking a remedy in diversion 
Pascal says, ‘our nature is in movement; complete repose is death’382.   He 
means our fallen nature: our condition consists in restlessness (inconstance), 
vague melancholy (ennui) and anxiety (inquiétude) 383 which result from our 
frequently suppressed feeling that our present satisfactions are illusory coupled 
with unawareness that our future ones are too (73:107).  As Mill puts it, we 
recognize in ourselves  
                                                          
379 Pensées 35:69, 129:162 & 634:527. 
380 See Williams 2005a, pp 162-3. 
381 Pensées 150:183, 193:226 and 821:661.  Compare Montaigne 2002 II, pp 179-80.   
382 Pensée 641:529bis. Thus he echoes Callicles’ reaction to Pythagorean dogma, in Gorgias  492e-
494a. 
383 Pensée 24:58.  See Hammond 1994, pp 86 ff. 
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‘the love of action, the thirst for movement and activity, a principle 
scarcely of less influence in human life than its opposite, the love of 
ease’384. 
 
Pascal’s second theme is thus divertissement: he describes the futility of 
many ordinary and ostensibly rewarding activities.  He sees the triviality of some 
people’s obsessions: the Friars Minor fighting over the length of their hoods 
(18:52), sportsmen chasing balls (39:73 & 136:168) or playing billiards 
(136:168) or real tennis (522:453) or tilting at the ring (620:513).  As futile 
activities he cites hunting a hare one would not normally pay for, gambling, doing 
algebra to impress people385, ‘la conversation des femmes’ (sic: presumably the life 
of the salons) (136:168), making music, dancing, the theatre, verse-making 
(620:513 & 628:521) or any sort of combat between animals or debaters 
(773:637) or admiring a picture of something (or someone) one doesn’t admire 
per se (40:74).  A modern suggestion is that analytic philosophy with no eye to the 
ends of life would count as Pascalian divertissement386. 
 
For other pursuits he uses the stronger term ‘folly’, i.e. an activity which 
fails, despite one’s beliefs to the contrary, to advance one’s interests.  His 
examples of folly include: seeking wealth or external goods (626:519) or fame 
(628:521) or top jobs, or going to war or ruling a country (136:168) or writing 
tracts on political philosophy (533:457).   Unlike some Jansenists387, Pascal did 
not blame people for seeking movement and amusement:   
‘their fault is not that they seek excitement [...] but [...] that they 
seek it as if, once they possessed what they seek, they’d be happy’ 
(136:168).   
It is sensible of ordinary people to indulge in divertissement so as to have at least 
some transient happiness (101:134); those who sneer, as if they were 
                                                          
384 See Mill 1969, p 96, also Voltaire 1964, p 173. 
385 This is a jibe, from a disciple of Desargues, against Descartes’s application of algebra to 
geometry (see Brunschvicg 1953, pp 126-9, Gardies 1984, p 101 & Carsin 2011, pp 36-7).  
386 See MacIntyre, A: The Tasks of Philosophy (Cambridge, CUP: 2006), pp 130-1. 
387 See Goldmann 1959, p 243. 
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philosophers, at their irrationality just don’t understand human nature (136:168 
at OCG II 584-5).   
 
On the other hand divertissement is essentially irrational because it does 
not bring about tranquillity388.  Although the hunter or gambler will, when 
questioned, be able to tell you why he hunts or gambles – and may admit that 
these activities are largely a way of passing time agreeably – he does not see 
beyond the futile aims of catching something or winning money.  Since these aims 
are not worth all the trouble their respective pursuits entail, the hunter’s or 
gambler’s behaviour is irrational: rationality implies acting on goal-oriented 
desires whose fulfilment can be achieved at proportionate expense389.  It does not 
involve acting on escapist desires whose fulfilment leads to no satisfying result, 
even in terms of the agent’s most modest expectations.  Pascal even seems to 
include family life in this category: such duties as providing for, and protecting 
the honour of, one’s family and friends can only make us discontented (139:171). 
 
Divertissement was the privilege of Pascal’s own milieu, the leisured 
nobility and gentry who lived as rentiers, and specifically of men from those 
classes.   Between the classes, the experience of divertissement differs:  
‘The gentleman sincerely believes that hunting is a great pleasure […] but 
his dog-handler doesn’t agree at all’ (136:168).   
Yet Pascal’s critique of human life goes wider: he claims that even those in hard 
jobs, a labourer or a common soldier, would not want to be idle (415:34) and then 
subject to gloomy thoughts.  He thus includes the sort of job which people took 
then, and do now, just to survive, in the category divertissement390.  This seems a 
harsh verdict on the majority of people who, in Thoreau’s words, ‘lead lives of 
quiet desperation’.  He concludes that all activities (occupations), although 
believed by the agent to be aimed at a good, are in reality futile because no-one 
can have knowledge of the good (28:62) without divine grace391; the same applies 
                                                          
388 See Elster 1985, Ch II. 
389 See Elster 2003, p 60. 
390 It would be misleading to identify divertissement with play (Hammond 1994 comes close to 
doing this).  Its essential feature is self-deceptive escapism.  
391 Pensée 44:78 at OCG II 555. 
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to attempts to arrive at scientific knowledge (890:445).  If all we can get out of 
our activities is that they distract us, they all can be classified as divertissement 
(478:713), i.e. activities which we use unreflectively to avoid thinking about our 
condition (136:168).  
  
Pascal says that, prima facie, our tendency to seek distraction and 
amusement can be explained by our inability to remain at rest in our own room; 
but there is a deeper explanation: our unhappiness at being weak and mortal, our 
being thus ‘so unhappy that nothing can console us when we really think about it’.  
That is why prison [solitary confinement] is so unpleasant, and why the pleasures 
of solitude are incomprehensible (136:168).  Even the most privileged person, a 
king, left to his own devices would think, first, of all the threats to his life and 
position and then of the inevitability of his own death392.    
 
It is no part of Pascal’s diagnosis that we desire only vigorous action: he 
can accept that what we hope to enjoy is a succession of active and restful states, 
although the latter typically involve undemanding activity393.  He may agree with 
Mill in giving slightly more importance to the human desire for repose than to our 
desire for activity394; but his main point is that even in repose we are dissatisfied: 
in this life, eudaimonia in complete repose eludes us395.  He is not alone in seeing 
this396.  Hobbes notes that  
‘there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we 
live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without 
desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense’397.   
                                                          
392 Pensée 137:169.  This echoes Plato’s description of the tyrant (Republic 580a) and Aristotle’s 
view that tyrants constantly need amusement (Nicomachean Ethics X.6, 1176b 9-23).  Hobbes 
takes a dim view of monarchs’ psychology: when they think their power is secure at home and 
abroad, they turn either to further conquest, or to ‘ease and sensual pleasure’, or to admiration 
and flattery (Leviathan I.11).  Observations of this kind do not, Pascal admits, apply to a Christian 
king – just as, we might add, it does not apply to Plato’s philosopher-king or to any wise monarch 
(Voltaire 1964, p 174). 
393 ‘La nature de l’homme n’est pas d’aller toujours’ (27:61). 
394 See Mill 1969, p 96. 
395 Human beings want to be active and at rest at the same time: that is their tragedy (Goldmann 
1959, p 229).  
396 Voltaire gives his character Martin a very Pascalian thought: ‘l’homme [est] né pour vivre dans 
les convulsions de l’inquiétude, ou dans la léthargie de l’ennui’ (Candide, Ch XXX).  On Voltaire’s 
Pascal, see Ehrard 1962, pp 238 ff.  
397 Leviathan I.6, Felicity. 
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Even the optimistic Hume allows that we cannot do without activity:  
 
‘I own the mind to be insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment,  
and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may produce  
a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits.’398 
 
Pascal goes deeper or at least more pessimistically: 
 
‘Nothing is more difficult for man to bear than to be completely still,  
without passions, matters to think about, diversions or tasks.  In that state 
he thinks about his nothingness, his abandonment, his insufficiency, his 
dependency, his powerlessness, his emptiness.  Immediately there well up, 
from the bottom of his soul, anguish, blackness, sadness, grief, spite, 
despair’ (622:515).   
 
Without the distraction of activity, we perceive both our moral frailty, the futility 
and absurdity of our lives and the inevitability of death.   
 
20. Futility and Fragility 
Might Pascal concede that there exist some human activities which are not 
in vain but a more or less agreeable necessity399?  Examples cited by his critics 
include parents bringing up children, craftsmen or artists creating things of use or 
beauty, any activity indeed which demonstrates commitment as well as skill.  And 
aren’t there activities whose results we cherish in repose: being in loving 
company, contemplating a work of art?  
 
Pascal has three overlapping replies to these suggestions.  First, it is the 
process of activity which we value: we are not, he would argue, committed to the 
                                                          
398 This assertion is a concession to those ‘who take pleasure in declaiming against human nature’ 
and who see the ‘continual search after amusement in gaming, hunting, in business’ as avoidance 
of ‘the deepest melancholy and despair’ (Hume 2007, I, p 228) – perhaps a reference to Pascal but 
possibly also to Rousseau (see Ehrard 1962, pp 237-8).  Hume returned to this point many times 
(see Hume 2007 II, pp 846 & 882).  
399 Lacombe 1958, p 171.  I owe some of the examples in the following paragraphs to Lacombe’s 
lucid commentary. 
106 
 
 
 
end-product: ‘they’re not aware that it is the hunt not the quarry that they seek’ 
(136:168).   ‘Only the combat pleases us, not the victory’ (773:637).  We might 
concede that indeed even in important matters, the process counts for more than 
the result.  Our commitment to any project dies in the end, celebrating its success 
or accepting its failure.  Second, what diverts (or occupies) us is external to us and 
‘is subject to a thousand accidents which cause inevitable afflictions’ (132:165): 
the end result is never guaranteed; no external element of human life is 
permanent: our lives are in this sense fragile400.  Third, human achievement is 
inevitably evanescent: people in all walks of life don’t achieve the happiness they 
seek because they can’t attain lasting satisfaction; after each disappointment we 
hope that things will be different next time, yet ‘experience tricks us into carrying 
on from one misfortune to another, until death which caps it all eternally’ 
(148:181).  As ‘spectators of our own lives’, we see that they pass leaving no 
enduring value401. 
 
Would Pascal have conceded that it is logically possible for people to find 
lifelong and worthwhile satisfactions?  For us, these would not arise from light-
hearted amusements, but from serious, long-term activities, most likely of a 
creative nature.  For example, from the fact that J S Bach continued composing till 
his dying day one can reasonably conclude that he saw lasting value in his music, 
perhaps independently of his religious faith.  If a creative person looks back on a 
life of both success and failure, he may still value the whole for what he has 
achieved.  Disappointments may be inevitable, but some people can surmount 
them just by looking at their lives as a whole. 
 
Behind Pascal’s pessimism lies an invitation to us to reflect on the brevity 
of human life and the smallness of our actions (402), their insignificance even in 
the context of our inner circle.  We can, in Larkin’s phrase,  
 
‘sense the solving emptiness 
                                                          
400 See OCG II 86 and pensée 199:230 (OCG II 612) and compare Epictetus 1959: Discourses I, 4.   
401 For Hans Küng, our earthly life is ‘entirely ephemeral’: see his Eternal Life? (New York: Image 
Books: 1985), p 4. 
402 Pensées 148:181 & 427:681. 
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That lies just under all we do’.  
 
There are three thoughts at work here: one is that our activities don’t 
secure for us what we want in general, namely enduring contentment.  The 
second thought is that, looked at in the wider context of human achievement as a 
whole, each individual life adds up to very little, inter alia because neither as 
individuals nor working together can we solve the problem of the deep feelings of 
discontent which  most people in our societies would, on reflection, admit to 
having.  Thirdly, Pascal believed that, as finite beings, we are at the mercy of our 
own fallibility (44:78) and of external influences403 : we cannot master either 
ourselves or our environment – or ensure that the human race inherits any 
achievements which we may credit to ourselves – yet we suffer from the illusion 
that we are masters of our own destiny404. 
 
  It would stop Pascal’s therapy in its tracks if we could show either that our 
predicament is not really a problem at all or that it can be remedied without 
turning to Christian faith, without in essence creating the City of God.   Our 
predicament, as described by Pascal, does not look like a provable matter of fact: 
optimists are just as numerous as pessimists: Aquinas takes the view that we can 
be genuinely happy in this life, in worthwhile activity, even though this world 
cannot give us perfect happiness405.  One of Descartes’s moral principles is 
‘d’aimer la vie sans craindre la mort’ and ‘nous avons toujours plus de biens que de 
maux en cette vie [...] elle me semble nous enseigner que nous ne devons pas 
véritablement craindre la mort [...]’406.    
 
 But religious pessimism is not confined to Pascal.  Wittgenstein says that 
religious commitment might come from seeing ‘the hopelessness of my situation’ 
                                                          
403 Pensées 48:81, 199-200:230-231. 
404 See Spinoza’s account of our inevitable failure as finite beings, with a natural tendency to assert 
ourselves but with no chance of prevailing over our environment: Ethics IV.3.  See Joachim, H H: A 
Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford, Clarendon: 1901), pp 255-8. 
405 See MacIntyre 2009, p 75. 
406 Letter to Mersenne, 9 January 1639: AT II 480 and Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 3 November 
1645: AT IV 333. 
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and then running to religion as ‘a means of rescue’407.   Swinburne concedes that 
‘for most of us, our life on earth contains many good things’ but he adds  
‘Natural processes make our situation bad and unhappy [...] The salvation 
available on earth is indeed a limited one’408.    
That last point is crucial: the religious attitude is minimally expressed in the 
observation that however much we find life rewarding now, its very finiteness 
brings us to ask the question: ‘And then?’ as the eponymous heroine of the film 
Ida puts it. 
 
Pascal the therapist thus presses a normative pessimism on his subject: if 
the subject claims to be happy with e.g. hunting and dissipation, he replies that 
she is not unconditionally happy, and with the person who, like Montaigne, 
withdraws from human society to seek tranquillity, he will say, as we saw in 
Chapter I, that he has slipped into faint-hearted inertia (‘une extrême lâcheté’ – 
OCG II 95) which will lead over time to regret at not having grasped opportunities 
for action.  The human dilemma is thus either to fail to achieve tranquillity 
through action or to fail to do anything and thus have one’s tranquillity, if any, 
spoilt by regret.  Pascal assigns value neither to activity nor to rest between 
activities because neither delivers true contentment.   The modern distinction 
between moment-to-moment happiness and life satisfaction409 illuminates 
Pascal’s doctrine: satisfaction is based on a retrospective assessment of purpose 
when the experienced pleasure is no longer present.  It is in this phase that any of 
us may lapse into gloom. 
 
But we need not follow Pascal further.  One option open to us is to declare 
that the good life is a balanced combination of activity and repose410: neither is 
valuable in itself, but – if the balanced life achieves contentment over time – that 
is the best we can hope for.  Another option is to say that it is a matter of 
temperament and social conditions whether one is busy or inactive: different 
individuals (and societies) will put different values on activity and inactivity, 
                                                          
407 Wittgenstein 1980, p 64. 
408 Swinburne 2005, pp 170 & 174. 
409 See the discussion in Sunstein 2014. 
410 As Hume does: Hume 1902, p 9. 
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according to their situation: some under external threat may require more 
individual or collective action while others with little external danger and lavish 
resources to meet their needs may require less.  
 
A competing value system would challenge Pascal’s: its protagonist would 
argue that we can do something about this futile and unhappy existence without 
resorting to Christian faith.  The Utilitarian optimist – while conceding that of 
course one or more moments of happiness could not justify a whole life – might 
say that in principle one could devote one’s life to increasing the sum total of the 
happiness of the human race and to instilling in others the same sense of mission.  
Such a beneficent campaign could have a ‘multiplier effect’ such that, even if the 
sum of human happiness varied from one epoch to another, the overall level of 
happiness would be higher over time411.  
  
Pascal was not unsympathetic to social schemes set up to increase 
happiness or at least to diminish suffering.  But he would reply to the Utilitarian 
that all human institutions are unstable and liable to change or vanish over time 
because they are at the mercy of the irreducible diversity of human beings and of 
human passions, customs and prejudices (60:94)412.  They lack absoluteness413.   
Nagel too would say that the Utilitarian programme would not reduce the 
absurdity of life because happier (or less unhappy) lives are still absurd lives: ‘If 
we take others seriously and devote ourselves to them, that only multiplies the 
problem [of the absurdity of human life]’414.  This remark applies to futile lives 
too.  This is not for him – nor was it for Pascal or Spinoza – a matter of fact, but is 
necessarily the case.  An apparently non-futile life, a contented or apparently 
purposeful life, may still be ultimately futile because it serves ends which just 
prolong or enhance other fundamentally futile existences.   
 
                                                          
411 For a brief discussion of these points, and a pessimistic view of Utilitarian schemes, see 
Kołakowski 1997, pp 231-45. 
412 The bus service, designed by Pascal to fund help for victims of a natural disaster, ran for less 
than 30 years. 
413 As a Law-maker, God is indestructible (OCG II 186). 
414 Nagel 1979, p 14. 
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21.  Absurdity 
If our own activities don’t give our lives meaning, perhaps they are a 
contribution to the life of the universe and meaningful in that sense.  Pascal would 
deny this possibility: he implies that our relationship to an infinite, mute universe 
(198:229) cannot give our lives meaning (199:230).  Man’s position as ‘neither 
angel nor beast’415 does not give him a place in the universe.  Unlike the beasts 
whose behaviour is proper to their species, man has no such fixed nature: he can 
assume any patterns of animal behaviour; after the Fall he has indeed descended 
to the level of the beasts which have become his enemies416.   
 
The cosmos tells us nothing about our place in it: the agnostic does not 
know where she came from, what the infinite cosmos means, where she fits into it 
and what is the nature of the death from which she cannot escape (427:681).    
This thought is not only the agnostic’s: the seeker after faith too can be struck by 
the apparent meaninglessness of the cosmos (68:102 and 198:229) which does 
not reveal its Creator (429:682).  This thought goes beyond the notions of futility 
and fragility: it points to our absurdity which consists in the fact – if it is a fact – 
that the cosmos does not show that we belong in it, that we have a function in it, 
that our lives have meaning in that sense.    
 
On the contrary, our role in the cosmos is characterised by the manifest 
and cruel absurdity of our unparalleled ability, compared with that of other 
species, to engage in savage and genocidal conflict with members of our own 
species, to spoil our environment and to bring about the extinction of other 
species.   We are the most calamitous and arrogant species417. 
 
Yet, Pascal would reply, we are aware of our faults and deficiencies – our 
misère418 – and have the ability – our grandeur – to seek God (149:182).  We have 
immortal longings in us.  This has been put without begging the question of the 
                                                          
415 Pensées 678:557 & 121:154. 
416 On the fixed nature of non-human creatures, see the remarks on bees at OCG I 455-6.  On 
human plasticity, see Pensées 397:16, 400:19, 630:523 & 664:545. (The latter two Pensées use the 
biblical term: omne animal: we can become any animal, used by Pico della Mirandola in his De 
hominis dignitate .)  On brutes as enemies: 149:182 at OCG II 595. 
417 Montaigne 2002 II, p 190, echoing Pliny. 
418 Pensées 114:146 and 117:149. 
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truth of Christianity. Cottingham has argued that our abilities to appreciate truth, 
beauty and love ‘give the lie to the glib labelling of our universe as inherently 
dead and void of value’419.  But these human capacities are counterbalanced by 
our tendency to vice of all kinds, to cruelty and to destructiveness.  In any case, to 
argue that we have a meaningful place in the cosmos because we give moral or 
aesthetic meaning to our lives seems unavoidably circular.   
 
22. The Mechanics of Error and Futile Activity 
Therapy needs explanation as well as diagnosis.  Pascal offers an 
explanation of the human predicament on two levels: psycho-anthropology and 
doctrine, i.e. the Christian explanation of human nature as it is now.   In this 
Section, I reconstruct Pascal’s account of the mechanisms which are at work in us 
and which lead to the state we are in.  The Pensées contain enough hints of 
Pascal’s theory – that our drives, desires and emotions conduce to error and futile 
behaviour – for us to do this.  The theory centres on six main psychological 
mechanisms or syndromes: the nexus between desire and belief, the treadmill of 
desire, selectivity of attention, avoidance of the present, self-deception, and 
fixation of belief.  I will take these up in turn. 
 
22.1 Desire and Belief 
The mechanics of error, as Pascal sees them, hinge on a contrast between 
reason and the passions420.   Imagination pleases us whereas ‘reason [pursued to 
the point of finding out the truth about our condition] can only make its friends 
miserable’; so powerful are our desires and emotions that ‘reason has been 
obliged to give way and in its wisest form adopts as its principles those which 
imagination has boldly inserted into every sphere’ (44:78)421.  We naturally 
prefer pleasure to pain and thus pleasant thoughts to unpleasant ones; we find 
idées recues, habit and custom more comfortable and easier to follow than 
                                                          
419 Cottingham 2003, p 61. 
420 See pensées 44:78, 410:29 & 621:514.  It is the agnostic’s passions which prevent him from 
believing in God (418:680). 
421 The second phrase anticipates the Humean judgment that reason is always the slave of the 
passions. 
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working out what to believe for ourselves422.  Needing to act without excessive 
delay, we take risks, ignoring the fact that we lack evidence423.   
 
Pascal does not suggest that we choose to adopt erroneous beliefs424: it is 
just because we make no effort of will that we passively fall into error.  The 
irrationality of erroneous beliefs consists in their lacking sufficient – or indeed 
any – relevant evidence or sufficient reason.  There is no conscious act of choice 
involved: the pompous judge who discounts the scruffy preacher’s sermon, the 
Stoic on his plank, the person who judges that an empty trunk really contains 
nothing425 – all these are ‘induced’ by imagination to fall into error (44:78, 
especially OCG II 554). Our desires can influence our beliefs, for it is they that are 
formed by upbringing, chance, customs, personal habits, social display, illness and 
personal interest.  We focus on aspects of the truth which please us; belief itself is 
not chosen (539:458).  It is, as I will mention below, the absence of reflective 
choice which characterises error.  We are often ‘machines’ driven to believe and 
to act as we do, not on the basis of reasoning, but by desire and habit (821:661).  
22.2 The Hedonic Treadmill  
  Pascal says that we are, in our natural state now (on which more will be 
said below), invariably unhappy.  As parts of the physical universe, we are in a 
state of flux (199:230); continual change (in our bodies) gives rise to thoughts 
which come and go randomly (542:459) 426, our minds are naturally ‘voluble’ 
(574:477) so that our consciousness consists in an ever-changing flow of 
                                                          
422 The key features of these patterns of causation of belief are, as Hume puts it, constancy and 
coherence on the part of the observed world and custom and habit in us, causing us to associate 
ideas (Hume 2007 I, pp 130-3).  
423 Leibniz agrees with Locke that one of the main causes of error is that most people have no time 
to review their beliefs because they are ‘are given up to Labour and enslaved to the Necessity of 
their mean Condition’ (Locke: Essay IV.20.2; Leibniz: New Essays concerning Human 
Understanding, IV.xx (ed. Langley, A: La Salle, Open Court: 1949), pp 607 ff. 
424 He thus implicitly rejects Descartes’s description of error in Méditation IV, in terms of the will’s 
greater extent than the intellect’s (AT VII 56-60).  On the difficulties of that doctrine, see Williams 
2005b, Ch 6. 
425 See Descartes’s Méditation VI: ‘il y a plusieurs autres choses […] qui se sont introduites en mon 
esprit par une certaine coutume […] ainsi il peut aisément arriver qu’elles contiennent quelque 
fausseté […] par exemple, l’opinion que j’ai que tout espace dans lequel il n’y a rien qui […] fasse 
impression sur mes sens, soit vide’ (AT IX-1 65). 
426 He accepts Descartes’s picture of the human body as a machine (l’automate) (see OCG I 106) 
which is incessantly changing and thus causing the psychological changes we experience.   
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experiences, images, felt desires and sensations427.  So desires continually arise in 
us, at the level of consciousness, to be in a different state from the one we are in 
(639:529).  This process involves awareness of each of our desires ‘joined with’ 
the awareness of our current discontent and the hope that fulfilling the desire 
would make us happy; yet this can produce only instability (73:107).  Thus, we 
become aware of desire D1 and try to fulfil it; whether we succeed or not, we 
experience either a positive or a negative mental state S1 but then, as a natural 
sequel to S1, we become conscious of D2 which, if we attempt to satisfy it, will lead 
to S2 which in turn will give rise to our consciousness of D3, and so on 
(639:529)428.  So ‘since we are always planning to be happy, it is inevitable that 
we should never be happy’ (47:80).   Divertissement is a type of this sequence 
working itself out in a particular setting429.    
 
  It follows that the duration of a life is not important for Pascal: 
accumulating pleasure – which is evanescent anyway – does not increase 
contentment because of the hedonic treadmill on which we are, when conscious, 
indefinitely condemned to run.  As Hobbes puts it:  
 
‘felicity is the continual progress of the desire, from one object to  
another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the  
latter’430. 
 
 The superiority of Pascal’s account of the treadmill over Stoic moral 
psychology is striking.  Whereas the Stoics tend to say that the human 
predicament is wanting-and-not-getting (as in longing and grief), Pascal rightly 
sees that satisfying a desire only leads to the emergence and pursuit of other 
desires.   It is thus impossible to give up desiring altogether: our need is, as will be 
explored in the next Chapter, to focus on desiring an object which completely 
fulfils our lives, namely union with God. 
                                                          
427 ‘[L]’homme change à toute heure, et ne peut jamais demeurer en même état’ (Ecrits sur la Grâce 
VIII, OCG II 275). 
428 Pascal’s account mirrors Plato’s image of the leaky and sealed pots at Gorgias 493b-494a.  See 
also Kraye 1988, p 317 n 98 on Facio’s De humanae vitae felicitate.  
429 See the example of the gambler: 136:168 at OCG II 586 footnote. 
430  Leviathan, Ch 11. 
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Pascal conflates having a desire with believing that fulfilling the desire will 
make one more contented than one is at present.  These two different features of 
the mental life can be disentangled and included in his account without creating 
any new problem: it helps us to distinguish between consciously or deliberately 
acting on a desire from an act which has no such antecedent.  Before I scratch an 
itch, only in special circumstances would I deliberate before doing so.  Addictive 
behaviour may also occur without reflection on its consequences.  Other routine 
behaviour may, on the other hand, rely on beliefs which I hold but do not at the 
moment of action bring to consciousness.  Pascal’s account therefore needs to 
recognize the complexity of the states S1 etc. which are not always of the same 
structure.  They can include explicit awareness of any or all of the following, or 
none of them: of the preceding or concurrent action, of D1, of D2, of my belief that 
the act of fulfilling D1 or D2 conduces to contentedness, or none of them: we can 
have desires and beliefs of which we are not concurrently aware, and act on them. 
 
Pascal assumes that we are usually incapable of stepping off the treadmill 
of desire unaided, especially when we lack adequate awareness of our 
predicament: hunters don’t realise that it is only the business of hunting they 
want, not the quarry431.  Yet Pascal’s project presupposes that people can and do 
step off the hedonic treadmill and adopt strategies which– however imperfect in 
conception and execution– change the course of their lives.  A life of endless 
futility is in principle avoidable as the classical doctrines of virtue suggest432.  
Pascal summarily recognises that the elements of this life-changing opportunity 
exist: we can reflect on our lives (200:231), step back from our current activities 
and goals, and change direction: we can reflect on our predicament and resolve to 
try to change it: we are neither beasts nor angels (678:557).  We may need 
training to do this, but that too Pascal foresees (821:661). 
 
                                                          
431 Pensée 136:178 at OCG II 585.  We might call Pascal’s ‘instincts’ drives, i.e. internal factors 
which shape desires but of which we are not usually conscious; they can cause us to hold 
erroneous beliefs (see Elster 1985, pp 24-5). 
432 See Nussbaum 2009. 
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22.3 Selectivity of Attention  
Pascal is fully aware that we can’t choose to believe just anything:   the will 
doesn’t create belief; but we can choose to attend to one aspect of a proposition so 
that when we come to form a judgement we do so only on the basis of what is 
before us (539:458).  Any choice may cause bias which in turn can lead to error; 
modern social scientists call this the ‘focusing illusion’433.   It is impossible for an 
individual to avoid bias: her time and other resources are limited: she can’t 
suspend belief indefinitely while she broadens the field of her attention.  In 
practice human agents’ search for information to support or falsify their beliefs is 
limited by one or both of two considerations:  how urgent is the need to take 
action, and how important it is, in the agent’s current situation, to act on the basis 
of a hypothesis and therefore how much time or other resource she wishes to 
devote to it434.  Human agents face limited resources of time and energy.  They 
incur, therefore, an ineradicable risk of self-deception or bias. 
 
22.4   Self-Deception   
Pascal’s account of the human condition doesn’t imply that we are 
invariably self-deceived in what we think or do: imagination generates erroneous 
beliefs, not necessarily the holding of two incompatible beliefs.  But he does 
describe three types of case where we both hold a fundamental belief about 
ourselves and yet deny it (the sense of ‘fundamental’ here will become apparent).  
First, we claim to be chaste or humble, or sceptics able to doubt everything; but 
most of us deceive ourselves: ‘We are only lies, duplicity, self-contradiction, and 
we hide and disguise ourselves from ourselves’ (655:539).   
 
Secondly: we habitually hide our faults from ourselves and others, thus 
creating a self-reinforcing web of self- and mutual deception (see the discussion 
in Section 17 above of pensée 978:743).  Note also that the gambler ‘deceives 
himself’ into imagining that the sum he could win would make him happy, but if 
you gave the same sum to him, he’d still want to gamble (136:168).  (It might be 
argued that Pascal skews the case in his favour by focussing mainly on activities 
                                                          
433 See Kahnemann 2011, pp 402-6. 
434 See Elster 1985 and Elster 2003, pp 58-63. 
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(i.e. sports and games where chance plays a role) which bring out our disposition 
to deceive ourselves, for example by attributing success to our own skill and 
failure to bad luck.  Yet this idea can be extended to failure and success in life 
generally, of course and, as I will mention in Chapter V, to the belief that one has 
received grace435.) 
 
Thirdly, we are paradoxical beings: we have ‘a secret [i.e. unconscious] 
instinct’ to be active and to seek excitement and buried deep in us another 
‘secret’436 instinct: to seek tranquillity (the trace of our pre-lapsarian nature to 
which I will refer below).  The latter ‘instinct’, like the former, influences our 
behaviour and emotions without our bringing either to consciousness (136:168).   
We can think that – at the end of a day’s hunting, for example – we shall find 
restful contentment and that we shall somehow step off the hedonic treadmill, but 
that is just what we do not do, unless we achieve a revolution in our conception of 
human life, seeing it in a completely new light.  
 
Self-deceived role-playing is a common development of human behaviour: 
hence the bogus self-importance of magistrates and doctors who contribute little 
if anything to society’s well-being (44:78).  They wear ‘disguises’ as Pascal puts it: 
they may, like some members of the Royal Family today, become sticklers for 
dress and protocol but nothing else437.  Academics who care little for their 
appearance 364 days a year suddenly don pseudo-mediaeval garb for the role-
playing of Graduation Day.  Divertissement itself consists in processes which we, 
unconsciously or unreflectively, generate a false image of ourselves.   
 
Descartes sketches two embryonic accounts of self-deception: his 
mourning widower displays a sort of self-deception created by the existence of 
                                                          
435 See Williams 2011, pp 217-8. 
436 Pascal’s term ‘secret’ is important here: Descartes’s widower sheds genuine tears at the funeral 
as a ceremonial gesture but harbours ‘une joie secrète’ at his wife’s death (AT XI 441).   
437  On collective self-deception in public life, see Williams 2005a, Ch 13.  His point is mainly about 
political self-deception but the mechanisms which he describes have wider ramifications: the 
mass media can and do distort personal relationships as well as political arrangements. 
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conflicting emotions and his social setting438; his religious bigots attribute all the 
religious virtues to themselves while being intensely uncharitable to those who 
do not share their beliefs439.   More fully developed is the case of Sartre’s waiter 
who feels undervalued as a waiter but, in his stiff way, operates mechanically to 
deceive himself that he has no freedom to change his situation440.  
 
Pascal’s use of the notion of self-deception needs a more searching essay in 
psycho-anthropology than he supplies.  We should, for example, make clear that 
self-deception is not the simultaneous and conscious acceptance of p and ∼p.  Nor 
is it, as some have claimed, the intentional adoption of a belief441 which 
contradicts a belief one already holds.  Self-deception is unlike intersubjective 
deception which involves believing that p but stating that ∼p to others, or 
otherwise acting as if ∼p is the case with intent to deceive.   When self-deceived I 
may say to myself whatever puts me in the best light and ignore its contrary – 
which would, were I to reflect on it, appear to me to be true.  Since belief shows in 
behaviour, an astute observer can see from my behaviour (over a certain period) 
that there is a mental conflict which my behaviour expresses. 
  
Self-deception is not, in Pascal’s eyes, an affliction of the transparent 
Cartesian mind: it trades on the fact that we do not reflect on all our beliefs or 
suspicions or fears all the time nor do we keep checking our beliefs etc., yet we 
have them442.  For Pascal, self-deception is a strategy adopted by the whole 
person in whom beliefs arise as a result of physical processes (821:661), beliefs 
for which one may be unable to give a reason.  The self-deceived person often 
avoids explicit recognition of either p or ∼p although the truth or falsity of p is 
actually important to him: the waiter’s behaviour conveys to the observer the 
idea that he is or can be much more than a waiter while at the same time he does 
what waiters do.   He cannot say to himself that he is self-deceived, for the 
                                                          
438 Les Passions de l’Âme II.147 (AT XI 440-1).  Pascal also sees bereavement as an occasion for 
hiding the truth from oneself in divertissement (136:168 at OCG II 586). 
439 Les Passions de l’Âme III.190 (AT XI 471-2). 
440 See Sartre 1943, pp 98-100, and Merleau-Ponty, M: La Phénoménologie de la Perception (Paris: 
Gallimard 1945), p 435: ‘The child and many adults are dominated by “situational values” that 
hide their actual feelings from themselves’.  
441 Pensée 539:458.  See Elster 1985, pp 149-50. 
442 See van Fraassen 1988, p 125. 
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hypothesis of self-deception rules out his being able to say any such thing about 
himself.  It is also clear that, as Pascal suggests in the case of the honnête homme 
(597:494), self-deception arises over issues which are fundamental for us, 
especially in moral contexts: moral rules are never precise enough to resist 
perverse interpretation443, nor are moral facts. 
 
We may always fear that we are self-deceived about something important 
to us444.  I will argue in Chapter V that the believer who deliberates about her 
faith cannot escape from this fear.  Pascal’s account of self-deception – its non-
intentionality, social context and involvement of the whole person – implies that 
certainty about oneself is hard to find. 
 
22.5 Avoidance of the Present 
One aspect of self-deception is a mechanism of avoidance.  Anyone who 
examines his thoughts would, Pascal claims, find them focussed almost always on 
the past or the future.  If we do think about the present, it would be only to work 
out what to hope or try for in the future445.  Hence, we do not focus just on the 
present moment, but tend either to think about the future or – if that looks 
unappealing – to relive the past.  We do this because the present is [generally] 
painful to us446:  without hope for the future or consolation from the past, we’d be 
able to think only of our current miseries or of those that threaten us in the future 
(136:168).  If we focused on the present, we’d suffer from a sort of melancholy 
(ennui) which is deeply rooted in our natures (ibid.).   
 
Evidently this tendency contributes to our restlessness either to banish 
thoughts from the past or to fulfil pleasant anticipations of the future: focus on the 
present requires a sort of inertia, the opposite of action.  It is thus hardly 
achievable for human beings:  it is not even clear that meditation achieves a focus 
                                                          
443 For Bishop Butler, self-deception in morality arises out of ignorance of our own characters, out 
of egoism and passionate engagement, and turns on the indeterminacy of moral rules (Butler 
1914, Sermon X). 
444 ‘Nothing is as difficult as not deceiving oneself’ (Wittgenstein 1980, p 34). 
445 This tendency may assist self-deception, but it is also beneficial since it prompts us to plan for 
the future (Voltaire 1964, pp 172-3). 
446 Pensée 47:80.  ‘À chaque moment il me semble que je m’échappe’ (Montaigne 2002 I, p 165). 
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on the present as opposed to a state in which one attends to no moment in 
particular447.   
22.6 Fixation of Belief 
The will does not act in a vacuum: we choose those aspects of an object or 
situation which are agreeable to us448, which respond to our desires and elicit 
from us a favourable emotional reaction.  We need to fix on propositions to 
believe, and objects to love, so much so that in the absence of justification for our 
adoption of them, we’ll believe in false propositions and love vain objects 
(661:544).  We then have to forget that we have chosen to attend to only some 
aspects of an object or situation, so erroneous beliefs of this type need a certain 
time to form: hence Pascal’s emphasis on custom, habit and socialisation, on error 
as ‘second nature’ (44:78).  He appears to have believed that the process of 
fixation of belief was a physical one, constituted by repeated experiences of the 
same type or content or by repeated actions449.  Pascal believed that, unlike 
imagination, this feature of human nature can, as we shall see in Section 34, be 
used for a positive purpose: habituation as a way of approaching belief in God450.  
For less exalted purposes, it is a useful characteristic: for example, my experience 
of having completed pieces of work in the past gives me grounds for believing 
that I can complete this thesis, although I cannot be certain that tomorrow I shall 
be alive, or even capable of further work. 
 
In sum, Pascal’s moral psychology in the Pensées needs only sympathetic 
reconstruction, and some filling-in of the gaps, to be plausible.   His account of 
error is largely borne out by modern studies: surveys suggest that routines which 
are important to us individually or collectively can induce or be based on false 
beliefs451.  Error has its antecedents in thoughtless or unexamined behaviour.  
                                                          
447 Behind Pascal’s thinking here is probably the Augustinian thought that the past and the future 
are unreal and the present elusive (Confessions XI.11 & 14-16).  See Kołakowski 1982, pp 120-1. 
448 Pensées 44:78 & 539:458.  See Kołakowski 1997, p 195. 
449 See Davidson 1979, Ch 3. 
450 Pensées 7:41, 11:45, 418:680 and 821:661. See Ferreyrolles 1995, pp 99 ff.  On the fundamental 
importance of habituation for the acquisition of ethical beliefs, see Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics 
I.9, 1099b 8-1100a 9, II.1, 1103a 14-1103b 25 & X.9, esp. 1179b 31-1180a 14.   
451 And ‘what is “out there” is usually a farrago of truths, half truths, misperceptions, indifferent 
appearance and illusion’ (Geuss 2014, p 140).  On jumping to conclusions, see Kahnemann 2011, 
Ch. 7 and on the distorting role of imagination in choosing hypotheses to investigate, ibid. p 426.  
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Our acceptance of tradition and authority risks error: as Mill says,  ‘authority is 
the evidence on which the mass of mankind believe everything which they are 
said to know, except facts of which their own senses have taken cognizance’; and 
Nagel: ‘the whole system of justification and criticism, which controls our choices 
and supports our claims to rationality, rests on responses and habits that we 
never question...to which we shall continue to adhere even after they are called 
into question’452. 
 
Pascal’s accounts of motivation and intention are at best sketchy: they 
omit the possibility that a subject may have more than one desire at once: for 
example, desiring two equally appetising dishes on a menu, she chooses one 
because she wants to make a choice of one only, because she does not want to 
overeat.  Pascal does not explicitly account for second-order desires of this sort.  
He even refuses to accept that we can choose between two equally attractive 
options (OCG II 273).  The sheer implausibility of the story of Buridan’s ass does 
not appear to have occurred to him.   The treadmill metaphor (which is mine not 
Pascal’s) turns out to be unhelpful, unless it be allowed that a desire can arise to 
leave one treadmill for another, and that desire can be acted on: we have the 
subjective freedom to choose policies as well as specific outcomes. 
 
 This criticism raises an important point for Pascal’s project: if we can have 
second-order desires, we can order the fulfilment of our desires according to a 
policy or plan, and thereby ensure, of course, that over time some of our desires 
will fall off the agenda.  The bourgeois custom of postponing gratification need 
not concern only trivial, materialistic desires, but also the sort of goals which 
Christianity recommends.  Yet Pascal does not believe that there is a crucial 
element of choice here: as I will explain in Chapter V, he stresses instead the need 
for submission or obedience, not choice453.  He would appear to deny, to the great 
                                                                                                                                                                        
On the mixing in memory of the past and the present, see Fernyhough, C: Pieces of Light (London, 
Profile: 2012). 
452 Mill 1961, p 494 & Nagel 1979, p 15. 
453  More precisely, submission is a choice not to choose, to be passive: to try to ignore the 
treadmill altogether.  
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disadvantage of his project, that others can help us to avoid self-deception: he 
depicts others only as accomplices in self-deception. 
 
23.  Only Christian doctrine explains our ethical incapacity 
Pascal’s psychology of belief, desire and action is a mere sketch.  Had he 
worked it out, he would have allowed that we can choose strategies as well as 
immediate outcomes.  We are capable of reflecting and reasoning and thus, in 
principle, of choosing rational strategies to avoid error and unhappiness.   The 
question now is: how is it that most people choose ways of life which leave them 
dominated by error, distracted by divertissement and profoundly discontented?  
Why can’t we adopt more rational and satisfying ways of life?   
 
Pascal’s answer is that there is no explanation in terms of human potential 
for our failure: we are both wretched and great (117:149)454.  Instead, he makes a 
case for looking for a non-naturalistic explanation of persistent human weakness 
and under-achievement.  He believes that the Augustinian doctrine of the Fall 
(discussed in Section 7) explains the ‘paradox’ of human nature: it asserts that the 
current state of human nature differs from that at the time of Creation (OCG II 
95): the ‘human nature’ which then had been capable of choosing virtue is not the 
same ‘human nature’ which is now incapable unaided either of eudaimonia or of 
virtue: mankind has exchanged one condition for another (131:164).  Mankind 
was once truly happy but there remains only a trace of this now; instead of 
finding profound happiness, we run after external goods but remain incurably 
unsatisfied or unfulfilled (148:181).   
 
How can this doctrine explain both the conflicts in human nature and our 
failure successfully to devise and uphold a secular moral system? Pascal’s answer 
in general terms is that the Augustinian account of the Fall satisfies the 
requirement that the true religion must explain the paradox of mankind’s powers 
or potential (grandeur) and shortcomings (misère) (149:182).  For this to work, 
                                                          
454 Yet how can he show that a natural explanation – citing variations in human abilities and 
dispositions – is inadequate?  There is no logical contradiction in our wanting x yet being 
incapable of achieving x (Voltaire 1964, pp 162-4). 
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he has to identify a bridge which will take the agnostic from a perception of the 
human condition to a non-natural explanation of it. 
  
23.1 Pascal’s theological explanation 
The ‘bridge’ has to be a set of purely psycho-anthropological observations 
which the agnostic can accept but not explain.  Let us concede to Pascal that we do 
want to be active and yet yearn to be in repose; we suffer from limited 
knowledge; we are prone to error and to pursue external goods but seem in the 
end more interested in the process of getting them than in the goods themselves; 
we have moral understanding but fail to act on it455.  If we can peel away layers of 
self-deception, we’d see how deeply unhappy we are, whatever schemes we adopt 
to avoid our misery; but we also believe that, as human beings, we were destined 
for a better life than that of the beasts, that we should be able to choose that 
better life.   
 
Pascal argues that our feelings of futility and of ‘missing something’ are 
real enough for us to want to seek an explanation of them.  He says that no one 
could fail to realise that ‘Man is visibly lost’ (400:19) and that ‘he has fallen from 
his place which he seeks anxiously, but can no longer find’ (430:683).   His 
argument is thus that, unlike the rest of Nature, human beings have no 
satisfactory life.  Their failure is universal and irremediable.   
 
Even if we concede this, however, it is a great leap from these observations 
to claiming that the narrative of the Fall is an effective explanatory device.  There 
are two difficulties here: the need to interpret the ‘evidence’ in a convincing 
manner, and the need to offer a genuinely explanatory hypothesis.   
 
The thesis that the Fall explains our paradoxical nature may only be a 
‘working hypothesis’ to be confirmed (or not) when Pascal lays out his historico-
scriptural ‘proofs’456.  The deployment of ‘proofs’ would presuppose adoption of 
an agreed method of scriptural interpretation.  Yet Pascal is not consistent in 
                                                          
455 See Webb 1929, pp 68-75. 
456 See Shiokawa 2013, p 247. 
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practice: he interprets Genesis as a historical document which tells us what 
actually happened but treats the stories in other parts of the Old Testament 
(especially important prophecies) as metaphors457, the very treatment that other 
theologians would now give to Genesis458 . 
 
The Fall is, in any case, a strange kind of historical event: there is no 
evidence for it unless we take Genesis, a text written centuries after the supposed 
event, as evidence.  Pascal takes the bizarre view – probably based on the 
Jansenist Chronologie Sainte – that Genesis is composed of eye-witness accounts 
handed down over the centuries459.  Understandably Pascal has no other source to 
support his interpretation of Genesis.  The agnostic just has to take this story on 
trust while awaiting an explanation of the whole Christian narrative.  As I will 
discuss in Chapter V, we meet here the problem that significant events in the 
history of Christianity, whether human action, prophecies or miracles, draw their 
significance from the very doctrine which Pascal wants the agnostic to take on 
board. We cannot disentangle the history from the doctrine to arrive at a neutral 
explanation of the human condition.  The best consideration which Pascal can 
offer is that the account he gives of human nature coheres with Christian 
doctrine460. 
 
Yet our feelings of weakness and unhappiness are too vague per se to lead 
us infallibly towards a theological explanation461.  There is no reason to rule out a 
naturalistic solution to this problem in the future:  there are many things we do 
not know about ourselves and about the rest of the world.  Our ignorance is not 
necessarily incurable.  Pascal misses this point in his discussion of Montaigne’s 
                                                          
457 Pensée 270:301.  Most of his scriptural interpretation is not literal but of ‘figures’ or ‘chiffres’ as 
he calls them (259:290 & 270:301); his interpretation of Genesis is the exception to an almost 
consistent practice (276:307) based on the principle that whatever would be ‘unworthy’ of God 
must be interpreted figuratively (501:737) and because God has decided to blind [almost all] the 
Jews to the truth (256:288, also 311:342 & 1:37).  See PH I, pp xxiii-xxiv & Gibert 2013.   
458 See Wood 2013, p 20. 
459 Pensées 290:322; 296:327; II: 741.  This bizarre view seems to rest on the idea that God told 
Adam about Creation and that Adam witnessed all events in the Garden of Eden after his own 
creation.  
460 There is a further problem for Pascal: other religions – e.g. Mithraicism, Orphisms and versions 
of neo-Platonism – purport to explain human duality (see Bayet 1948, pp 129-34 and Voltaire 
1964, p 161).  
461 See the measured but incisive remarks in Russier 1949, pp 99-100. 
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scepticism: the apparent inexplicability of human behaviour now should not lead 
us to think that we shall never explain it: as he acknowledges elsewhere, scientific 
knowledge continually expands to conquer unknown domains462. 
 
Setting that problem aside, let us even so suppose that a thesis capable of 
convincing an agnostic could be extracted from the Bible, for example in terms of 
our propensity to fail morally: what sort of explanation would that thesis offer? 
Plainly not, in my view, an explanation analogous to those of modern psychology 
where it seeks as far as possible to draw conclusions from repeatable 
experiments: Pascal cites a unique event – the Fall – to explain the phenomena. He 
is aware that, in physics, any effect may be ‘explained’ by more than one 
hypothesis, e.g. the three rival cosmologies (ibid. OCG I 382-3) and that ‘we often 
draw the same conclusions from different suppositions’ (109:141)463.  The fact 
that the story of the Fall fitted the facts of human nature (if it did) would be no 
guarantee of its truth.  And the uniqueness of the Fall as a historical event 
prevents us from ascribing explanatory power to it, just as – in Hume’s eyes – the 
Creation cannot be used to explain why the world is as it is464.  
  
23.2 The incoherence of the doctrine of the Fall 
Pascal admits, however, that even if it did cohere with his account of the 
human predicament, the doctrine of the Fall would still contain two 
incomprehensible elements: if Adam was wholly virtuous and happy (‘whole, 
unstained, righteous and dutiful’ – OCG II 261; ‘holy, innocent, perfect [...] filled 
with light and intelligence’ – 149:182), how and why did he defy God?  How did 
his discontent arise?  Pascal’s answer is that Adam had free will, in the sense that 
he was equally capable of obeying God and disobeying Him465.   But if he was 
contented, why did he defy God?  If his wants were equally balanced between 
obedience and disobedience, what tipped the scales in favour of the latter? Pascal 
has no answer:  he concedes that Adam’s sin is inexplicable (431:683).  
                                                          
462 On the inexplicability of human behaviour, see the Entretien, OCG II 90; on scientific progress, 
see the Préface, OCG I 456-8.  
463 The Entretien includes a similar motif: OCG II 90.   
464 See Hume 1993, pp 51-2.   
465 OCG II 261, 269-70. See Augustine, City of God  V.105 (EA, p 186). 
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 The inheritance of guilt is another key feature of the doctrine which Pascal 
admits to finding incomprehensible466.   The Augustinian doctrine confuses the 
fact of guilt – that an agent has knowingly done something wrong or failed to 
prevent harm when it was in her power to do so – with feelings of guilt and their 
close relative shame.  It is possible (as in my family) to feel ashamed of what an 
ancestor did; young Germans still feel ashamed of their great-grandparents’ 
activities (or passivity) during the Third Reich.  But a person who is ashamed of 
another’s act is not thereby guilty of committing it467.  The inheritance of guilt is 
also mixed up in the Augustinian mind with the propensity to sin.  But we cannot 
be guilty of having a propensity however much it may make us feel sinful.  
Augustine may have held that Adam as the first man is the whole human race: ‘We 
were all in that one man, since we were all that one man who fell into sin’468; so 
since the Fall he has split amœba-like into millions of individuals but they are 
really all part of him and therefore they all committed the first sin and are all 
guilty.  This fanciful doctrine does not solve the problem: perhaps in some sense 
Adam represents the whole human race; but representation of a by b does not 
imply that a and b are identical agents; on the contrary it implies that they are 
not.  Pascal ultimately concedes that we can’t measure God’s justice against our 
‘miserable’ human justice469.  In practice, he is in two minds, sometimes refusing 
to describe divine justice yet on other occasions doing so470.   
 
 So we cannot understand what Adam’s state was when he committed the 
first sin, nor how it was ‘transmitted’ to the rest of humanity (430:683)471.  The 
doctrine of the Fall is incomprehensible but – according to Pascal – without it the 
human predicament would itself be incomprehensible (809:656). These 
                                                          
466 Pensée 131:164.  Adam’s posterity are corrupt ‘comme un fruit sortant d’une mauvaise semence’ 
(OCG II 288-9). 
467 Webb puts the problem in these terms: ‘Original Sin seems to be just the sin which we do not 
impute to the individual person, nor the individual person to himself, as his own free act’ yet ‘it is 
only the individual consciousness of sin that gives significance to those facts of moral experience 
which demand a doctrine of Original Sin to account for them’ (Webb 1929, pp 86-7). 
468 City of God, XIII.14, quoted in Talbott 2014. 
469 Pensée 131:164 at OCG II 582; see Section 27 below. 
470 E.g. he says that God was ‘just’ to withhold salvation from ‘hardened’ unbelievers and it would 
not have been ‘just’ for God to hide Himself completely after the Fall (149:182). This whole pensée 
expounds a surprising amount of the thinking of an incomprehensible God!   
471 For a discussion of these problems, see Quinn 2010. 
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mysteries explode Pascal’s contention that Christianity is the only religion which 
explains the human predicament (215-6:248-9). We might ask how the scientist 
in Pascal, so condemning of empty scholastic verbiage (e.g. OCG I 385), could 
conclude that the doctrine of the Fall could explain anything472.   Little wonder 
that the doctrine was singled out for ridicule by Enlightenment thinkers: Diderot 
complained that the doctrine was blasphemous in denying God’s goodness473, and 
rendered the notion of justice vacuous474.   I conclude that Pascal’s planned 
theologico-anthropological phase of his project does not, for all its originality, 
compel us to take the Christian explanation of human nature on board475 .    
However this is not necessarily fatal to his project: there are other ‘proofs’ to be 
explored476. 
 
24. The Demand for the Meaning of Life 
There may be an alternative argument to Pascal’s use of the doctrine of the 
Fall to persuade us to seek in Christianity a way out of the human predicament.  
Pascal’s case is that our lives are futile and absurd: if we reflect, we are aware that 
our activities bring no lasting contentment and that the cosmos gives no meaning 
to our lives.  This, he would say, is the unhappiness of human beings without God 
(6:40). 
 
Most if not all of us can’t look back on a life of unified purpose and 
consistent achievement.  But should we be as worried about this as was Pascal?  
There are two possible answers, one optimistic and the other a form of 
acceptance. 
 
  First, we can insist that we are not as unhappy as Pascal claims: not all 
amusement is escapist but may simply be to give variety to life, to share pleasures 
with others or to develop skills which might be useful one day (e.g. games which 
                                                          
472 Augustine’s ‘observation of the abject misery of much of the human race seems more plausible 
than his inference that this misery is due to a specific “original” sin’ (Rist 1994, p 293). 
473 See Diderot 1964, p 58. 
474 Quoted by Nagakawa 1989, p 26. 
475 A further difficulty for Augustinians is the current consensus among scholars that their 
doctrine rests on the Vulgate’s mistranslation of Romans V.12: see Rist 1994, p 310 and 
Kołakowski 1997, p 47. But see also Quinn 2010, who quotes Romans V.19. 
476 See Droz 1886, pp 53-4. 
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develop dexterity or powers of observation and recall: hunting was, after all, 
regarded as good training for battle).  Not all rulers are so weak as to be content 
only if surrounded by obsequious courtiers477.   Not all work merely prolongs 
futile lives: it can enhance life.   
 
Secondly, if we accept that life is a succession of activities with no lasting 
results, with nothing we can really count on, we realise that this is just what 
human life is: a succession of actions and events with no overall meaning 
independent of the purposes we have478.   
 
Pascal’s answer to both these suggestions is that they are self-deceptive: 
both rely on suppressing our deep unease about our lives now and how they will 
end.  He presses the point that religion underlines human frailty and the limits of 
human endeavour479: yet this is not enough to show, as I outlined in Chapter II, 
that only an eternal, infinitely good life would be the solution to our problems 
here and now.  Just as the question of interest cannot be determined for Pascal’s 
subject with no reference to her long-term desires and aspirations now, so too the 
question of her needs remains open:  it is a matter of temperament whether one 
feels that ‘this can’t be all there is to life’, not something Pascal can stipulate for 
the whole human race.  The tendency to abstract from one’s personal 
temperament and situation, and to look at human life sub specie æternitatis, is not 
universal480.    
 
In the end, the most he could establish is that a religious attitude to life – 
offering meaning for the whole of one’s life as the service of God – is possible.   
                                                          
477 See M. Lefebvre, ‘Conférence’ in Béra 1956, p 200. 
478 ‘I live and have my day, my son succeeds me and has his day, his son in turn succeeds him. 
What is there in all this to make a tragedy about?’  Bertrand Russell: The Conquest of Happiness 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1930), p 33. 
479 As Philo says with heavy irony, ‘the best and indeed the only method of bringing every one to a 
due sense of religion is by just representations of the misery and wickedness of men’; this remark 
prompts Demea to give a very Pascalian speech about the corruption of human nature, the 
miseries of life and the unsatisfactory nature of enjoyment of externalities (Hume 1993, p 95). 
480 See Sutherland 1984, Part II and Jones, J R: ‘Love as perception of meaning’ in Phillips 1967b, p 
149-50.  See also ‘Is Life worth Living?’ in James 1956, pp 32-62. 
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But even that he took to the extremes of asceticism: ‘la maladie est l’état naturel 
des chrétiens’481.   But, as Cottingham more mildly suggests, the benefits could be  
 
‘the care of the soul, tranquillity of mind, release from the false 
pursuits of egoism and material gain, a closer awareness of the 
mystery of life, an affirmation of its profundity and its blessings’482. 
    
This thought invites us to consider whether Christian morality – or the Christian 
faith from which it is, for Pascal, inseparable – can afford the solution to our woes.   
 
 
 
                                                          
481 Quoted by his elder sister (OCG I 92).  In defence of this extraordinary view, Mesnard has cited 
‘les mythes du confort et de la santé’ (‘La maladie, “état naturel des chrétiens” ‘, Communio - Revue 
catholique internationale, t. II, 1977, pp 84-94). Kołakowski suggests that ‘Christianity may be 
viewed as an expression of what in human misery is incurable by human efforts’ (Kołakowski 
1982, p 200).  The contrast with the Epicurean view, which denies any value to suffering, is 
profound. 
482 See Cottingham 2003, p 95. 
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CHAPTER IV: DO WE NEED CHRISTIAN MORALITY TO ACHIEVE 
TRANQUILLITY? 
 
The preceding Chapter deals with Pascal’s account, and attempted 
explanation, of a type of moral error: those who escape into divertissement are led 
by their own frivolity and short-termism to act unwittingly against their own 
long-term interests.  If they persist in their unreflective way of life, they will be 
left with nothing of lasting value.  We shall now see how Pascal extends his ideas 
about moral error: the classical moralists are themselves in error483: they 
mistakenly believe that the ways of life they preach will produce eudaimonia and 
cure egoism or, more generally, that they will show that life is worth living. He 
will ultimately argue that only Christianity can afford the benefits of the 
meaningful life, which secular systems of ethics fail to deliver484.   
 
25.  The failures of secular morality: to achieve eudaimonia and to cure  
 egoism 
Major classical moralists would have agreed with Pascal about the moral 
error committed by ordinary people: about the pitfalls, that is, of unrestricted 
self-indulgence over which Socrates argues with Callicles; Plato claimed that the 
majority of people enjoy only the appetitive pleasures – ‘food, drink, sex and 
everything associated with them’, and money – none of which bring true 
contentment; Aristotle argues that ‘the life of enjoyment’ does not fulfil people’s 
lives: focusing on mere ‘amusement’ is ‘silly and utterly childish’, and – as 
relaxation – is worth undertaking only as rest from purposeful activity485;   
Epicureans and the Stoics both argued that we should adopt a degree of 
asceticism to achieve ataraxia486.  Pyrrhonian ethics amounts to, even if it does 
not adopt the principle of, a degree of asceticism.  Montaigne drew on all three 
                                                          
483 The programmatic pensées are 4:38 and 694:573. 
484 Showing the inadequacy of secular morality, in whatever form, does not of course show the 
truth of Christianity (Voltaire 1964, pp 161-2); Pascal is however well aware of the distinction 
between respecting or loving a creed and believing it to be true (pensée 12:46). 
485 Plato: Gorgias 495b and Republic 580e; Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics I.5, 1095b 15-22 & X.6, 
1176b 30-36 and his Politics, VIII.3, 1337b. 
486 Epicurus: Letter to Menoeceus §130; on the Stoics: Pascal’s account of Epictetus, OCG II 86-7.  
See Nussbaum 1994, pp 488-90. 
130 
 
 
 
‘sects’ for his eclectic – and semi-ascetic – personal morality. He saw that there 
was a type of restless person who was continually busy for the sake of being busy; 
he proposed, as a solution, being selective in undertakings, calm in their execution 
and keeping the world at arm’s length487.  His classical predecessors offered 
similar ethical doctrines which they believed would, taking account of human 
nature, provide a solution to our woes, at least for some sections of society.  These 
secular solutions appealed to Pascal’s humanist contemporaries: it is they he 
seeks to bring back to Christian morality. 
 
Pascal adopts, as explained in Chapter I, a broad distinction between types 
of ethical doctrine (or ‘sects’): one stresses our moral self-sufficiency, our ability 
to be virtuous without external help, and the other claims we are unable to do 
more in ethics than work out piecemeal how to maximise our (lasting) pleasure 
and happiness and minimise pain and unhappiness.  This distinction emerges in 
the Entretien and becomes a theme in the Pensées, where two arguments are 
sketched:  first, that both types of morality (and, by implication, the Montaignian 
derivative of the second) are ineffective: neither enables us to achieve 
tranquillity; and, secondly, that all three involve a misunderstanding of human 
nature and the human predicament.  The aim of this Chapter is to see how Pascal 
uses this complex argument to try to show the necessity for Christian morality.   
 
Pascal’s first argument follows Augustine: pagan ethics claims  that 
achievable virtue is the path to eudaimonia;  but that sort of profound fulfilment  
of the virtuous mind is God’s gift, not achievable unaided by human beings488.  We 
all fall by the wayside: for classical thinkers akrasia was either impossible489 or 
intermittent in most people490; for Augustine, akrasia is a constant and invariable 
failing in all who lack grace, so no human being can achieve virtue unaided491.  
                                                          
487 Montaigne 2002 III, p 355.  
488 See Rist 1994, pp 48-53. 
489 Socrates at Protagoras 358d. 
490 Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, VII. 
491 See Rist 1994, p 184 and MacIntyre 1988, p 158. 
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Behind this thought lies a deep scepticism about the effectiveness of practical 
reason and our ability to rise above our ‘natural’ egoism492.    
 
As for the first of the two ‘sects’, the Stoics’ ‘virtue’ is vitiated by their 
pride493, their confidence that each person has an internal door-keeper who can 
be trained to admit as motivation for action only unemotional value judgments; 
they believed that they could rise to God’s level and could achieve virtue unaided 
(OCG II 98).  It is easy, Pascal thinks, to demolish our confidence in our ability 
always to master our emotions:  in the Pensées he mocks the (Stoic) philosopher 
feeling fear on a plank above a precipice even though his reason tells him he is 
safe494.  As noted in Chapter I, the Augustinian account of free will profoundly 
conflicts with Epictetus’ notion of proairesis495, the allegedly God-given ability to 
choose (rationally or irrationally) to do what we do, even if phenomenologically 
our passions appear sometimes to overcome our better intentions496.  Pascal 
implicitly acknowledges that we can sometimes master our passions but would 
deny that we always can: whereas the Stoics seem to have invalidly deduced 
‘always can’ from ‘sometimes can’; they preach an impossible, path to 
happiness497.  Hume takes up this theme in the next century: Stoics (and 
Pyrrhonians)  
‘seem founded on this erroneous maxim, that what a man can  
perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform  
always and in every disposition’498. 
The Stoics imply that one’s life can be organised exclusively on the basis of 
rational deliberation about ends and means.  Pascal on the contrary insists that 
                                                          
492 This scepticism colours Provinciale V: it is a mistake to conclude that ‘Pascal believes [...] that 
anyone (or at least the saved) can work out his opinions for himself’ (Franklin 2001, p 98).  On the 
contrary, no human conscience can itself identify the path of virtue.  Moral knowledge depends 
wholly on and is inspired by God. 
493 See Algra, K.: ‘Epictetus & Stoic Theology’ in Scaltsas & Mason 2007, pp 51-2.   
494 Pensée 44:78 at OCG II 552.   
495 See Sorabji, R: ‘Epictetus on proairesis and self’ in Scaltsas & Mason 2007, pp 87-98 and 
Dragona-Monarchou, M: ‘Epictetus on Freedom...’, ibid., pp 112-139.  The latter defines proairesis 
as ‘denoting the autonomous inner disposition and attitude, volition, moral choice, moral purpose, 
moral character and [...] particularly, basic free choice’ (p 112).  
496 For a discussion of Stoic moral psychology, see Cooper 2012, Ch. 4 esp. pp 158-166, 181-2 & 
209-13 and Brennan, T: ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ in Inwood, B: The Cambridge Companion to 
Stoicism (Cambridge, CUP: 2003). 
497 Pensées 146:179 then 143-4:176-7 and 407:26.  
498 Hume 1990, p 43. 
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reasoning is influenced by non-rational impulses and dispositions (44:78) and 
that Reason is necessarily founded on basic beliefs (sentiments – 530:455).   
 
In the end, it is only by denying the reality of suffering that the Stoic can 
claim to have achieved eudaimonia and even then he keeps open the option of 
suicide as an escape from suffering, thus contradicting his ideal of self-
sufficiency499.  The sage aims to be a self-made saint but divine grace is needed to 
make a man a saint500.   
  
Pascal’s criticism of the other ‘sect’, ethical Pyrrhonism (see Section 8.2 
above), also amounts to saying that the Pyrrhonian cannot achieve constant 
ataraxia and therefore never achieves eudaimonia.  (Montaigne’s variant of the 
Pyrrhonian approach is, Pascal implies, vulnerable to the same criticism, even if 
Montaigne sets his sights pretty low.)  There are various reasons for the 
Pyrrhonian’s failure: the most obvious is that a sceptic would lose heart because 
he could never be sure that his way of life conduces to eudaimonia501; if he firmly 
believes that it can, then he is not a consistent sceptic; he will worry that his 
method of balancing arguments might not lead to tranquillity in the long term502.  
Secondly, if Montaigne gives up the Pyrrhonian’s ceaseless quest for certainty he 
is still vulnerable to the criticism that, as Augustine argues, the sceptic who 
suspends judgment and merely goes along with appearances actually gives up the 
active pursuit of eudaimonia503: he wants an outcome but does nothing to bring it 
about and thus, since eudaimonia resides in activity, does not get the result he 
wants504.  Thirdly, the sceptic cannot allay mental tension merely by suspending 
judgment:  the sceptic remains aware of the reason for the tension505; he cannot 
stop his thoughts returning to a desire (or other type of tension which he wants to 
alleviate), just as he cannot jump off the hedonic treadmill. 
                                                          
499 Pensée 147:180.  See Augustine, City of God,  XIX, 4. 
500 Pensée 869:440. See Christodoulou, K: ‘Le stoïcisme dans la dialectique apologétique des 
Pensées’ in Goyet 1979, pp 419-25.  
501 See Nussbaum 2009, p 298 and pp 300-2. 
502 See Cooper 2012, p 303. 
503 See Rist 1994, pp 52-3. 
504 This, I believe, is with the first criticism the basis of Pascal’s assertion that Montaigne’s eclectic 
morality leads to ‘despair’ (OCG II 95). 
505 See Barnes’ Introduction to Sextus 2000, p xxxi. 
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These arguments against the ‘sects’ are of uneven quality: as I argued in 
the preceding Chapter, Pascal’s hedonic treadmill is of limited explanatory power: 
we can and do introduce measures, largely as the result of training, to adopt 
medium- or long-term policies at the expense of satisfying all desires as they 
come along.  It is true that we cannot invariably and effectively set all pursuit of 
satisfaction or gratification to one side: much depends on the training we have 
received and on individual character.  But secular moralists can and do show 
discipline in their lives, as Pascal tacitly concedes in his comments on Mitton 
(597:494).   Where, then, do the secular moralists go wrong? 
 
Pascal’s key accusation is that the secular moralists who think that it is 
possible to live according to principles of benevolence and justice do not 
understand human nature.  The honnête homme like Mitton may be able to uphold 
the principle of respect for others (as part of his eclectic Montaignian morality).  
But he cannot rise above his deep-seated egoism506.  This is an Augustinian 
doctrine: since the Fall there can be no act of choice which does not express 
concupiscence, since we have through Adam’s fatal act lost the ability to choose 
objectively, i.e. from God’s point of view.  So, for his criticism of secular moralities 
to succeed, Pascal has to deploy his doctrine of the Fall, which – as we saw in the 
previous Chapter – does not compel the agnostic’s consent.    
 
Pascal’s view is also that, regardless of Christian doctrine, as a matter of 
fact each of us puts him or herself at the centre of our world and pursues his or 
her own interest, if necessary at others’ expense (597:494).   He may concede that 
people do things for each other which appear altruistic, even if the fundamental – 
and sometimes unconscious507 – motive is selfish; but the only real altruists are 
true Christians (recipients of grace) who put God first and their own interests 
last. 
 
                                                          
506 Pensée 597:494.  This egoism is not, I believe, the sort of ‘formal egoism’ encountered in 
classical ethics where the agent’s aim is eudaimonia in the long term, and which is discussed in 
Williams 2011, p 36. 
507 See Miel 1988. 
134 
 
 
 
This doctrine seems too pliable for its own good: Pascal seems to be saying 
that, if we do come across genuine benevolence or other virtue, then necessarily it 
is the result of God’s grace.  All other acts are the result of human concupiscence.  
The secular moralist can concede that virtuous acts are ‘necessarily the result of 
God’s grace’ and all others are not, because this has become just a semantic point.  
To escape from this bind, and without using the doctrine of the Fall, Pascal is 
obliged to show that as a matter of fact human beings with no religious faith 
always act selfishly. 
 
 Yet his account of non-religious pseudo-benevolence seems superficial 
and unconvincing.  First, the undeniable fact that from my perspective I am 
always at the centre of my world does not imply that I always approve of508 or 
choose policies or courses of action which favour me at others’ expense.   Self-love 
and benevolence are competing perspectives but the former does not always 
prevail over the latter509.  The existence of extreme cases, those of heroes who 
lose everything or almost everything for the sake of others or for the sake of 
justice, is indisputable.  But Pascal is avowedly almost blind to heroism510, unless 
it is the heroism of martyrs on whom, of course, grace has been bestowed 
(359:391).   
 
Secondly, Pascal implies that if an altruistic action is motivated even 
slightly by a prudential motive, however minor the role it plays, the action is not 
morally praiseworthy.  If – as has often been argued – there is a duality in 
practical reasoning, namely that it is rational to act morally (e.g. because one 
needs, and needs to be an active part of, a morally-regulated society) and to 
pursue one’s own long-term interests, there is no guarantee that these will 
coincide perfectly511.  There are important considerations which are not wholly 
squeezed out by moral considerations512.   But such clashes as occur are not 
inevitable; and while we admire pure altruism more than actions stemming from 
                                                          
508 See the argument at Hume 1902, pp 215-7. 
509 See Wiggins 2006, pp 45-6. 
510 On the Jansenist repudiation of Corneille’s optimistic view of human nobility, see Bénichou 
1948, p 106. 
511 See Mackie 1977, p 227. 
512 See Wiggins 2006, p 23. 
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mixed motives, we judge the latter to be better than purely selfish actions.  
Pascal’s view ignores the value we put on the positive consequences for others of 
acts which are partly benevolent and partly in the agent’s interest513. 
     
Thirdly, the honnête homme may reply to Pascal that some social virtues 
are ‘desirable in a view to self-interest’514: a kind of self-love is a strong motive 
for, and plays a positive part in, the development of society515: so it is that we 
have developed moral principles in order to make the best of our lives 
together516.  Pascal concedes this: even while dominated by self-love and 
concupiscence, mankind has been able ‘admirably’ to regulate society, to create a 
simulacrum or ‘false image’ of charity517.  The very operation of amour-propre in 
our social dealings may produce benefits for our communities: ‘we have used 
concupiscence as best we may to serve the public good’ and ‘admirable rules have 
been established and derived from concupiscence, covering public order (police), 
morality and justice [...] But in the end this only covers up and does not eliminate 
our fundamental vileness, the evil component [in our souls]’518.   
 
Social morality is merely a series of conventions arising by chance, or 
imposed by rulers by force (Pascal would seem to disagree with Hobbes that we 
are all more or less equal in power519), and radically differing from one society to 
another; these conventions are comparable to the natural languages520.   They are 
imperfect but there is anyway no attainable ideal they could reach521.  We have 
forgotten how social morality and language came about522 but the origins of 
human society lie, we may surmise, in the imposition of order on the weak by the 
strong (828:668).   Any ‘social order’ we may subsequently achieve is fragile: 
selfishness is the slippery slope down to war, misgovernment, economic 
                                                          
513 See the discussion in Williams 1993, pp 66-8. 
514 Hume 1902, p 280. 
515 See Voltaire 1964, p 169. 
516 As with other tenets of honnêteté, this idea lives on in 18th Century France (see McKenna 2003, 
p 258), as well as in Hume.  
517 Pensées 118:150 & 106:138; also 74:108 (social order masks our inveterate selfishness). 
518 Pensées 210-211:243-244. 
519 For recent comparisons of Pascal with Hobbes, see Lazzeri 1993 and Zarka 1995, Ch XII. 
520 See the very brief morality/language comparison at 720:598 and Carraud 2007, pp 304-8. 
521 See Spitz, 1997, pp 104-5. 
522 See Delbos 2010, p 91 (on the origin of property).  Pascal makes no comment on the necessity 
for language in the formation and functioning of societies (as Hobbes does in Leviathan I.4).  
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mismanagement and ill health (421:680).  Pascal’s picture is a persuasive one: 
rulers (and those aspiring to rule) in the modern era use moral language but their 
real appeal is to people’s selfishness and acquisitiveness.  The people forget that 
their government will resort to or allow coercive exploitation, especially of 
women and minorities, to ‘get things done’.  Yet Pascal does not accept that there 
are customs and other patterns of life which do not result from chance, coercion 
or exploitation.  His psychological egoism entails that such arrangements cannot 
arise out of general benevolence and a preference for solidarity over 
competition523.   
 
  How, then, do secular moralities fail, in Pascal’s eyes?  They collectively 
suffer from a faulty moral psychology: they all presume that we can stop or ignore 
or channel the constant flow of thoughts, sensations, felt desires and longings 
which constitute consciousness and express concupiscence. But as long as we are 
embodied beings in the world the flow continues except in dreamless sleep.  The 
Stoics fail because they cannot attain Stoic virtue: their very presumption that 
they can is a form of pride and thus a falling away from virtue.  In moments of 
self-doubt which can assail any of us, the Stoic will realise that he has not 
achieved the tranquillity of true virtue, and is ultimately, if he is honest about this 
failure, unquiet and dissatisfied524.  The Pyrrhonians or Epicureans fail because 
they cannot guarantee to minimise all mental disturbance: a non-trivial 
perturbation, for example regret or remorse or doubt, remains however hard one 
tries to put it aside.   The eclectic Montaignian moralist also fails in his search for 
ataraxia:  and in addition his moments of complacency are dissipated by his 
experience of living with other people and experiencing their default egoism . He 
is uneasily aware that other people don’t uphold the principles of honnêteté 
(642:529bis). 
 
                                                          
523 See Wiggins 2006, p 242. See also Aristotle’s view that we are ‘naturally fitted’ to receive the 
precepts of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, II.1, 1103a 24-5). 
524 Compare Kant’s view that, even after close examination of our motives for an action, ‘we cannot 
by any means conclude with certainty that a secret impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the 
idea of duty, was not actually the true determining cause of the will’ (Kant 1959, p 23). 
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 Yet if all these failures are real, Pascal is far from showing that Christianity 
can come to the rescue: he claims, as we saw in the preceding Chapter, that the 
Christian religion understands the paradox of humanity but his use of the 
doctrine of the Fall fails to render the ‘paradox’ intelligible and introduces further 
puzzles to which he can offer no solution. 
 
26.  The failure of secular moralists to find an objective basis for morality 
The changeability of social values – which are, in practice, the secular 
moralities’ claimed achievement – is, for Pascal, inimical to true morality525.  We 
can be aware of this: the selfish ego, however much it falls – with others’ 
connivance – into self-deception, is aware of its faults or, at least, able to bring 
them to consciousness (978:743).  The greatness of human beings is that they are 
aware, however dimly, of their lowly condition (misère, 114:146).  They have 
some notion of a better life however far they are from it, like a deposed monarch 
nagged by the loss of his throne (116-7:148-9).  Our innermost attitudes reflect 
our own deep-seated awareness of our own condition: we are all Augustinians 
deep down. 
 
So Pascal believes that we are vaguely aware of the existence of objective 
values.  Yet he pours scorn on moralists who try to identify a secular, objective 
basis for their principles.  It is imagination which conjures up these value-
systems, not objective reason (44:78)526. 
 
The most common stratagem in this context is to try to derive an ethical 
system from the study of human nature.  But, says Pascal, there is no fixed point 
from which we can judge the correctness of an account of human nature 
(697:576).  No conception of human nature would both be able to show that we 
make free choices (see Sections 21 and 22 above) and, in any case, be separable 
from the ethical system in which it appears: about the Christian faith he says that 
the true account of human nature, true virtue and true religion are inseparable 
                                                          
525 See Moriarty 2006, pp 222-3. 
526 See Enthoven 2009, pp 56-7. 
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(393:12)527; in other words, there are no independent, value-free observations of 
human nature which could act as reasons for adopting a given morality528.  Unlike 
Hobbes, he does not believe that we can even attempt a description of human 
nature in culturally neutral terms: what we think of as ‘a state of nature’ is 
invariably the result of ‘custom’ (126:159).  We cannot strip away the results of 
acculturation to identify such basic traits as the urge to survive, or egoism529, or 
benevolence.  We may add to Pascal’s thought that an ‘outsider’ observing 
behaviour in our society would have to understand at least some elements of our 
culture to see how those of our dispositions which appear to be ‘the ultimate 
supports of ethical value’530 have come to predominate over other dispositions 
and have been articulated in language. 
 
Secondly, Pascal rejects the Stoic belief that we are able to see an order in 
the Universe which human beings should follow: human beings have no 
comprehensive grasp of the laws which govern Nature’s behaviour531.  We would 
be on Pascal’s side in this today: Mill pinpoints the nonsense of the Stoic view that 
we can choose to obey laws of nature: ‘man has no power to do anything else than 
follow nature; all his actions are done through, or in obedience to, some one or 
many of nature’s physical or mental laws’532.  A Stoic may try to show that the 
order of the world is meaningful.  But here, despite the best efforts of Romantic 
poets and others since, we must recognize that the Humean onslaught on 
cosmological and design arguments remains a sturdy basis for the view that we 
have no way of distinguishing, given our knowledge of only this world, between a 
created or designed world and an uncreated and thus undesigned one533 and, by 
extension, between a meaningful world and a meaningless one.  The universe on 
                                                          
527 This Jansenist doctrine may conceal an inconsistency: as Augustinians they accept the Fathers’ 
morality, devised in the light of human nature, but rule out any post-Augustinian improvements of 
the same kind (see Baudin 1946, II*, p 139). 
528 There are proleptic hints here of the discussion in Williams 2011, pp 170-2. 
529 This point is not inconsistent with Pascal’s insistence that secular moralities fail to show how 
we can act altruistically: for him, we are not essentially egotistic but without Christian moral 
commitment (inspired by grace) we are invariably selfish. 
530 This is Williams’ phrase in 2011, p 58.  He of course argues that [contrary to Pascal’s apparent 
view] these ‘ultimate supports’ exist even if we can’t identify them in our time.   
531 Pensées 199-200:230-1 and the agnostic’s speech in 427:681 at OCG II 683-4.  
532 Mill 1961, p 487. 
533 Hume 1993, pp 51-2.  See also: ‘the visible surfaces of heaven and earth refuse to be brought by 
us into any intelligible unity at all’ (James 1956, p 41).  
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the contrary gives the impression to an agnostic – and to someone seeking faith – 
of Unheimlichkeit534.   (It is of course open to a Stoic to concede that their 
approach projects values on to the world, and thus to refrain from making any 
claim to moral objectivity535; this is, of course no solution to Pascal’s problem.) 
 
  Thirdly, Pascal argues that no objective, i.e. universally accepted, moral 
principles can be derived from the study of the morality, laws and customs in the 
world, which vary profoundly over time and from place to place 536.   This arises, 
he thinks, from two factors: first, customs can eliminate instinctive behaviour, 
thus changing ‘human nature’ profoundly in the society concerned537.  Secondly, 
our rational nature is indefinitely pliable: we have the capacity to devise an 
indefinite number of social arrangements in particular circumstances538.  Hence, 
what we observe in our societies as ‘human nature’ is in part at least an accretion 
of customs and habits, which Augustine calls our ‘second’ nature539.   Thus for 
Pascal there is a sense in which the very rationality of customs can vary from one 
society to another.  His project thus urges the aspiring believer to step back from 
‘the world’, from the life of error and concupiscence540. 
 
 In sum, for Pascal there is no evidence for the existence of common human 
dispositions so specific as to enable us to define a set of values as comprising a 
universal ideal541.  Generally, there is no way, by looking at human dispositions 
and behaviour in societies – or at Nature as a whole – to identify an objective 
basis for a secular morality.  Whatever an individual thinker – or a group of 
thinkers – devises, the question always arises: will it prevail?  If it is to do so, it 
will be in an entirely different context. 
 
                                                          
534 Pensée 429:682 at OCG II 683-4.   
535 Christopher Gill asserts that Stoicism offers guidance for moral choice but does not guarantee 
moral objectivity (presentation at the University of York, Autumn 2013). 
536 Pensée 148:181. See e.g. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V.6, 1135a 3-5 & 1134b 34-5.  
537 Whereas Greek moralists, and their 18th Century successors like Hume, regard sympathy 
among family members as a fundamental part of human nature, Pascal doubts that it is an 
invariable feature of human conduct (126:159). 
538 Pensées 55:88 & 520:453 (variability of human nature) and 630:523 (we can adopt any nature). 
539 Pensées 44:78 (error supplants rationality) and 60:94, 600:497 (human reason is corrupt).  
540 Pensées 678:557; also 121:153-4, 122:155 & 522:453. 
541 Compare: ‘there is no direct route from considerations of human nature to a unique morality 
and a unique moral ideal’ (Williams 1993, p 62). 
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Pascal’s problem is now to explain what reason we should have to set out 
on the path to Christian morality, apart from the merely negative one that the two 
‘sects’ and a derivative from them – seem unable to deliver eudaimonia, to cure 
egoism or to identify an objective basis for morality.  Part of the answer to the 
first problem he draws from Epictetus: it is beyond our powers to achieve 
eudaimonia by pursuing a way of life or policy which consists in garnering 
possessions, protecting one’s life and reputation (OCG II 87) and indulging 
scientific curiosity (OCG II 43-4), so we must look elsewhere.  Augustine would 
say such a policy is beneath us anyway: it cannot benefit the soul542.  As for the 
objectivity of values, Pascal would say that we must understand that the notion of 
objectivity functions differently in the domains of empirical and religious 
knowledge.  There is no scientific account of objective values available to us.  But 
without it we are rudderless unless we look to God as giver of the moral law. 
  
27. The Christian God’s Moral Commands: defeating egoism 
Pascal’s Augustinian thesis is that we cannot unaided excogitate the 
principles of morality from empirical evidence about the world or human nature 
or human societies or our own conscious dispositions; instead the principles are 
divine commands revealed in Scripture.  All other religions and secular moralities 
‘have had natural reason as their guide’; only Christians ‘have been obliged [...] to 
find out what [rules] Jesus Christ bequeathed to the ancients for transmission to 
the faithful’ (769:634).  We must recognise that we depend on, and must turn to, 
God for His moral commands: Christian morality begins with Jesus Christ 
(189:221).   
 
Pascal does not justify turning to Christian morality by asserting that 
obedience to Christ’s rules will promise entry to Paradise: given that no one can 
unaided achieve either virtue or salvation, and that God’s mercy is 
incomprehensible, eternal life is not a guaranteed reward for good conduct and 
retribution, in the form of damnation, is not inevitable.   
 
                                                          
542 See EA, pp 152-3. 
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Christian belief will instead satisfy our longing in this life for an ideal state 
which both meets our goals and affords us a lasting sense of fulfilment.  This 
Christian contentment cannot be with oneself, for then one would fall short of the 
ideal of humility (655:539).  The solution is submission not self-assurance, hence 
the importance of the idea of God-given commands (which we cannot obey 
without God’s help). 
 
Pascal says that Jesus’ two commandments – to love God and to love thy 
neighbour as thyself – ‘suffice to govern the whole Christian republic better than 
all the political laws’543.  This seems excessively optimistic given the complexity of 
human life544.  But we must note that by the ‘Christian republic’ he means 
Augustine’s City of God545 in which, to govern the love which one owes to oneself, 
one must imagine oneself a thinking member of the body of Christ546.   In non-
mystical terms this means ridding oneself of egoism and of all human attachments 
which are at base egoistic547, and thus taking a step towards faith.  
 
What does loving God mean in an ethical context?  If it means ‘seeking 
unity with God forever’ (149:182), what implications does this have for moral 
choices in this life by the seeker after truth?  The answer is: in a sense, none.  For 
only by means of grace will the seeker attain virtue and, after bodily death, 
eternal life.  She cannot unaided do anything towards this end. And if she does 
seem to do anything towards this end, she is deluded either about the nature of 
her action or about her responsibility for the outcome.  So it seems odd to claim 
that Pascal’s morality is ‘humane’ in that it offers fulfilment, for that will be 
bestowed only on a tiny minority who receive God’s grace548.  The arbitrariness of 
                                                          
543 Pensée 376:408.  We may suspect that Pascal regarded the second rule as merely a version of 
the first, i.e. that loving God is a necessary and sufficient condition for loving one’s neighbour (see 
Webb 1929, p 90). 
544 See the discussion of Richard Robinson’s views in Mackie 1982, pp 257 ff. 
545 See PF p 251 n4 and Sellier 1995, pp 99 & 198.  But see also Carraud 2007b: it is doubtful that 
Pascal fully assimilated the doctrine of the City of God. 
546 Pensées 368:401 & 370-2:402-4. 
547 Pascal apparently took the view that loving others as individuals distracted us from pleasing or 
searching for God (396:15) and see OCG I 84-6. 
548 Mesnard 1992, p 362. 
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grace would strike most as the opposite of ‘humane’: why not award grace to 
everyone?  Why impose duties on us which most of us can’t carry out549?    
 
Loving God involves submission, admitting one’s weakness and relying 
wholly on Him for moral inspiration and impulsion.  Pascal’s morality demands 
obedience but not deliberation, a sort of passivity in thinking and effort which 
will be successful only if God bestows grace.  The bizarre consequences of this are, 
first, that virtue – far from being a relatively long-term disposition, turns out to be 
possibly momentary, since grace is awarded instant by instant.  Secondly, his 
morality demands that which no one can deliver proprio motu, and can attribute 
no moral responsibility to the virtuous550.  Some moral philosophers would 
welcome this: moral responsibility has so often rested on an incoherent account 
of intention and action.  But we must not forget that Pascal’s God punishes most 
sinners: why He does so is incomprehensible.  
 
There is another puzzle at the heart of the Augustinian doctrine, viz. that 
truly virtuous action necessarily involves consciously obeying God, performing 
the action for God’s sake, loving and trusting in God, adoring God and no one and 
nothing else (503:738).  The enigma here is: what do these thoughts add to the 
intention of the agent or to the consequences of her action?  Someone who e.g. 
helps another in distress, or prevents another’s harm, intends to provide a 
remedy and often to do something which the other person desires.  Nor is such an 
act necessarily self-regarding: the agent may secondarily intend to be thought a 
fine person but this is not invariably the case, for example where she acts 
instantaneously without reflecting on the secondary consequences of her action.  
Loving God alone is too abstract, too far from the problem to be dealt with, to be a 
form of motivation in the moral life.  But Pascal dismisses thoughts of this sort: a 
moral agent whose actions do not focus on serving God cannot be virtuous.  This 
has a hard consequence: an unbeliever who in fact follows Christ’s teaching to the 
                                                          
549 For similar criticisms of Augustine’s theology, see Rist 1994, pp 275, 281 & 286.  Bayle saw the 
impossibility of Christian obedience from a wholly different perspective (see Wilson 2011, p 409). 
550 See Baird 1975, p 75.  Christian humanists criticised Jansenist doctrine just for propounding an 
unattainable morality (Bremond 1929, Vol I, p 411). 
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letter shall be damned while the Christian sinner may be saved551.  ‘He who is not 
with Christ is against Him’ (OCG I 746): there is no middle way.   Pascal 
propounds a dogmatic basis for morality which turns out to be amoral!  
 
The Pensées stress the inseparability of faith and moral commitment: 
without faith in Christ, there can be no moral knowledge for He is the Law-giver 
(189:221). Consequently moral commitment comes to the believer as faith does: 
no believer can, in Augustine’s view, determine the moment at which she comes 
to commit to Christian religion and morality: in his case, it was hearing a child’s 
voice by chance552.  Accepting divine authority is apparently arbitrary at the 
moment of acceptance; entering into a relationship of trust in a supreme being 
does not depend on reasoning553.  
   
This need not be a leap in the dark.  It is possible for the unbeliever to see, 
by reading Scripture (especially the New Testament), what the Christian way of 
life entails and to understand the outcome: the person who follows the way of life 
(even before receiving grace and thus true faith): ‘will be faithful, upright 
(honnête), humble, grateful, beneficent, a sincere, true friend’554.  There is the 
prospect of happiness in whole-hearted obedience to God’s law555: there will be 
enjoyments to replace the filthy pleasures, worldly acclaim (gloire) and luxury 
which the Christian foreswears556.  One can be more contented not giving in to 
desire (volonté) than in giving in to it (362:394), for we shall never get off the 
hedonic treadmill by just seeking to satisfy one desire after another. 
    
                                                          
551 Augustine’s example: Moriarty 2011, pp 77-8.  Baptism is a necessary condition for salvation 
(925:754).  The fate of virtuous pagans concerned the ‘devout humanists’ (Bremond 1929, Vol I, 
pp 414-5). 
552 Confessions VIII.12. 
553 See MacIntyre 1992, p 92.  (I will further discuss faith qua trust in the next Chapter.)  
554 Pensée 418:680. 931:759 lists similar virtues but ends on an excruciatingly pharisaical note to 
be found also in his work on the conversion of the sinner:  the convert’s soul, Pascal says ‘begins to 
rise above the common run of men [...] condemns their conduct, detests their maxims, weeps at 
their blindness and sets out to seek the true Good’ (OCG II 101). 
555 Pensée 357:389. Montaigne says of the solitary Christians’ ascetic life: ‘the rigour of their rules 
is soon enough smoothed by habituation [...] Only the aim of a blessedly immortal life really 
deserves our abandoning the comforts and pleasures of this life of ours’ (Montaigne 2002 I, p 
423). 
556 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 680. 
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Pascal relishes the fact that Augustinian asceticism goes against the grain 
of the human constitution (284:316) and makes enemies of our basic impulses557.  
Dependence on grace is to give us the means to repose our tranquil trust in God, 
to recognize our own powerlessness and the feebleness of our own nature. We 
rise above egoism by loving God, not ourselves. But, we may ask, how then can 
this morality give us more fulfilled and happier lives, given that we must 
constantly fear that God will abandon us (969:803)? 
 
As a command morality, Christianity is vulnerable to the charge that it 
denies our autonomy as moral agents: is ‘blind obedience’ is an option for us as 
moral agents558?  How are we to deal with moral conflicts? Are we – to take Kant’s 
example – permitted to lie to prevent a murder?  Pascal would answer by saying 
that our autonomy is partly an illusion: the choices we make are inevitable, 
flowing as they do from either our fallen nature or from God’s grace; and we 
cannot use reason to work out the fundamentals of morality: no one has 
succeeded in doing that (148:181).  Moral conflicts arise but apparently they can’t 
be resolved559.   Perhaps we can use reason to apply the principles to particular 
cases, but – as Pascal illustrates in his discussions of casuistry in the Provinciales –  
here too the risk of error is high, for our reason is so pliable (530:455): better to 
follow Scripture560 and Church doctrine than to indulge in theological or moral 
novelties (OCG I 452-4).  
 
If Christian morality resides in following the letter of the law as laid down 
2,000 years ago, it is open to Mill’s well-known criticism that it is always possible 
that rules derived from Scripture, or from the traditions of the Church, will turn 
out to be badly framed such that, for example, their application causes needless 
human suffering.  Or it may be that they ‘are no longer suited to the changes that 
                                                          
557 Bénichou 1948, p 150. 
558 Oakeshott, an admirer in some respects of Augustine, rejects the notion of ‘irresistible grace’ 
because it rules out moral autonomy: see ‘Religion and the Moral Life’ in Oakeshott & Fuller: 
Religion, Politics and the Moral Life (New Haven, Yale UP: 1993), p 43.  
559 Pensée 905:450 which is headed Pyrrhonisme: a hint that discovering conflicts between moral 
principles prompts moral scepticism.   
560 This does not mean observing the 613 commandments in the Old Testament: Pascal’s 
watchword is that the Law is figurative, not to be taken literally (270:301 & 259:290). 
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have taken place in human relations’561.  A common observation made since 
Aristotle is that, for this reason among others, there can be no exhaustive account 
of morality in practice562.   Pascal might rebut this objection by saying that 
fundamental moral principles must be immutable, for otherwise we lose our 
bearings (21:55; 697:576).  But I believe he offers another more complex answer 
to this problem, which I will now outline.  
 
28. The ‘Three Orders’: the fragmentation of the Christian’s system of value 
Pascal does not believe that all human beings participate in the same 
system of values.  His doctrine of the ‘three orders’ – which began as an attempt 
to show how a humbly-born Messiah could be superior to kings and generals563 – 
lays out a neo-Augustinian564 hierarchy of domains of value: bodies, minds and 
holy or divine beings.  Each domain’s values are infinitely distant from the level 
above565, their respective value-sets are incommensurable566.  The lowest level is 
that of ‘carnal’ – we might say materialistic – values, those of ‘kings, the rich, 
military chiefs’.  A whole people –  the Jews with the possible exception of a few 
prophets – lived on this level and could not perceive the spiritual significance of 
their own history (256:288).  The powerful men of society who live wholly at the 
lowest level cannot see the greatness of those on the next tier, the intellectual 
geniuses for whom value is in demonstrative knowledge and in truth and the 
elimination of error.  But the latter in their turn cannot see the greatness of those 
at the top level of charity: the supremely wise, the saints and Christ himself567; in 
another dimension this is the level of repos, of freedom from the flux of desire, of a 
                                                          
561 Mill 1969, p 417.  See also Williams 2014, p 20. 
562 See e.g. Aquinas’ Prologus to Summa Theologiæ 2a2æ: ‘Sermones enim morales universales 
minus sunt utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt’. 
563 On this doctrine see Mesnard 1992, pp 462-484; Baird 1975, Ch I; PF p 325 nn1 & 2; and 
Nemoianu 2013.  
564 See Augustine’s Letter 18 to Coelestinus: EA, pp 45-6; also Letter 120-222 to Consentius (OCG II 
1428 n6) and Sellier 1995, pp 191 ff.  
565 Pensée 308:339, 298:329 & 933:761.   
566 Scholars have noted the doctrine’s analogy to Pascal’s earlier account of geometrical ‘orders’ 
which Pascal may have had in mind: points add nothing to lines, lines add nothing to surfaces and 
surfaces add nothing to solids (OCG I 266 & II 1429 n8).  Lines do not contain points and surfaces 
do not contain lines: the higher moral ‘orders’ do not contain the lower.   
567 So God is in the highest order, not (pace Davidson 1979, p 61) in a fourth even higher order. 
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wholly fulfilled life. It is the level of faith – cœur568 – of Christ’s commandments 
and of the ‘Christian republic’, of intuitive understanding. 
 
Pascal’s system – which remains unpolished and not wholly consistent569 – 
assumes that some beings may live wholly at one level only but also that others 
may respect the values of more than one level570.  There can be monarchs with 
serious intellectual interests571 and saints who are also kings.  In this earthly life, 
as embodied beings, we cannot wholly ignore the ‘carnal’ order: there is a 
minimum of material things necessary for our survival, a survival that requires 
the co-operation of others572.  We cannot therefore avoid operating according to 
the values of the lowest level, however much we may aspire to being intellectuals 
or saints.  The main values of the lowest ‘order’ are not truthfulness but social 
peace, a degree of order, not abstract justice but obedience to local custom and 
the coercive state573.  The true Christian’s attitude to the state is submission to its 
customs and laws while viewing this obedience as of no salvific value: like 
Hobbes, Pascal favours a strong state which keeps order574 and deceives its 
citizens if necessary (60:94).  This order is, for a Christian, folly but she obeys 
because it is God’s punishment of the human race575. 
 
In Augustinian terms, the relationship between the Earthly City and the 
City of God will always be ‘perplexing’ for Christians576.   While on earth, they 
obey the laws of the terrestrial city while knowing that laws are merely, in 
                                                          
568 See Gouhier 1986, Ch III. 
569 See Webb 1929, pp 107 ff. 
570 See Broome 1966, p 105. 
571 The idea of the ‘orders’ is an elaboration of an idea Pascal had when writing a letter of 
dedication to Christina of Sweden, in which he stresses the superiority of intellectual over 
temporal power (OCG I 350).  See also L’art de persuader, OCG II 171-2. 
572 Pascal seems to deny this when he says that saints have no need of ‘grandeurs charnelles ou 
spirituelles’ (308:339); intellectually, perhaps not, but they have to live with others and share the 
benefits – the ‘admirable order’ – of society, such as they are.   
573 Pensées 60:94 & 103:135.  On the latter see the analysis in Auerbach 1989. 
574 He may have got wind of the arguments in Paris between Hobbes and Royalist exiles as to 
whether allegiance was owed to a powerless monarch (see Franklin 2001, p 82).  Of course, unlike 
Hobbes, Pascal does not envisage a contract between the individual and the state. See Auerbach 
1989, pp 33-5. 
575 Pensée 14:48.  I doubt whether this amounts to saying that the lowest ‘order’ is ‘evil’ (see 
Auerbach 1989, p 34).  Genet suggests that each order has its good and bad sides (Genet 2010, pp 
181-2) but surely there are no ‘bad sides’ to the highest level. 
576 See Rist 1994, p 255 and Sellier 1995, p 200. 
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Augustine’s phrase, ‘a combination of human wills to attain the things which are 
helpful to this life’; they obey for the sake of social order not for the sake of God’s 
law577; they know, but keep the thought to themselves, that human laws do not 
represent what is truly valuable but are the expression of ‘concupiscence’ and of 
where power lies in society578.   
 
So those who operate on more than one level may experience moral 
vertigo: a Christian sports referee applies one principle of fairness on Saturday 
afternoon and hears about an utterly different principle of Divine justice in the 
Sunday sermon: God does not answer prayers579 and He is not, despite the 
optimistic sentiments of a Thomas Hardy character, ‘a perfect gentleman’580.  As 
the finite is nothing compared to infinity (because adding a finite number to an 
infinite number does not change its nature581), ‘so it is with our mind in relation 
to God, with our justice confronting divine justice’ and ‘God’s justice meted out on 
the damned exceeds less [what we consider as] the norm (est moins énorme582) 
and must be less shocking than his mercifulness towards the elect’583.   If a 
monarch behaved with such disregard for equity, he would be called a tyrant: but 
God’s justice has no relation to what justice requires of a monarch ... or a referee. 
 
The true Christian’s value system is fragmented: at the lowest level, she 
obeys the laws of the state and acts according to standards of ‘justice’ which are 
imposed by force.  She pays respect to those of high rank but her pensée de 
                                                          
577 ‘’Tis set down so in Heaven, but not in earth’, Shakepeare: Measure for Measure, II.iv.50. 
578 City of God XIX.17 (EA, p 203).  See pensées 90:124, 797:650, 103:135 and the Trois Discours, 
OCG II 195-6.  This doctrine attributes all civil law to human efforts to live together while God’s 
law consists in absolute edicts valid for all mankind at all times (see Sections 27 & 28 below). 
579 On prayer, see for example the Prière pour demander à Dieu le bon usage des maladies (OCG II 
183-193) which is not a request for any action by God but an act of submission, recognizing that 
illness is a ‘salutary’ punishment for sin, which has the additional benefit of preventing the sinner 
from ‘enjoying the world’. 
580 Who rewards virtue (Thomas Hardy: Far from the Madding Crowd, London, Macmillan: 1975, p 
133). 
581 Pascal is a bit hazy as to what the ‘nature’ of a number is (Davidson 1983, p 27) and comes 
close to regarding infinity as a very big number. 
582 See the discussion in Chrétien, J-L: ‘L’énormité de la miséricorde selon Pascal’, Dix-septième 
siècle, nº 261 (2013), pp 651-70.  
583 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 676 & fn*; see also 131:164 (at OCG II 581-2), 935:762 & 896:448 and 
the Écrits sur la grâce (OCG II 253-4).  See also a letter possibly addressed to Pascal from Barcos 
(OCM IV 1620-1625 and OCG II 1451, n6). 
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derriere la tête is that hereditary rank reflects no merit584; nor does she see 
property rights as just; she is respectful only because this attitude promotes 
social order.  Is she, as Voltaire would say585, duplicitous, hiding her real 
intentions from others while pretending to respect them and the law?  No, 
because she is upholding social peace – even though are serious objections to all 
the main political systems (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy et al)586. The key to 
a successful society lies not in applying Christian values but in the judicious 
application of force to establish and maintain the government’s authority, of other 
measures, including deception, to increase respect for it and – given that some 
injustice is inevitable – to achieve a trade-off between the use of force and the 
application of justice587.  All this achieves a degree of social order but only a 
simulacrum of charity588.  Such a society will not be a Christian community but – 
for all its imperfections – it may be a going concern which harnesses human 
destructive energy to create an ‘admirable’ order589 which, however – as must be 
expected – cannot instantiate the pure ideal of justice590.    
 
We can see too that, at the middle level, a group of intellectuals could be 
occupied almost wholly with the search for and dissemination of knowledge 
without being able wholly to ignore, or to cease to be dependent on, the level of 
material concerns.  They inevitably benefit from a degree of social peace achieved 
by the state’s use of force and deception (60:94) even though their main value is 
truthfulness.  There is no dishonour in what they do, but the intellectual life 
breeds hubristic scientific confidence, scathingly criticised in Disproportion de 
l’homme (199:230). 
 
If anyone can operate at the highest level, her purpose will be to love and 
obey God.  From the point of view of this ‘order’, efforts to produce a harmonious 
                                                          
584 Pensées 90:124, 91:125, 92:126 and Trois Discours sur la Condition des Grands (OCG II 195-6). 
585 Voltaire 2008, pp 113 & 200-1. 
586 See Bayet 1948, Ch IV. 
587 Pensées 103:135, 74:108, 81-2:116 & 85:119. 
588 Pensées 118:150; 210:243 & 106:138.   
589 Pascal sees no way of improving the status quo: he rejects Augustinian theocracy and, on the 
other hand, Hobbes’ idea that the state could dominate and use the Church (Ferreyrolles 1984, pp 
215-229).  
590 See Rogers 1998. 
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society and to further intellectual enquiry are valueless because they contribute 
nothing to salvation.  
 
Although Pascal refers to types of people591 belonging to each level, it is 
clear that he has in mind shared activities in pursuit of ideals or values.  These 
ideals or values are, or tend to be, mutually exclusive in practice.  This is because 
of their ætiology rather than their content: a prohibition of murder could be 
found either at the lowest of the three ‘orders’ or to be derived from Christ’s two 
commandments: in the former context, the law against murder promotes social 
peace; in the latter it is an absolute prohibition, whether it promotes social peace 
or not592.  Soldiers, merchants or rulers do not pursue truthfulness as an ideal, 
although they may be truthful when it suits them.  Intellectuals do pursue the 
truth but not necessarily the ideal of charity per se, although they may on occasion 
be charitable.  Saints accord little or no value to intellectual pursuits (apart, they 
would concede, from non-speculative theology), and see the measure of social 
order which human societies achieve as falling far short of divine justice, for our 
egoism can never be wholly repressed593.  Pascal implies that, in the two lower 
‘orders’, there can be conflicts between values; our judgments of value and of fact 
are, at best, only part of the truth (905:450).   
 
A useful way of understanding the ‘orders’, as conceptually independent 
domains of activity, is to apply to them (whether to each as a whole or to their 
component spheres of activity) the 20th Century notion of forms of life.  Each 
‘order’ is a domain, or a group of domains, of functioning linguistic and other 
activity.  Words like ‘justice’ may be used in all three domains but the use will 
differ from one to another.  For Pascal, none of them is (as explained above) a 
domain universal to the whole human race: they are all products of a culture with 
a history.  In the case of the highest ‘order’, its fundamentals cannot change: God 
is immutable and His commands are for all time; hence Pascal’s ‘perpetuity’ 
                                                          
591 Who, incidentally, all have minds and live as embodied beings (Webb 1929, p 109). 
592 See the discussion of Maimonides’ doctrine that obeying laws promoting social harmony and 
obeying divine law respectively have different ends, in MacIntyre 2009, pp 66-7.   
593 Pensées 210-211:243-244. 
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doctrine594.   Pascal’s insistence on the immutability of the highest ‘order’ is 
doctrinal, not based on historical observation for clearly moral practices depicted 
in the Bible present, as a whole, no coherent set of principles – not least the acts 
of Jehovah himself!  These aberrant features – coupled with other conflicts 
between the Testaments – caused Marcion to discard the Old Testament 
altogether595, an option not open to Pascal.  Instead, he attempts to construct the 
Christian morality which has always existed by selecting and interpreting some of 
the ascetic prophets’ sayings.   
 
We can however see how Pascal would answer Mill’s objection to 
command morality: he would say that indubitably the lower two ‘orders’ change: 
human societies have adopted innumerable values and codes over time; 
intellectual pursuits like natural science undergo profound change as observation 
and experiment modify hypotheses596 (and methods).    But the order of ‘charité’ 
does not change if human relations change, for that change would be reflected in 
the lowest or middle ‘order’.  Pascal’s position is that Christian morality of the 
highest ‘order’ provides us with an absolute standpoint from which to rebuild our 
lives, repressing immoral desires, perhaps modifying others.  The agnostic may 
well ask how this process can be carried out without begging the question why it 
is to be done at all: from ‘outside’ the form of life don’t we lack the understanding 
needed to see the point of the highest ‘order’, if only because we seem unable to 
adopt a standpoint completely outside and independent of our ‘fundamental 
motivational structure’597?   
 
The agnostic may well prefer to continue trying to live with, and even to 
improve, the social morality with which he can connect.  Diderot describes 
Pascal’s doctrine in even bleaker terms: the Gospel presents two moralities: one is 
common to the whole human race but the other truly Christian morality ‘est la 
morale la plus antisociale que je connaisse’598.  The highest ‘order’ is out of human 
                                                          
594 Pensées 279-289:311-321 & 392:11. 
595 See Freeman 2009, pp 134-6. 
596 OCG I 455-8. 
597 See Geuss 2005, p 91 who mentions Williams 2011.   
598 Quoted in Nagakawa 1989, p 29. 
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reach because only God can transform a person so that she becomes a member of 
that ‘order’.  Pascal has to make a case for our aspiring to the highest order, for 
leaving ordinary human relationships and pursuits behind.  But since even the 
true Christian cannot leave them behind in this life, the result for her is a 
fragmented system of value.  That people may operate with more than one set of 
values is beyond doubt: strongly held Christian principles can conflict with 
professional ethics.  We may feel the ‘pull’ of the community and its values within 
which we have been brought up but also the demands of ‘abstract rationality and 
universality’599.  But we shall now see that the true Christian’s dilemma is 
profound. 
 
29. Revaluation, submission and peace of mind. 
Pascal sets out a ‘revaluation of all values’ in the reverse direction to 
Nietzsche’s.  He begins with the claim that this earthly life has nothing of enduring 
value.  The therapeutic strength of Christian morality is that it enables us, having 
realized that the goals we usually pursue are futile, the pleasures transitory and 
our future uncertain, having pushed away the world and all we like in it600, to turn 
to God, to the only everlasting Supreme Good, to that certainty which we 
constantly seek (148:181).   When we do this, we find that earthly suffering turns 
out to conduce to eternal goodness; earthly pleasures are found to be concealed 
evil (OCG II 31).   The convert to Christianity has to learn to put no value on 
visible, transient things and to focus on the invisible and eternal (OCG I 628).  This 
means considering as nothing ‘the sky, the earth, one’s mind, body,  parents,  
friends, enemies, possessions, poverty, disgrace, prosperity, honour, ignominy, 
esteem, contempt, authority, weakness , health, sickness and life itself’, because 
they are all transitory (OCG II 100).  There are clear echoes of the Stoic 
programme (e.g. in Epictetus’ hands) in which longing, fear, intense pleasure and 
grief are seen as resulting from erroneous values601. 
 
                                                          
599 See Williams 2014, pp 313-4.  It would be futile in such a situation to argue, as Phillips does, 
that the different codes are independent ‘systems of reference’ which cannot be compared but 
have to be accepted or rejected wholesale (see Phillips in Glock 2001, pp 363-6).  
600 See OCG I 628 and OCG II 188-9. 
601 See A A Long: From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford, 
OUP: 2006), Ch 18.  
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Pascal’s answer to the agnostic is thus that there is no peace of mind for 
those who aspire only to live according to the lower two ‘orders’.  Stoic 
asceticism, to which is added Christian humility, provide the context for Christian 
tranquillity.  Only the context: for without grace the effort will be in vain.  
Meanwhile, however, Pascal claims we should be happier than in pursuing 
worldly goals.  This does not mean that the reward will resemble worldly 
rewards. 
 
At the lowest level, we can be benevolent in two ways: either towards 
particular cases or in a more generalised fashion towards our fellow citizens.  
Pascal may have thought particular benevolence impossible but he helped 
unknown indigent individuals and developed his own project to set up a bus 
service (les carrosses à cinq sols) in Paris aiming both to benefit people moving 
about the city and to generate profit for the benefit of some country people in 
distress602.   
 
At the level of intellects, the pay-off might be some technological 
improvement (Pascal’s example of an intellect is Archimedes) or the invention of 
better (but still imperfect) principles of governance (60:94).  But at the highest 
level, realizing that God is the Supreme Good does not have a direct pay-off.  An 
omnipotent God does not answer prayers; He is not a contingent being: he does 
not respond to events in the world even though He appears to do so: He is and 
does what He is and does from all eternity.  If He seems to answer some prayers, 
that is not because He responds to prayers603.  So Christians cannot converse with 
God or experience God’s love or justice as we experience the love of other people 
or the justice of the courts604. 
 
The agnostic can complain that there seems little if any meaning in ‘loving 
God’: He is not a person in the appropriate sense.  Loving God resembles, 
                                                          
602 See OCG I 81 and II 527-540 & 1292. 
603 Pascal’s God causes the just to pray; without grace they would be unable to pray (OCG II 253) 
so He does not respond to merit (pace Genet 2010, p 201).  It is only human to think that merit is 
to be rewarded (935:762).  
604 D Z Phillips comes to much the same view from wholly different premises (Phillips 1965). 
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according to Augustine605, desiring to be united with Him, being committed to 
Him; to love Him is to rejoice in submitting to Him and to repudiate all non-divine 
things.  This account, even if it were intelligible, would represent a pretty one-
sided affair, since God, as a perfect Being, lacks nothing and does not desire 
anything.  God does not reciprocally re-assure those who feel that they love Him. 
 
So the agnostic may press for further explanation: what then is God’s 
justice or mercy or love?  Section 23.2 relates that Pascal effectively retreats from 
explaining the Fall and thus fails to show that Christianity can explain the human 
predicament.  Now the challenge is to explain why one should aspire to the 
highest ‘order’.  We encounter a barrier of incomprehensibility: in saying that God 
is merciful to the few elect who are just as guilty as the damned (418:680), Pascal 
is implying that God is not always just.  Diderot suggests that justice is the mean 
between excessive clemency and excessive cruelty606.  But this applies only where 
excessive clemency would have untoward consequences whereas Pascal can cite 
no reason for God’s limiting His mercifulness, for His limiting salvation to a small 
minority of the human race607.   
 
God is a very odd legislator indeed: as a timeless, omnipotent and 
omniscient being, God cannot be said to deliberate between different courses of 
action over time, for his information is perfect and his opportunities for action 
limitless; a Spinozist would say that there cannot be potentialities in Him which 
are not actualised608.  Since virtue is a disposition to make choices of a 
determinate kind, God cannot be said to be virtuous or to love individuals.  On the 
contrary, an Augustinian like Pascal – who regards Genesis and other parts of the 
Bible as historical documents – has to face the fact that God breaks His own 
commandments609. 
 
                                                          
605 Quoted and discussed in Peters 2009, pp 70 ff.  
606 See Diderot 1964, p 13. 
607 Unless it be Christ’s saying that many are called but few (i.e. only those who are ready to follow 
Him) are chosen (Matthew XXII.14).  . 
608 ‘Neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God’ (Spinoza: Ethics I, Proposition 16; also 
Propositions 31 & 32).  
609 See Rist 1994, pp 296-8. 
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Pascal’s answer is that to approach God is to submit to Jesus Christ 
(449:690).  But that presupposes belief in Jesus as a historical figure of 
supernatural qualities; and that belief requires faith, if for example (as I shall 
discuss in the next Chapter) we are to believe in the miracles of the New 
Testament, and in the Old Testament prophecies which are supposed to show that 
Jesus was the Messiah.  So the agnostic may make two further objections: the 
figure of Jesus may be morally attractive in some respects, but why should He be 
the object of trust?  Even if one gets some feeling of satisfaction or security from 
following Jesus, that feeling may be based on an illusion.  
 
The agnostic may also argue that tranquillity through some form of 
asceticism and a resolve to be selfless in relations with others might be achieved 
without religious faith.  This was an Enlightenment commonplace: Diderot 
claimed that the difference between the moral behaviour of the sincere and 
principled honnête homme and the Christian would be marginal 610.  Hume 
probably believed that religion could not generate but only enforce ‘the motives 
of morality and justice’, which arise naturally in us611.  The secular moralist will 
be glad to jettison the doctrines which have made the moral life appear 
incomprehensible, above all the thesis of the divine legislator, which has turned 
out to be more mysterious than enlightening.   The agnostic would prefer to 
devise a secular morality which is at least intelligible in that it shows that the 
moral life meets at least some of the needs of human life and motivate moral 
behaviour.  We may concede that we have little or no prospect of moral certainty 
or of mental tranquillity in secular ways of life.  But perhaps that is all that is 
available to us.   
 
Pascal’s basic dilemma would remain, even if he could answer our 21st 
century worries: he both wishes and refuses to build a link with our everyday 
morality as we experience it now: he is confident that we are unhappy now and 
promises us happiness if we are lucky enough to be infused with God’s grace.   In 
practice, Pascal did not give up worldly pursuits (see the Introduction).  Instead 
                                                          
610 Diderot 1964, pp 526-532.   
611 Hume 1993, p 122. 
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he sought a balance between being conventionally good in this world and 
preaching an utterly different sort of goodness – a reversal of values – which we 
should achieve on our conversion to the faith.  This balancing act could not 
succeed.  His doctrine fatally implies so radical a disconnection between our lives 
now and the Christian life that we cannot see why it should matter to us now. 
 
Pascal’s hypothesis falls far short of a convincing proof: neither the fact of 
our deep unhappiness nor the failure of competing philosophical systems (10:44 
& 408:27) compel assent to either his theological account of human nature or the 
transcendent moral doctrine which flows from that account. His project has not 
brought the agnostic or lukewarm believer to find tranquillity in the 
transcendence of faith; it has not yet met Pascal’s own objective to show that 
Christianity is ‘not contrary to reason [...] venerable [and] loveable’ such that good 
people can be ‘made to wish it be true’  (12:46).  In the next Chapter we shall see 
how difficult the way to tranquillity is for the aspiring Christian who follows 
Pascal’s path towards faith.  
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CHAPTER V: EVIDENCE AND PROOF: HOW CAN WE BE CERTAIN 
WE HAVE FAITH? 
 
Peace of mind is the key therapeutic objective for Pascal; part of that 
tranquillity – indeed the basis of it – will be faith.  I have shown, however, that 
Pascal’s doctrine of the ‘orders’ and the incommensurability of the highest level’s 
values in relation to the other two, puts an intolerable strain on his assumption 
that commitment to Christian values – and therefore faith – will secure 
tranquillity: those aspiring to Christian faith must expect to be pulled morally in 
at least two directions at once.   
 
In this Chapter, I will set these problems aside.  I will focus now on the 
problem of the certainty of religious faith: how can intelligent and sensitive 
people believe a series of propositions which apparently lack sufficient evidence 
or demonstrability?  On the other hand, many Christians regard their critics’ 
demand for evidence, for signs and wonders, as facile: faith is, they say, not a 
matter of being convinced by objective evidence, but a question of trust.  It is a 
commonplace – with a long history in the Christian tradition612 – they add, that 
there are those who firmly believe but without sophisticated theological 
knowledge or even scriptural knowledge to support their belief.  (This is not 
necessarily a claim that the belief in question is not propositional.)   
  
For Pascal, however, this is not the end of the matter for two reasons: first, 
there is an explanation to be found in Scripture and Christian tradition for the 
ambiguity and obscurity of the Christian message – namely that God is hidden – 
yet the message is available to those who seek it; secondly, some believers fit the 
                                                          
612 The anima naturaliter christiana of Tertullian (who was by the way no fideist – see Amesbury 
2012) reflects a common biblical theme. Augustine noted that the ancient philosophers had failed 
to convince anyone of the existence of God yet even the most unphilosophical peasant woman 
firmly believed in Him (see pensées 229:261, 447:690 and Sellier 1995, p 79).  Also to mention is 
Aquinas’ rusticus, ‘qui nullo modo philosophiae subtiles considerationes capere potest’  (Summa 
contra Gentiles, I.iii.4).   Descartes says in Discours I  that ‘the most ignorant’ have just as much 
chance of getting to Heaven as the most learned (AT VI 8); he says the same about ‘idiotas ac 
rusticos’ to Burman (AT V 176).  See Gilson 1967, pp 133-4. 
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extreme fideist picture but others do not.  For the latter, reasoning about evidence 
has a role to play in their approach to faith and their life as believers.   
  
In this Chapter I will argue that the doctrine of God’s hiddenness has 
plausible aspects but, in Pascal’s hands, it compromises our notion of God’s 
benevolence.  I will then show why we can accept Pascal’s distinction between 
‘simple’ believers and deliberative believers while noting that this dual account of 
faith fatally undermines his project to show how those aspiring to belief – who 
are of course his therapeutic subjects – can achieve faith in God and thus peace of 
mind. 
 
30.  Pascal’s doctrine of the Hidden God 
Christian doctrine has often implied that in this life the evidence for the 
faith is neither easy to discern nor available to all:  
 
‘now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I 
know in part; but then I shall know even as also I am known’  
(I Corinthians XIII.12).   
 
The promise of Christianity is that the divine, which is now all but hidden 
from us, will one day be revealed.  But Paul also says: ‘the invisible things of [God] 
from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things 
that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead’ (Romans, I.20).   He also tells 
the Athenians that some of them already know about the Christian God613. 
 
Pascal has no consistent response to these thoughts.  He echoes the 
passage in I Corinthians XIII.12614:  in the Letter of 1 April 1648 (OCG II 8) he 
repeats the commonplace615 that God has represented the invisible things in the 
visible.  This is not a reference to the Design Argument: Pascal explicitly says that 
                                                          
613 ‘Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you’ (Acts XVII.23). On Paul’s 
mission to Athens, see Christopher P Jones: Between Pagan and Christian (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), Ch 1.   
614 ‘…par la foi nous connaissons son existence, par la gloire nous connaîtrons sa nature’ (418:680 at 
OCG II 677). 
615 See OCG II 1101 for references to similar thoughts in Montaigne and Saint-Cyran. 
159 
 
 
 
the physical world reminds us of what the human race lost through Adam’s sin 
and of our current moral weakness because we are embodied beings in a 
Universe which takes away our freedom.  He insists elsewhere that only the 
faithful can ‘see’ God in Nature (3:38).  The claim by some apologists (e.g. Jean-
Pierre Camus and in a different way Gassendi) that we have an instinct to see God 
in Nature616 gives, for Pascal, only half the story; perhaps we have an instinct of 
this sort, but God more often than not over-rides it: He blinds the many to the 
reality seen by the elect few617.  It is this action by God which explains the 
paradox of the ‘invisibly visible’.   
 
Pascal half-acknowledges that a few pagans were aware of God618 but in 
289:321 he says that the pagans do not know God at all and in 442:690 that God 
abandoned the pagans.  These latter assertions sit uneasily with Paul’s telling the 
Athenians that some of them already worship God, but he tends more often than 
not to say that (a) only the faithful virtuous can be aware of God and (b) the 
pagans lack faith and are incapable of virtue619.    
 
Pascal’s main belief is that the hiddenness of God is His response to 
Adam’s sin: He ‘abandons’ those who defy Him and reduces them to the level of 
beasts620; He does not want the whole human race to have the benefit of faith so 
He does not make His existence manifest and He allows false religions to exist; His 
hiddenness affects all people, even those who are virtuously seeking Him; but He 
has given signs so that those who seek Him (having received grace to enable them 
to do so) can find the truth.  One of the ‘signs’ is the human predicament itself: we 
can see both how futile our lives are and paradoxically that we have the capacity 
to aim for things of lasting value.  God’s hiddenness actually benefits us, because, 
lacking direct knowledge of Him and thus confidence in our powers, we see that 
we are submerged in error and deep unhappiness, and then look for a cure621.  
                                                          
616 See d’Angers 1954, pp 103-4 & 112-113. 
617 The idea that God deliberately does this was suppressed by the editors of the 1670 edition of 
the Pensées (see PH I, pp xvi-xvii). 
618 See his Letter of end October 1656, OCG II 31, and pensée 286:318. 
619 Faith and virtue are inseparable (930:757).  See Sections 5 & 24 above. 
620 Pensée 149:182 and OCG II 289. 
621 ‘Dieu s’est donc voulu caché pour amener l’homme à se convertir’ (Magnard 2001, p 15). 
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The unbelievers’ complaint that God is not manifest to all amounts to a complaint 
against deism not against the existence of the Christian God who is not completely 
hidden but was revealed in the person of Christ and may still be in other ways622.   
 
Pascal concedes that there is a sense in which God is present in the world 
even though He is hidden623.  But this is not like the presence of someone hidden 
in a room who may make his presence felt at any moment, like Hamlet behind the 
arras.  So the notion of His presence is very tenuous at best.  God is ‘absent’ for all 
of us because He is invisible in the usual sense of that word, and also ‘absent’ for 
many in the sense that they will never have a mystical experience of His 
presence624.  
  
There are two elements in Pascal’s version of the hiddenness doctrine, one 
of which is plausible and one problematic.  The plausible element is the 
contention that religious belief does not rest on empirical evidence in the way 
that many of our beliefs do625.  There are three ways of interpreting this assertion 
in reading the Pensées.  First, divinity is not of this world: no one expects God to 
be routinely visible in the way that human and other animals are: faith does not 
contradict sense experience: it says something different (185:217).    
 
Secondly, we cannot ‘see’ God in natural phenomena, for example there is 
no doctrine-free observation that the sheer beauty of the celestial bodies tells us 
there must be a God; for Nature is – as an array of physical objects – 
fundamentally inexplicable and bears no evidence of God’s existence626.   
 
Thirdly, natural phenomena cannot ‘prove’ the existence of God: His 
having created the world is not the only possible explanation of its existence with 
                                                          
622 See Pensées 149:182, 149:274, 236:268, 242:275, 427:681 (at OCG II 681), 444:690; 446:690 
and 449:690.  
623 Pensée 449:690 at OCG II 699. 
624 See the following Section. For this reason, I do not, pace Miel 1969, pp 114-5, n 17, disagree 
with Goldmann’s use of the expression ‘le Dieu absent’. 
625 See Kołakowski 1982, p 49. 
626 Pensée 199:230.  See also 198:229 and the Letter of the end of October 1656: ‘[Dieu] est 
demeuré caché sous le voile de la nature’ (OCG II 30).   In this Pascal apparently disagrees with 
some Jansenist thinkers, for example Saint-Cyran (see Russier 1949, II, pp 403-4). 
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the qualities we see in it627. Since we cannot explain the fundamental causes of 
natural phenomena, how much less able are we to understand supernatural 
phenomena (188:220).  We are far from being able to construct a comprehensive 
mechanistic account of the universe (84:118), let alone to show that the universe 
presupposes the existence of a Creator (781:644).  
 
Pascal might well have rejected a posteriori proofs of God’s existence on 
grounds similar to those advanced by Hume’s Philo: he believes that deducing a 
cause from an effect (perceiving a natural necessity) depends on prior 
observation of constant conjunction, although he did not use that phrase 
(660:544)628.   However, as it stands Pascal’s position is not exactly Hume’s: 
whereas he would say that, absent comprehensive scientific understanding of the 
universe, we cannot see any pattern in it and thus no evidence of a divine 
Designer, Hume would say that, even if we could see a pattern, there is no valid 
inference from that to the existence of a Designer because there is no 
independent evidence for it. Pascal comes close to saying that it is ignorance of 
causes which prompts people to devise a posteriori arguments for the existence of 
God.  To ‘see’ God in the visible world we must already have faith, not by 
entertaining some sort of doctrinally neutral causal hypothesis629.  His over-riding 
doctrine is, as we shall see, that God can be known only through Jesus Christ630 
and it is this which leads to his rejection of the soon-to-be popular Design 
Argument631.  
 
Pascal implies that unbelievers culpably ignore God: they bring their 
ignorance on themselves by, for example, refusing to accept the evidence for the 
miracles of the New Testament (841-2:426-7).  Or he implies that they unfairly 
dismiss believers as credulous, viz. employing lax standards of evidence or no 
                                                          
627 Pensées 427:681, beginning, & 449:690. 
628 See Hume 1993, pp 46, 48-9 & 51, and Penelhum 2000, Ch 13.  
629 Pensées 3:38; 427:681; 463:702; 781:644.  As Phillips suggests, ‘it was the lives of the faithful 
which breathed into the formal proofs whatever life they had’ (Phillips 1986, p 91).   I discuss 
Pascal’s views on metaphysical proofs of God’s existence in Section 36 below. 
630 See especially pensées 449:690 and 781:644. 
631 Before its full flowering in the 18th Century, Pascal’s contemporaries could have been aware of 
the argument in a synoptic version in Aquinas’ Fifth Way where he says, ‘whatever lacks 
intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with 
knowledge and intelligence’ (Summa Theologiæ Ia.2.3). 
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standards at all632.   The notion of blame here may be out of place.  But he is right 
(as I will outline in the Epilogue) to imply that religious belief contains in some of 
its domains its own rules of evidence: for example, the rule that Scripture and 
declarations by the Church have to be consulted to learn what Christian doctrine 
is. 
 
Pascal’s position may seem to add up to an unobjectionable form of 
‘theological non-naturalism’633.  He is not committed to the view that no theistic 
proofs are possible but only to the view that, as human knowledge is now, we 
cannot use empirical facts to prove God’s existence.   It is also part of Pascal’s 
position that the fact that there is no conclusive evidence for God’s existence does 
not show that religious faith is irrational.  Incidentally, he would also see no 
reason to claim that personal experience of the presence of God is conclusive 
evidence for His existence634 since we cannot tell the difference between fantaisie 
(false) and sentiment (true)635. 
 
  Modern justifications of divine hiddenness start from the assumption that 
His being hidden seems to be an evil which thus needs to be explained as part of a 
theodicy636.  The most common approach is to say that God’s hiddenness leaves 
us free to look for Him or to ignore Him and that our freedom is an essential 
prerequisite for being committed to God.  Moser has in addition argued that a God 
visible to all would encourage wilful opposition.  As with all such arguments, the 
problem is to explain why an omnipotent God cannot arrange both to be obvious 
to all and for everyone to feel sincerely committed to Him. 
 
                                                          
632 Pensée 427:681 at OCG II 682. 
633 See Penelhum 1971, pp 55-60. 
634 See the discussion of Paul Moser’s view that (in Coffman & Cervantez’s formulation) ‘your 
experience of the presence of God’s Spirit would be the best kind of evidence for God’s existence’ 
(Coffman & Cervantez 2011, p 98).   
635 Pensée 530:455.  I take fantaisie here to be another word for Pascalian imagination, not 
dreaming as Ferreyrolles suggests (PF p 321, n1). 
636 Nietzsche doubts that an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God can hide Himself from 
His creatures (quoted in Natoli 1985, p 90).  For modern discussions of God’s hiddenness and its 
degrees, see Howard-Snyder & Moser 2002, the accounts of MacIntyre’s and Hick’s arguments in 
Penelhum 1971, pp 45-8, Swinburne 2004, pp 267-272 and Moser 2008.  Küng identifies ‘an 
unconditional, ultimate absolute [which] is remote and concealed’ as part of the basic consensus 
between the ‘great religions’ (Eternal Life?, Garden City NY, Image Books: 1985, p 54). 
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 Pascal takes a different line: his explanation of divine hiddenness is an 
aspect of his moral doctrine.  He says that God’s hiddenness is prompted by the 
wickedness of those from whom He is hidden.  One aspect of sin is that I 
concentrate on my worldly and sinful pursuits and ignore the spiritual aspect of 
life, so God is hidden from me in that sense637.   But it is God who hides Himself 
and it is hard to understand why He withdrew from the human race after the Fall: 
an omnipotent and omniscient God cannot be taken by surprise, or angered by, 
Adam’s sin638.  It does not help to be told by Pascal that God’s ‘justice’ is 
incomprehensible639, for example in relation to the damnation of unbaptised 
infants (131:164): it so is in relation to the damnation of all unbelievers and thus 
to God’s hiding Himself from them. 
 
Pascal asserts that God hides from us in order to make it possible for us to 
strive to overcome the obstacles to faith (including the existence of other 
religions) and thus to ‘find’ Him, achieving a virtuous state which would not have 
been possible had God been manifest to us in the first place.  This sounds similar 
to the familiar Christian idea that God tests the steadfastness of faith.  But, as I will 
discuss in the next Section, for Pascal faith is exclusively a gift from God, never the 
result of human effort640.  So Pascal’s God consigns us to an obstacle race which 
we cannot win without His help.  But if we fail to win, that is ‘inexcusable’ 
(236:268)!  God hides himself so that the majority of the human race does not 
recognize Him, in order to bestow grace on a select few who become either 
temporarily just (for there is no guarantee of enduring grace) or definitively 
members of the elect.  The rest are damned because they do not get God’s help.   
 
The first objection to this doctrine can be put in two questions: why would 
an omnipotent641 and benevolent God choose to hide Himself after the Fall rather 
                                                          
637 See the Letter of 1 April 1648, OCG II 8.  
638 Or caused to do anything by His creatures. 
639 Apparently not wholly incomprehensible: several pensées justify God’s just acts: 793:646; 
467:704; 472:709; 418:680 (footnote* on OCG II 676). 
640 Grace is a necessary and sufficient condition for faith which is ‘the grace-given power to hold 
fast to God as He speaks His word’ (see Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Vol 31, 2a2æ.1-7 (ed. T C 
O’Brien, Cambridge, CUP: 2006), p 4, nc.   
641 Pensée 968:802 (citing Augustine). 
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than remain manifest and save everyone from everlasting suffering642?  Since He 
bestows grace on the elect regardless of their merit or demerit (OCG II 262), why 
could He not do so for all? 
 
Another related objection to God’s hiding Himself is that it is incompatible 
with the love God feels for all human beings.  Schellenberg has argued that, if God 
loved us, He would want a close personal relationship with each of us and to be 
available to everyone in the world; He would not be hidden and there would be 
no ‘reasonable nonbelievers’643.  We would, in a sense, all be happy mystics in 
direct touch with Him.  The difficulty with Schellenberg’s argument is that it is 
hard to attach much meaning to the phrase ‘close personal relationship’ in this 
context: God would have to have such relationships with billions of people, living 
and dead, yet how agreeable would they be? He could not, without insincerity, 
evade difficult issues, for example: a veracious God could not be tactful yet tact is 
often a key ingredient in personal relationships.  On the other hand, God’s 
unavailability to all but a few mystics surely counts against His benevolence: even 
if He wants to avoid coercing us into believing in Him, he could lower the barriers 
considerably. 
 
Pascal is not concerned to defend God’s benevolence or to stress His love 
for all people: he emphasises God’s justice and barely mentions His love; in this he 
is in line with Jansenist doctrine644.  So his answer to objections which insist on 
God’s benevolence or loving nature is that God’s love is shown in His merciful 
attitude towards the elect but that we have no ‘right’ to measure His mercy645.  
Since the Fall He has been justly enraged by the behaviour of the sinful majority 
and merciful only to the elect.  God has ‘abandoned’ (most of) the human race 
(149:182) particularly those who did not recognize the Messiah when He came.  
God’s love for the Jews has been absent since they ‘rejected’ the true Messiah: 
they have suffered misfortune ever since646.     Yet it is hard to accept that this 
                                                          
642 See Droz 1886, p 47.  
643 Schellenberg 1993, and see Howard-Snyder & Moser 2002, pp 40-54. 
644 See OCG II 1451, n 6. 
645 Pensée 149:182 at OCG II 594. 
646 Pensées 311:342 & 1:37. 
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peevish behaviour expresses benevolence towards humanity as a whole: it seems, 
as one scholar implies, less than divine647.   Pascal has no philosophico-theological 
reason for ignoring these objections.  His doctrine is, especially with his 
therapeutic aims in mind, extremely unattractive648: his aim after all is to make 
the agnostic love the faith and want it to be true (12:46).   
 
31. Observing ‘simple’ believers: the nature of their faith 
Pascal’s project is to encourage a specific type of belief, not to replicate all 
types of faith.  So we need a preliminary examination of types of faith before 
discussing the relation between evidence and faith.  This Section will consider the 
phenomenon of faith from an observer’s perspective. 
 
For Pascal there are three types of person: the person who has found God, 
the person seeking Him and the person not seeking Him (160:192); as to the first 
sort of person, it is a matter of observable fact649 that there are people whose 
piety and devotion tell us that they have faith which, for Pascal, can be attributed 
only to a divine source; in them it is the lack of proof which shows the significance 
(sens) of their belief.  For persons of this first type, the question why they believe 
either never arises or, if it does arise, is answered in one sentence: e.g. ‘Jesus loves 
me’ or ‘I know that my Redeemer liveth’.  Their faith plays such a basic role in 
their lives that it does not require or give rise to critical evaluation.  They very 
probably share their faith with others who have a similar approach.  Pascal says 
these ‘simple believers [...] believe without reasoning’.  Some ‘believe without 
having read the Scripture’.  ‘Simple believers’ display a commitment which, in 
theological terms, consists in ‘feeling that God created them’, loving God and 
hating oneself, feeling incapable of virtue without God’s help and seeing the 
                                                          
647 ‘Tout apparaîtrait raisonnable sauf ce qui rend raison de tout: qu’y a-t-il de divin, en effet, dans la 
volonté de se cacher?’ Gouhier 2005, p 243.  Kołakowski sees the problem of God’s justice as a ‘tear 
in the fabric’ of Pascal’s thought: see Is God happy? (London, Penguin Books: 2012), pp 196-200.   
648 Goldmann famously argued that this doctrine placed the seeker after faith in a tragic 
predicament (see Appendix III).  
649 Pascal is not alone in this observation: see Coffman & Cervantez’s discussion of Moser’s 
argument (which puts the observation to different use) that ‘[t]he second-best kind of veridical 
evidence [of God’s existence] [...]comes from first-hand acquaintance with people transparently in 
volitional fellowship with, and thus led by, God’s intervening Spirit’: Coffman & Cervantez 2011, p 
101.  See also Moser 2008, pp 223-4. 
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Incarnation as a way to salvation.  But perhaps they would not be able to convince 
an unbeliever of the truth of their faith, since the unbeliever would see no reason 
– in the mere fact that they believe – to consider adopting Christian beliefs650.   
 
Is God not hidden to ‘simple’ believers?  Unless they are mystics and have a 
direct experience of His presence, He may remain hidden from them: the ‘simple’ 
believers do not need evidence or signs of God: they just believe.  They know God 
but in a different way from that of those ‘who have enough intellect to see the 
truth, even if they resist it’ (394:13).  As for mystics on whom Pascal has little to 
say651, again they are not the sincere seekers after truth to whom God’s signs are 
addressed: they have ‘found God’. 
  
The ‘simple’ believers’ incurious recognition of the Church as an 
established institution – with its rituals and traditions – is sufficient for them to 
have faith, (while others may want to know the history of the Church back to the 
apostles or to the beginning of the world652).   Pascal attributes ‘simple’ belief to 
the cœur and not to powers of reason because that is how it is expressed in the 
believers’ behaviour.  The notion of cœur (which Pascal associates with charité 
and volonté) is complex: the best interpretation of it is as a capacity of intuition of 
such certainty as to create conviction and commitment653.  This is not to say that 
‘simple’ believers intuit Christian doctrine from their own hearts: what they know 
is what they hear (and can inwardly digest) in church, which may not be much.   
Their commitment is not a matter of conscious choice: volonté is involved only 
because beliefs result indirectly from what one has consciously or unconsciously 
chosen to focus on; or one has, explicitly or tacitly, chosen not to focus on certain things.  
The ‘simple’ believers are Jansen’s ideal: he thought that faith should be in a cage of holy 
ignorance and that all attempts to investigate the faith amounted to curiosity and 
vanity654.  Sometimes we focus on and evaluate evidence before we come to 
believe something.  But on other occasions we just find ourselves believing 
                                                          
650 Pensées 394:13, 380-2:412-4.  
651 Pensée 928:756 cautions against seeking God’s love by imitating St Teresa whose virtue in 
God’s eyes was humility.  
652 Pensées 482:717, 895:448. 
653 Pensée 110:142; see below for a discussion of this. 
654 See Busson 1933, p 262. 
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certain propositions, beliefs which are accompanied by a specific attitude which 
we find hard to disentangle from the beliefs; this is the operation of the cœur655.   
 
Observation of ‘simple’ believers’ faith is theory-laden: it presupposes 
some general doctrines about the mechanisms of belief656, others about human 
nature and about the traditions of the religion concerned.  Any (Augustinian) 
Christian believes, for example, that an individual left to his own resources is 
incapable of leading a virtuous life: we are all fallible and too weak to be virtuous.  
Virtue – inseparable from faith – is always and only God-given:  if you believe a 
human being can become a saint without grace, you do not know what it is to be 
human or what it is to be a saint (869:440).   So the ‘simple’ believer is, if she has 
true faith, necessarily a recipient of God’s grace.  We are justified in believing that 
her belief is the effect of a specific cause, an act of God, which explains why she 
has it without having gone through a process of evaluating evidence or other 
reasons for holding the belief. 
 
The ‘simple’ believer’s faith consists in a few basic beliefs, ‘basic’ in the 
sense that the believer offers no grounds for them.  The believer, if pressed, would 
say that reasoning does not enter into her belief and perhaps point to the 
authority of priests, parents or others and to the institutional setting657.  But, if 
the story ended there, an observer would have no reason to respect the ‘simple’ 
believer’s faith: passionate conviction, however sincere, is cognitive weakness, 
not strength658.   Usually, we expect a person of normal intelligence to be able to 
explain how her belief fits in with other beliefs she holds.  Mesnard suggests that 
the ‘simple’ believer’s faith implicitly includes total knowledge of Christianity659.  
But it is hard to make sense of this claim: the ‘simple’ believer does not have 
unconscious knowledge of Christian doctrine such that, like the slave in the Meno, 
                                                          
655 See pensées 424:680, 179:210, 328:360, 588:487, 172:203, 110:142, 423:680, 661:544, 
703:581, 202:234, and 539:458.   
656 Pascal sketches this in L’Art de Persuader (OCG II 171). 
657 Compare Locke 1999, Ch XV, pp 168 ff, and the charge that Locke proposed a ‘Double 
Christianity’ (ibid. p xlvi). 
658 See Simon Blackburn: ‘Religion and Respect’ in Antony 2007. 
659 Mesnard 1976, p 166. 
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it could be elicited from her by questioning.  She simply has not read the 
Scriptures or attended to Pascal’s ‘proofs’ which are based on them.  
 
A sceptic can rightly demand more explanation of ‘simple’ belief as a way 
of checking its sincerity. There could be three possible concerns here.  First, to 
express a belief is implicitly to recommend the belief to others, implying that it is 
open to acceptance or rejection by others on the basis of reasons, or even – in an 
as yet unspecified context – their absence.  Can the ‘simple’ believer explain why 
she has no reasons for her belief?  Can she explain why she holds that belief 
rather than, say, the belief that the dead all live on Venus?  Second, in the case of 
Christian faith, there is an additional reason for seeking to know why the beliefs 
are held: they involve, in some perhaps not invariably explicit way, commitment 
to a moral code.  So the question arises: ‘why should I adopt that way of life?’  
Thirdly, the believer cannot, by claiming her belief is wholly personal and 
somehow immune to others’ scrutiny, beat a tactical retreat here because her 
faith is not a private possession: it is shared by others within an institution which, 
furthermore, sets out to ‘bear witness’, to convert non-believers. 
 
The ‘simple’ believer is an incomplete Christian: she does not participate in 
various key aspects of Christian life as an institutional system of beliefs and 
practices: for example, she does not read the Scriptures either alone or with 
others.  Her belief is intensely personal in the sense that she is the kind of person 
who does not question authority: her reasons for belief are inherent in her 
character.  As Diderot says, not everyone is suited to scepticism: this is shown in 
the fact that we often have reasons for our beliefs which others would not share: 
‘Chaque esprit a son télescope’660 (and we’re often looking through the wrong 
end).  Since scepticism is the beginning of the quest for faith (170:201), the 
‘simple believer’ is not the model believer whom Pascal aims to present to the 
seeker after the truth.  As Locke puts it: ‘He that believes, without having any 
Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks the 
Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker’661. 
                                                          
660 Diderot 1964, p 24. 
661 Essay, IV.xvii.24. 
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32. ‘Deliberative’ believers and Pascal’s ‘proofs’  
Pascal’s agnostic is not tabula rasa.  She has, just by growing up in a 
Christian culture, a body of assumptions and beliefs, some of which have been 
absorbed– perhaps unconsciously – from her experience of religious practices.  
Pascal says his subject has superficial biblical knowledge (427:681 at OCG II 682) 
which must be replaced by a profound grasp of Scripture.  Here, therapy consists 
in digging out beliefs which the agnostic has ultimately to accept are not just 
myths662. 
 
This process is to produce another kind of believer who, unlike the ‘simple’ 
believer, arrives at belief by ‘reasoning’ (110:142).  We can observe this type of 
‘deliberative’ aspirant being persuaded to make – like Pascal himself – the best 
possible case, for themselves or for others too, for the Christian religion.    The 
context and the content of these aspirants’ faith – if it comes – contrasts with that 
of the ‘simple’ believers.  They have lived different lives and very probably share 
their faith with other ‘deliberative’ believers or at least regard themselves as 
taking part in a tradition of learned belief.  That such believers exist is crucial to 
Pascal’s project: he aims to motivate potential believers to study his ‘proofs’ in the 
hope that they shall become ‘deliberative’ believers663. 
 
These believers will, in Pascal’s hands, study his ‘proofs’, i.e. mainly his 
interpretations of the Scriptures and other texts, with the aim of taking in 
evidence for the truth of the New Testament.  This is a historical and textual 
investigation which has two aspects: first, to prove that Christianity – unlike any 
other religion – is not a human invention, that it has always existed (‘perpetuity’: 
281-2:313-4); secondly, to show that the life and death of Christ, including His 
miracles, were predicted by a series of prophets over 4,000 years (332:364) and 
that apparent contradictions between Old Testament prophecies and New 
Testament events can be resolved664.  The importance of these ‘proofs’ to Pascal’s 
                                                          
662 On the cultural inheritance of myths, see Frye 1982, p xviii. 
663 He aimed his projected work at, in Sainte-Beuve’s words, ‘un petit nombre d’esprits et de cœurs 
méditatifs’ (Sainte-Beuve 1848, p 255); see Genet 2010, pp 308-9.   
664 I will not relate the detail of Pascal’s efforts to align the prophecies with the events of the New 
Testament.  It is sufficient to say that even one of Pascal’s most sympathetic interpreters finds 
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project, especially the prophecies665 and the narrative of the New Testament 
(which they are supposed, in some respects, to predict), is evident from the 
quantity of notes he made on them, no doubt aiming at ‘deliberative’ aspirants.  
They should, he says, approach the faith (or rebuild it, if they are lukewarm or 
indifferent Christians) by reflecting on the ‘proofs’.  
 
The difficulty of this part of his project is immense666:  for example, his 
knowledge of other religions is exiguous667; as for the Scripture at his fingertips, 
the prophets contradict each other and are generally vague668.  Pascal knows in 
any case that a successful prediction does not confirm a hypothesis: Descartes  
predicted the result of the Puy-de-Dôme experiment, but on the basis of a 
hypothesis fundamentally different from Pascal’s669.  Moreover, the prophets 
witnessed and predicted supernatural events, including the coming of the 
Messiah.  So the prophecies are not susceptible of empirical evaluation as 
predictions, except in the sense that they fit in with events reported in the New 
Testament.   Pascal’s intention was not to identify propositions which a non-
believer has to accept – in this case doctrinally-neutral historical facts – and then 
to deduce the truth of Christian doctrine from them.  His originality lies in 
avoiding this classic technique.   Instead, he introduces his reader to a self-
contained belief-system.  So the ensemble of prophecy/New Testament ‘proofs’ is 
best understood not as an argument from evidence to a conclusion but rather as a 
set of propositions which (are alleged to) fit together: the truth of the prophecies 
as divine revelation is ‘proven’ by the fact that the events they predict took place, 
the divinity of Christ is ‘proven’ by the prophecies and God’s existence is ‘proven’ 
by the history of Christ’s life670.  In Frye’s wise words:  ‘The two testaments form a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
them ‘curious’ and ‘excessive’ (Mesnard 1992, pp 447-453).  See also Russier 1949, pp 105-151, 
Lacombe 1958, pp 212-3 and Davidson 1979, pp 23-6. 
665 See pensée 335:368.  
666 And thus put faith in danger (Voltaire 1964, pp 170-1). 
667 See Lacombe 1958, pp 191, 303-4. 
668 Havet doubted that Pascal could, even in good health, have completed his project (PH I, pp 
xxxvi-vii). 
669 See Letter to Mersenne, 13 December 1647, AT V 98-100 & Letter to Carcavi, 11 June 1649, AT V 
365-7.  Neither Descartes nor Pascal was able to take into account all the variables affecting the 
result (see Davidson 1983, p.11 and Clarke in Clarke & Wilson, 2011, p 258). 
670 See pensées 389:8 [read with 502:738], 189:221, 240:272, 274:305 & 489:735. 
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double mirror, each reflecting the other but neither the world outside’671.  It is not 
even necessary, on this interpretation, that the prophets consciously predicted 
the coming of Christ.   
 
Pascal’s treatment of the problem of the deceiving apostles is a further 
example of his technique: he argues that they promoted the story of the 
Resurrection despite its implausibility and in an atmosphere where powerful 
adversaries would have been well-placed to bribe or threaten some of them to 
recant, yet none did so.  He sees that inconsistencies between the narratives of the 
Gospels might undermine trust in the evangelists as witnesses.  But he argues that 
these very inconsistencies show that the evangelists were not collaborating to ‘fix’ 
the story672.  He does not consider the hypothesis that the Church might have 
suppressed evidence which contradicted the story it wanted to tell.  Nor does he 
remark that, when two stories contradict each other, one must be false or both 
may be.  What interests him in these problems is to provide a possible version of 
events rather than a completely convincing version.    In this sense he is not a 
historian and was anyway poorly equipped to be one673.   He asserts that he is 
willing to believe only witnesses who were prepared to die for the truth 
(822663): but, as he seems almost to admit, every religion has its fanatics and 
their courage – or folly – is no sign of the truth of their beliefs674.  
 
As in the case of his diagnosis of the human predicament and the doctrines 
of Fall and Redemption675, Pascal’s project here is to show that Christian 
narrative and doctrine cohere, not that they provide historical evidence for the 
religion which a non-believer would accept.  For Pascal, the Bible constitutes the 
framework and provides the detail of human history: the Old Testament ‘history’ 
of the world starts with a supernatural event – the Creation – and continues with 
many more, punctuating both the story of the Jews and other stories, like the 
Book of Job.  The New Testament (the Gospels and the Acts) likewise describes 
                                                          
671 See Frye 1982, p 78. 
672 Pensées 310:341, 322:353 & 236:268. 
673 See PH I, pp xxi-xxiii. 
674 Pensée 899:448 (a note written during the drafting of the Provinciales). See Voltaire 1964, p 
177. 
675 See pensées 431:683, 449:690 (at OCG II 698-9) & 454:694. 
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events which inseparable from doctrine.   His reader is thus invited to accept as 
authoritative676 the framework as well as the narrative, a framework which 
includes both the doctrine of the hidden God and the assumption that 
supernatural events occur.   Unsurprisingly, since asserting ‘p is true’ largely 
comes down to asserting p, Pascal’s plan is to show the truth of Christianity by 
asserting its main tenets.  The tradition of stressing the unity of the Christian 
message – Scripture, Christ’s teaching, the activity of the Spirit in the world since 
the Crucifixion and the teaching of the Church – is a very old one677.   
 
As other writers do, Pascal uses the term ‘supernatural’ to cover both 
events which go against observed regularities in nature and events which reveal 
God’s hand at work.   As he says about miracles678, the ‘proofs’ involving 
prophecies both presuppose and support doctrine679.  Prophecies and other 
miracles are identified as such by Christian doctrine, not by a set of observations 
which are external to the system, i.e. made by non-Christians680.  Pascal would 
have thought it blasphemous to assimilate the notion of the miraculous to the 
notion of the fortunate but they do, at least in some contexts, look similar: an 
event is fortunate because it unexpectedly meets a need or want; a miraculous 
event is unusual and unpredictable yet immediately or ultimately beneficial, and 
meaningful to those who see it as miraculous681.  An agnostic who demands to be 
convinced by miracles is barking up the wrong tree: conversion is not an 
intellectual acceptance of certain propositions but a profound commitment to 
change one’s life inspired by Christ as mediator (378:410).   A believer finds the 
necessity to love God so obvious (visible) as to require no miracles (844:427). 
                                                          
676 Pascal’s originality lies in his use ‘des procédés d’argumentation qui [...] supposent admise au 
moins l’autorité de l’Écriture’: Russier 1949, p 389. 
677 See Freeman 2009, p 159, on Irenaeus. 
678 Pensées 835:423, 840[second part]:428 & 832:421.  See the quotation from Northrop Frye in 
Aupetit 2013, p 38.  See also Russier 1949, p 3.  (The prophets proved their divine inspiration by 
performing miracles.) 
679 Pensée 840:425 tussles inconclusively with this conundrum. See also: pensées 832:421 & 
840:425 (doctrine is needed to distinguish between true and false miracles or prophecies), 
841:426 (miracles are believable only if they do not contradict doctrine), 840:428 (‘we must judge 
doctrine by miracles and miracles by doctrine’), 846:429 (those who witnessed the miracles 
judged them first and then the doctrine);  ‘je ne crois les miracles qu’en foi’ (Montaigne 2002, III, p 
117).  
680 See his sister’s comments on the way Pascal decided, after his enquiry into miracles, that ‘all 
truths are derived from each other’ (OCG I 75) and Le Guern 2003, pp 109-112. 
681 See Holland, R F: ‘The Miraculous’ in Phillips 1967b, pp 155-170. 
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Hume’s ironic mockery of the miracle of the Holy Thorn (the alleged cure 
of Pascal’s niece’s fistula in 1656)682 would not have seemed, to Pascal, to 
undermine the Christian position because it is for the Church to rule on the 
miraculous nature of an event, not for individual believers, and certainly not for 
non-believers who cannot be expected to understand the criteria on which 
miracles are to be judged683.  It is thus vital, in the context of the discussion of 
miracles in the Pensées to distinguish between miracles seen by the faithful and 
those, if any there be, admitted as miracles by agnostics.  On Pascal’s own 
grounds, it would anyway be irrational to recognise the latter as miracles, since 
agnostics uncommitted to a theological view of the world can always say of an 
unprecedented and apparently inexplicable event that there may at some future 
date turn out to be a scientific explanation for it684.  This key point is missed in a 
recent attempt to debunk Hume685 who himself allows that there may be 
‘violations of the usual course of nature’ for which unanimous testimony from a 
wide range of observers is available: what such an event could not be is ‘the 
foundation of a system of religion’686 for there can be no evidence that a given 
event, however strange, has been caused by a supernatural being.  
 
What if all miracle reports are false?   Pascal advances a very weak 
argument to deal with this: if all miracles were fakes, no one would ever believe in 
miracles687.  As he says himself, people believe many things without sufficient 
evidence because they want to believe them or slavishly accept the authority of 
others (44:78); luck can play a big part in, for example, the career of a faith-healer 
whose ‘cures’ are just the result of  the spontaneous remission of a disease688. 
  
                                                          
682 See OCG I 74-5 and Hume, 1902, p 346. 
683 These are not only to do with the causal background of miracles.  The authenticity of miracles 
is judged according to doctrinal criteria (see Genet 2010, pp 354-8). 
684 Montaigne says that miracles reflect our ignorance of Nature, our ingrained beliefs and ‘the 
power of the imagination’; and he finds most stories of miracles either confused or mendacious 
(Montaigne 2002 I, pp 204 & 182, III, p 398).  See Graves in Desan 2007, pp 766-8, Ferreyrolles, G: 
‘Lecture pascalienne des miracles de Montaigne’ in Montaigne et les Essais, 1580-1980 (Actes du 
Congrès de Bordeaux, Paris, Champion Slatkine: 1983), pp 120-134 and Curley 2005.  
685 Peters 2009, pp 117-137. 
686 Hume 1902, pp 127-8. 
687 Pensée 734:615.  See Voltaire 1964, p 180. 
688 Pascal is well aware of the role hasard plays in the course of events (see e.g. 550:461). 
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Pascal’s project would not, I suspect, have included this argument, for he 
firmly believes that it is a mistake to try to construct doctrinally impartial, 
reasoned arguments to support Christian beliefs689.  To suggest that we have 
some privileged philosophical route to awareness of God’s existence, for example, 
denies a key Christian tenet: that it is only through the person of Christ that we 
come to know God, in other words through reading the Scriptures and, if we are 
fortunate, undergoing a sort of revelatory experience690.     
 
Nonetheless there is a gap to be bridged between the unbeliever’s 
ignorance of – or doubts about – doctrine, and acceptance of the doctrine: how 
can the seeker after truth be sure that the prophecies really are what Christians 
say they are and thus that Christ is who they say He is?  Pascal’s ultimate answer 
is, as we shall see, that only God can give her this certainty.  His therapeutic aim in 
this context is to envelop his subject in a self-contained system of belief – and in a 
sort of experience – which will afford the tranquillity we all seek.  This technique 
naturally presupposes an open-minded and serious subject for the therapy to 
work691. 
 
The ‘deliberative’ believer’s achieved faith operates (unlike that of the 
‘simple’ believer) on two levels: first, ‘human faith’ based on reasoning using 
authoritative evidence which is from a human source and therefore not 
watertight692, and on habituation; and, second, God’s inspiration, the sort of faith 
which the ‘simple’ believer has (179:210).  ‘Human’ faith is as vulnerable to 
                                                          
689 See the previous Section on metaphysical proofs which if successful, prove only a form of 
deism, viz. that an infinite and necessary being exists and not, as Pascal puts it ‘the God of 
Abraham [...] Isaac [...and] Jacob [...] who fills the soul and heart of those whom He possesses’ 
(449:690).  He who devises metaphysical proofs of God runs the risk of the sin of pride (190:222-
223). 
690 Pensées 189:221; 191:224.  See Carraud 2013, pp 58-65, who points out that the editors of the 
1670 edition of the Pensées were not entirely happy with this rejection of the Cartesian proofs.  
Van Fraassen implies that Pascal’s rejection of metaphysical proofs coheres with his empirical 
stance: van Fraassen 2002, pp 1-4, 27-8.  It is possible that Pascal also feared that, if it became 
popular, deism would encourage believers to drop the Old Testament with all its embarrassing 
bits and to adopt deism as a religion (possibly attached to a sort of Jesus fan club). 
691 See Garber 2009, p 17: acceptance of the metaphysical proofs requires a certain state of mind.  
692 Pensées 110:142; 7:41 and OCG I 955-9.  See also the account of ‘human faith’ in Logique IV, Ch 
12 (which was probably drafted by Pascal: see Le Guern 2003, p 150) and Russier, pp 341-3.  
There are echoes here of Duns Scotus’ distinction between acquired and infused faith (see 
Swinburne 2005, pp 119-20).  
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criticism as any line of reasoning: it is always possible that arguments will be 
found which will undermine the ‘deliberative’ believer’s certainty that the ‘proofs’ 
are true or probably true693.  But that rational certainty cannot in any case be the 
core of her faith, which depends on divine inspiration. 
 
There is a conundrum at the heart of this complex account, which is found 
also in Locke’s view that any claim to have received revelation must be subjected 
to the test of reason (Essay IV.xvi.14).  The result of such a test would at best be a 
positive probability in favour of the claim’s being true694.  On the other hand, faith 
was for Locke as for Pascal beyond all doubt695.  This should not be taken to mean 
that faith somehow fills in a gap between evidence and belief: it includes the 
conviction that there is no gap to be filled, however bizarre the narrative which is 
believed696. And this leads us to ask whether ‘simple’ and ‘deliberative’ believers 
are seen to have the same faith.  One could reply that their core beliefs are the 
same, namely those Pascal attributes to the ‘simple’ believers; the two sorts of 
believers participate in the same rituals and other activities of their church.  
Against this, the content of the ‘simple’ believer’s faith is extremely thin, while the 
‘deliberative’ believer has complex factual and doctrinal beliefs, inter alia about 
the Scripture and the history of the religion. Since, like any developed system of 
belief, Christian doctrine is a network of beliefs, each contributing to the meaning 
of the others, it is implausible to claim that a believer who subscribes to only two 
or three skeletal dogmas possesses the same belief as someone who subscribes to 
all or nearly all the dogmatic content of the system697.  
 
Another way of looking at the difference is to consider how each type of 
believer might lose her faith.  A sign of loss of faith in both types would be giving 
up participation in Christian rituals etc.698 but there the similarity ends.  The 
                                                          
693 Pensée 821:661, last paragraph at OCG II 819. 
694 See Locke 1999, p xxxii, n2. 
695 This tension also exists between the two key Pensées on faith and knowledge, 110:142 and 
131:164, as discussed below. 
696 See O’Hear 1984, p 2. 
697 As Pascal says about Descartes’s cogito, its context – in relation both to its origin and its 
consequences – determines its meaning (OCG II 179-80). 
698 This is not to say, of course, that we can give up our beliefs at will, in the way we can decide to 
give up going to church. 
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‘simple’ believer may, while she believes, be unable to imagine no longer having 
belief.  Even if she can, if she loses her faith she may do so without really knowing 
why:  since she had no reasons for her faith, losing it can happen inexplicably.  
(Or, if a mystic, she may lose her faith because she, again inexplicably, no longer 
has mystical experiences, or has others which deprive her of her faith.)  The 
‘deliberative’ ex-believer on the other hand will usually be able to explain her loss 
of faith, e.g. that the historical ‘proofs’ or some doctrines no longer convince her.  
Such a loss of confidence in the Church’s authority and traditions drains meaning 
from her beliefs.  The ‘deliberative’ believer can also suffer, as she reviews her 
reasons for believing, a gradual loss of faith (as Bertrand Russell recounts of his 
adolescent self in his Autobiography). 
 
Pascal’s account of faith involves commitment as well as a propositional 
attitude.  But the two types of believer have different commitments: one is 
uncritical and the other is thoughtful and open to doubt.  This difference will 
show in their respective behaviours.  Pascal claims that ‘deliberative’ believers 
will see that believers ‘without knowledge of the prophecies and proofs’ can judge 
the truth of Christianity just as well as those that have that knowledge (382:414).  
He presumably means that the ‘simple’ believer’s faith has enough content to be 
recognised as genuine faith.  But the meaning of the ‘simple’ believer’s faith is 
utterly different from the meaning of the ‘deliberative’ believer’s faith.  The 
difference might be expressed by calling the ‘simple’ believer’s faith animation 
(i.e. the believer attaches importance to the narrative she knows but is unworried 
by truths which apparently contradict it) while reserving the term belief for the 
faith of some if not all ‘deliberative’ believers699.  The latter may reasonably doubt 
that their faith is the same as that of the ‘simple’ believer whose certainty without 
a developed doctrinal context could be a sign of superstition or idolatry as well as 
of true faith. It is tempting to say of a ‘simple’ believer – like Félicité in Flaubert’s 
Un Cœur Simple – that, since she learnt the Catechism by rote without 
                                                          
699 See Blackburn 2006, pp 18-22.  If Blackburn is saying that all religious faith is animation, he 
does not substantiate this view. 
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understanding a word of it, she could not be called a true believer, despite her 
great virtue700.    
  
  This account reveals two problems for Pascal’s project: first, he maintains 
that God-given faith is the same for ‘simple’ and ‘deliberative’ believers because 
he wishes to show that the ‘proofs’ are neither sufficient (since they produce only 
‘human faith’) nor necessary for faith, since ‘simple’ believers are not aware of 
them.  But this unitary account of faith is contradicted by the fact that the two 
different frameworks give each type of faith its specific meaning and expression 
in behaviour.  There is no single account of faith of the sort Pascal wants.  To 
claim that the two sorts of believer have ‘substantially the same faith’701 ignores 
key features of belief: its expression in behaviour and its existence in a context, 
within a set of practices.   
 
Secondly, if the ‘proofs’ are neither sufficient nor necessary for faith, why 
introduce them at all?  He contends that common sense and faith do not compete 
with one another and at least some important elements of belief can with profit 
be shown to be consistent with common sense702.  But the value to faith of the 
‘proofs’ in Pascal’s project is unclear.  He concedes that the ‘proofs’ are not 
‘absolutely convincing’ or ‘demonstrative’ but they provide some reason to 
believe: the balance of evidence is in favour of Christianity; resistance to it is 
attributable to attitudes, desires and passions.  The ‘proofs’ are signposts to faith 
designed for a certain kind of person who, presumably, cannot believe in the way 
a ‘simple’ believer does.  But, he says, we follow them only if inclined to do so in 
our hearts703.  So what is it that the ‘proofs’ do for us, that divine inspiration does 
not do? 
 
The key Pascalian notion here is submission, unreflective in the ‘simple’ 
believer’s case but complex in that of the ‘deliberative’ aspirant, who, we may 
assume, has seen that the ‘proofs’ – the intellectual content of her belief –  have 
                                                          
700 Incidentally, Félicité’s belief declines into idolatry. 
701 Mesnard 1992, p 424.  On the psychological differences, see Malvy 1923, p 81. 
702 See e.g. the Letter of 26 January 1648 and the Écrits sur la grâce, OCG II 6 & 311. 
703 Pensées 835:423, 482:717, 418:680 & 840:425. 
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their own internal logic, are ‘possible and fitting’ in Augustine’s words, with some 
elements of certainty704.  She now has to take two further steps: (a) to recognise 
that not all questions can be settled by rational enquiry; and (b) to submit to the 
authority of the Scriptures and the traditions of the Church (820:660).  
   
Pascal sketches step (a) in various forms.  He argues, for example, that all 
reasoning makes unproved assumptions and in that sense depends on intuition 
(sentiment)705.  Human reason has its boundaries: there are matters which just 
have to be accepted by rational enquirers, without any reasons being given for 
them.  In the important pensée 110:142, Pascal appears to say that the crucial 
point is that knowledge does not come only from reasoned argument: our basic 
beliefs or ‘first principles’ are felt by the heart, not rationally justified706.  Our most 
general beliefs that space has three dimensions, that the series of numbers is 
infinite, and that there are no two square numbers such that one is double the 
other, are, according to pensée 110:142, felt.  The same applies to our belief that 
we are not dreaming and to God-given faith.  Sceptics cannot defeat our certainty 
in these ‘common notions’ or ‘principles’.  He associates these basic concepts with 
the human constitution, accepting that we have certain basic concepts as part of 
our make-up, and he implies that they are purely human constructs which may 
bear no relation to the properties the world has707.  On the contrary, at the 
beginning of the ‘Wager fragment’ he links our possession and use of such 
concepts to our having bodies, implicitly then to our interaction as embodied 
beings with the world (418:680).   
 
                                                          
704 De Vera Religione, VIII (published in Arnauld’s French version in 1647). 
705 Pensées 110:142, 530:455.  Compare James’s ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ in James 1956, pp 
63-110. 
706 This seems to be a major departure from the neo-Cartesian doctrine of De l’esprit géométrique 
which attributes certainty in the basic propositions of geometry to lumière naturelle and clarté 
naturelle (OCG II 157, 163).  For a discussion of Descartes’s influence on De l’esprit géométrique, 
see OCG II 1180-2.  For an account of Pascal’s going further than Descartes, see Lorenzen 1987, Ch 
14. 
707 McKenna suggests that the process of acquiring sentiments as habits of the mind is very 
probably seen by Pascal as selective, for we cannot comprehend the infinite complexity of the 
Universe (pensée 199:230).  Moreover, such is our need to grasp at epistemological straws that we 
are prone to adhere to fantaisie as much as to sentiment (pensée 661:544).  See McKenna 2004, pp 
48-49 & 50-1.  These points do not themselves imply that Pascal believed, as Broome suggests, 
that ‘all systems of logic are human institutions of a purely conventional nature’ (Broome 1966, p 
77).  Pascal believed this to be true of geometry but made no claims wider than that. 
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Pascal’s argument is in some ways parallel to Nagel’s view that certain 
forms of reasoning cannot intelligibly be doubted because they form the 
irreducible framework of everything we can think about the world and 
ourselves708.  But whereas Nagel seems not to see any need to posit certain 
constancies in human nature, Pascal does709.    
 
Pensée 110:142 has several curious features: the ‘first principles’ form a 
heterogeneous group: there is one contingent proposition (‘I am not dreaming’),  
there is a definition of space suitable for Euclidian geometry, a sketch of a theory 
of numbers and counting, a mathematical proposition for which a proof can be 
provided ... and faith in God seen in other people710.  Pascal laments that God has 
provided so few of these certainties711. 
   
There may be the makings of a tu quoque argument here, on these lines: 
various forms of secular knowledge require our reliance on their basic 
propositions, for they lack reasons for us to adopt them; so there can be no 
criticism of belief in God if it too requires faith712.    With his mention of the role of 
‘nature’ in geometrical certainty (OCG II 161), Pascal may be hinting that some 
concepts are innate.  Today we would instead consider whether some activities, 
like doing arithmetic, function on the basis of constitutive principles: without 
these rules, there would be no activity.  Or we might argue that the search for 
foundations is mistaken, for systems of belief hang together as networks of 
                                                          
708 See Nagel 2003, Ch 4.  Pascal’s remarks on être are to the point (OCG II 158). 
709 ‘La nature le [l’ordre géométrique] soutenant au défaut du discours’ and ‘la nature fournit tout ce 
que cette science ne donne pas’ (L’Esprit géométrique, OCG II 157 & 161).  Thus he apparently 
ignores in this context his arguments for the profound variability of human nature (see Chapter IV 
above). 
710 Notice the switch from talking about ‘our’ knowing the ‘first principles’ to citing ‘those to whom 
God has given religion in their hearts (par sentiment de cœur) who are really fortunate and 
justifiably convinced’.  These are the ‘simple believers’: pensée 110:142 was probably dictated at 
the same time as 382:414 (see OCG II 1348). 
711 As Locke does when he says that ‘in the greatest part of our Concernment [God] has afforded us 
only the twilight […] of Probability’ (Essay IV.xiv.2).  
712 Another pensée sketches a different tu quoque argument: we have to act, Pascal says, without 
certainty in some spheres of life – e.g. sea voyages, battles – and, in comparison with our belief 
that we shall see tomorrow, religion is more certain (577:480).   Here he glosses over the 
difference between gambles (like battles), empirical beliefs which rest on inductive arguments 
and religious beliefs which appeal to authority.  The result is no more satisfactory than in 110:142. 
180 
 
 
 
mutually supporting propositions713.  It follows in either case that there is no 
need to posit a ‘feeling’ to explain why we use them. 
   
It cannot be argued that the basic certainties on Pascal’s list are all 
inherent in the human activities involved.  ‘I am not dreaming’ seems unsuitable 
as a basic proposition: one may dream that one is not dreaming714.  Faith in God is 
not constitutive of religious activity: someone having doubts can pray to be given 
faith, or to have her faith strengthened715.  There is a profound difference 
between what look like Cartesian intuitions which necessarily cannot contradict 
one another and religious beliefs which, Descartes concedes, can in principle 
contradict clear and distinct perceptions716.  And there is a potential muddle in 
this pensée between possessing certain concepts (space, time etc.) and believing 
certain facts (e.g. that I am not dreaming, if that is a fact).    It may be true that we 
need both conceptual understanding and certain basic beliefs or judgments in 
order to do the things we do717.  But Pascal does not help us to understand this 
point. 
 
Finally, this is the only note where Pascal attributes our belief in the 
axioms of geometry to the heart (cœur)718, with connotations of emotional 
commitment which would surely be better absent719. The assertion sits 
uncomfortably with his remarks in 131:164 (see below).  Even if we could clear 
up the untidiness of this pensée720 (as Pascal would surely have attempted) we 
should anyway have to concede that it is no answer to Montaigne’s scepticism or 
to the exercise of Méditation I: it is merely a dogmatic statement. And it provides 
no path to faith. 
                                                          
713 Pascal comes close to this view in the Esprit géométrique (OCG II 162). 
714  It would not, incidentally, be one of Wittgenstein’s ‘framework’ propositions, because, as he 
says, ‘I may be dreaming’ doesn’t make sense.  See Wittgenstein 1969, §§ 383 & 676, and for a 
brief discussion: Blackburn 2006, p 134. 
715 The devils fear God (James II.19). 
716 See Section 9.1 above. 
717 See Wittgenstein 1967, §242. 
718 On the history of this term, see Malvy 1923, Ch III & d’Angers 1954, pp 115-7.  In Pascal, it 
seems sometimes to denote the soul as a whole yet in other contexts to be contrasted with ‘raison’ 
(see Miel 1969, pp 158-167) and in others to be a sort of cognition (see McKenna 2003 & Genet 
2010, pp 37-41).   
719 See McKenna 2004, p 43. 
720 Which seems to owe much to Yves de Paris: see d’Angers 1954, p 115.  
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The thrust of 110:142 is, where it is not confused, commonplace: 
according to the activity in which we engage, certain concepts and assumptions 
will be so basic as not to require explication for the purposes of the activity.  But 
at best this only shows that Christianity may be the sort of belief-system which 
necessarily cannot prove all the propositions it contains.  Even if the basic 
function of religious faith in believers’ lives may have some similarity with the 
function of ‘common notions’ in some contexts, it is not ‘natural’– i.e. shared by all 
human beings – in the sense that the function of ‘common notions’ is for Pascal; so 
the function of faith as a set of basic or foundational beliefs still requires 
explanation.  The pensée states that some believers just believe without that faith 
answering to any conscious need.  But, as we have seen, those believers do not 
need Pascal’s therapy. 
 
Another option open to Pascal would be to argue that we have many 
beliefs for which we can give no evidence now, and for which we have sought no 
evidence in the past.  These beliefs might be (i) so basic to our Weltanschauung 
that we cannot understand how we could believe anything without believing 
them.  Or (ii) they might be justified in some vague and uninvestigated pragmatic 
way. Or (iii) they might be the sort of belief about which one believes that, with a 
lot of digging, one could come up with the necessary evidence.   Pascal’s best 
option here would seem to be (iii), since, as regards (i), many people live without 
belief in God (it does not seem to function as a ‘framework’ belief in the way 
Wittgenstein’s examples do in On Certainty) and, as for (ii), again we seem able to 
do everything we want to do without belief in God, including obeying Christian 
moral principles and taking part in Christian rituals.  If he opted for (iii), he would 
argue that faith will yield enough illumination for us to see the truth of God’s 
existence and then see God’s existence in the world (3:38 & 781:644).  But this is 
not an argument: from the fact that we accept many beliefs on trust in the hope of 
finding evidence for them later does not justify any particular belief721. 
 
                                                          
721 See Malcolm 2003 and Garber 2007 on believing without evidence. 
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Another version of step (a) is to argue that reason cannot wholly 
determine the content of supernatural beliefs; their very nature puts them 
beyond rational criticism: this is a brute fact about the ‘mystery’ of Christianity 
(173:204).  But one man’s mystery can be another’s superstition: just saying that 
there is a boundary does not show where it is to be drawn722.  Pascal mentions 
the problem that we need criteria to distinguish between true faith and mere 
superstition. He says that total, uncritical submission to doctrine is an error no 
less than applying rational criticism to all doctrinal precepts723.  But he does not 
solve the problem of the difference between superstition and the true faith – 
perhaps understandably, since there is little agreement on the distinction among 
Christians. 
 
So step (a) is not fully worked out in the Pensées and is unsatisfactory as it 
is.  Step (b) – an  act of submission to authority – implies that we may not have 
explicit reasons, e.g. for becoming members of a church, at the moment of opting 
for membership.  It seems that all the seeker after truth can do is to wait for the 
moment when submission occurs, when grace is bestowed.  This is not an 
implausible description of becoming a believer724.  The moment of doing so has 
parallels in other spheres of life: finding that one has come to regard another as a 
friend or a lover, or becoming committed to a political cause.  At this moment, 
doctrines seem less important than commitment to living a certain way, which 
requires a fundamental change of outlook725.  So powerful may be the experience 
of living the Christian way that one forgets the ‘proofs’ and any difficulties they 
may raise726.  None of this is to say that one remains committed indefinitely to 
                                                          
722 There is, for example, clear disagreement between Pascal and Spinoza: Pascal says it is 
superstitious to fear that God may exist but not to fear God (906:451) whereas Spinoza attacks the 
superstitious [presumably Calvinists] ‘who study not to lead man by reason, but to hold him in 
through fear’ (Ethics IV, Proposition 63, 1st Scholium). 
723 Pensées 170:201, 173:204, 183:214. 
724 Newman says that religious certainty may rest on ‘arguments too various for enumeration, too 
personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for reversal [...] one and the same 
teaching is [...] both object and proof, and elicits one complex act both of inference and of assent’ 
(quoted in Adamson 1995, pp 159-60). 
725 See Frye’s discussion of metanoia (Frye 1982, pp 130-1). 
726 See the excellent discussion of the ‘proofs’ in Bayet 1948, Ch VII. 
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that which one has accepted in this manner or that the feeling that one has 
completely submitted to God counts as evidence that one has received grace727 .   
 
33. The experience of  faith: is it easier for another person to tell if I have faith than 
it is for me?  
We have seen how for some people their faith is either so deeply-rooted in 
their lives that they can scarcely articulate why they believe; for others, the 
search for belief may suddenly mature into faith. This account has been mainly 
from a third-person perspective and, as such, superficial in some respects.  Pascal 
also considers the first-person experience of aspiring to faith.  This is the effect of 
moving from describing what men naturally – or at least non-rationally – believe 
(110:142) to describing the doubt a solitary Cartesian can experience, potentially 
affecting her faith as much as all other beliefs728.     He announces the problem: 
subjective certainty based on a sentiment naturel is not a convincing proof of the 
truth of the propositions believed729.  
 
 The argument runs as follows: the sceptic is undefeated because he can 
bring out an unbeatable weapon: the kind of doubt raised by Descartes’s 
hypothesis of the malin génie, which undermines our trust in our natural 
intuitions730: the dogmatists, who insist on the commonplace view that we have 
‘natural’ beliefs without which we cannot live, are ‘impotent’: they have no 
answer to the hypothesis that, whether by chance or by some other force, our 
nature has been so determined that we believe what is false and disbelieve what 
is true; it could be that some unidentified cause has determined that we are 
awake when we are dreaming and asleep when we believe ourselves to be awake 
(131:164).     We may assume that this applies to our natural intuitions which are 
ingrained in us although Pascal does not explain how we could be mistaken in 
                                                          
727 Ravaisson chose to stress the importance for Pascal of the experience of receiving grace but did 
not see that the memory of having had such an experience does not expel doubt (Ravaisson 2008, 
p 17).  On counting submission as evidence for God’s existence, see Coffman & Cervantez 2011, pp 
99-100. 
728 Pensée 131:164. Summarised in pensée 406:25. 
729 In this Pascal differs profoundly from Arnauld who believed it was possible to possess the truth 
and know that one possesses it.  Whereas Pascal apprehends that the truth may be sought but may 
remain out of reach (see Le Guern 2003, pp 174-8). 
730 Pascal mentions this argument in the Entretien (OCG II 90).  
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thinking that, e.g., 2+2=4.   In the present context, the important point is that the 
sceptical turn can apply to intuitions which are not common to the whole human 
race, for example Christian faith: the option of scepticism can consist in 
consciousness of the lurking possibility that a particularly important belief is 
subject to rational doubt731.   
 
Pascal claims that we cannot live as sceptics (131:164), just as Hume will 
do.  But this will not give the Pyrrhonian pause: he explicitly accepts that he has to 
live ‘by appearances’, i.e. that his nature obliges him to do so732.   Saying that we 
cannot live without acting as if certain basic propositions or principles are true is 
not a refutation of scepticism: it cannot per se eliminate the malin-génie doubt (or 
similar modern hypotheses like the brain-in-the-vat).  Perhaps we each of us 
cannot live without some unjustified beliefs, and self-deception too; but that is 
not a cognitive justification of those beliefs.  It is worth noting here that Pascal’s 
argument need not be read as an argument for ‘metaphysical scepticism’: he does 
not need to presuppose that, for example, what we believe to be true may be false 
in the eyes of God or an angel733.  It is sufficient for him to argue that we may find 
out at some point in the future that some of our most important beliefs are false. 
  
Pascal as good as concedes that scepticism cannot be refuted when he says 
that, for people who have no Christian faith, scepticism is the truth (691:570) 
regardless of how they live.  On the other hand, he never considers on what 
grounds we should take the malin-génie hypothesis seriously: in the context of the 
Méditations it is, after all, a device to persuade us to see the peculiar 
characteristics of the cogito and that context is all-important to its meaning734. 
 
It is, I suggest, in the nature of extreme scepticism – with or without the 
malin genie hypothesis – that it cannot be set aside definitively: first, necessarily if 
                                                          
731 Hume says that ‘if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty 
and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other 
subjects’ (Hume 1993, p 36).  On recurring episodes of doubt, see Hunter 2013, pp 195-6. 
732 On living by appearances, see Sextus 2000, pp 6-7 & 85-6. Pascal does not attempt to argue, as 
he might well have done, that the distinction between the sceptic’s ‘living by appearances’ and the 
behaviour of a believer in an ‘outside’ world may turn out to be merely verbal.   
733 See Descartes’s discussion in the Second Replies, AT VII 146. 
734 As Pascal remarks, comparing Augustine’s and Descartes’s arguments (OCG II 179-80). 
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there is a standoff between dogmatism and scepticism, the rational reaction is to 
suspend judgment, and thus remain a sceptic; secondly, we are creatures 
permanently capable of ‘stepping back’ from a given train of thought and of 
remembering past doubts about or objections to it.  In pensée 131:164 Pascal 
commands the dogmatist and sceptic to ‘listen to God’, to submit to the authority 
of doctrine and Scripture735.  But will such a course tranquillise doubt?   After all, 
we can have rational doubts about authority itself (505:672). 
  
Pascal does not explicitly air the question why the malin génie should not, 
by creating delusions in us, trick us into believing that a benevolent God exists.  
But it is live in Pascal’s account, for he concedes that, from a first-person 
perspective, no one has a rational method to distinguish between intuition 
(sentiment) and mere imagination (fantaisie) in our individual experience.   
People [may] falsely conclude that mere imagination is intuition: they believe 
they have been converted when they are [merely] thinking about being 
converted736.   Pascal’s diagnosis of error entails this possibility: imagination 
gives no indication of whether the notions it produces are true or not, even 
among the wisest of men737.  So we can be deceived or self-deceived about (a) our 
really having faith and relatedly (b) about whether its object exists, for it is not 
just a matter of what we say to ourselves or others but whether states of affairs 
exist, viz. (a) the sincere commitment to God, which may lie deeper than our 
conscious life and is caused by God and (b) the existence of the object of our faith, 
of a being independent of our thought.  Pascal’s unfortunate subject may thus 
overcome doubts about the truth of Christianity – as it appears in the ‘proofs’ – 
and achieve ‘human’ faith, only to doubt whether God has given her genuine and 
veridical faith738.  
  
Pascal claims – as we have seen – that, from a third-person perspective, 
‘those to whom God has given religion by a feeling of the heart are very fortunate 
                                                          
735 There is a similar suggestion in the Entretien: OCG II 96-7. 
736 Pensées 530:455 & 975:739. 
737 Pensée 44:78 at OCG II 551-2. 
738 The utility of the Wager is that it side-steps this problem; but it has its own difficulties, as I 
discuss in Appendix II. 
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and justifiably convinced’ of what they believe (110:142): the simple believers’ 
behaviour reveals their deep faith.  But in pensée 131:142, he concludes that there 
is an impasse between the sceptic and the dogmatist, for neither the sceptic nor 
the dogmatist can either dispense with or prove our ‘natural’ intuitions 
respectively; so the dogmatist and the sceptic both have ‘to listen to God’, in other 
words to attend to the ‘proofs’, for faith in God is the only way to drive out the 
hypothesis of the malin génie.  But there is no impasse between the dogmatist and 
the sceptic: the latter always prevails, as Pascal admits (691:570).    And we have 
just seen that for Pascal the proofs are not ‘absolutely convincing’: the quest for 
the certainty of faith must continue739. 
 
We cannot assume that the aspirant’s confidence in the ‘proofs’ is 
unshakeable:  a reflective person may come to doubt the authority of the 
Scriptures and teaching: Pascal says that we should not believe something we 
have heard until we have made the assumption that we had never heard it.  It is 
our own rational assessment of a belief that counts, not what others say, not 
majority opinion, not the antiquity of the belief740.  This applies, Pascal says, 
invariably to scientific knowledge741 but he also sees that reflective people can 
come to doubt religious authority: there are some who cannot stop themselves 
thinking, who think all the more for being forbidden to do so;  these people may 
even give up the true religion unless they find solid arguments for it (815:659).  
Submission may be an observable fact of religious life in others but one’s own 
attitude of submission may be subject to doubt at any moment.  Pascal seeks a 
balance between reasonableness and acceptance742 but this is not a stable state 
for the thoughtful individual.  It is all very well Pascal saying that we have to 
                                                          
739 The 150-year-old debate whether Pascal is or is not a sceptic need not concern us here.  The 
key point is that he uses scepticism as a therapeutic device which is ‘turned off’ only when the 
certainty of faith is achieved (see Lacombe 1958, pp 113 ff).  I will argue that the use of scepticism 
in this way is fatal to his project because the seeker after truth never reaches a moment when it is 
reasonable to set scepticism aside, at least as regards her own relation to God. 
740 Pensée 505:672, a very Montaignian thought: see Vieillard-Baron’s article in Desan 2007, esp. p 
98.   
741 Préface sur le Traité du vide (OCG I 453); Provinciale XVIII (OCG I 812-3). 
742 See OCG I 956 and the discussion in Le Guern 2003, pp 111-2. 
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know when to doubt, when to have certainty and when to submit (170:201) but 
the frontiers we draw are inescapably subject to second-order doubt743. 
 
Pascal’s doctrine of divine grace gives further grounds for a believer to 
doubt that she has God’s gift of faith and that she will have it until she dies744.  
Unlike the Jansenists, some if not all Calvinists believe that grace is a gift once and 
forever bestowed745 and some also that a believer’s membership of their 
community (perhaps granted by the pastor) is sufficient evidence of her 
justification and salvation.  Another possibility is that the believer holds that an 
intuition of God is transparently what it is and, necessarily, caused by God.  A 
third option is the view that such an intuition is not caused by God ‘outside’ me 
but is God ‘inside’ me.   But the Pascalian believer is unable to accept any of these 
possibilities: first, because she knows that faith requires both outward obedience 
and an inner state, no effective re-assurance can come from others who see only 
the outward show (923:753); her own introspective doubt – and virtuous 
modesty – may cancel out their words of comfort.  Secondly, her intuition of God 
is not transparent: it could be fantaisie and not sentiment (true intuition).  Thirdly, 
although God can affect my mind and would be ‘in’ me in that sense, He is 
necessarily ‘outside’ me as an independent Being746. 
 
More needs to be said here on Pascal’s view of the second of these 
possibilities. I mentioned his almost total lack of interest in mysticism above.  But 
can we rule out that the experience of conversion be certain in itself747?  His 
description of genuine conversion is submission: reducing oneself to zero in the 
face of God and recognising that one can do nothing without Him and that one 
deserves nothing more from Him than disgrâce, rejection (378:410).   Conversion 
as described seems to be more act than experience, the enunciation of a resolve to 
fulfil the demands of the faith, comparable to vows Pascal himself made on his 
                                                          
743  See Popkin 2003, p 181. 
744 Each of us ‘is obliged to believe’ that he or she is a member of the elect, but ‘with a belief 
mingled with fear and unaccompanied by certainty’ (Écrits sur la grâce, OCG II 262). 
745 See Miel 1969, p 45, Kołakowski 1997, p 155 and MacCulloch 2009, p 634.  The Jansenists 
precisely opposed this doctrine (see Laporte 1923, p 164 and Miel 1969, p 120). 
746 Pensées 407:26; 564:471. 
747 See the discussion in Davidson 1979, Ch 4. 
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‘Night of Fire’ in 1654748.  In this there is no experience of receiving grace: if his 
act of commitment is – as Pascal says – joyful, that is per se no sign of grace but 
rather an expression of relief after months of anxiety749.   Signs of grace are seen 
in others, not in oneself: as in the case of St Teresa, others appreciate the mystic’s 
enlightenment while the mystic herself is merely humble towards God750.   For the 
‘deliberative’ believer focusing on her own experience, there is no certainty that 
she has received grace751.  If she believes that she has received grace because she 
is in all respects virtuous, this does not help either: for such a belief is a sign of 
pride and thus per se cannot be God-given faith.  All she can do is humbly to strive 
to be virtuous (774:638). 
 
The contrast between the ‘simple’ and ‘deliberative’ believers’ respective 
experiences of faith is now stark: the former has no doubts because she does not 
apply reasoning or common sense to her religion: her experience of faith is just of 
the rituals, the shared Christian life and prayer addressed to the Redeemer – 
and/or of mystical experience.  Her certainty is unselfconscious.  She does not 
wonder whether she is in a state of grace.  In contrast, for the ‘deliberative’ 
believer, her experience and reason are, in Hobbes’ phrase, ‘not to be folded up in 
the napkin of an implicit faith’.  She may, in her solitude, be assailed by many 
kinds of doubt: ‘perhaps by chance or by a demon I am deceived in thinking God 
exists; I cannot tell whether an “intuition” that God has given me faith is my 
imagination or not; faith includes respect for the authority of Scripture and 
Christian tradition, but these are based on human testimony and thus fallible752; 
even if I feel I have received God’s grace and the gift of faith, I may be mistaken 
because the bestowal of grace is an arbitrary act which my efforts to be virtuous 
                                                          
748 Recorded in pensée 913:742. 
749 On the idea that joy is the ‘internal sign’ of the reception of grace, see Blondel in Études 1923, 
pp 6 & 18; grace is ‘undergone and felt’,  ibid., p 14 n1.  Most scholars today deny that Pascal’s 
Mémorial (913:742) records a mystical experience, e.g. Gouhier 2005, pp 57 ff.  But Mesnard says 
that the Mémorial results from ‘une sorte d’état mystique’ (OCM III 41 & 45). 
750 Pensée 928:756 (paragraph entitled Œuvres extérieures). Teresa was invariably cautious about 
the genuineness of mystical experiences (see Gellman 2014, Section 8.5). 
751 Pascal’s meditation Le Mystère de Jésus (919:749 & 751) has given rise to the suggestion that 
Pascal was certain of his own salvation, but that text looks to be more an effort of imagination 
than a resounding affirmation. 
752 The fundamental problem in Hobbes’ words: ‘if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to 
him supernaturally and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what 
argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it’ (Leviathan, Ch XXXII). 
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cannot bring about; even if I was right a moment ago to feel the joyful infusion of 
grace, perhaps now God has withdrawn His grace and I am damned753.   My 
submission does not expel doubt...’ No wonder Pascal’s last words were reported 
to be ‘Que Dieu ne m’abandonne jamais’ (OCG I 94). 
 
The ‘deliberative’ believer’s doubts arise in the context of the Jansenist 
doctrine that both inner sanctity and outward conformity with ritual and morality 
are essential to the life of Christian faith754.  If the ‘deliberative’ believer herself 
remains uncertain about the genuineness of her religious sentiment, should she 
try to imitate the ‘simple’ believer’s outward conformity in the hope that that will 
remove her doubts?  
 
34. Habituation: is it enough to produce salvific faith? 
Moralists and religious believers have often thought that there was a 
difference between mere intellectual acceptance of moral or religious beliefs and 
the ‘internalisation’ of such beliefs.  Were there a process which could achieve the 
latter, it would give one the sense that the beliefs concerned were entirely 
natural.  In theological terms: what can be done for or by the seeker after truth 
who comes to see a need for, or the point of, Christianity (she achieves 
‘illumination’)?  Her problem is that she sees that this will not be enough for 
salvation, for it cannot be a way of securing grace.     
 
Pascal’s answer to this question is: ‘the machine’ (habituation).  Learning 
his ‘proofs’ results only in ‘human’ faith but it is an effective prelude or 
accompaniment to habituation which removes the obstacles to belief: ‘one must 
open one’s mind to the proofs, then strengthen them in oneself by custom’755.  
Pascal’s contention is that, just as many of our ordinary – and sometimes 
mistaken – beliefs are habitual756, so we can use the mechanism of acquiring 
habits to induce true beliefs.  In the case of ritual, the habits to be acquired are in 
                                                          
753 ‘Les justes sont sans assurance de persévérer’ (OCG II 252). 
754 See ‘l’extérieur ne sert à rien sans l’intérieur’ (453:693) and 219:252; 861:439; 944:767.  
755 See Pensées 808:655, 5:39, 7:41, 11:45, 821:661 and 418:680 at OCG II 680.  
756 Pensée 44:78 at OCG II 554. 
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the performance of customary acts, so both aspects of his term coutume757 are 
involved.  The process of habituation is in part physical758: it employs the senses 
and bodily movements, such as those stimulated by ritual, to reduce emotional 
and intellectual resistance; by going through the motions of the Christian life, one 
both directs one’s emotional energy towards the object of belief and engages in a 
shared practice with its established meaning.  This seems to strengthen one’s 
belief in the ‘proofs’ and to enable one to become open to God’s inspiration, i.e. 
the gift of faith759.  It will not of course determine God’s bestowal or withholding 
of grace; so habituation is not a means to attain [divine] faith760  but it does 
remove obstacles to ‘human faith’. 
 
Pascal uses the term ‘automaton’ to convey the idea that our acquisition of 
new dispositions occurs without our being conscious of it per se (821:661).  But 
that does not mean we can think what we like during Mass.  Habituation, if it is to 
work, should include a concomitant process of focussing the mind761 on the 
rituals and in prayer, and – in the case of Christianity – on the person of Christ762.  
In church, as George Herbert writes, 
 
‘Let vain or busy thoughts have there no part:                                                                                                          
Bring not thy plough, thy plots, thy pleasures thither.’ 
 
As in meditation, rituals may help the aspirant believer to concentrate on the 
present rather than chase futilely after the fugitive past and the notional future 
(47:80).  The direction of attention is a path to belief (539:458).   
                                                          
757 See the entry ‘COUTUME’ in Rey 2006.  For the use of ‘custom’ in connection with training, 
compare Hobbes’ Leviathan I.3: ‘a dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his 
master’.  
758 Aristotle thought the body ‘prior to’ the soul and thus that the appetites had to be trained for 
the sake of reason and of the soul (Politics VII.15).  See Davidson 1979, Ch 3 & OCG II 1315, n 8. 
759 See PB, p 448, nn 1-4, and p 441, n 1 on the passage on habituation in the ‘Wager fragment’.  
Pascal apparently adopts the Cartesian notion that a passion is usually caused by – or partly 
consists in – a bodily event (Les Passions de l’Âme, I, §§ 36-38). 
760 Ferreyrolles’s phrase: Ferreyrolles 1995, p 99. 
761 It is no part of Aristotle’s notion of habituation that it should be merely a matter of ‘going 
through the motions’: attentiveness is a crucial part of moral training: the pursuit of happiness 
involves ‘study and care’ (Nicomachean Ethics I.9 1099b 20, and see Laden in Antony 2007). 
762 Pascal says in Provinciale IX that thoughtless participation in ritual or prayer can engender a 
false sense of salvific peace: rituals have to be approached in the spirit of faith and charity (OCG I 
673-4).  It is the soul, Augustine says, which observes good customs (EA, p 155). 
191 
 
 
 
 
 This account is not in itself new or prima facie implausible763.  It 
presupposes that the subject has a certain character, capable for example of 
seeing the ephemerality of divertissement and understanding the human tendency 
to error, open to the possibility of faith, sceptical of secular pathways to 
tranquillity.   It requires, moreover, that the habituated believer should, to enjoy 
the certainty of faith, either forget choosing to begin the habituation process or 
believe that God prompted her to do so.  Yet problems arise in assessing the 
function of habituation in Pascal’s project.  I have assumed that the process 
should best be in parallel to the ‘deliberative’ believer’s realisation that her 
reasonable assumption that the ‘proofs’ are plausible is not enough for faith764.   
‘Submission’ has an element of returning to childlike trust, to a basic sort of 
learning in which reasoning plays no part.  It leads to, or immerses us in, ‘belief’ 
and in the happiness of the Christian life765.   But will habituation induce the kind 
of profound transcendental and moral beliefs at which Pascal aims766? 
 
The first problem is the risk of self-deception, particularly present in a 
social setting where other believers may reinforce one’s hope and wish to 
conform to their standards and to believe.  Pascal agrees that this is a risk in 
human life (see Sections 18 and 22.4 above) but he specifies no preventive 
measures.   
 
 The second problem with habituation is: how rational is it?  Should I adopt 
a strategy to put beliefs in me for which I have insufficient evidence?767 The 
answer to this is that the process is not wholly non-rational: the ‘proofs’ are more 
plausible than for any other known religion768; the habituation is therapeutic; it 
removes affective resistance rather as a psychoanalyst may be able to persuade 
                                                          
763 As a Jansenist idea, habituation appears in a text by Saint-Cyran (OCG II 1456, n 4). 
764 Pascal toys with other possibilities: he implies that habituation could also be applied before the 
review of reasons for belief because according to the religion itself such reasoning is ‘useless’ for 
salvation (5:39, 7:41 – see PF, p 55, n2) or that it could come after showing that it is in our interest 
to investigate Christianity (11:45) or after rejecting the Wager (418:680). 
765 Pensées 188:220, 182:213, 418:680 (at OCG II 680), 821:661. 
766 See Russier 1949, p 218. 
767 See Garber 2009, pp 18-32 on ‘non-cognitive’ belief formation, on contingency and self-
deception, and his earlier remarks in Garber 2007. 
768 That is, they are not ‘contrary to reason’ (12:46). 
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her patient that, for example, he is not surrounded by enemies.  Still, habituation 
is not the ideal way to acquire beliefs and must count against their solidity: the 
‘deliberative’ believer may regard her faith tentatively769. 
 
The third problem is that habituation is a purely contingent process: were 
I a Turk, Pascal admits, I would be a Muslim as the result of habituation 
(821:661).  ‘Custom’ cannot be a reason for believing something; many – if not 
most – of our customary beliefs are completely unsupported by rational 
considerations (44:78).  This is what critics of Christianity say, Pascal concedes 
(150:183).  His answer is that Christianity is superior to its competitors because it 
is based on revelation through prophecies and miracles, explains human nature, 
explains why other religions exist (they are part of God’s smokescreen, an aspect 
of Divine Hiddenness), and offers tranquillity in the moral life now and in the 
afterlife770.   But this answer would work only if it were not just plausible – as the 
‘proofs’ are – but absolutely certain.  It is not.   
 
Pascal’s project as planned was to show that the other religions were false, 
a doomed endeavour we may think from a 21st Century vantage-point.  The main 
difficulty is not that religious belief is largely a matter of where and when one is 
born, for this leaves open the possibility that one religion out of the many is true.  
The key problem is that there is no Archimedean point from which to evaluate the 
truth claims of the religions of the world771.  Pascal might have conceded that the 
aspiring believer would have to be content with Christianity’s claim to be able to 
explain the existence of other religions.  This is intellectually a very weak 
position: an explanatory hypothesis which ‘fits the facts’ needs independent 
confirmation before it can be seriously entertained.  In any case, there may be 
other religions (e.g. Islam) which also claim to explain the plurality of religions.  
                                                          
769 Compare Spinoza’s notion of therapy as a rational process ‘leaving behind suffering and 
moving towards happiness’ through ‘the abolition of contingent individuality’ (Hampe in Ganeri & 
Carlisle 2010, p 48).  The ascent to a realm of general understanding, divorced from self-
knowledge, may be rational but one may ask: ‘Who would be happy?’  In contrast, there are 
Christians who believe religion should be felt, ritualistic: ‘formalized action, rather than thought’ 
(Oakeshott 2014, p 344). 
770 See pensées 149:182, 208:240, 209:241, 214:247, 243:276, 421:680, 426:680 and 894:448. 
771 For a recent discussion, see Adam Kirsch’s review-article ‘Is Reason Enough?’, New York Review 
of Books, Vol LXII, No 7 (23 April 2015), pp 42-3. 
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The fourth problem centres on whether this process leads to my receiving 
grace on which true faith depends.   Evidently not: habituation enables us to 
dispense with the effort of recalling the ‘proofs’ every time we consider a 
religious topic, but it does not produce salvific faith.  So it is not a solution to the 
‘deliberative’ believer’s predicament: she can still say of a belief that she feels 
certain of it but that certainty may not be God-given: her doubts about her 
relationship with God may remain live.  Without certainty of salvation, is 
following the rituals and rules of the Christian life preferable to a life based on the 
pursuit of divertissement? 
 
In rejecting the neo-Thomist path to belief – by means of metaphysical 
proofs – and also the neo-Augustinian acceptance that, since we have no certain 
beliefs, we must simply submit to religious belief (577:480), Pascal presents his 
historico-scriptural ‘proofs’ as less than wholly convincing but probably true 
(821:661)772;  submission is necessary but it is motivated to some extent by the 
‘proofs’.  Yet the doctrine offers are no probabilities concerning the bestowal of 
grace: we can be impressed by the Christian narrative and ‘take it to heart’, but 
unsure whether we shall be saved.  There is no ‘leap of faith’ available to Pascal’s 
aspirant773: she waits on God. 
 
  Pascal’s rich account of faith liberates it from what was always an uneasy 
relationship with the standards and practice of philosophical proof.  He does not 
try to base Christian faith on historical facts known independently of the faith.  
Yet he does not wish to eliminate all reasoning from the sphere of faith.  Faith is 
not in all believers simply pure feeling, a sort of warm glow:  it has content – 
expressed in Scripture and other texts sanctioned by the Church – about which 
doubts can arise in the unceasing stream of consciousness at any moment774: 
‘Nothing stops the volubility of our mind’ (574:477).   If the Pensées are in outline 
                                                          
772 See d’Angers 1954, pp 96-9. 
773 See Davidson 1983, p 91. 
774 ‘les raisons qui, étant vues de loin, paraissent borner notre vue, mais quand on y est arrivé, on 
commence à voir au-delà : rien n’arrête la volubilité de notre esprit’ (574:477) ; a Montaignian 
thought (see PF, p 334, n3). 
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an ‘argument between the sceptical self and the Christian self’775, then it is an 
unending dialogue: the sceptic has no sufficient reason ever to abandon his 
position.  
 
  These doubts can undermine belief in the truth of Christianity, the belief 
that one has received grace and will continue to do so776 and the belief that one 
can identify the experience of receiving grace.   Perhaps the grace-experience 
would momentarily drive doubt away777, but the doubts can re-assert themselves. 
They are accentuated by the fear that, given how much one wants to believe and 
to be saved, one may be deceiving oneself.   Some believers, he claims, believe as a 
sort of unthinking commitment to Christianity; they neither know nor would see 
the need for the ‘proofs’.  But there are others who have assessed the content of 
the faith rationally: for them, doubt cannot be excluded from the sphere of faith: 
as conscious beings, they experience doubts778 as well as moments of certainty, 
without being able to prevent the former or stabilise the latter. Such aspirants are 
torn between reasonable doubt and faith (924:753).  Especially if they are 
judgmentally cautious779, they languish, unquiet seekers after truth.  Awaiting 
grace – a miracle which must be repeated at every instant, for God can justifiably 
damn them at any time780 – is not conducive to a tranquil life.  This point is made 
eloquently by Hume: our ‘natural’ impressions are so much stronger than ‘the 
obscure, glimmering light’ of faith; he recommends ‘a manly, steady virtue, which 
either preserves us from disastrous, melancholy accidents, or teaches us to bear 
them.  During such calm sunshine of the mind, these spectres of false divinity 
never make their appearance’781.  
 
                                                          
775 MacIntyre 2007, p 40. 
776 See Brunschvicg 1953, p 224, referring to pensée 921:752. 
777  As is argued in Malvy 1923, Ch IV.   
778 Pascal, following Montaigne, teaches them scepticism as a way of purging their intellects.  But, 
as Brunschvicg sagely remarks, ‘Montaigne a raison.  Le danger est qu’il a trop raison’ (Brunschvicg 
1953, p 210). 
779 As pensée 44:78 teaches them to be. 
780 ‘[…] cet être universel qu’on a irrité tant de fois et qui peut vous perdre légitimement à toute 
heure […]’ (378:410). 
781 Hume 1993, pp 172 & 182. 
195 
 
 
 
The Pensées’ accounts of human fallibility and of the arbitrariness of God fatally 
undermine the seeker’s confidence in the prospect of salvation: Pascal’s 
therapeutic project fails at this ultimate moment. 
 
There is another possibility: that Pascal’s aspirant sees, at this last 
moment, that all human endeavour, including the Pensées themselves, is folly and 
that the final act of submission is to embrace the stultitia of Christian faith as 
such, leaving all rationality behind (418:680 at OCG II 677).  If this were Pascal’s 
view it would defeat his aim:  it would surely deter the honnête homme from the 
Christian path, for he – like nearly all of us – will not leave the world in which we 
need to follow a rational approach to life.  One of Pascal’s aims is, after all, to show 
that ‘religion is not at all contrary to reason’ (12:46)782.   Living in the world is, of 
course, a problem in itself.  Just as achieving Stoic apatheia or Epicurean or 
Pyrrhonian ataraxia looks impossible as long as we are embodied beings in a 
changing world which impinges on us continually (199:230 at OCG II 612), so 
Christian tranquillity appears – because it contrasts with change and 
movement783 – to be impossible to achieve in this life784.  
 
There are two further reflections to make on this failure: first, that Pascal 
probably regarded moments of doubt as part of the thoughtful Christian’s 
predicament, which would account for the vividness of the speeches he puts into 
the agnostic’s mouth in pensées 427-9:681-2 and elsewhere; in this way he 
anticipates the acceptance by many of today’s Christians that they will suffer 
doubt continually, recognizing the life of faith is for some a ‘journey’ not a stable 
state: Thomas Halik has recently said that ‘the main line is not between believers 
and non-believers but between dwellers and seekers, people for whom belief is a 
path, not a doctrine’ 785.  Secondly, and connectedly, some modern Christians 
                                                          
782 A standard which, he seems to concede, is met by Stoicism and Montaigne’s ethics (OCG II 94). 
783 See Beugnot 1988 who usefully discusses the mouvement/repos contrast in Pascal’s thinking: 
see, e.g., L’esprit géométrique (OCG II 169).  It has been suggested that all Pascal’s project achieves 
is to inspire a little ‘metaphysical anxiety’ in the agnostic or atheist (Genet 2010, p 389). 
784 Pascal’s own method, bequeathed to the ‘deliberative’ believer, is equally subversive of 
tranquillity: perhaps an end to the ‘Renversement continuel du pour au contre’ (93:127) may never 
be achieved. 
785 Financial Times, 21 March 2014. 
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brush aside metaphysical scepticism to argue that faith is exclusively a matter of 
our own attitudes and values – about which no doubt can arise – and that 
religious utterances do not refer to an independent reality.  I shall turn to this 
second option in the Epilogue. 
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EPILOGUE: PASCAL AND THE WITTGENSTEINIANS 
 
 The preceding Chapters describe phases of the journey made by Pascal’s 
seeker after truth, identifying some live philosophical issues along the way.  
Pascal’s over-arching conception of religious belief also has contemporary 
resonance: some Wittgensteinian philosophers have, with scant reference to 
Pascal, developed a similar approach over the last five decades.  I will briefly 
compare these ideas with Pascal’s theory of Christian belief (Section 35) and then 
go on to compare Pascal’s and the Wittgensteinian responses to the challenges his 
project attempts to meet (Sections 36-41). 
 
35. The Wittgensteinians as ‘heirs’ of Pascal’s approach to religion 
 John Cottingham has suggested that ‘Wittgenstein’s concept of religion [is] 
in many respects the heir to Pascal’s approach’786.   He recalls Pascal’s views, 
expressed in Infini rien (418:680), that reason does not play a role in believing in 
God’s existence and that the agnostic can come to belief by praxis787 by subduing 
her passions blocking belief.  Cottingham expresses this view in these terms: the 
‘practical dimension must take precedence over the intellectual and the 
theoretical’ (Cottingham 2003, pp 93-4) without however explaining whether the 
precedence involved is pragmatic (i.e. to deal with the particular case of Pascal’s 
interlocutor in the Wager) or a matter of conceptual priority.  We shall see that 
this is the crux of one of the contrasts between Pascal and the Wittgensteinians. 
 
 I shall in this Section discuss these themes referring both to Wittgenstein’s 
various remarks on religion and to those of the Swansea School788.    
                                                          
786 Cottingham 2003, p 96.  See also O’Drury’s comments: Rhees 1984, pp 92-4. There is no 
evidence that Wittgenstein read the Pensées. The most plausible hypothesis is that Schelling (who 
read Pascal with care) influenced Kierkegaard who in turn influenced some aspects of the 
approach of Wittgenstein and his disciples of the Swansea School.  It seems that Pascal and 
Wittgenstein also shared a conception of God as the severe Judge whose oppressive presence is 
felt in the workings of conscience (see Kenny 2004, p 213) but for Wittgenstein this had no 
implication that God determines one’s afterlife. 
787  I use the term ‘praxis’ here to denote activity which has no ‘external product’ and thus justifies 
nothing else: see Geuss 2014, p 60. 
788 I affix the label ‘Swansea School’ to a group led by Phillips and Winch with Malcolm and Rush 
Rhees in senior supporting roles.  I do not wish to imply that all members agree with each other 
on all points, nor that they adopt all aspects of Wittgenstein’s approach to religion.  As for the 
198 
 
 
 
35.1. Reasoning and Commitment 
The first of these points, the limited role of reason in faith and in the 
approach to it, is reflected in Infini rien in these terms: ‘Either God exists or He 
doesn’t [...] Reason can determine nothing in this case’ (418:680 at OCG II 677).  
People believe in God on another basis: it is the heart (cœur) which  is aware of 
(which ‘senses’) God and not Reason (424:680).  So knowledge of God does not 
belong to Reason, our highly developed and complex – and in the best case unified 
– domain of general knowledge which includes the data of experience, reasoning 
about the data afforded by experience and reasoning abstractly (e.g. 
mathematical demonstration)789.  On the side of the cœur is an understanding, in 
at least some believers, of the doctrines which regulate the content of belief790.  
These doctrines are also the basis of Pascal’s critique of other religions791. 
 
We must also recall here Pascal’s emphasis on the role of childlike 
submission in faith792; this is not a requirement to be wholly submissive; it is by 
reasoning about belief and proof in general that we come to see the limits of 
scepticism and the limits of demonstration793.   
 
All this foreshadows, but only in some respects, Wittgenstein’s dictum that 
‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a 
system of reference’794.  Wittgensteinian religious commitment is absolute, 
unshakeable, a belief clung to ‘through thick and thin’, a loving acceptance of the 
Gospels, faith ‘in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative 
intelligence’795.  So for D Z Phillips ‘the love of God is the primary form of belief in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
latter, my impression is that Wittgenstein’s views are more personal and more tentative than 
Swansea’s: note his frequent use of the first person pronoun in Wittgenstein 1966.  Many of the 
remarks in Wittgenstein 1980 seem to be personal responses to the writings of others. 
789 This distinction will be discussed further below.  It seems to be associated with the distinction 
between the esprit de finesse and the esprit de géométrie (512:670), discussed in Section 4 above.  
790 Pensées 482:717: ‘doctrine accounts for everything’. 
791 Pascal’s rejection of other religions – e.g. Islam and Judaism – is made from a Christian 
standpoint (see pensées 203-209:235-242, 214:247, 218-220:251-253, 256:288 & 826:667).  
792 ‘La sagesse nous renvoie à l’enfance’ (82:116). 
793 Pensées 170:201, 174:205 & 188:220. 
794 Wittgenstein 1980, p 64.  For a brief treatment of Wittgenstein’s alleged fideism, see Amesbury 
2012. 
795 Wittgenstein 1980, pp 64, 32, 33, 53.  There is in these remarks a characteristic reluctance to 
require that faith should have intellectual foundations and an implicit rejection of the classical 
proofs of God’s existence (see Phillips 1986, pp 2-3). 
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God’796.   Faith does not result from a dispassionate assessment of the probability 
or improbability of God’s existence, but in penitence, a childlike opening of one’s 
heart to God and to others797.  By calling religion a ‘system of reference’ 
Wittgenstein implies that it is a self-contained array of linguistic and other 
practices understood within a particular conceptual framework.  This could be a 
faint echo of Pascal’s interest in the domain of the cœur as opposed to that of 
Reason, but we shall soon see that the similarity is merely superficial. 
 
 35.2. Praxis  
  Cottingham’s second point of comparison turns on praxis in the life of the 
religious believer.  Pascal says that the ultimate stage in the approach to faith is 
for the passions to be diverted to conduce to belief by participation in the 
Christian way of life; the result will be ‘human faith’, a commitment to God and to 
Christian doctrine, short, unless God bestows it, of salvific faith798.  Pascal’s 
doctrine of coutume as one of the bases of belief (see Section 34 above) implies 
that by adopting the Christian way of life – by doing – we can come to ‘human 
faith’.  As Cottingham points out (p 95) this is not an irrational step: Pascal spells 
out the benefits of the Christian life rather as Aristotle pointed to the benefits of 
virtue799.  
 
Wittgenstein’s reference to commitment is close to Pascal’s emphasis on 
religious praxis.  Religious belief is not (just) a matter of knowing or believing 
things in the abstract: it consists in living a certain life.  Forms of life – ‘a 
deliberately vague expression’800  are ‘the given’801: they are not in need of, or 
capable of, justification.  Phillips says: ‘If we can see nothing in [God’s divinity] 
                                                          
796 Phillips 1970a, pp 31. 
797 Wittgenstein 1980, p 46. 
798 Pensées 418:680 at OCG II 680 & 110:142. 
799 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 680; Nicomachean Ethics, X.6, 1177a 1-10.  
800 See Garver 1994, p 237 (citing Black). 
801 Wittgenstein 1967, p 226.  Scholars seem to disagree about the notion of a ‘form of life’: to 
some, it seems based on ‘primitive reactions’ like returning another’s smile (see ter Haak in Glock 
2001, pp 207-8) but others see it as involving practices and activities (see Mulhall in ibid., pp 253 
& 266-7).  Garver suggests that ‘first and foremost Wittgenstein’s forms of life are those of natural 
history: bovine, piscine, canine, reptilian, human […]’ (Garver 1994, p 240).  Without getting 
entangled in this dispute, I will use the expression ‘form of life’ to refer to a more or less 
identifiable group of activities, such as Catholicism, which seem fundamental to their participants 
and to provide a Weltanschauung or Weltbild (see Kenny 2004, pp 204-5). 
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there is nothing apart from it that will somehow establish its point’802.  
Wittgensteinians thus imply that, if the religious life involves reasoning, it goes on 
only within the faith.  Believers do not – and see no need to – reason about their 
faith as a whole.  Their belief is their active life.  This equation underpins the 
Wittgensteinians’ ‘ethnological’ approach to understanding religion803, their 
project to ‘pay attention to what believers do and say’, i.e. prayer, worship, story-
telling, religious services, expressing Christian love, confessing, thanking and 
asking804.    
 
Faith for Phillips is necessarily expressed in praxis: ‘In learning by 
contemplation, attention, renunciation, what forgiving, thanking, loving, etc. mean 
in these contexts, the believer is participating in the reality of God; this is what we 
mean by God’s reality’805.  Phillips thus espouses the notion that beliefs do not pre-
exist praxis in the religion, but arise out of it806.  God is real apparently only in the 
sense that He is mentioned during Christian praxis: ‘The word “God” is not the 
name of a thing’807.   
 
Here the crucial difference I referred to above opens up between Pascal 
and the Wittgensteinians.  Given his ‘simple’/’deliberative’ distinction between 
types of belief, Pascal assigns two functions to praxis in relation to faith: the 
‘simple’ believer inherits and grows up with the Christian life, its rituals and its 
customs, including its moral practices.   This is also the Swansea picture: for 
Phillips the objectivity of belief in God consists in the sense that the believer does 
not make her religious beliefs up: she is born into a given tradition808.  She does 
                                                          
802 Phillips 1970a, p 81. 
803  The term ‘ethnological’ is Wittgenstein’s:  ‘If we look at things from an ethnological point of 
view [...] we are taking up a position right outside so as to be able to see things more objectively’ 
(Wittgenstein 1980, p 37; his emphasis). 
804 Phillips 1965, p 1 & 1970a, p. 5.  Instead of seeking explanations, philosophers should stop at 
the level of description  (see Phillips 1986, p 17, quoting Wittgenstein: Zettel (Oxford, Blackwell: 
1967), §314).  
805 Phillips 1970b, p 55; his emphasis.  Note the use of the pronoun ‘we’. 
806 See the discussion in O’Hear 1984, pp 14-15.   
807 Phillips 1970a, p 85. 
808 Phillips 1967a, p 151.    
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not choose it.   As Malcolm puts it: ‘we do not decide to accept framework 
propositions, [they] are pressed on us by our human community’809. 
 
On the other hand, Pascal’s ‘deliberative’ aspirant initially stands at some 
distance from praxis, weighing up the significance of the Christian life; Pascal 
would tell her, as we saw in the preceding Chapter, to take the plunge, to adopt 
the customs, to follow the rituals and to become a new person with new horizons.  
In the case of this type of believer, therefore, praxis is again important as 
habituation: schooling her personality towards faith; but it is not on its own the 
basis of the ‘deliberative’ believer’s belief: the aspirant believer necessarily 
understands Pascal’s ‘proofs’ before practising the religion, because it is the 
‘proofs’ which motivate her to take up the religious practices. 
 
  The ‘simple’/’deliberative’ distinction on which Pascal insists thus reveals 
that he has a wider view of approaches to faith than do the Wittgensteinians. He 
accords a role in the process of conversion to the aspirant’s understanding of the 
‘proofs’, of doctrine.  Phillips says that ‘there is no theoretical knowledge of 
God’810.  Wittgenstein is notably wary of doctrine: he says,  
‘Christianity is not a doctrine, not I mean a theory about what has 
happened and what will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that actually takes place in human life.’811  
Wittgenstein is thinking of Bunyan here; in other contexts such as the Gospels, his 
position is not so cut-and-dried812. 
 
The Swansea School avoid any conception of doctrine implying that the 
doctrine would be true even in the absence of relevant religious praxis.  This 
would just not ‘make sense’ for Swansea because beliefs and therefore doctrines 
arise only in praxis.  The penalty of the Swansea view is that, apart from the 
                                                          
809 Malcolm 2003, p 184. 
810 Phillips 1970a, pp 32. 
811 Wittgenstein 1980, p 28.  Compare: ‘one of the things Christianity says is that all sound 
doctrines [alle gute Lehren] are useless.  That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of 
your life.)’ (Wittgenstein 1980, p 53).  Does he mean useless as a means of conversion, but not 
necessarily senseless? 
812 Kenny 2004, p 211. 
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anthropologist’s diagnosis, there is no explanation why a person is a believer813: 
this may suit some believers but surely not all.  It is also difficult to explain why 
people lose their faith.  Phillips is aware of this difficulty.  He claims that loss of 
faith is either the result of no longer attending to doctrine or treating it 
superstitiously (for example, I’d guess, blaming God for not answering one’s 
prayers) 814.   This explanation seems likely to cover only a few types of apostasy. 
 
35.3. Can an ‘outsider’ understand Christian faith? 
Since we shall be considering various challenges to Christianity, we must 
ask how, if understanding comes only from praxis, how can those agnostics 
indifferent to, or critical of, a religion be capable of making judgments about it 
from ‘outside’ it, either to criticise it or to consider an approach to faith?  Pascal’s 
position is that ‘atheists’, i.e. those who question some religious tenets if not all or, 
having absorbed the thrust of Pyrrhonism, ‘do not know what to think’815, have 
some strength of character816 and are a real threat to the steadfastness of 
religious believers, for example when they attack religion from a relativist or 
rationalist standpoint (150:183).  He also believes that the agnostic can be 
brought to understand, respect and become committed to the faith (12:46). 
 
The Swansea view is generally that unbelievers are not practising the 
religion, so they cannot wholly understand what they purport to criticise.  There 
are two claims involved here.  The first claim is that it makes no sense to label a 
religion absurd or false as a whole.  The critic of a religion might deny certain 
particular propositions (e.g. that God designed the world) and can be misled by 
this into thinking that he can reject a religion (or all religion) in the same way.  He 
cannot because, as Wittgenstein would say817, there are no criteria for him to 
deploy to do this, unless – I suppose –he develops with others a denying-religion-
as-a-whole language-game.  But that game would be for those who have no use 
                                                          
813 See Williams 2014, p 97. 
814 Phillips 1970a, Ch VI.   
815 See PH I,  Introduction, p x. 
816 Pensée 157:189.  See Gouhier 1986, p 119. 
817 See the discussion in Blackburn 2006, pp 129-136.  
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for a religion or for religion in general.  It would deploy criteria for which the 
believer would, in turn, have no use818. 
 
The Swansea School’s second claim is that a religion cannot be understood 
using the concepts employed in other language-games or forms of life.  The 
former concept covers activities which involve the following of rules819 and 
essentially the use of language, but they are also equated with beliefs820; the latter 
seems to refer to cultures which may consist in one or more institutions like a 
religion or a system of education.  Forms of life may, at least from the point of 
view of any participant, appear to be just ‘what is done’ or ‘what is necessary’821.  
Phillips implies that a religion is a congeries of language-games in a form of life822.   
But he also talks of ‘the form of life of which belief in God is a fundamental part’823  
which suggests that there can be such a thing as a Christian form of life which is 
unintelligible to other forms of life. 
 
 This philosophical apparatus does not offer criteria of demarcation either 
between language-games or between forms of life824.  Yet without such criteria 
within a given society, it is hard to say who is an ‘outsider’ and who is not, whose 
criticisms of a religious belief or practice are cogent and whose are not.  Winch 
came to see that some language-games do not simply overlap but are internally 
related to each other825.   In overlapping perhaps they also straddle forms of life, 
but that point is not clear.  Phillips  does not explicitly address this question in 
any discussion of the relationship between a religion and non-believers ‘outside’ 
it. 
 
                                                          
818 For example, that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of God. 
819 As Winch admitted, not all human activity is rule-governed so it is not clear that the notion of 
language-game fully captures what religious believers, for example, do qua religious believers. See 
Winch 2008, pp xiii-xiv. 
820 Phillips 1970a, Ch V passim. 
821 On these concepts, see for example Addis, M: ‘D Z Phillips’ fideism in Wittgenstein’s mirror’ in 
Arrington, R L & Addis, M: Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion (London, Routledge: 2001), 
especially pp 88-95. 
822 Phillips 1986, p 79. 
823 Phillips 1970a, p 14. 
824 Kenny says: ‘The concept of language-games is an obscure and ambiguous one in 
Wittgenstein’s own writings’ (quoted in Phillips 1986, p 20). 
825 See Gaita in Winch 2008, p xxi. 
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Despite these difficulties, the Swansea School tend to insist that a 
language-game cannot be a mistake826, because it is only within a ‘system’ or 
language-game that blunders can be made827.   It is possible to talk nonsense only 
within a language-game828 and within a form of life mistakes can be made; so 
what criteria can guide us here?  Phillips’ suggestion is, as we saw above, the 
institutional criteria of tradition but he does not indicate how one is to adjudicate 
between different Christian traditions.  Can one tradition even understand the 
others?  Pascal is in a similar boat: his ‘proofs’ centre on the build-up through 
tradition of a set of doctrines, living in praxis and forming a framework which is 
impressive for the aspirant because of its explanatory power and consistency (see 
Section 32 above).  In the end, one’s particular version of Christianity itself is ‘the 
given’.   
 
Does all this amount to saying that, for Wittgenstein or Pascal, Christianity 
is ‘pre-rational’ as Cottingham suggests?  The answer seems to be: only in the 
sense that commitment to any form of life is ‘the given’.  Pascal is groping towards 
applying this thought to other forms of life as well as faith: he suggests that 
sentiment – intuitive acceptance of (a network of) certain basic propositions – is 
indispensable to any branch of knowledge, to any way of life829.   Some judgments 
are as basic as the conceptual framework itself830.  But this is a general point 
about forms of life: it will not lead us to see what specific features of religious 
belief are ‘pre-rational’.   
   
 The later Wittgenstein’s refusal to see any unique pattern present in all 
forms of life or language-games takes us further: some forms of life will involve a 
commitment to observation of the world, and require a rational appeal to the 
facts, and others will not.  In the case of Christianity, his personal view was that 
beliefs which seemed to be about future events – the Last Judgment or the 
                                                          
826 Phillips 1970a, pp 64 & 72: ‘it is only by reference to other religious beliefs that [a] confusion is 
recognized’. 
827 Wittgenstein 1966, p 59. 
828 ‘Don’t for heaven’s sake be afraid of talking nonsense!  But you must pay attention to your 
nonsense’ (Wittgenstein 1980, p 56). 
829 As discussed in Section 32. Pensées 110:142 & 530:455. 
830 ‘If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions 
but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments’ (Wittgenstein 1967, §242).  
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resurrection of the body – might not be so: they did not ‘rest on the fact on which 
our ordinary everyday beliefs normally do rest’.   This seems to fit with his view 
that the believer’s ‘picture’ of the Last Judgment will include ‘guidance for his life 
[...] regulating for all in his life [...] foregoing pleasures’831.  In this lies the 
believer’s commitment to his faith: the way he leads his life. 
 
Pascal would agree that religious truths are not established in the way that 
empirical truths are, from experience and using reasoning.  The grounds of 
religious belief are to be sought in the authority of the holy books (OCG I 452-3).   
But for Pascal this does not imply that religious beliefs are vague about whether 
the events foretold in Scripture etc. will actually happen.  The thrust of the 
prudential argument discussed in Chapter II, and in the so-called Wager 
Argument, is that there is a risk that the agnostic will after death have bad 
experiences.  So Pascal has a complex conception of the relationship between 
experience and expectation on one hand, and religious belief on the other.  He 
would say that the doctrines of eternal life or damnation (as discussed in Chapter 
II), of the Last Judgment and of the Second Coming (in the Sixth Age described by 
Augustine832) are all doctrines about possible future experiences.  In one form or 
another we shall experience the afterlife and the events at the end of time.   The 
Swansea School deny – perhaps more firmly than Wittgenstein would have done – 
the assumption that religious belief includes any factual components or 
predictions.   
 
On the other hand, both Pascal and the Wittgensteinians concede that the 
unbeliever, the ‘outsider’ – while unable to criticise a religion as a whole – can 
understand some of the content of the religion for which she has no use.  This 
seems to be the position of Pascal’s interlocutor in Infini rien (418: 680) and of 
the seekers after truth (160:192).  There is a type of agnostic who understands 
Christianity very well but cannot commit himself833.   
 
                                                          
831 Wittgenstein 1966, pp 53-54. 
832 Pensée 283:315 and see PF, p 218, n 1.  
833 The best known example would be Augustine, as he records in the Confessions, Books VI to VIII. 
On Augustine’s studies before his conversion, see Rist 1994, p 15.  
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Phillips, following Wittgenstein, claims that ‘the man who has no use for 
the religious picture is not contradicting the believer’834.  But he concedes that 
faith is not ‘all-or-nothing’835 and that understanding is not all-or-nothing either.  
‘The line between belief and unbelief may not be at all sharp at many points’836.  
The unbeliever stands ‘on the threshold of religion seeing what it must be like’837.  
This contradicts Phillips’ other contention that commitment is inseparable from 
understanding838.  The unbeliever hears what Christians say and sees what they 
do; she may have a very good understanding of the Scripture and of the appeal it 
exerts; she can understand, for example, that Christians stress selflessness and 
see sub specie æternitatis the unimportance of worldly concerns and calamities839.  
Her separateness from believers seems to be only one of attitude.  Were it 
suggested that there is no explanation of what the unbeliever is missing – and 
thus what she cannot contradict – Swansea would have purchased Christianity’s 
irrefutability at the price of vacuity840.  This problem reverberates throughout the 
following discussion: what more does religion offer over and above what 
Wittgenstein calls ‘our ordinary everyday beliefs’? 
 
In sum, the Wittgensteinians part company from Pascal over two key 
points: first, for Pascal God reveals doctrine and doctrine determines praxis 
whereas for the Wittgensteinians it is out of praxis that any doctrine, for example 
the meaning of God or the key moral principles, emerges; secondly, Pascal’s 
religion includes factual statements (even though many of these are, as we shall 
see, shaped by doctrine) but the Wittgensteinians confine religious utterances 
solely to the expression of attitudes.  Behind these points lie profoundly different 
concepts of God. 
 
                                                          
834 Phillips 1970b, p 76. 
835 Phillips 1970a, p 32. 
836 Phillips 1970b, pp 75-6.  ‘Religious concepts are not inaccessible to non-religious 
understanding’ (Phillips 1967b, p 196). 
837 Phillips 1970a, p 12.  See also Phillips 1986, p 11. 
838 ‘Belief, understanding and love can all be equated with each other’ and the understanding of 
religion is ‘incompatible with scepticism’ (Phillips 1970a, pp 29 & 33). 
839 See Sutherland 1984, pp 15 & 88 ff. 
840 See MacIntyre 1970, p xi.  
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We shall now see how these differences between Wittgensteinians and 
Pascal play out by examining the various intellectual challenges which Pascal’s 
project addresses.  These are the main challenges to traditional Christianity 
discussed in the Introduction and Chapter I, arising from the humanists’ retrieval 
of classical texts, the rise of early modern science and the absorption of 
discoveries about the New World. 
 
36. The challenge from Montaigne’s rationalist sceptic 
Pascal says gleefully of Montaigne’s scepticism that it showed how Reason 
‘cast so little light [on our understanding of  justice and of the world] and went [so 
much] astray, that one is not tempted, when one makes good use of its principles, 
to find the mysteries [of religion] implausible’ (OCG II 97).  As mentioned in 
Section 8.4, there seems to have been among Pascal’s contemporaries a kind of 
rationalist sceptic (an honnête homme perhaps) who regarded the Christian 
paradoxes as open invitations to criticism841: if there are good reasons, for 
example, to regard God both as benevolent and as the severe judge who 
arbitrarily saves only a few souls from eternal suffering, the rationalist sceptic 
sees in the equipollence between the two sides a reason to suspend judgement842.  
Or he insists that the principle of non-contradiction shall apply to Christianity just 
as it applies to other spheres of belief843.  For example, is it not apparent that God 
created the world in order to damn it?  Pascal’s response is to turn the sceptic’s 
own weapon on him: from what position of rock solid certainty does he criticise 
the Christian mysteries (896:448)?   
 
                                                          
840 See for example the approach of La Mothe Le Vayer, quoted in McKenna 1976, p 498. 
841 This is not a route Montaigne wished to go down (see Montaigne 2002 II, pp 184-6), but his 
influence made it an option for his readers. 
842 Hare puts the challenge thus: if to be called a Christian ‘one has to believe all the things that the 
orthodox say they believe, and believe them literally – then nobody with any claim to rationality is 
going to say that he is a Christian’ (Hare 1973, p 395).  
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Pascal, who is sympathetic to the demand that we purge ourselves of 
contradictory beliefs in science,844 sees ineliminable paradoxes at the heart of 
mathematics.  He cites the concept of infinity: we are aware of the infinite because 
there exists an infinity of numbers in both ‘directions’: addition/multiplication 
and subtraction/division; but we cannot understand the infinite because we 
cannot comprehend the action of dividing a number or an extended line infinitely 
(OCG II 164)845 or creating an infinite number by making an infinite series of 
additions; we also know that adding a unit to infinity does not change its nature, 
because, unlike addition to a finite number, addition to an infinite does not 
change it from even to odd or vice versa; yet all numbers are either odd or even 
(418:680).  The rationalist is, in Pascal’s time846, obliged to accept these 
paradoxes because their denial is absurd (OCG II 164)847.  (In envisaging the 
existence of infinites, Pascal is here advancing where Cartesian and Leibnizian 
angels feared to tread.) 
 
Pascal also suggests that everyone has to accept mysteries when 
contemplating the human predicament: for example, the paradox of weakness of 
will; and the phenomenon of consciousness – ‘how a body can be united with a 
mind’848 – eludes us.  Let the rationalist come up with convincing explanations of 
apparent paradoxes like this before rejecting the mysteries of the faith.   
 
This is a poor argument: it is a non sequitur to argue from the apparent 
failure of rational enquiry in one domain to the permissibility of irrational beliefs 
in another.  This applies especially to Pascal’s implied argument that, because we 
cannot understand mathematical infinity, we can accept that an infinite God may 
                                                          
843 He attacks those (e.g. Thomists) who believed that change and decay occur only in the 
sublunary sphere and refused to see change and the emergence of new entities (e.g. the nova of 
1572 and the comet of 1577) beyond this sphere (OCG I 457).   
844 See also pensée 149:182 (at OCG II 593). 
845 Absent the new definitions and discoveries of the 19th Century (see Gardies 1984, Ch V). 
846 Arnauld’s Cartesianism leads him to criticise apagogical reasoning as unenlightening: it leaves 
the proposition proved unexplained (Logique, IV.9, pp 255-6).  
844 See pensées 199:230 at OCG II 614 and 809:656. 
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exist even though both His existence and His nature are incomprehensible 
(418:680)849.   It is a bad argument because, whereas we can understand the 
mathematical operations involved in the notion of infinity, since God is neither a 
number nor an extended being, we cannot begin to understand the sense in which 
He is infinite.  To go on, as Pascal does, to say that His justice is infinite just 
muddies the waters further: ‘infinite’ applied to justice is just a metaphor for ‘all-
embracing’ or ‘absolute’ and adds nothing to our understanding of God’s infinity.  
The rationalist would surely be right to conclude that Pascal has not shown that 
the sentence ‘An infinite God can exist’ has any meaning. 
 
Pascal has, however, another reply to the rationalist: Christians – at least 
‘simple’ believers – gladly admit that, from our limited point of view, the 
supernatural may look paradoxical and some doctrines may look like folly 
(695:574).  Religion can’t be wholly rational – for then it would have no 
mysterious or supernatural aspects – nor can it be wholly irrational, for then it 
would be absurd and ridiculous (173:204).   The reason for folly is that faith is 
essentially a meeting of two realms which are utterly separate:  the natural with 
the supernatural.  The paradoxes this entails should not be ‘wiped away’850. 
 
In the Pensées, the matter does not end with Pascal’s assertion that some 
Christian beliefs are folly: as he himself recognizes, someone investigating the 
religion is in a different position from a believer: the latter accepts some Christian 
beliefs which to others look mad (and lack proof) but the unconvinced 
investigator says that that very madness (and lack of proof) deters him from 
putting his trust in the religion (418:680 at OCG II 677).   
 
Wittgenstein also notes that believers don’t pretend to be [invariably] 
reasonable: the Epistles851 talk of folly; but it would be wrong to call them 
unreasonable: ‘Why shouldn’t a form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a 
                                                          
849 On Arnauld’s view of God’s incomprehensibility, see Nadler in Clarke & Wilson 2011, p 535-7. 
850  See Scruton 2014, p 186. 
851 He was probably thinking of Paul’s saying ‘But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a 
stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness’ (I Corinthians I:23); see pensée 291:323. 
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Last Judgment?’852  There are then three options:  to say either that religious 
belief is wholly non-rational as a fideist would, or that, in some religious contexts, 
no attempt is being made to be reasonable but in others the attempt is made (this 
is Pascal’s position) or thirdly that there is a criterion of rationality governing 
what can be said in Christianity, but the rationality criterion in religious forms of 
life differs [completely] from those employed in, say, the natural sciences.   
 
Wittgenstein raises the third possibility not in connection with Christian 
belief but concerning a wholly strange system of beliefs found among people on 
an island853.  We can imagine experiencing, in an alien culture, a religion where no 
utterance or action seems to us to make sense.  We may ask, first, why should 
anthropological observations of a wholly separate society have a bearing on 
religious praxis and belief in our society?  Secondly, on what basis can we apply 
notions of rationality – centring on the rules of evidence and the procedures for 
obtaining it – to this wholly strange society? Why use the notion of ‘rationality’ at 
all?  If we do use it, are we not using our concept of rationality to describe this 
alien society (for example, gathering and assessing evidence, generalising from it 
and so on)? 
 
Phillips says that the first step in the philosophy of religion is ‘to show the 
diversity of criteria of rationality’; ‘there is no one paradigm of rationality to 
which all human activity has to conform’854.    There are two points to be made 
here: first, if criteria of rationality vary between activities855, this may be true of 
some activities in a given society but not all: for example the notion of a rule may 
be the same in many different sports or games; secondly, variations between 
societies or cultures in the world may consist in variations in criteria of 
rationality but may not.  We cannot rule out either that two traditions, to both of 
which we owe allegiance, should clash in fundamental ways856 or alternatively 
                                                          
852 Wittgenstein 1966, p 58.  
853 Wittgenstein 1966, p 58. 
854 Phillips 1970a, p 17 & Phillips 1976, p 7. 
855 See e.g. Phillips 1970, pp 16, 128 
856 See MacIntyre 1988, pp 166-171.  ‘We’ – whoever that is – may not be sitting comfortably in 
one form of life and thus with settled criteria of truth, rationality etc. or clear ‘intuitions’, to speak 
à la mode. 
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that forms of life may overlap or interpenetrate such that they come to share 
criteria of rationality, truth and reality; the same may be true of whole societies or 
cultures857.   
 
A religious believer living in our culture is not in the same position as 
someone living in what Winch quaintly calls ‘a primitive society’.  In our culture, 
believers can and do seek – whether spontaneously or as the result of training – 
to reach a rational accommodation which suits both their religious beliefs (and 
behaviour) and their store of secular knowledge, much of it scientific or 
technological, and consider themselves to have a set of not unreasonable beliefs 
about what is the case and what is not.  Some may be self-deceived.  But in our 
culture (if not in all others), an individual’s believing and asserting p in one 
context and ~p in another, claiming that each context determines what it makes 
sense to believe and say, produces vertigo in others if not in the individual 
concerned.   The difference between what is the case and what is not ‘will come 
completely cut off from the rest of the world, visitors to it from our society might 
be baffled by many of the judgments made and beliefs held in that society.  To be 
baffled, however, is not necessarily to discover different criteria of rationality. 
 
The rationalist need not, in noting this point, deny the importance of praxis 
and the context it provides for beliefs and assertions of various types.  All he 
needs to do is to leave open the possibility that some forms of life and language-
games share similar concepts which may in specific respects function differently 
in the different contexts but have enough similarities for us to understand that 
they are very close.  For example, some forms of life involving believing and 
stating beliefs may all share the [same] concepts of truth or ‘relation to reality’858.  
When the soprano sings ‘I know that my Redeemer liveth’ and means it, would 
                                                          
857 Manifestly religions influence each other, if only in the sense that each strives to make clear 
how it differs from the others.  Another observable phenomenon is the imitation by one religion of 
another’s ritual style, e.g. Buddhist ritual imitating Christian styles in some countries. Manifestly 
religions influence each other, if only in the sense that each strives to make clear how it differs 
from the others.  Another observable phenomenon is the imitation by one religion of another’s 
ritual style, e.g. Buddhist ritual imitating Christian styles in some countries. 
858 Winch 1967, p 22. 
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she not be surprised to be told that she does not mean ‘know’ or ‘liveth’ in 
something close to their usual senses? 
 
Phillips’ doctrine leads him to condemn traditional theologians as 
‘superstitious’ or ‘confused’, but from what Archimedean point will he assess the 
rationality of their claims?  There seem to be at least three Christian traditions 
alive today:  the Thomists believe that faith includes certain metaphysical and 
historical beliefs; the Lutherans agree but stress as well the essential role in faith 
of trust in God; and the Kierkegaardian faith which is only trust in God 
(‘subjectivity’)859.  Can Phillips demonstrate the incoherence of the first two of 
these three? 
 
  The rationalist sceptic’s eyebrows may also be raised by Phillips’ 
expressions ‘the reality of God’ or ‘God’s reality’860.    The question of God’s reality 
is, Phillips says, whether it is possible to talk sensibly or truly about God861.  This, 
the rationalist might reply, is both platitudinous and odd: it is true that (a) 
questions of reality are necessarily linked to the truth of beliefs or assertions, but 
(b) are there kinds of sense, truth and reality?  And can’t we talk sensibly and 
truly about griffins while considering them to be unreal?  Talking about God 
seems, the rationalist might add, more like talking about a hitherto invisible 
person whom one hopes to see one day rather than talking about nobody.  There 
is nothing incoherent about this as far as it goes862.   Phillips wants to rule out 
here and now that God would be visible under any circumstances: he ‘is in fact not 
seen, and […] anything that is in fact seen could not be God’863.  Yet there are Old 
Testament sightings of God, and Jesus is visible to believers and unbelievers alike 
in the New Testament864: Phillips’ position entails, at the very least, substantial 
re-interpretation of Scripture.  
 
                                                          
859 Hyman 2010, p 186. 
860 See Phillips 1970b, p 55. 
861 See the discussion at Phillips 1970a, pp 1 ff. 
862 See Mackie 1982, pp 1-2. 
863 Phillips 1976, p 149. 
864 And His visibility after the Resurrection is a key aspect of the narrative. 
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  Phillips suggests that ‘seeing that there is a God [...] is synonymous with 
seeing the possibility of eternal love’865.  But does saying that God’s reality 
consists in or flows from human practices or perceptions get the believer where 
she wants to be?    The ‘reality of romantic love’, for example, is seen in various 
practices, but that does not mean that love is the sort of thing one would worship 
or pray to, unless personified as Aphrodite perhaps.  To situate all uses of ‘God’ 
within practices and utterances which do not state that He exists for everyone – 
regardless of whether they believe in Him or not – will leave many believers 
dissatisfied: God becomes a wholly anthropocentric notion.  He may be that, but 
the believer assumes that He is not just a human creation. 
 
  Grant raises another problem: he asks whether – given that for Phillips the 
believer worships, praises and loves God – the believer can specify who or what is 
being worshipped etc.   If God is not an intentional object,  
‘it becomes extremely difficult to give an account of what it is to believe in 
God; for what can it mean to worship or believe in God if one cannot give 
some sort of explanation, however fragmentary, incomplete and 
analogical, of the nature of the being who is worshipped and believed 
in?’866    
Swansea’s God is not a being separate from us or what we do.  So there is no 
object of worship, praise or belief.  Religious hope is not hope for any outcome867.  
Other contemporary theologians differ completely from Phillips’ position868. 
 
Pascal’s reply to this would be that we know God through a real person, 
Jesus Christ (449:690).  But this suggestion, the rationalist sceptic may reply, does 
not eliminate the problem: if Christ is a mediator869, it must be possible to specify 
the being whose relationship with the believer He sustains.  For the sceptic, the 
paradox is that a ‘personal God’ does none of the things which contribute to a 
                                                          
865 Phillips 1970a, p 21. 
866 Grant 1967, p 154.  See also Mackie 1982, pp 3-4. 
867 Phillips 1965, p 67.   
868 See, e.g.: ‘The relationship to God as one who faces us and can be addressed [...] is of decisive 
importance particularly for prayer’: Küng, H: Does God Exist? (New York, Crossroad: 1980), pp 
634-5.  See also Alston in Helm 1999. 
869 Pensées 189:221, 190:223, 378:410.   
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personal relationship with Him.  On the contrary, as some believers have 
argued870, His attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and timelessness militate 
against our understanding of Him as a personal being.  The rationalist would say: 
Christ may have lived once but now He is dead and consequently non-existent: 
‘conversations’ with him are anyway curiously one-sided.   
 
Phillips evades this challenge by suggesting that one’s relationship with 
God consists in a set of personal attitudes: it is ‘a certain attitude to life, and 
seeing what one’s life ought to be [...] the possibility of giving thanks for one’s 
existence [...] One could not believe in God and assert that life is devoid of 
hope’871. 
 
In contrast, belief in the mysteries to which a rationalist might object are 
not just attitudes: they are at the heart of Pascal’s doctrine: the incoherence of the 
doctrines of the Fall and grace is, I argued in Section 23, a problem at the centre of 
belief.  They are not mysteries marginal enough to be tolerated by the 
rationalistic sceptic. I conclude that the rationalist sceptic has a case which Pascal 
cannot answer while he is saddled with Augustinian doctrine.   
 
The problems of the Swansea approach are of a different order:  its tactic is 
to refuse to meet the rationalist’s requirement for reasons which she would 
recognize as reasons for belief: Christianity is rational, Swansea replies, but its 
rationality is not the same rationality practised in other forms of life and its 
importance cannot be explained outside the form of life in which it consists872.  In 
practice, Phillips’ position is very weakly stated: he sees some merit in the view 
that ‘the appeal to the internality of religious criteria of meaningfulness can act as 
a quasi-justification for what would otherwise be recognized as nonsense’873.   
The rationalist will thus never get from Swansea any description of the grounds of 
religious belief or of the benefits of the Christian way of life 874.   If a rationalist 
                                                          
870 See e.g. Sutherland 1984, Ch 4. 
871  Phillips 1967b, p 195. 
872 Phillips 1970a, p 17.  
873 Phillips 1970a, p 78.  
874 Which, by the way, Cottingham stresses: Cottingham 2003, p 95. 
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believes that participants in any human practice should be able to explain to non-
participants, however vaguely, what benefit the practice brings to its 
participants875, she will leave Swansea disappointed. 
 
37. The deists and their proofs 
  Deism emerged before Pascal’s time as a kind of rationalism (see Section 7 
above).  His condemnation of deism is that it is a purely abstract belief, neither 
specifically Christian nor involving the cœur.  It is almost as detestable as atheism 
(449:690).   As a rational religion refusing to recognize the divinity of Christ, 
deism argues that the only certainty a believer can have is in the traditional 
proofs of God’s existence.   For Pascal, of course, the figure of Christ is essential to 
the believer’s relationship with a hidden and inaccessible God (378:410), and as 
the law-giver who requires us to recognize our sinfulness and unhappiness 
(449:690). 
 
  Pascal’s rejection of deism also involves a refusal to employ the traditional 
proofs of God’s existence; this is threefold: first, the hiddenness of God rules out 
empirical evidence for God (as I discussed in Section 30) 876.  Secondly, the proofs 
are not specific: they deliver only ‘speculative knowledge of God’877, not the God 
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (449:690), known through the concrete facts of 
Christ’s life foreshadowed in the Old Testament and narrated in the New878.   
Thirdly, the proofs are unpersuasive.  They will not get agnostics et al. to take 
Christianity seriously:  they are excessively complex or abstract and will be 
unconvincing to agnostics and unmemorable (190:222).  That said, Pascal rejects 
the proofs only in the context of his project: as expressions or confirmations of 
belief they might have a role.   
 
                                                          
875 Recall Wittgenstein’s question concerning those who express presuppositions in probabilistic 
terms: ‘What difference does this make to their lives?’ and his answer: ‘Isn’t it just that they talk 
rather more about certain things than the rest of us?’ (Wittgenstein 1969, §338) 
876 Pensées 3:38, 427:681 & 781:644.   
877 The phrase used by Pascal’s sister commenting on versions of pensées 189:221 & 190:222 (OCG 
I 76).  I suspect this remark applies above all to the ontological argument, to the Cartesian version 
of which he seems to allude in pensée 449:690 at OCG II 698.  
878 Pensées 189:221 & 449:690. For a 20th Century account on these lines, see Clarke in Hick 1964, 
pp 145-7. 
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Phillips rejects all the traditional metaphysical proofs of God’s existence, 
on several grounds.  Like Pascal, he argues that it is unclear how the God of the 
proofs is to be identified with the God known through faith879.  The proofs, being 
purely theoretical, cannot lead to knowledge of God for ‘there is no theoretical 
understanding of the reality of God’880.  
  
Phillips sees no valid argument deducing God’s existence from empirical 
facts: empiricist arguments – especially Hume’s – against the cosmological or 
design arguments have won the day881.  The proofs rest, Phillips would say, on 
two types of confusion.  First, God’s reality lies in what believers say and do, not 
beyond the system of reference within which praxis takes place.  Secondly, God is 
not a Being separate from the world: there is no class containing all existing 
things, so there is no way the world can be individuated and thus differentiated 
from another Being; ‘when we speak of things being in the world, we do not mean 
to contrast them with other things which are outside the world’882.   There is thus 
no Being whose existence could be demonstrated as Creator of the world.  Pascal 
would be unable to accept this second argument against the cosmological proof: if 
a philosopher stipulates that this world is all there is, of course he cannot admit 
the existence of another Being who created it883.  Against that, it could be urged 
that we have no frame of reference in which to individuate the world and a 
transcendent Being respectively.  To which a supporter of Pascal would reply that 
this distinction between the world and God is part of the Christian tradition, a 
living mode of life which philosophers should investigate rather than label as 
nonsense.   Thus Swansea and Pascal disagree: Christian praxis does not, for 
Swansea, presuppose a God who exists in and alongside the world; but for Pascal 
it does. 
 
                                                          
879 He is, however, sympathetic to Malcolm’s interpretation of Anselm’s ontological argument as 
expressive, without any metaphysical implications, of the believer’s attitude that God’s existence is 
‘unshakeable’ (p 14 & Phillips 1967a, p 134).  It has recently been suggested, on similar lines, that 
Anselm’s ontological argument expresses a conception of God which flows from faith, and relies 
on premisses which only believers can assert (MacIntyre 2009, pp 38-41). 
880 Phillips 1970a, p 32. 
881 Phillips 1967a, pp 139-40. 
882 Phillips 1967a, pp 137-8. 
883 See Geach’s comment that ‘to say the world is all-inclusive would be to beg the question – God 
would not be included in the world’ (quoted in Phillips 1967a, p 141). 
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38. The proto-empiricist’s challenge: evidence 
 As I mentioned in the Introduction, forms of empiricism – closely linked to 
what I have called the ‘rationalist’ position – were emerging in Mersenne’s circle 
as Pascal’s scientific interests developed.  For example, Gassendi saw that the 
scholastic system of defining essences and entangling them in sterile syllogisms 
did not produce knowledge: ’Just what routes will logic produce to lead me to the 
complete knowledge of the flea?’ he asked884.  But Gassendi was never seen as an 
empiricist critic of faith. 
 
In contrast, the bluff, common-sense empiricist challenge to religion has 
been put in these terms: 
 
‘To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that 
the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are 
nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason 
otherwise [ ...] without plunging into the fathomless abyss of 
dreams and phantasms. I am satisfied, and sufficiently occupied 
with the things which are, without tormenting or troubling myself 
about those which may indeed be, but of which I have no 
evidence.’885  
 
   Some of Pascal’s acquaintances seem to have demanded empirical 
evidence for the existence of God: to which Pascal answers that Christianity does 
not claim that such evidence exists: God is hidden but He has laid down 
observable signs of His existence in the Church (427:681).   
   
  To explain the difference between empirical evidence for and signs of God, 
Pascal reverts to a distinction he originally formulated (following Huarte886) to 
keep the new science free of theological or scholastic interference:  he stipulates 
                                                          
884 Quoted in Woolhouse 1988, p 54.  A typically Gassendist approach to knowledge in the Fifth 
Objections is at AT VII 283-4.  See Ayers in Garber & Ayers 1998, pp 1019 ff.   
885 Thomas Jefferson, quoted in R Dawkins, The God Delusion (London, The Bantam Press: 2006), p 
42.  
886 See OCG I 1095-7 on the importance to Pascal of the Académie Le Pailleur in developing this 
line of thinking. 
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that the principes or starting-points of inquiry in natural science (and geometry) 
consist in experience, i.e. reports of past observations and experiments, and 
current observations and experiments devised to test the hypotheses formulated 
as part of the inquiry (OCG I 452-4).  Science cannot advance by relying on 
authority, scriptural or otherwise (OCG I 381 & 453)887.   There is no point in the 
theological condemnation of scientific hypotheses: Pascal argues in Provinciale 
XVIII that whatever statements are made by the Church about Galileo’s 
astronomical hypotheses, if the earth does go round the sun, no human action or 
declaration would stop it moving (OCG I 813). 
Hence our senses are the ‘legitimate judges’ of questions of fact, ‘as reason 
is of natural and intelligible things [science] and faith is of supernatural and 
revealed things’ (OCG I 810).  Whatever counts as a reason for believing a 
scientific proposition would have no place in theological thinking which has an 
utterly different basis: it draws only on Scripture and Church doctrine, on a series 
of statements and beliefs which are accepted by those who respect the traditions 
and authority of the institution to which they belong; there can be no new 
theories in theology: it does not progress as science progresses (OCG I 452-4)888.  
It is worth noting that this view presupposes the existence of a God who at one 
time (or more) intervened in the world to reveal the truths of the faith. 
 Pascal acknowledges that, awkwardly, the scientific and doctrinal domains 
may overlap: where Scripture makes a statement clearly at variance with what 
our senses or our reason know to be true, we cannot deny what they tell us; 
instead, we have to seek a different interpretation of Scripture (OCG I 811).  
Scientific advance shows how little we know (199:230) but also in some contexts 
entails challenging Scripture, e.g. on the number of observed stars889.  The 
awkwardness here is, of course, that empirical observations might contradict 
religiously more important matters than the number of stars, and this is indeed 
                                                          
887 Pascal’s early adoption of the criteria of ‘clarity and distinctness’ (OCG I 377-8) also excludes 
considerations of authority from empirical science (see Delbos 2010, pp 31-2 & 65).  Pascal would 
doubtless agree with Descartes that it is an abuse of Scripture to try to use it to solve abstract or 
empirical questions (Notæ in Programme quoddam, AT VIII-2 353).  
888 Rauh rather oddly calls this approach ‘le positivism chrétien de Pascal’ (Études, p 182). 
889 Pensée 782:645 (Pascal is commenting on the supersession of the Ptolemaic count).  On the 
Milky Way, see OCG I 457. 
219 
 
 
 
what has happened: modern scientific developments, for example the theory of 
evolution, have turned out to be more influential on most people’s lives than the 
traditional beliefs of Christianity.   
 
  The ‘Wittgensteinian’ approach evolved as an attempt to eliminate this 
problem by stipulating that religious belief does not rest on evidence or signs at 
all.  Wittgenstein was perhaps less certain about this in the Lectures and 
Conversations as recorded by his pupils: of the believer in the Last Judgment he 
says: ‘He will probably say he has a proof’ but these will not be ‘ordinary grounds 
for belief’890; this seems not to exclude the notion of proof from the religious 
sphere.  But his soi-disant disciples in Swansea evolved a position which gave to 
empiricism (or its sister positivism) a key role in their theory of the meaning of 
religious beliefs.  R B Braithwaite anticipated the Swansea approach to religious 
belief: he suggested that religious statements could be neither verified as can 
factual statements, nor refuted by experience as can scientific hypotheses, nor 
taken to be necessary truths891.   Turning to look the meaning of religious 
statements in terms of their use, Braithwaite argued that a religious assertion was 
only ‘the assertion of an intention to carry out a certain behavioural policy, 
subsumable under a sufficiently general principle to be a moral one, together with 
the implicit statement, but not necessarily the assertion, of certain stories’892; it 
was, he said, not dogma which caused religious commitment but the other way 
round893. 
 
  The Swansea School broadly accepts Braithwaite’s conclusion.  Phillips 
asserts that the concept of ‘the reality of God’ is such that the ‘depth grammar’ 
does not involve empirical evidence894.  As I indicated in Section 35.2, by 
stipulating that praxis, attitudes and values are constitutive of religious belief895, 
                                                          
890 Wittgenstein 1966, pp 53-4. 
891 Braithwaite 1955, pp 4-10. 
892 See Carnap’s influential view that metaphysical statements ‘serve for the expression of the 
general attitude of a person towards life’ (his italics) in ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics’ in Logical 
Positivism, ed. A J Ayer (Glencoe, The Free Press: 1959), p 78. 
893 Braithwaite 1955, pp 32 & 16.  (I take it that Braithwaite’s contrast between ‘statement’ and 
‘assertion’ implies that believers tell stories without invariably claiming they are true.)  
894 Phillips 1970a, pp 12-13. 
895 Phillips 1970b, p 55.  
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Phillips can lift from believers the obligation to offer evidence for their belief: 
Swansea philosophers hope to defeat or evade any empiricist attack which 
asserts that, if religious statements cannot be shown to be testable experientially, 
then Christian beliefs lack sufficient reason to be held.  Following Braithwaite, the 
Swansea view is that, although Christian discourse appears to include assertions 
about the way the world is or about what exists, it does not do so: statements 
about God can usually (if not always) be translated into statements about the 
believers’ attitudes, practices or values896.   They express what Hume calls 
‘sentiment’897 and thus avoid being committed to the flames.  
 
Phillips – in a discussion of poetic language –implies that religious 
language is not ‘referential or descriptive [...] It is an expression of value’ and 
religious pictures do not refer to anything in the way pictures of plants refer to 
their objects898.   His contrast between reference and description on one side and 
value on the other invites extended comment beyond the scope of the present 
study.  Let’s say merely that evaluation of particular actions and their 
consequences surely does involve referring to and describing them (this is not an 
activity from which poets are disbarred either).  But, for Phillips, such 
descriptions are non-religious statements, even though they may be made from 
the pulpit.  The common-sense answer for Phillips to make here, one not spelt out 
by him however, is that within a religion there may be no references to God or 
other aspects of divinity because God is not an object of reference, but there can 
be references to the ordinary occurrences and features of human life.    
 
In a sense, the Swansea School accepts that religion is concerned with our 
daily lives.  As Winch recognizes  
‘ways of speaking are not insulated from each other in mutually exclusive 
systems of rules.  What can be said in one context by the use of a certain 
expression depends for its sense on the uses of that expression in other 
contexts (different language games)’899.     
                                                          
896 Some Christian ‘pictures’ may not be translatable (Phillips 1970b, p 70). 
897 Hume 1902, p 165. 
898 See Phillips 1976, pp 147-9.  
899 See, on coherence and rationality, Winch 1967, pp 26-7 and 33-4 and on exclusivity, pp 40-1. 
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Phillips allows that (quoting Winch) modes of social life overlap and that we can’t 
always draw a clear demarcation line between them900.  Religion is not ‘cut off 
from the ordinary problems and perplexities, hopes and joys’; ‘religious beliefs 
cannot be understood at all unless their relation to other forms of life is taken into 
account’ (my emphasis);  ‘religious doctrines [...] would not have the importance 
they do were they not connected with practices other than those which are 
specifically religious’; ‘the meaning and force of religious beliefs depend in part 
on the relation of these beliefs to features of human existence other than religion’; 
but ‘despite the existence of connections between religious and non-religious 
discourse, the criteria of sense and nonsense in the former are to be found within 
religion’901.   
  
This is a puzzling series of statements: if ‘features of human existence’, i.e. 
facts about the way we live, are important to the ‘meaning and force’ of religious 
beliefs, how can ‘the criteria of sense and nonsense’ be found exclusively within 
religious discourse?  If a set of everyday propositions is important to religious 
belief, it must make the same sense both within and outside a religious form of 
life.  For example, an object of prayer (say, somebody’s suffering) must be the 
same suffering both within and outside the religious form of life.  As we’d expect 
then, there are expressions within a religious form of life which mean the same in 
another form of life.  There is therefore no sensible way to show that a religion 
never deals in facts while other language-games do.  But, if fact-stating goes on 
within a religion, then empiricist believers will apply the same standards of 
accuracy, truthfulness and so on to that fact-stating as they do to other cases of 
fact-stating.   
 
                                                          
900 Phillips 1970a, p 65.  So ‘these phenomena [language-games] have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same word for all,— but that they are related to one another in many 
different ways’ and ‘we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ 
(Wittgenstein 1967, I §§65 & 66; see also the remark that expressions used in more than one 
language game are ‘not just part of one particular routine’: Rhees 1970, p 79).  Note also that since 
‘patterns of life’ form the basis of language use yet are unpredictable and irregular, so there must 
be ‘a degree of play in our concepts’ (see McGinn in McManus, D (ed.) Wittgenstein and Scepticism 
[London, Routledge: 2004], pp 255-9). 
901 Phillips 1970a 20-1, 97 [my italics], 230, 100 & 231. 
222 
 
 
 
Braithwaite may after all be right in thinking that religious believers 
would, were they empiricists, apply similar criteria of truth, rationality and 
evidence to all their beliefs and put religious statements in a different non-truth-
stating category902.  But Phillips refuses to accept Braithwaite’s conclusion that 
believers may regard religious stories as possibly false: he says that the use of the 
term ‘story’ is to indicate that for believers the question never arises whether 
scripture or other religious texts could be true – or turn out to be false.    Phillips 
thus retreats from a rigorous form of empiricism: he uses the phrase ‘religious 
beliefs are truths for the believer’ to indicate that the believer is not interested in 
whether there is or is not evidence for them and ‘in morality and religion truth is 
a personal matter’903.    
 
  This discussion shows, I suggest, that in their different ways both Pascal 
and the Swansea School are each stuck on the horns of a dilemma. Pascal asserts 
that all religious statements are based on authority, but also is obliged to delete or 
amend those that are contradicted by empirical evidence, thus undermining the 
authority of the doctrine as a whole and exposing it to continual attrition.   
Doctrine is not wholly immune to our continual practice of comparing beliefs and, 
as new ones come along, reviewing and if necessary revising or eliminating the 
old ones904. 
 
  The Swansea School are forced to accept that there are logical 
relationships between religious beliefs and ordinary factual beliefs but also to 
insist that the criteria governing our acceptance of the latter have no relevance to 
our acceptance of the former.   In his efforts to keep facts and religious practice 
separate, Phillips ignores manifest features of religious discourse, namely 
references to what has happened or is happening in the world.  As MacIntyre 
came to see (after a brief flirtation avant la lettre with the Swansea approach), 
‘part of the core belief of Christianity’ is factual, namely the existence of evil in the 
                                                          
902 Braithwaite’s believers leave open the truth or falsity of some of the Christian stories 
(Braithwaite 1955, pp 23-32).  
903 Phillips 1970b, p 72 & Phillips 1965, p 150. 
904 See the contributions of Rey and Adler in Antony 2007.  
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form of suffering905.   Without any factual elements, Christian belief would have 
no importance for us: it would provide no motive for persisting in or adopting the 
attitudes which the Swansea philosophers describe.  
 
39. The proto-empiricist’s challenge: metaphysics 
  As we saw in Chapter II, Pascal is aware of a kind of empiricist challenge to 
the notion of the afterlife, a challenge in the Epicurean tradition: we have no 
evidence of any afterlife, or indeed of the existence of any beings like immaterial 
souls or deities.  For Pascal salvation is a future state to be enjoyed by the elect as 
communion with God who is the Sovereign Good with which the elect will be 
united after bodily death (148-9:181-2).  It is a key assumption of Pascal’s 
therapeutic project that we are right to worry about what may happen to us after 
bodily death: it is this worry which motivates divertissement (134:166) which in 
turn leaves us dissatisfied and troubled.  Pascal is therefore very far from 
discounting talk of the afterlife as misconceived.  His view survives among some 
recent philosophers: Hick presents an account of personal survival which does 
not eschew metaphysical assumptions: he asserts that Christian belief in the 
reality of God is inseparable from the belief ‘that God holds men and women in 
being, or reconstitutes them, beyond bodily death, so that they shall participate in 
the final fulfilment of his purpose’906.   
 
  Phillips tends to sweep aside assertions like Hick’s as ‘superstition’907 or 
‘confusion’: there can be no metaphysical content in Christianity: to believe there 
is muddles up different forms of life908.  He has a strong case:  the use of religious 
language reflects the (as it seems today) strange place religion occupies in human 
life: a sort of limbo between the human world of desires, projects and problems 
and the vague prospect of an afterlife909 which seems, as I mentioned in Sections 
                                                          
905 MacIntyre 1970, p x.  On the reality of suffering and its religious significance, see Pascal’s Prière 
pour demander à Dieu le bon usage des maladies (OCG II 183-193). 
906 Hick 1964, p 249. 
907 Phillips 1970a, p 128 & 1976, p 110. 
908 Metaphysics is based on ‘confusion about the grammar of our language’ (Phillips 1976, p 111). 
909 See Talbott 2014. 
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11 and 15, to be close to unintelligibility – not least as to its content and its place.  
These difficulties add to the attractions of robust ‘common-sense’910 positivism.  
 
  Phillips says that talk of an event like the Last Judgment or our surviving 
bodily death (‘eternity’ or ‘immortality’) is not talk about the future. He argues 
that, as Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, death is not an event in life and this 
implies that death is not experienced and is the end of all experience911.  He adds 
in an apparent non sequitur that ‘one is at a loss to know what it means to talk of 
surviving death’.  He says it is ‘nonsensical’ to speak of bodies rising from the 
dead, which implies – although he does not say so – that the story of Lazarus in 
the New Testament is ‘nonsensical’, as are the Resurrection and the doctrine of 
the resurrection of the body912.  
  
  This argument seems to confuse the fact that there is no evidence of life 
after death with whether or not it is logically possible.  Phillips wants to say, I 
believe, that the phrase ‘surviving death’ is self-contradictory913.  But it is not a 
necessary truth that bodily death is the end of life for a person: it is the end of a 
life but there is nothing conceptually odd in the notion of the same person having 
two lives.  The posthumous appearance of Hamlet’s father on the battlements at 
Elsinore could lead those who saw him to carry out various tests to establish his 
identity (e.g. is the coffin empty?).  Assuming it is not just a hallucination, the 
appearance is certainly a very odd event, but it is not nonsense or inconceivable.   
The bizarre practice of cryonics may be based on some fishy scientific 
assumptions, but it is not based on a conceptual error.   
   
  For Phillips ‘eternal’ has no connotation of duration but only of 
immutability.  Further, ‘eternal life for the believer is participation in the life of 
                                                          
910 See e.g. Phillips 1976, p 122: ‘common sense demands the reiteration of the […] truth: the dead 
are dead and that is all there is to say about it’.  Regarding death as a long sleep is the sort of 
religious response which ignores or distorts ‘what we already know’ (Phillips 1986, p 14). 
911 There are, of course, echoes here of Epicurus’ argument that death is nothing to us. 
912 Phillips 1970b, pp 13 & 15.   I Corinthians XV: 16-19 sets out the doctrine.  Phillips does not 
explain how he can disregard this explicit text (see Helm, P: Varieties of Belief [London: Allen & 
Unwin: 1973], pp 49-50). 
913 See Poteat 1967, where a linguistic argument by Flew, that ‘I will survive my death’ is self-
contradictory, is endorsed (p 208). 
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God’, which is – as we have seen – achieving understanding through a set of 
practices, including prayer.  Thus immortality or eternal life consists in 
understanding various religious practices engaged in now; they are modes of 
judging how we live914.  At the end of his book, Phillips admits that probably only 
a small number of people share his views on immortality and eternity.   Yet if this 
is so Phillips is not, in this case, wholeheartedly sticking to his original project to 
pay attention to what believers do and say.  His position fails to illuminate 
contrasting Christian Weltbilder between which he is not, on his own terms, in a 
position to adjudicate. 
   
  As for the respective positions of Pascal and Hick, the empiricist challenge 
remains unanswered: dogmatism is no answer to the empiricist.  The lack of 
explanation of life after death in both its aspects – the survival of a person after 
bodily death, the content of the afterlife and its location – is a major gap in 
Pascal’s project.  His account is so flimsy, as I argued in Chapter II, that it would be 
unlikely to persuade the agnostic to study Christianity and thereby to give up 
other activities. 
 
40. The revisionist historian’s challenge 
  Pascal recognizes that revisionist historians pose a threat to Augustinian 
Christianity for which the history contained in the Bible is of fundamental 
importance (see Section 5 above).  He singles out the hypotheses of La Peyrère 
who drew on observations by writers (including Montaigne) of the peoples of the 
New World, and on classical chronologies, to promote the pre-Adamite 
hypothesis that Genesis described only the creation of the Jewish race; the rest of 
humanity had been created earlier915.  This would imply that only the Jews had 
inherited Original Sin.  Pascal condemns the theory of the pre-Adamites as 
‘extravagant’, grouping it with other unconventional interpretations of history 
                                                          
914 Phillips 1970b, pp 54-5 & 49. 
915 See Wetsel 1994, pp 147-8. On La Peyrère’s influence, see Popkin 2003, pp 221-9 and Wetsel 
1994, pp 133-4.   
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(575:478).  He insists that Moses wrote the whole of the Pentateuch (811:658), 
another notion challenged by La Peyrère916.    
 
  Pascal summed up his approach to the study of history in an early 
discussion of scientific method: it consists only in consulting written sources and 
is to be distinguished from empirical science (OCG I 452-5).  He implicitly 
excludes empirical evidence (e.g. archaeology) from historical discovery, refuses 
to countenance chronological evidence from outside the Christian world and 
effectively turns history into a branch of theology917.  This is not surprising 
because, as we have seen in the preceding Chapter, his ‘proofs’ are in large part 
historical and as ‘proofs’ they presuppose and are inextricably entangled with 
doctrine: God is the mover of Pascal’s version of history; it is, in his phrase ‘la 
conduite du monde’ which disposes us to take Christianity seriously918.  Even if 
individual persons seem to act according to their own devices and desires, it is 
God who writes the script919.  Thus we should always look for God’s intentions in 
history: the Old Testament is a cipher (276:307): all its events have two 
meanings, a literal meaning and a figurative one which points to some future (i.e., 
New Testament) event (267:298), thus showing that God has a plan for the 
history of the world, namely that the Messiah would come to offer (a select group 
of) humanity the chance of salvation (281-2:313-4).  Thus he rejects non-
Christian theories – like La Peyrère’s – for doctrinal not historical reasons.  Pascal 
offers the seeker after truth not objective historical facts but an enclosed system 
of doctrine and narrative which – he expects – will seem convincing ‘from the 
inside’.  Like Hooker in England920 he believes that a narrative will be convincing 
if its sources are credible (hence his concern about the apostles’ reliability) and 
the story likely921 or at least that the evidence for it should outweigh that 
against922. 
                                                          
916 And tentatively by Hobbes: Ch 33 of Leviathan.  
917 See Gouhier 2005, pp 220 ff..  
918 Pensées 482:717 & 449:690 (at OCG II 696-7).  See Kołakowski 1982, pp 154-7. 
919 Ferreyrolles 1984, pp 261 ff. 
920 See Franklin 2001, p 243. 
921 On the apostles, see pensée 310:341 and, on the reasonableness of Christianity, 12:46 & 
173:204.  Grotius’ influence here is evident (see Franklin 2001, p 245). 
922 Pensée 835:423.  So he has a grasp of logical as well as numerical probability (see Franklin 
2001, p x). 
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  Pascal’s position on the historicity of Scripture is complex.  He wishes to 
establish two things: first, that the Old Testament is both a historical narrative 
and metaphorical: he attempts various feeble arguments to show that the 
testimony of eye-witnesses  is a vital oral tradition which ‘reasonable people’ can 
accept as evidence of the Creation [of Eve, which Adam witnessed] and of the 
Flood923.  He is perhaps on safer ground when he implies that the figure of Christ 
cannot be wholly fictional or unhistorical924: as we have seen, the personal 
qualities of Christ, his life and his precepts are central to Pascal’s account of the 
faith (417:36).   
 
  The second point he wishes to make is that much of the ‘history’ recounted 
by Scripture cannot provide an absolutely sufficient basis for faith; and that the 
historical tapestry he weaves in the Pensées is not wholly convincing to the 
uncommitted (835:423).   He is in the position of certain modern theologians who 
do not base faith on historical evidence but ‘still want to make some residual 
historical claims’925.  For example, he appeals to the historical facts about the 
establishment of Christianity as a major religion to suggest the Church has been 
divinely inspired (482:717 & 301:332).    (An alternative strategy for believers is 
to retain references to Jesus as a historical figure without referring to particular 
historical facts (subject as always to criticism), and to focus on His ‘work’ or 
teaching926.)   
 
  The Pascalian strategy may be aimed at defeating deists who were keen to 
jettison the Old Testament in particular, but he can also point to the fact that the 
tradition of the Church’s use of the narrative of Scripture, within and outside 
ritual, is an integral part of Christian belief and praxis.   The narrative includes 
events which appear in non-Christian historians’ pictures of the past (for 
example, that a group of the people of Israel were exiled to Babylon in the 7th and 
                                                          
923  Pensée II:741, also 290:322, 292:324 and 296:327.  The belief in Moses’ authorship of the 
Pentateuch, which La Peyrère had demolished, was essential to Pascal’s conception of the 
authority of the Pentateuch as a historical document (see Popkin 2003, pp 222-4). 
924 On the difficulty of pinning this historical figure down, see Freeman 2009, Ch 3. 
925 Trigg 1998, p 105.  See also Ward 1992 and Oakeshott 2014, p 159.  
926 See Sutherland 1984, pp 178 ff. 
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6th centuries BC, and that Pontius Pilate was  prefect of Judaea, AD 26–36); these 
are therefore not the objects of religious beliefs.  The story also refers to acts of 
God: manifestations, miraculous events, including the prophecies927, which are 
straightforwardly the objects of religious beliefs.  There is a third category: beliefs 
which under one description are historical but under another are religious: for 
example, ‘Jesus was a charismatic figure’ is a historical claim928  but ‘The Son of 
God was a charismatic figure’ is a religious statement.  
 
  Pascal adopts an approach which, by interweaving plain historical fact and 
religious narrative elements, carries risks for the certainty of belief.  For him, 
history (as he sees it) forms part of the hinterland of Christian commitment: a 
religious person who, for example, adopts a policy of selfless service to others 
does it with the example of Christ, as a historical figure, in mind.  History is not 
just loosely connected with Christianity but is essential inspiration to many 
practising Christians929.   
 
  Whatever the strategy, believers have to accept that Christian faith cannot 
be based on the historical facts associated with it and that key events like the 
virgin birth and the Resurrection are not historically attested events.  We should 
not, however leap to conclude, as MacIntyre once did, that ‘everything of 
importance to religious faith is outside the reach of historical investigation’ and: 
‘Religious beliefs can in no sense be translated into and cannot be derived from 
non-religious beliefs’930.   There may be plausible historical material in the Bible 
and yet much else that can be neither verified nor falsified.  After all, the dubiety 
of parts of the New Testament is little different from that of other contemporary 
records; and some historians find that much of it rings true931 despite the fact that 
the writers of the Gospels neither were nor aspired to be historians.  There is no 
prima facie reason to reject all the history recounted by New Testament writings 
                                                          
927 ‘God […] is alive and active in history’ – Hans Küng: Does God exist? (New York, Crossroad: 
1980), p 188. 
928 Freeman 2009, p 25. 
929 Although some may prefer to avoid the ‘historical’ Jesus: Oakeshott 2014, p 546.  
930 MacIntyre 1970, p 198.  This echoes the Barthian approach as described in Trigg 1998, pp 93-5.  
MacIntyre retracted these views in his Preface to the 1970 edition. 
931 See Trigg 1998, pp 110-111.  
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as a whole: the evangelists were not impartial but they had a motive to include as 
much factual material as they could in order to convince uncommitted readers of 
the truth of their narrative.  Some of the New Testament history may stand up to 
scrutiny.   
 
  Pascal says in any case that there is nothing peculiar about commitment to 
a system of thought on the basis of inadequate or hypothetical information (577: 
480); this important pensée implicitly distinguishes between the less than certain 
aspects of religion and the certainty of faith: some doctrines may not be 
indubitable but the person who has faith will be absolutely certain of at least a 
minimum of doctrine, without necessarily having reasoned to her conclusion 
(380:412) or even looked at any ‘proofs’ (382:414).   
 
  In sum, Pascal neither makes historical material the justification of faith 
nor excludes history altogether from Christianity.  Christian commitment is to 
Jesus as a historical figure but the firmness of that commitment does not depend 
on the historical accuracy of all the statements about Him.  Christian belief is thus 
in a complicated position: it is impregnated with historical assumptions, can 
survive the falsification of some of those assumptions, but presumably not all, and 
lives on in a historical setting of which some elements are not doubted, e.g. that a 
teacher, Yeshua or Joshua (Ἰησοῦς in the New Testament), lived in Judaea roughly 
between 1 BC and 30 AD, while other elements seem improbable but have not 
been falsified (e.g. the Resurrection).  This is ultimately not a satisfying position 
for any clear-thinking believer who, as a follower of Jesus, would like to have 
certain knowledge about the character and actions of the man.   
 
  History is today a critical discipline which coheres awkwardly – if at all – 
with religious faith: insisting on Christ’s historicity puts faith at risk932.  Pascal’s 
abrupt dismissal of La Peyrère’s hypotheses for doctrinal reasons does not solve 
the problem they represent: they themselves may be false, but raising them opens 
the possibility that some historical propositions to which believers attach great 
                                                          
932 See Sutherland 1984, pp 132-4. 
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importance may turn out to be false933.  A believer taking those results seriously 
could justifiably complain that they threatened his commitment to Christ.  
 
  Wittgenstein seems to take two distinct views about the relation of history 
to religious belief.  The first view is that historical facts can neither be the basis of 
faith (‘historical proof [...] is irrelevant to belief’ because faith is a matter of 
‘passionate commitment’ and even if the historical facts were indubitable, that 
‘wouldn’t be enough to make me change my whole life’934 nor, if the Gospels 
turned out to be false, would that destroy faith because ‘belief would lose 
nothing’.  Against the last point, it seems that ‘passionate commitment’ actually 
involves an asymmetry: it can only very rarely be based wholly on an assessment 
of the relevant facts, as Wittgenstein rightly claims: most of our commitments are 
made on the basis of incomplete information; but he is surely wrong to deny that 
it can be undermined by one’s coming to know certain new facts: betrayal and 
disillusion can destroy trust.   For example, he did not think ‘that any competent 
authority doubts that there really was such a person [as Jesus]’935.  Yet if a group 
of competent historians denied that Jesus existed on the basis of high quality 
evidence, would Christians not have doubts themselves?  
 
   The second Wittgensteinian view is that believers may well assign some 
importance to the history revealed by Scripture.  He says about the Gospels that 
they are not mutually consistent but may be ‘quite averagely historically 
plausible’ so that ‘the letter should not be believed more strongly than is proper 
and the spirit may receive its due’936.  Here Wittgenstein seems closer to Pascal 
than, as I show below, to Phillips.  Their respective approaches are also in line 
with Frye’s judgment that ‘if anything historically true is in the Bible, it is there 
not because it is historically true but for different reasons [which] have 
presumably something to do with spiritual profundity or significance’937.  The 
                                                          
933  The Jesus Seminar estimated that only 18 per cent of Jesus’ reported sayings and 16 per cent of 
his recorded actions seemed authentic or possibly so (see Freeman 2009, p 24). 
934 See Wittgenstein 1980, pp 32 & 64, Rhees 1984, p 101 and Wittgenstein 1966, p 57.  The view 
is an echo of Kierkegaard’s (see Sutherland 1984, p 133). 
935 Rhees 1984, p 101. 
936 Wittgenstein 1980, p 31, his emphasis. 
937 See Frye 1982, p 40. 
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problem with this view is that, despite all assurances to the contrary, it can give 
rise to epistemological dithering for those believers who deliberate about 
doctrine and scriptural interpretation.  
 
Is it then preferable to adopt the Swansea position, that Christianity 
includes no historical claims?  Phillips denies that the Creation story or the 
doctrine of the Last Judgment have any empirical content: they are ‘the absolutes 
of faith’938.   The dogmas make sense within the religious mode of life, existing in a 
sort of fenced-off limbo.   He is surely right to insist that biblical events are not 
taken by believers to be mere fictions: a work written either as fiction or with no 
regard to whether it is true or false cannot be the object of specifically religious 
respect, for – if it deserves respect as ‘illuminating’ or even ‘true’ – it does so as 
the creation of a writer: literary critics need no religious frame of mind to 
appreciate fiction in this way.  The Christian tradition venerates Scripture just 
because it is not fictional or, at least, not fictional in certain key respects (of 
course, its literary qualities can be evaluated by literary critics with their critics’ 
hats on).  
  
Yet Phillips’ position is not ultimately plausible: he denies the historical 
perspective of Christian faith, which gives Scripture its special place: many 
believers wish to say that, even if much of Scripture is of doubtful veracity, some 
of it is historically true939.  In any case, it was written at a certain time and sits in a 
historical framework which is important to understanding how and why the 
praxis of Christianity has arisen (and evolved).   Phillips himself is conscious of 
this, for example when he talks of Abraham’s and Paul’s worship of God as being 
in the same tradition940; are historical statements of this sort outside the Christian 
form of life?   If at any one time, a consensus among historians accepts certain 
stories about Christ or other figures as probably true, it would be very odd for a 
                                                          
938 Phillips 1976, pp 142-4.  
939 Braithwaite concedes that a Christian ‘will naturally believe some or all’ of the 
‘straightforwardly historical statements about the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth’ (Braithwaite 
1955, p 26. 
940  Phillips 1970a, p 4.  
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believer to say that for him the question whether the stories are true or not does 
not arise. 
 
The believer’s caring about the truth and falsity of certain claims is 
important in another way: I am not sure that Phillips’ approach allows him to 
distinguish between Scripture and literary works which have a spiritual ‘message’ 
(the Swansea School follow Wittgenstein’s well-known penchant for 19th Century 
Russian novels941).   Yet he needs to be able to explain why Christians are 
followers of Christ but not followers of Father Zossima or Father Sergius.  What, 
in other words, is the motivation behind Christian commitment?  This is a 
different question from asking what the importance of Christian belief is.  Phillips 
says the latter question is unintelligible942 because for the believer faith is an 
absolute.  There are of course believers, like Pascal, who believe Christianity’s 
importance can be shown.  But for Phillips, they are either ‘superstitious’ or just 
mistaken about what they believe.   
  Pascal might say that, in the case of ‘simple’ believers, their motivation is 
wholly internal to their faith: they love God and hate themselves, have feelings of 
being corrupt and dependent – all this compels them to believe (380-1:412-3).  
But the ‘deliberative’ believer comes to faith (if she does) only after investigating 
the religion, being impressed by Christianity’s history and the historical figure of 
Christ.  This personal history must enter into any account of her motivation. 
This is the measure of the importance of history to Christianity: it is not the basis 
of faith, but it provides a kind of content which many believers find indispensable 
to their motivation to follow the Christian way of life.  It is one thing to say, as 
Wittgenstein does, that ‘Christianity is not based on historical truth’943 but quite 
another – as Phillips implies – to exclude all historical statements from religious 
thought.  The advantage for the believer who accepts Phillips’ view is that she can 
ignore revisionist historians’ claims that, for example, the Gospels are almost 
entirely false.  Whereas Pascal’s ‘deliberative’ believer cannot ignore the risk that 
she will find her faith undermined by successive historical findings. 
                                                          
941 See Rhees 1984, pp 44-5, 72, 85-7 & 102. 
942 Phillips 1970a, p 79.   
943 Wittgenstein 1980, p 32.    
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  Pascal’s God is a historical or rather theologico-historical figure.  He is not 
just a way of talking about attitudes and values but is an active being944.  He is the 
Creator who reveals doctrine through revelation and the Law-giver.  To these 
aspects of Christian life we now turn. 
 
41. The challenge of humanist ethics 
  In Chapter IV, I described Pascal’s contentions that secular moralities are 
neither purely altruistic (which for him as for many others they must be, to 
qualify as moralities) nor objective: only the Christian life of self-forgetting and 
obedience to divine law can satisfy his requirements for morality.  So, when he 
devises his own ‘proofs’ they deal, inter alia, with the absolute value and 
rewarding nature of the Christian life945.   His answer to the humanists is that the 
principles of true morality are unworldly, immune to changes in Nature or in 
human civilisation, absolute (he says ‘sovereign’) and unchanging (148:181).  The 
divine law is absolute law: Christian ethics is a fixed point from which we can 
make judgments, instead of being all at sea as the humanists are (697:576).     
Some of this is, we shall see, echoed by Wittgensteinian accounts of religious 
morality.  But there are, in my view, two distinct ‘Wittgensteinian’ approaches to 
this topic. 
 
  The first approach is that of the middle-period Wittgenstein in his Lecture 
on Ethics:  morality is wholly separate from the world of facts.  Values are, in neo-
Kantian terms946, absolute:  ‘What is good is also divine.  Queer as it sounds, that 
sums up my ethics’; ‘The good is outside the space of facts’; ‘Ethics, if it is 
anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts’947.  The 
                                                          
944 A god is necessarily aware of the believer, has agency and is transcendent (Hudson 2003, pp 9-
10). 
945 Pensées 482:717, 418:680, 357:389. 
946  Compare ‘no state of affairs has [...] the coercive power of an absolute judge’ (Wittgenstein 
1965, p 7 and ‘the proper and estimable worth of an absolutely good will consists precisely in the 
freedom of the principle of action from all influences from contingent grounds which only 
experience can furnish’ (Kant 1959, p 44). 
947 Wittgenstein 1980, p 3 and Wittgenstein 1965, p 7.  Phillips talks of the absolute value of 
religion (Phillips 1970a, pp 80-1). 
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Wittgenstein of the Tractatus948 and the Lecture views the ethical absolutes as 
inexpressible: they can be shown but not verbalised.  Metaphorical language in 
the ethical domain cannot be translated into ordinary descriptive language: 
religious pictures are similar: ‘It says what it says.  Why should you be able to 
substitute anything else?’949  Thus, we must suppose, we can understand through 
their behaviour what ethical views people have, yet never hear them spoken (but 
presumably approximations of them – popular morality – are heard).   This puts 
the believer’s commitment to the Christian way of life – e.g. for Wittgenstein, 
‘foregoing pleasures’ and a certain way of viewing life950  – in a new light: the 
function of ‘pictures’ like the Last Judgment, or the idea that sickness is a form of 
punishment, is to guide behaviour without explicit expression of the ethical 
principles involved because that would be impossible.  Doctrine concerning the 
supernatural must, in this context, also be inexpressible.   The general implication 
is that it is only by leading the religious way of life that one comes to see the 
deepest values intrinsic to that life951. 
 
 This approach would accord with elements of Pascal’s moral absolutism 
(and his rejection of ethical naturalism): God’s justice is inexpressible for us, His 
wisdom unfathomable952.  That said, Pascal cannot leave matters there: his 
project is to undertake the process of criticising humanist egoism and naturalism 
and replacing them with a form of absolute morality.  Christian morality is not 
ineffable: it is a body of principles which, when worked out in human life, forms 
one of the ‘proofs’ of the religion addressed to the seeker after truth (482:717). 
 
  Phillips similarly takes an intermediate position in his account of ethics – 
the second Wittgensteinian position – neither excluding nor cleaving exclusively 
                                                          
948  See Wiggins, D: ‘Wittgenstein on Ethics and the Riddle of Life’, Philosophy 2004 No. 3, pp 363-
391.  Wiggins sees what I call the middle-Wittgenstein view of ethics extant still in the ‘late’ 
period. 
949 Wittgenstein 1966, p 71. 
950 See Wittgenstein 1966, pp 57 ff. 
951 Pensée 418:680 at OCG II 676 (footnote) & 680-1; Wittgenstein 1980, pp 64 & 86: ‘the pupil 
himself, of his own accord, [is] passionately taking hold of the system of reference’ & ‘Life can 
educate one to a belief in God’; ibid. p 81 : ‘an incomprehensible mystery’. 
952 Even a secular moralist may admit that the deepest layer of the ethical life, consisting in shared 
human reactions to similarities, may not be capable of expression in language. See Williams 2010, 
pp 108-9. 
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to the divine.  In his conception of religious belief as of absolute value, he follows 
Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics.   ‘Doing God’s will’ is, for Phillips, integral to 
belief in God: ‘for believers, ‘good’ means ‘whatever God wills’’; God must be 
obeyed953.   This position has two implications: first, that religious duties are 
absolute in a way which marks them off from moral duties: the former involve 
submission to authority whereas the latter are carried out because, from the 
agent’s point of view, they meet a need954.  Secondly, that the believer must 
ensure that her religious and moral beliefs form a coherent and consistent set of 
principles, because otherwise they could not function as guides to life.  Taken as a 
whole, religious beliefs constitute a way of understanding human life: ‘religious 
belief is itself the expression of a moral vision’: for example, one’s belief in the 
Last Judgment is the belief that ‘one is known for what one is all the time’ in the 
sense that one is scrutinised infallibly by ‘love and goodness’955 .  Or:  Christian 
love consists in loving everyone and in unconditional self-renunciation.  These 
can be interpreted as moral concerns: Phillips’ religion is bound up with everyday 
life: ‘religion is not some kind of technical discourse [...] cut off from the ordinary 
problems and perplexities, hopes and joys’956.   
 
  In practice, Phillips assigns full autonomy to moral duties, as distinct from 
religious duties957, in a manner alien to Pascal.  For example, Phillips believes that 
a believer can feel that a religious obligation – e.g. the vocation to the ministry – 
clashes with his moral obligations – e.g. to provide adequately for one’s family.  In 
a more complicated example, Phillips claims that a believer today would not see 
any meaning in the idea that it is his God-given duty to sacrifice his son, as 
Abraham did, because the respective social circumstances of the contemporary 
believer and Abraham are different958.  Morality then appears as an autonomous 
sphere of thought involving non-religious considerations and for some believers 
                                                          
953 Phillips 1970a, pp 223 & 228. 
954 Phillips 1967b, pp 191-7. 
955 Phillips 1976, pp 143-4.  See also the discussion of ‘God knows what you do’ in Sutherland 
1984, Ch 5.  Such sayings have to be translated into expressions of the believer’s attitude on the 
grounds that there is no being who or which knows what I am doing.   
956 Phillips 1970a, pp 21 & 230. 
957 See ‘Moral and religious conceptions of duty’ in Phillips 1967b, pp 191-7. 
958 Phillips 1965, pp 152-3 & Phillips 1970a, p 211-2. 
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seems prior to religious values959.  If this is so, humanist ethics has no less 
authority than the ethics of a religious believer and can have the same content 
since it too deals with our hopes and joys.  If moral practices are to be understood 
only within a form of life, as Swansea philosophers have argued, then again there 
are no criteria for choosing one morality over another.  It is not even clear that we 
can understand values ‘belonging’ to a different form of life or adopt new moral 
values.  The risk is that we shall cultivate ‘an inarticulate conservatism of the folk-
ways’960. 
 
  But in that case can the Swansea School show why anyone needs a 
religious ‘picture’ or a doctrine to follow a certain life policy?  What does religion 
add to the moral life?  Religions may usefully reinforce altruistic and other moral 
sentiments961 but, the humanist can reasonably argue, they are not the only 
source of moral sentiment: the honnête homme would insist that he upholds a 
morality which conduces to social harmony and order without needing religious 
grounds.  Swansea would concede that religion cannot be justified at all962, let 
alone in terms of need963.   
  
   So it may be asked: where, for Phillips, does religion make a difference for 
us?  His answer seems to be an attempt to encapsulate the form of life concerned 
in aphoristic pronouncements,  to point to such sayings as ‘God cares for someone 
in all things’ means that that person ‘meets and makes sense of the contingencies 
of life’ in a certain way964.   In realising our dependence on God, we see the ‘limits 
of moral endeavour’ – limits of situation, ability, determination and character965.  
There can come a time, he claims, when one’s resolve to become a better person 
fails: one cannot, he claims, resolve to be the kind of person one would like to be.  
                                                          
959 Compare Kant’s argument – wholly inimical to Pascal – that we cannot see that Jesus is good 
without an ‘ideal of moral perfection [...] which reason formulates a priori [...] examples serve only 
for encouragement’ (Kant 1959, p 25). 
960 Williams 2014, pp 314-5. 
961 See Hume 1993, pp 122 & 210 (editor’s note) and Mill 1961, p 494. 
962 Phillips 1965, p 10; 1970a 7, 13 & 101; & 1976, p 164. 
963 Phillips 1967b, p 193. 
964 Phillips 1976, pp 114. 
965 See Phillips 1982. 
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What belief in God does is to turn this despair into hope966 though, oddly, without 
any expectation of change for the better.  In some ways Phillips’ suggestion 
appears to be a rather feeble answer to Hume’s observation: 
 
‘Hear the verbal protestations of all men: Nothing so certain as their 
religious tenets.  Examine their lives: You will scarcely think they 
repose the smallest confidence in them’967.   
 
Here, religious belief seems to have an amoral function, an acceptance of one’s 
own weakness: it wipes out the notion that through self-training we can do better 
and that we should keep on trying968.  It accepts that we don’t know all the 
answers to moral questions969  and seems to give up seeking them.   Phillips uses 
the word ‘grace’ in this context; it may indeed seem that Pascal’s doctrine of grace 
puts him in an analogous position: if I depend wholly on grace to be virtuous, I too 
am helpless; but Pascal would counter this by claiming that Christianity provides 
the answers and that it is a Christian duty to act as if one is saved (OCG II 262), to 
strive to be virtuous because virtue itself is a sign of grace.  In contrast, Phillips’ 
resignation is not very different from the ‘despair’ Pascal sees in Montaigne’s 
ultimate moral position (OCG II 94).   
  
   I conclude that neither of the two ‘Wittgensteinian’ approaches promise 
greater success in countering humanism than does Pascal’s dogmatic belief that 
the doctrines of man’s nature and of the Good, virtue and the true religion are 
inseparable (393:12); morality is part of theology: it can be summed up in the 
doctrines of concupiscence and grace (226:258).   All these approaches do not 
effectively rule out the possibility, whatever principles Christian morality has, 
they are available to be followed for their own sake without reference to Christian 
                                                          
966 See Phillips 1965, Ch 1. 
967 Hume 1993, pp 184.  Montaigne expresses a similar view (Montaigne 2002 II, p 175). There 
are, says Pascal, very few true Christians (179:210). 
968 And doesn’t it go against Christ’s injunction: ‘Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which 
is in Heaven is perfect’ (Matthew V.48)?  
969 Phillips 1967b, p 196. 
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doctrine.   The humanist would add that, in any case, we are naturally motivated 
to be moral and need no religious inspiration to be so970. 
 
   Phillips’ approach has the additional disadvantage of suggesting that, for 
some religious people, moral helplessness is a desirable option.  (To be fair to the 
Swansea School, I should mention that, of course, unlike Pascal they have no 
interest in encouraging people to become Christian.)   
 
  At the level of explaining one’s way of life and its possible rewards, the 
humanist (who may by the way claim to be a devout Christian) has the advantage 
over both Pascal and the Wittgensteinians of offering a practical way ahead:  he or 
she promotes the idea of following an ethical stance or way of life which suits 
one’s character and situation – and brings a certain wholeness or integrity to 
one’s life.  This can be undertaken without complacency.  We can’t all be monks or 
Solitaires or saints, but we can choose to develop at least some positive aspects of 
our way of life, to try to understand what that implies for the long term, to 
criticise ourselves day to day and continually to seek betterment971.   
 
42. Conclusion 
  In this Chapter I have returned, in the context of a comparison with 
Wittgensteinian conceptions of religious belief, to consider Pascal’s response to 
the main intellectual challenges he identifies either directly or by implication in 
the Pensées. 
 I have argued that neither Pascal’s traditional Christianity nor the 
Wittgensteinians’ neo-positivist version meet the challenges effectively.  Pascal’s 
historical and moral proofs, and his rich account of faith, expose his version of 
Christianity to a continual whittling away of its tenets, a process which has been 
going on intermittently for centuries as various disciplines offer explanatory 
                                                          
970 See Hume 1993, p 181 and Wiggins 2006, Ch 2.  
971 See Catherine Wilson, ‘On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor’, Journal of Philosophy, 
1993, Vol 90, No 6, pp 275-289. 
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hypotheses in new domains972.  And some – for him – key doctrinal points – 
including God’s existence and nature, and the afterlife – may remain unintelligible 
to believers and aspirant believers alike.   The Wittgensteinians’ stripped-down 
version of Christianity evades rationalist and empiricist attacks but exposes itself 
to the charge of vacuity, namely that there is no intentional object of its prayers, 
thanks etc., and that it offers no principle of action which cannot be part of secular 
moral practice. 
 
 The challenges all test the believer’s commitment to her faith.  The 
Wittgensteinian notion of religious commitment is such that it requires neither 
secular justification nor explanation: it is just a brute fact that there are people 
brought up in a religious tradition who remain believers while others do not. It is 
also a mystery that the individual believer commits herself personally to a way of 
life without our being able, as Phillips admits, to see the connection between the 
praxis which constitutes that way of life and her faith973.   Pascal recognizes that 
one’s personal circumstances play a large part in the formation of one’s religious 
beliefs (193:226).  But true faith is God’s gift, arbitrarily bestowed, so religious 
commitment is ultimately unintelligible both to the believer and to others.   
 
  For both Pascal and the Wittgensteinians there is, in Garber’s useful 
phrase974, a non-cognitive background to belief.   There is a cognitively 
unbridgeable gap between a more or less insecure understanding and the bright 
light of certainty: 
‘Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow’. 
                                                          
972 Pascal has an account of scientific progress (OCG I 456-8) which leads in this direction: ‘there 
are certain arguments for religion, depending essentially on an appeal to the inexplicable, which 
do collapse under the advance of scientific explanation’ (Williams 2014, p 23).  See also 
Kołakowski 1982, p 60. 
973 Phillips 1970a, pp 9-10. 
974 See Garber 2009. 
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This centrally important mystery about faith exposes Christianity to the charge 
that it survives in our culture only as a series of arbitrary personal attitudes 
adopted by members of various social groups, attitudes which have no essentially 
beneficial function in our society.  It would not help the defence of Christianity to 
argue that Christians inspire moral action and carry out benevolent work, for 
those we can have ‘without fancy dress’975.   
  The Swansea School may argue that since various versions of Christianity 
each play a distinctive part in our culture, in our form of life, they cannot be 
‘sophistry and illusion’, because ‘it makes no sense to speak of a confused 
language-game’976.  But language-games (and, presumably, forms of life) come 
and go977 and we may say of some that have disappeared – like the belief in 
witchcraft and the social practices surrounding it978 – that they were a mixture of 
illusion and delusion.  Phillips concedes that ‘having seen what religious beliefs 
and rituals come to, someone may still want to make moral criticisms of them’979.  
But his implication here is not that the beliefs involved are mistaken in relation 
to, for example, everyday beliefs or scientific theories, but only that someone may 
‘want’ to criticise them, for personal reasons.  The beliefs and rituals still make 
sense to the believers and as such invite others to try to grasp their meaning.  Yet 
the fact that the Christian language and liturgy are still in use does not itself 
guarantee that they make sense, for it is possible (as Anscombe famously argued 
concerning deontological moral language) for certain key expressions in use to 
‘lose their root’ and to retain ‘mere mesmeric force’980.  Christianity may linger on 
because its adherents have not caught up with movements of thought that regard 
religion as a purely human construct.     
 
                                                          
975 Williams 2014, p 19. 
976 Phillips 1986, p 19. 
977 As Wittgenstein recognizes: Wittgenstein 1967, I.23. 
978 See Franklin 2001, pp 47-58.  Pascal mentions witches’ spells in his discussion of ‘false 
miracles’ (734-5:615-6), a weak discussion vulnerable to his own pensée 44:78.  
979 Phillips 1986, p 40. 
980 Anscombe E: ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 33 (1958), 124, pp 5-8.  Kenneth Clark 
once said that myths ‘do not die suddenly.  They pass through a long period of respectable 
retirement, decorating the background of the imagination’ (quoted in New York Review of Books, 
14 August 2014, LXI, 13, p 16). 
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  If, as a result of this Chapter’s discussions, Christianity as a system of belief 
appears paradoxical, philosophically unprovable, lacking proper evidence, 
clinging to belief in the invisible and unknowable, vulnerable to refutation by 
historians,  and ethically mysterious (or, on the other hand, offering nothing 
distinctively complementary to secular moral life), yet millions believe.  This 
miracle – as unbelievers sarcastically call it981 – is one more improbability which 
the believer accepts in submission when she declares that human beings 
manifestly need a belief beyond the limits of Reason and that she has found it. 
Sit finis libri, non finis quaerendi. 
 
 
 
                                                          
981 Hume 1902, p 131 and Mackie 1982, pp 11-12. 
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APPENDIX I: INTERPRETING THE PENSÉES 
 
  In what follows I allude briefly to various considerations on which I have 
based my treatment of Pascal’s last project. 
 
(a) Finding Pascal’s voice in the Pensées 982 
  Pascal’s use of the first person pronoun raises special difficulties: it rarely 
indicates that Pascal himself is speaking983: he regards first-person avowals as 
expressions of pride984: he criticises Montaigne for talking about himself985 and is, 
as a person, almost invisible in the Pensées.  The therapist who speaks in the 
Pensées is not necessarily Pascal himself.  Two avowals of his refusal of 
‘attachment’ and his virtue (396:15 & 931:759) would very probably not have 
appeared in his projected text.   
 
  Many uses of the first person pronoun are the result of his adopting the 
dialogue form (2:38) which he has already used in the Provinciales – and before 
that in the piece known as the ‘Wager fragment’ (418:680) – where there are two 
speakers: the persuader-therapist and the interlocutor-subject; both speak in the 
first person.  Several pensées illustrate the difficulty of working out who is 
speaking: the famous  
‘Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie’ (201:233)  
and its longer analogue (68:102) are interpreted by Brunschvicg986 as 
expressions of Pascal’s personal dread but by others as coming from the 
agnostic’s mouth987.  Carraud suggests that 
‘Le cœur a ses raisons que la Raison ne connaît point’ (423:680) 
 is also spoken by an interlocutor988.  They can be both: no one doubts that Pascal 
is himself speaking about the infinity of the Universe – and our smallness in it – in 
                                                          
982 There is an excellent discussion of the difficulties in this context in Russier 1949, pp 1-12. 
983 See Enthoven 2009, pp 37-40. 
984 He tried to avoid using the first person pronoun in speech (Miel 1969, p 175). 
985 Pensée 780:644.  See also  Logique  III.20.vi.  
986 PB, p 428, n 2.   
987 The agnostic says much the same in 428:681 (OCG II 684). See PF, p 172, n1 and Russier 1949, 
p 8.  
988 See Enthoven 2009, pp 127-8. 
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the pensée entitled Disproportion de l’Homme (199:230) or that he gives the cœur 
an epistemological role (110:142).  As for knowledge of God, the Port-Royal 
editors assigned to the sceptical interlocutor the thought that Reason cannot 
determine whether God exists whereas nowadays that is seen as Pascal’s 
remark989. 
 
  Other ‘difficult’ pensées are 194:227, 198:229 (which contrasts with 
429:682) and 135:167990.  Where a pensée is couched in dialogue form – as are 
the main pensées discussed in Chapter II – it can be difficult to decide where to 
insert the quotes; modern editors disagree on this too. 
 
 Pascal’s well-attested attempts to understand the agnostics he knew (OCG I 
78) – and to use scepticism to purge them of their hubristic rationalism – may 
have generated the pensées which express an existential disquiet which can be felt 
at times both by the agnostic who has in her the beginnings of religious awe, and 
by the believer.  Pascal’s balancing act between understanding the agnostic and 
yet pushing her forward towards faith thus raises ambiguities which he very 
probably could not wholly eliminate.   
 
 Many of the Pensées were not written for Pascal’s final project (e.g. the  
notes for the Provinciales and other polemical texts991) or are brief reminders or 
reading notes992 or jottings from conversations993 which are either too brief to be 
understood on their own or were never intended as an expression of Pascal’s own 
views; these can mostly be identified and set aside.  
 
  Some general precautions are therefore necessary: first, to be wary of the 
first-person pronoun; second, not without good reason to assume that texts 
                                                          
989 See PH I, p 158. 
990 See also Wetsel 1994, pp 208-11 on pensée 454:694.  Brunschvicg (PB, p 433 n2) and 
Ferreyrolles (PF, pp 478-9) regard 429:682 as spoken by an interlocutor, a suggestion missed by 
Franklin 2001, pp 253-4. 
991 These are usefully grouped together in PM, pp 167ff.  It was of course open to Pascal to use 
some polemical insights in his final project.  
992 It is plainly absurd even to hint at Pascal’s plagiarism (see Bloom1989, p 2) because his notes 
copy others’ words.  
993 See, e.g., the probing discussion of pensée 786:645 §7 in Laporte 1923, pp 164-7. 
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written for other works would be used in the project; third, to give greater weight 
to the longer texts but not to ignore relevant aphoristic or unfinished fragments.   
 
(b) Order 
  Did Pascal have in mind a single itinerary towards Christian belief?  The 
Port-Royal editors concluded that Pascal’s Nachlass, a sequence of groups of texts 
known as ‘liasses’ (bundles), did not suggest a workable intellectual structure for 
the project: they pointed to a lack of coherent order994 and the inclusion of 
pensées which are ‘imperfect, obscure, half-digested and some almost 
unintelligible’ such as to risk misrepresentation of Pascal’s thought (OCG II 908).   
They adopted their own order, using (and often amending995) Pascal’s longer 
fragments, incorporating shorter texts in them, and produced a continuous text 
which became known as Pascal’s ‘Apology’.  Various editors have since followed 
this example, attempting to put all Pascal’s fragments in a convincing order, 
taking more or less seriously Pascal’s own procedural remarks996.  That these 
attempts result in very different arrangements suggests that the task is 
insuperably difficult: in any case it means treating an unfinished work as a 
finished one997.    
 
   Many experts today believe that it is a mistake to ignore the order in each 
of the two Copies of the Nachlass which the Port-Royal editors commissioned.  
Both Copies include a ‘table of contents’998 which, at some time between 1658 and 
1660999, Pascal or someone close to him drew up.  The experts claim this 
                                                          
994 Most of  Liasse I, Ordre, seems – as noted above – to be  a series of Pascal’s  reminders to 
himself; the bundle Beginning is at No. 13; bundles on the figurative interpretation of Scripture 
(Nos.19, 24 & 25) are not in sequence; nor are the various bundles dealing with the human 
condition (No. 8 Divertissement should probably be next to No. 4 Ennui).  See Bremondy, F: ‘Le 
plan retrouvé.  Les Pensées de Pascal’, Concepts, I (2000).   
995 See Vamos 1972. 
996 The most recent of these arrangements are by Martineau (PM) and Kaplan (PK).  Another order 
is suggested in Ernst 1970, pp 521 ff.  Like Ernst, Pugh proposes an arrangement which sticks as 
far as possible to the order of the ‘table of contents’ which, he says, is the keystone of the work 
(Pugh 1984 & 1988, p 26).   The celebrated arrangements from the 19th century, by Havet (to 
which I refer as PH) and by Brunschvicg, were intended not to reconstruct Pascal’s order but just 
to group the fragments thematically (PB 268-9).   
997 Mesnard quoted in Gouhier 1986, p 27. 
998 Not in OCL but is in the Sellier edition as nº 1 (PF p 39). 
999 1660 looks more likely than 1658, given the presence in the liasses of notes dictated to Pascal’s 
sister Gilberte (see Genet 2010, p 391). 
246 
 
 
 
determines the sequence of ‘liasses’ and constitutes the order in which Pascal 
wanted to write his ‘Apology’:  it guided the assembly of the ‘liasses’ and led to the 
grouping of about 50% of the pensées into the 27 titled ‘liasses’1000.  Of the 
remaining 400 or so pensées1001, some apparently belong to the same phase of 
composition as those in the liasses, others are said to have been drafted or 
dictated after the liasses were made and others are simply irrelevant to the 
project1002.  There is a substantial group of pensées on Miracles, which is not 
among the 27 liasses: it seems that Pascal first thought that miracles encouraged 
or supported Christian belief but later changed his mind1003, perhaps because he 
realised that the human tendency to say and believe what one wants to say and 
believe (44:789) made the problem of testimony (raised by Montaigne in a 
passage which foreshadows Hume’s argument1004) more acute. 
 
  But there is no conclusive evidence that the liasses are Pascal’s attempt to 
give a definitive order to his project as a whole1005 and several reasons to doubt 
that the arrangement would have satisfied him as a plan of work: first, the liasse 
entitled ‘Ordre’ contains a series of reminders as to sequence and method, which 
would not themselves have appeared in the finished work, and anyway contradict 
each other1006 and other reminders; together they suggest no overall plan, as the 
Table at the end of this Appendix shows; secondly, some fragments in the liasses 
clearly do not belong where they are but should be in another liasse or outside 
them altogether1007; thirdly, the order of the liasses is odd: for example, 
                                                          
1000 ‘Liasses’:  see Lafuma 1956, p 83; OCL 493-4; PF 12-13; OCG II 1304-6.   Sellier’s edition of the 
Second Copy inserts a sequence of ‘fragments’ in front of the 27 (PF 41-52).  This appears to be a 
random set of ‘fragments’ awaiting inclusion in an appropriate bundle (OCG I 1308). 
1001 The exact number of ‘fragments’ depends on which edition one consults: Lafuma’s 
arrangement yielded 993 but Sellier’s only 813.  
1002 It seems that some 80% of the roughly 800 ‘fragments’ relate to Pascal’s project ‘for an 
Apology’: Wetsel 2003, p 162. 
1003 OCG II 1301; see also Lafuma 1956, pp 85-86 & 89, Pugh 1984, pp 319-328, Mesnard 1965a, 
pp 60-61 and Ernst 1996, p 245.  Pascal’s sister does not make this change of mind clear in her 
biography (OCG I 75-6). 
1004 Montaigne 2002 III 398.  See Curley 2005, pp 6-10. 
1005 See Gouhier 2005, pp 181 n17 & 304. 
1006 See Mesnard 2013, p 583. 
1007 See PM pp 18-20, Gouhier 2005, pp 181-2, Pugh 1984, pp 9 ff. & PK 41 ff. Kaplan identifies 
some 20 ‘fragments’ which seem out of place. Other ‘fragments’ are mere reminders: e.g. ‘Misère.  
Job et Salomon’ (69:103) which refers to another more explicit ‘fragment’ in another bundle 
(403:22); or ‘Il a quatre laquais’ (19:53) which is related to – and only comprehensible when read 
with – 89:123 in another bundle. On the other hand, Ernst insists that ‘entre tous les fragments 
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Commencement is in the middle not at the beginning1008;  fourthly, Pascal 
sometimes refers to a ‘First Part’ and a ‘Second Part’ (6:40; 780 & 781:644) but 
the disposition of the liasses does not clearly show where the ‘Second Part’ begins.   
  
  The liasses in the Copies are thus neither in an order which the final work 
would have followed1009 nor are they internally ordered.  It would thus seem 
sensible to regard the exercise of bundling the fragments only as a stock-taking 
exercise (by Pascal himself or an assistant) which was abandoned1010.  There is 
insufficient evidence to justify the titles which Sellier has provided in his 
edition1011.    
 
 Ernst’s study of Pascal’s MS identifies four major ‘strata’ which correspond 
to four separate phases of composition and suggests that Pascal adhered to the 
same binary structure (anthropology/exposition of Scripture and doctrine) in 
each phase1012.  But this may reflect Pascal’s method of composition rather than a 
definite order.  Pascal himself says that a disorderly exposition may suit his 
objective (532:457) and that he will not keep to a specific order: ‘no humane 
study can keep to it’ (694:573). 
 
 (c) A procedure for the philosophical study of the Pensées 
  This study of Pascal’s philosophical assumptions and assertions will rely 
generally on the more finished pensées of some length.  Many of the chosen 
fragments will come from the bundles but other fragments seem independently 
important to Pascal’s thought, e.g. the sequences which constitute Pascal’s key 
                                                                                                                                                                        
d’une même liasse existent en effet des rapports logiques si étroits et si solides que chaque liasse 
constitue un ensemble organisé, un tout cohérent’ (Ernst 1970, p 521).  This would imply that 
Pascal would have referred more than once to some key observations. 
1008 See Gouhier 2005, p 304. 
1009 Sellier’s remark in 2007 that ’40 or so clear textual indications tell us how to order nearly all 
the dossiers’ such that a Pascalian order can be discovered (Magazine Littéraire, Nº 469, 
novembre 2007, p 49) seems extraordinarily optimistic. 
1010 That said, the liasses often show us where to situate individual assertions: for example, 
submission appears as a key concept, although once it was regarded by Havet as applying only to 
the controversy over the formulaire (see PH I, pp xiv-xv).  
1011 For example: ‘Le projet de juin 1658’ or ‘Les développements  de juillet 1658 à juillet 1662’ (PF, 
pp 37 & 455).  Sellier’s edition is far from being the ‘standard edition’ of the Pensées as some have 
claimed; Le Guern’s more cautious approach is preferable.   
1012 Ernst 1996, pp 244-5. 
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texts purporting respectively to establish the importance of investigating religion 
(L427-429:S681-682) and to deny the need for metaphysical proofs (438-
449:690). 
 
 I will only rarely refer to non-philosophical pensées, e.g. accounts of 
Christian doctrine, Scripture etc.1013; but I will focus on texts intended to 
persuade readers to adopt a favourable attitude to Christian belief and second-
order remarks about the nature of religious belief, of knowledge and of 
philosophical argument.   
 
 But this operation would not be enough to generate an interpretation of 
Pascal’s project as a whole.  We would not know the order of Pascal’s arguments.  
For – as even their supporters admit – the ‘liasses’ do not form a sequence 
representing stages in Pascal’s overall argument1014 nor do we know where to 
place all the major fragments from outside the liasses.  There is no scholarly 
consensus where, for example, the important fragments L427-431:S681-683 
(discussed in Chapter II) would have appeared in the finished Apology: Gouhier 
believes these fragments would have formed an introduction to the Apology1015 
but others believe they would have come somewhere in the middle of the text1016.     
 
  My study sidesteps the question of the overall order of Pascal’s Apology 
and to present ‘phases’ of argument and assertion in four chapters (II-V) which 
could easily be re-ordered to reflect a different emphasis.  It would not be odd, for 
example, to put Chapter II between Chapters IV and V.  A better approach is to see 
them as parallel attempts to persuade the agnostic to aspire to faith. 
  
 
                                                          
1013 See Wetsel 2003, p 162.  Wetsel believes that this group numbers some 200 fragments, i.e. 
nearly a third of the material for the ‘Apology’.  
1014 See PK 29-30 & e.g. Pugh 1984, p 455. 
1015 Gouhier 1986, p 103.  See OCG II 1458 and PK 15-16.  The Port-Royal Edition of the Pensées 
placed this material at the beginning of the work, as a section entitled ‘Contre l’indifférence des 
athées’ (OCG II, 915-920).  Martineau 1992 regards it as a ‘Préface’ to the Apology, with other 
fragments merged within it.  Brunet 1956 says that 427:681 would have been the Preface of 
Pascal’s planned work and that its final paragraph expounds ‘the plan of his Apology’ (pp 42 & 39). 
1016 See e.g. Pugh 1984, p 149. 
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APPENDIX I: TABLE 
POSSIBLE SEQUENCES AND INTRODUCTIONS SKETCHED BY PASCAL  
FOR HIS PROJECT 
 
Pensée Ordering of themes     Sketches  
       of  themes 
 
2-4:38  (a) to show the impossibility of proving God  
  from  Nature        (see 
[see s2 below]     27:681) 
(b1) ‘letter’ to persuade agnostics to seek God   (see 427- 
  [see b2, b3 and u2 below]    9: 681-2) 
(c) investigate secular philosophers’ claims 
 [see q2 below]     (see inter  
            alia  
 208:240) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5:39                   (b2) ‘letter’ to persuade agnostics to seek God   (see 427-9:  
         821:661, 
         681-2) 
 (d1) ‘the Machine’ to remove obstacles to belief   (see  
         418:680,  
         last 
         part) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
6:40 (e) First Part: wretchedness of man without God   (liasses III-  
 = [human] nature is corrupted as is evident XI, XIV 
       Sellier  
 Numbers) 
 (f) Second Part: felicity of man with God   (liasses 
  = there is a Redeemer as Scripture reveals  XVII 
         ff.) 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7:41 (g) Letter on the [relative] utility of Pascal’s ‘proofs’ (110:142,  
        274:305,  
        335:368, 
        821:661) 
 (h) contrast between ‘proofs’ and ‘the Machine’ as 
 routes to belief                 (821:661)
  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8:42 (i) describe the state of the Jews    (liasses 
        XLVIII  
        ff.)  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9:43 (j) letter on ‘injustice’ [of human society]   (28:62, 
[see p2 below]     60:94,  
        66:100, 
        81-2:116
       86:120) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
11:45 (b3) ‘letter’ to persuade agnostics to seek God  (as above) 
 (d2) ‘the Machine’ to remove obstacles to belief 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
12:46 (k) to show religion is not contrary to reason    (110:142) 
 (l) to show religion is worthy of respect because 
   it explains human nature    (149:182) 
 (m) to show religion is attractive so that the  
  good wish it were true    (liasse  
        XVIII) 
(n) to show that religion is true    (liasses XV,
       XXIII &  
       XXIV) 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
694:573 (o) to show the futility of all sorts of social position (liasse III) 
 (p1) to show the futility of all types of communal  
 life       (liasse IV) 
             (q1) to show the futility of philosophical,  
    Pyrrhonian and Stoic lives    (208:240) 
             (q2) investigate secular philosophers’ doctrines  (“)  
9:42 (p2) letter on ‘injustice’ [of human society]  (28:62,
        60:94, 
        66:100, 
        81-2:116
       86:120) 
  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
780:644 [Preface to the first Part] 
  (r) to show that previous attempts to describe  
  self-knowledge [i.e. understanding of human  
nature] have lacked the right method 
781:644 [Preface to the Second Part] 
  (s1) to show the weakness of cosmological  
arguments for the existence of God 
(s2) to show the impossibility of proving God  
from Nature 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
190:222 [Preface] 
(t) to show that the metaphysical proofs of God are recondite, 
lacking in impact and unmemorable  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
428:682 (u1) to show agnostics that they are wrong to be 
  indifferent to religion 
 (u2) ‘letter’ to persuade agnostics to seek God        
 (v) presentation of the ‘proofs’ of religion 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
162:194 &  (w) begin by sympathising with the unbelievers (427:681) 
156:188 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
408:27 & 10:44 (x) Insert a ‘letter’ on the silliness of moral                                                                                
 science (science humaine) and philosophy  
 (metaphysics and physics)    (199:230) 
 before [the section on] divertissement (liasse IX) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
45:78  (y) Start the chapter on deceptive powers  (44:78) 
 by talking about human error 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
223:256  (z) Include in the chapter on ‘Foundations  (liasse XIX)  
 [of Religion]’ material on the ‘figures’  (liasses XX 
       & LXI) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX II: THE IRONY OF PASCAL’S WAGER 
 
  The aim of this Appendix is not to add yet another chapter to the 
discussion of the Wager itself1017, but to indicate briefly why this study has not 
included the so-called ‘Wager Fragment’ (418:680) in the discussion of the major 
phases of Pascal’s therapeutic project although I have referred to it in many 
contexts.  This omission may seem surprising: as many have seen, the Wager is an 
argument about the benefits of the Christian way of life, and the key feature of 
Pascal’s project is to provide prudential arguments for seeking to understand and 
for following the Christian way of life, buttressed by theologico-historical proofs.  
Pascal does not seek to show the absolute certainty of Christianity but its 
desirability and plausibility.  These two qualities are mutually supportive: if we 
admire a way of life and see that it brings benefits, that must in part be because it 
rests on a doctrine which is not obviously unbelievable (12:46).  The South Sea 
Islanders who worship Prince Philip as a god may be happy but we would not 
seek to join their religion. 
 
 The pensée within which the Wager appears does not attempt to show the 
plausibility of Christianity.  But it fits into the overall scheme of Pascal’s project in 
several respects: above all, as I said above, it is a prudential argument, as the title 
given it by the Port-Royal editors indicates: ‘Qu’il est plus avantageux de croire1018 
que de ne pas croire...’ (OCG II 935).  Secondly, the discussion starts with the 
assertion that God’s existence can’t be proved rationally (i.e. metaphysically), 
which fits in with – but is not identical to – Pascal’s other doubts about the value 
of the traditional proofs (see Chapter V and the Epilogue).  Thirdly, its treatment 
of habituation is consistent with that given in other pensées.  Fourthly, it develops 
– with other jottings on the same sheets of paper – the doctrine of the cœur.  
                                                          
1017 Among the horde of commentaries available, I have found Brunet 1956, Elster 2003 (marred 
by printer’s errors), and Devlin 2008 most helpful. 
1018 The use of ‘croire’ here is odd: Pascal proposes that the interlocutor only act as though 
Christianity is true.  Arnauld himself tacitly adopts this version in his brief evocation of the 
argument at the end of the Logique (p 275).  Similarly Locke’s version of the Wager sees it as 
proposing a choice between the Christian and the non-Christian way of life (Essay, II.xxi.70: 
’Preference of Vice to Vertue a manifest wrong Judgment’). 
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Fifthly, it could be used to push the Pyrrhonian towards commitment instead of 
suspension of judgment1019, an aim also to be seen in pensée 131:1641020.  
 
 Nonetheless, there are reasons of varying strength for believing Pascal 
would not have included the actual Wager argument – as opposed to the 
assertions which precede and follow it – in his final project.   
 
  First, he appears to have written the text as we have it – with many 
insertions and amendments apparently applied at different times – before he 
began his project: its date of composition is now put at 1655 or 1656 on the basis 
of watermarks and other physical and textual evidence1021 .  This dating would 
imply that the Wager pre-dates the planning of the project, such as we know of it 
from the liasse ORDRE.  If Pascal had intended to use it more or less as it stood, he 
would have mentioned it but it is not explicitly mentioned there or in other 
programmatic notes (see the table to Appendix I above) or indeed anywhere else 
in the Pensées1022.  Sellier, and following him, Ferreyrolles1023, argue that the 
references in pensées 5:39, 7:41 and 11:45 to the Machine are references to 
418:680, even though those texts do not use the word ‘pari’ and 418:680 does not 
use the words ‘machine’ or ‘automate’.  In the senses connected to Pascal’s theory 
of habituation, ‘machine’ appears in pensée 25:59 and ‘automate’ in pensée 
821:661.  It seems rash to conclude from this uncertain picture that pensée 
418:680 is the ‘discours de la machine’ mentioned in the planning reminders cited. 
  
  Secondly, for Pascal it may – some time after he wrote it down –  have 
counted against further use of the Wager itself that it took much of its inspiration 
from a Jesuit source, Antoine Sirmond1024, whom he criticises in Provinciale X 
(OCG I 694).  The Wager offers a sort of insurance policy against damnation, 
                                                          
1019 See McKenna 1979. 
1020 Interestingly, the Wager would be attractive to a Stoic in that it devalues external goods (see 
below).  But the Stoic would refuse the Wager on the grounds that the ascetic way of life is good in 
itself (and anyway there is no personal survival after death). 
1021 See Brunet 1956, pp 48-51 and OCG II 1449-50.  
1022 Genet 2010, p 292. 
1023 See PF, p 56, n 3 and the title Sellier gives to pensée 680.  See also Thirouin’s remarks in 
Enthoven 2009, p 102. 
1024  See Blanchet 1919 and Brunet 1956, p 63.  
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inculcating a calculating approach, an attitude which is the opposite of the 
submissive and loving attitude integral to conversion1025.   It also appeals to 
amour propre which for Pascal is, as we saw in Chapter IV, incapable of providing 
a basis for moral conduct1026.  We may doubt that habituation will obliterate this 
attitude and instil the right one.  Against that, however, it could be urged that 
taking the Wager means being religiously prudent, i.e. observant of the rites and 
the rules of the faith1027. 
 
  Thirdly, the core of the argument indeed sounds Jesuitical: ‘do this and you 
will receive eternal life’1028.  This difficulty has to be surmounted if the core 
argument is to find its place in the project: if true faith is necessarily and 
exclusively God’s gift (7:41) then nothing one does can lead infallibly to faith and 
thus salvation1029.  The Wager makes no distinction between ‘human faith’1030 and 
salvific faith, a distinction of great importance to Pascal’s project (as I argued in 
Chapter V).  For Pascal, the essence of superstition is performing rites or other 
actions to persuade God to save the supplicant1031.  For grace is not awarded on 
merit1032: God is just as likely to give faith to the resolutely wicked (the ‘good 
thief’ at the Crucifixion, Saul on the road to Damascus) as to the devout.   Even if 
you bet on heads and the coin comes down heads, God may still name the person 
who bet on tails as the winner1033.  And the number of the elect is very small1034. 
 
                                                          
1025 See Mesnard 1965a, p 43 and Guitton 1951, pp 66-7. 
1026 In this context we miss ‘the disinterestedness of morality’ (Webb 1929, p 56).  See also: ‘The 
steady attention alone to [...] eternal salvation is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and 
beget a narrow contracted selfishness’ (Hume 1993, pp 124-5). 
1027 An analogy here would be Mackie’s suggestion that moral prudence is not the same as 
prudence without moral feelings (Mackie 1977, p 192). 
1028 Or at least give you the hope of eternal life (Gouhier 2005, pp 283 etc.). 
1029 Leibniz saw that the Wager argued for adopting a pattern of behaviour, but did not instil faith 
(Guitton 1951, p 67). 
1030 Habituation can produce only ‘human’ faith: see McKenna 1979, p 504. 
1031 Pensées 181:212, 364:396 & 944:767. 
1032 Bénichou, p 104.  The assumption that God does respond to those who seek Him (see Franklin 
2001, p 256) is thus to be handled carefully: God responds only to those to whom He has already 
given grace, for only they genuinely seek Him; one is saved if and only if God wills it (OCG II 257). 
1033 If Mackie is right that the Wager assumes that ‘there is a god who will reward with everlasting 
happiness all those who believe in him’ (Mackie 1982, p 203), then it is an anti-Augustinian 
argument: God’s grace cannot be a reward for faith because it itself causes the faith in the believer.  
Natoli makes a similar assumption (Natoli 1985, p 51). 
1034 See Voltaire 1964, p 164. 
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  Fourthly, the Wager is conducted from an initial position of almost total 
ignorance: all the interlocutor fears is that some god has so arranged things that 
only He decides who will go to Heaven and who to Hell and that beginning to 
follow Him now may help to avoid Hell.  Yet Pascal’s project as a whole is to 
demonstrate at least the plausibility of the Christian story, and the importance of 
Jesus Christ to the believer now.  The interlocutor never asks if Christianity is 
true, though this looks to be one of Pascal’s key concerns at the planning stage 
(12:46).  Again, a lack of ‘fit’ with the way his project developed. 
 
 Fifthly, the argument is also non-specific in just the way which Pascal 
criticises in metaphysical proofs (449:690): as many have asked from the 18th 
Century onwards under the ‘Other Gods’ rubric, how can we be sure that we are 
betting on the right deity?  The interlocutor asks to see le dessous du jeu and is 
told to look at Scripture ‘and the rest’ (OCG II 679).  This suggests that the answer 
to the ‘Other Gods’ criticism is that the Wager assumes that ‘Christianity is 
supported by evidence other religions lack’1035.   If so, the interlocutor already 
assumes that Christianity is the only religion which can be true.  Yet the prior 
condition of the Wager is that it is conducted according to les lumières naturelles, 
i.e. putting all matters of faith to one side (OCG II 677).  What is more, 
immediately after hearing about the dessous du jeu, the interlocutor says that he is 
so made as to be incapable of belief, suggesting that he holds no belief about 
Christianity and has no reason to study it in particular (OCG II 679).  I conclude 
that the lack of specificity of 418:680 would have prevented its inclusion in 
Pascal’s final text. 
 
 Sixthly, the Wager equivocates about the value of a worldly life, i.e. life 
without the constraints imposed by Christian rules.  Having stressed the 
potentially infinite value of eternal bliss, Pascal seems to repeat his earlier 
rhetorical trick of saying that, because adding 1 to infinity does not change its 
‘nature’ from odd to even or vice versa, therefore relative to infinity 1 equates to 0 
(OCG II 676).  So giving up worldly life to win an infinitely happy life amounts to 
giving up un néant (OCG II 678).  But a true wager presupposes that the stake has 
                                                          
1035 Hunter 2013, p 128. 
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value.  If there is nothing to give up, then there is no risk1036.  In fact, of course, 
there may be a great deal to give up: someone born to a life of privilege and 
power – for example, the heir to a throne – may well feel that to give it all up 
would be not only to forego certain pleasures but also to betray her family or her 
duty as a monarch.  Even a lesser mortal can see that, in crude monetary terms, 
betting 100€ (which many can spare) to win 1 million € is not the same option as 
betting 100,000€ (which many cannot) to win 1 billion €.  The contrast between a 
finite stake and a possible infinite reward is not the only criterion by which to 
judge whether to take the bet: one’s own desires and circumstances have to be 
considered1037.   
 
  Pascal might invoke his doctrine of the three ‘orders’ (discussed in Chapter 
IV): from the true Christian’s point of view, both the worldly and intellectual lives 
look worthless.  He can therefore say to the interlocutor: ‘don’t worry; your stake 
will look worthless in retrospect’.  But that is to presuppose the truth of 
Christianity, the very presupposition which the Wager cannot make. 
 
  After the interlocutor has said he cannot believe, Pascal says that the 
Christian life will be happy in its own way and the worldly life involves only 
plaisirs empestés, [ephemeral] fame and luxuries (OCG II 680); in short, taking the 
bet means giving up a life which makes you ill and consists in the pursuit of 
nugatory benefits!  He is less ambiguous in pensée 427:681:  ‘there is no true or 
solid satisfaction [in this world], our pleasures are just vanity, our ills are infinite’ 
(OCG II 683)1038.  If this is so, the Wager is unnecessary: if we can be brought to 
see that we are profoundly unhappy (as I outlined in Chapter III) and that the true 
Christian is happy (see my Chapter IV), then we do not need to bet on anything: 
we submit to the therapy.  The Wager thus seems out of kilter with Pascal’s 
therapeutic project as it subsequently developed. 
 
                                                          
1036 Pascal almost admits this: ‘Cela ôte tout parti’ (OCG II 676).  Locke says the wicked are 
unhappy and risk eternal misery so they may as well turn to God (Essay, II.xxi.70). 
1037 For further discussion, see PH I, p 162 and Harrington 1982, p 146. 
1038 Note the use of ‘infinite’ here: classic Pascalian hyperbole : a finite life can’t have infinite ills. 
See also : ‘il n’y a point de bien sans la connaissance de Dieu, qu’à mesure qu’on en approche on est 
heureux […] qu’à mesure qu’on s’en éloigne on est malheureux’ (432:662).   
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 Seventhly, as has been only rarely noted1039 the Wager Argument fails to 
convince the interlocutor.  This is not only because he, like anyone else, cannot 
choose to believe: he is not constituted in such a way as to believe1040: as the Art 
de Persuader suggests, in order to persuade someone of something, one must 
understand both their ‘intellect and heart’, people vary widely and what pleases 
one person does not necessarily please another (OCG II 173-4).  Whatever Pascal’s 
initial hopes of leading his gambling friends towards taking religion seriously, 
ultimately he concedes that someone who is emotionally resistant to Christianity 
will not be swayed by the argument.  Practical reasoning is in this case ineffective 
as a tool: it is, as in its classical conception, a way of working out how to satisfy a 
want but not a way of creating a want.  On the other hand, doesn’t the Wager 
convince the interlocutor who ‘can’t believe’ at least to start following the 
Christian way of life?  It is not necessary for that purpose for, as Pascal stresses, 
the way of life is its own reward. 
 
 The irony of the Wager – which so many commentators have not seen – is 
that its main point, in the form in which Pascal left it, is to tell us that only 
habituation will remove emotional resistance to Christianity.  It might also tell us 
that someone who is not emotionally resistant to Christianity will see that it is 
reasonable to bet on the Christian God, but in that case is the Wager really 
necessary?  Why not introduce the willing aspirant – or indeed the sceptic – 
directly to the Christian picture of our unhappiness in the world, to the Scripture, 
to Church doctrine and to the Christian way of life, without beating about the 
probabilistic bush? 
 
 In short, I believe we can see why Pascal, instead of re-writing pensée 
418:680 for the purposes of the project, left his original manuscript untouched: it 
was not, as a whole, needed for his project’s purposes1041.  The first phase of the 
                                                          
1039 See e.g. Thirouin 2004. 
1040 ‘Je suis fait d’une telle sorte que je ne puis croire’ (OCG II 679). 
1041 Thirouin, for example, would disagree (see Enthoven 2009, pp 101-2).  But his claim that the 
Wager, as the ‘discours de la machine’ mentioned in Pascal’s planning notes (5:39, 7:41 & 11:45),  
would come at the beginning of Pascal’s ‘trajectory’ is not consistent with those very notes where 
the ‘discours’ is placed after other chapters or ‘letters’.  Thirouin also claims that the Wager would 
be part of Pascal’s strategy to show that religion is worthy of veneration and lovable (12:46).  But 
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pensée – on God’s incomprehensibility and the impossibility of a rational proof of 
His existence – could have a place in the project.  And the last phase – on 
habituation – certainly could.  But the middle section – the mechanics of the 
Wager itself – receives no explicit mention elsewhere in the Pensées1042. The règle 
des partis is mentioned in 577:480 and parti(s) in 153-4:186-7 but these 
references are very general.  There are two general issues in Pascal’s thinking 
evoked by these references.  First, that ordinary life inevitably involves taking 
decisions on the basis of imperfect information (577:480).  Secondly, that in living 
a certain kind of life, we cannot avoid choosing between a worldly life of limited 
duration and eternal life (153-4:186-7).  Both of these are implicit in pensées 427-
8:681-2 and others, as well as in the Wager.   
 
  No doubt the Wager MS retained great importance for Pascal: it seems at 
least to have been a mine of apercus used in other Pensées as Brunet’s table 
shows1043.  It is, finally, worth considering the hypothesis that, instead of 
developing the Wager, Pascal drafted the argument in pensées 427-8:681-2, 
drawing on notes he had made earlier1044, to put forward another prudential 
argument for agnostics’ attention and that it is this argument which appears in 
the liasse ORDRE as ‘Lettre pour porter { rechercher Dieu’ (4:38).  The argument 
has its own difficulties, as I point out in Chapter II, but it avoids some of the 
pitfalls of the Wager. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
the liasse entitled ‘Rendre la religion aimable’ makes no mention of the considerations behind the 
Wager, consisting instead of two Pensées asserting that Christ offers salvation to Christians only.  
1042 See Brunet 1956, p 47.  
1043 Brunet 1956, pp 44-6. 
1044 See Wetsel 1994, pp 243 ff.   
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APPENDIX III: MAJOR PASCAL STUDIES SINCE c.19501045 
 
In this Appendix I review some major analytical studies of Pascal’s Pensées 
which have appeared since about 1950.  These studies yield many valuable 
insights but in my view none gives the full picture of Pascal’s account of religious 
belief.  I attempt no exhaustive summary of these secondary texts, selecting those 
elements which will be of importance to my argument and putting them in my 
words, on occasion ignoring other matters which these authors considered worth 
mentioning. 
 
Reason in Christian belief 
Jeanne Russier’s La Foi selon Pascal1046 aims to show that, contrary to 
earlier critics’ views, faith for Pascal is not a matter of subjective feeling but 
involves a balance between reasonable belief and submission, a reasoned 
acceptance of the authority of Scripture and Church doctrine (29).  Russier also 
tackles the apparent paradox in Pascal’s apologetics: if faith is sufficient for 
Christian belief what role can reason play? If reasoning does play a role in the 
formation of belief, doesn’t it show faith to be unnecessary?  Russier’s answer is 
that no apology could function without the use of reason but reason’s role can 
only be to develop one’s faith, not found it (1-19).   
 
Russier identifies three main strands of reasoning in Pascal’s projected 
apology.  First, he uses, she says, sceptical arguments to undermine our certainty 
in everyday beliefs which stem from custom or are intrinsic to our nature.  This 
leads to a re-assessment of reason, belief and faith (53).  Secondly, Pascal argues 
for a revaluation of the human condition, which would reveal that our behaviour 
as human beings is unstable, absurd and futile, and that we are fundamentally 
unreasonable in the way we live our lives (67).  So, thirdly, we have to look 
beyond human life for the ideal to guide us, towards a notion of God as the 
Supreme Good and our immortality as a real prospect (82-3).  Hence reason itself 
                                                          
1045 There is a survey of different scope in Harrington 1982, pp 173-84. 
1046 Russier 1949; numbers in parentheses refer to pages in this and the other works described.  
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shows that only through Christian doctrine can we understand our condition 
(100).  Russier recognises that Pascal cannot demonstrate the truth of Christian 
dogma (139): his use of Scripture to establish Christ’s authenticity through the 
prophecies also cannot produce certainty of belief: he often ignores or distorts the 
historical record and the meaning of some crucial parts of the Scripture (140-9).   
 
Faith is God’s gift and, from the subject’s viewpoint, a sort of vision and 
commitment at the deepest level of human life (cœur).  At that level, faith is 
unavoidably bound up with our desires and affective constitution, our capacity to 
love God (154-5).  Faith is also stabilised in some believers by developing the 
habit of ritual or disciplined behaviour, but is not therefore irrational (205 ff.).  
We, corrupted by Original Sin, cannot achieve salvific faith: only God could instil 
faith in us (175).  So the path towards faith begins with the recognition of our 
inability to achieve faith without divine help.  
 
In comparing Pascal with Augustine and Aquinas, Russier claims that 
Pascal thought – unlike his great predecessors – that faith could be ‘perfectly lucid 
and certain in itself, fully reasonable’ (428).  I will argue in Chapter V that the 
Pascalian picture of faith is more complex than that: Pascal’s accounts of the 
simple believer (into whose faith reason enters not at all) and of the deliberative 
believer (the type of believer central to his apologetics) imply that the latter can 
never be sure she has faith and that that is a key characteristic of faith for this 
type of believer.  
 
The tragic predicament 
Lucien Goldmann argues, in his Le Dieu caché, that – placed between a 
world which contains no evidence of its Creator and a hidden God who never 
speaks – Pascal’s aspiring believer has tragically no rational basis for the 
affirmation of God’s existence (75)1047.  The seeker after truth has only indirect 
access to God through the Scripture; prayer is submission to God: it is not a 
mystic path to experience of God; at best, the seeker after truth must be content 
with an oblique approach to knowledge of God.   God is hidden also in the sense 
                                                          
1047 See, as well as Goldmann 1959, his contributions in Béra 1956.  
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that His role as supreme arbiter is obscure: His bestowal of grace is not on merit.  
All worldly activity is worthless.  The aspiring believer can do nothing to gain 
God’s approval: he is guilty just because he is human.  (Some pascalisants reject  
this pessimism suggesting, for example, that in submitting to God, Pascal’s 
believer achieves certainty1048.)  
 
 Pascal stresses our inability to achieve certainty in any empirical or 
evaluative sphere: our judgments are invariably open to qualification, to our 
considering the other side of the question (244; 277-9).  Our secular laws and 
customs can never be valid or just (175 & 304); we can do nothing effectively to 
ameliorate our earthly life1049.  This uncertainty also affects, according to Pascal, 
our attempts to lead a Christian life: we have to assume that everyone is either 
damned or a ‘justified sinner’ (the latter would be a member of God’s elect, 
making an authentic and constant effort to be virtuous but conscious too that 
complete virtue lies beyond human ability); we cannot know to which category 
any individual belongs (180-2).   
 
Goldmann thus widens the scope of Pascal’s pessimism: unlike Russier he 
sees no solution in the certainty of faith which, for Pascal, lay beyond human 
grasp.  The best the aspiring believer can hope for is the feeling of closeness to 
Jesus but not as God, only as a human being (78).  To believe in God, says 
Goldmann, was for Pascal only to bet on God (319)1050.  
 
The genius of Goldmann’s account is to put the doctrine of the hidden God 
at the centre of the Pensées.  But he does not take full account of Pascal’s 
distinction between simple and deliberative believers.  Simple faith is not 
reducible to a sort of wager.  In any event, Goldmann’s account of the wager 
fragment seems importantly wrong: the final bet is not to believe (Pascal accepts 
that one cannot decide to believe something) but to act as if the Christian God 
exists1051.  Goldmann’s critics have argued that the dialectic of the Pensées is not 
                                                          
1048 See e.g. Mesnard 1976, pp 307-14. 
1049 See Béra 1956, p 109. 
1050 See Béra 1956, pp 38 & 123 & 136. 
1051 See various critics’ remarks in Béra 1956, pp 132-158. 
264 
 
 
 
static but uses Christian revelation and ‘the person of Jesus Christ’ to resolve the 
paradoxes in the human condition (see Mesnard 1992, pp 363-5).  But Pascal 
recognises that he cannot achieve certainty in his exposition of revealed truths 
(see my remarks on Russier’s book above) and – like those of his Jansenist friends 
who accepted the doctrine of the hidden God – may have doubted that believers 
can have a direct experience of God or Jesus Christ1052. 
 
The unbeliever untamed 
Roger-Étienne Lacombe’s L’Apologétique de Pascal asks how convincing 
Pascal’s Apology would be for an unbeliever1053.  His approach is ahistorical and 
non-biographical1054.  He insists pace Russier that Pascal envisages that the 
unbeliever will be able understand Pascal’s ‘proofs’ of the Christian religion (52-
57).  But, as Lacombe notes, no apology could overcome the resistance of the 
determined unbeliever (71).  This idea runs through Lacombe’s book: on the 
Wager, he rightly implies that Pascal cannot merely assume that the unbeliever 
assigns little value to his current way of life (111).   
 
Our tendency to err in many ways, in factual and moral contexts may not 
motivate us to turn to Christianity: we may instead accept the limits of empirical 
knowledge while trying to avoid error (132-5).  Similarly, the unbeliever may see 
a kind of reasonableness in the adaptability of moral standards to social change, 
however much this complicates human life (150-1). 
 
Lacombe observes that Pascal’s warnings about the afterlife are more 
likely to prompt the unbeliever to want more of his earthly life rather than 
seeking eternal life (163-4).  Similarly, if human occupations and amusements 
(divertissement) are mostly futile, Lacombe’s unbeliever may say that human life 
is inevitably composed of more or less brief interludes of happiness; our lives 
have no overall meaning.  Or he may point to the great achievements of creative 
                                                          
1052 On this latter point, see Gouhier in Béra 1956, p 317. 
1053 Lacombe 1958. Bayet 1948 studies similar issues with comparable elegance. 
1054 Lacombe criticises Goldmann’s historico-sociological explanation of Pascal’s intellectual 
position as ‘strange and arbitrary’ (7, n1).  
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people:  not everyone devotes his life to amusements or finds refuge in frivolity 
after a day of pointless labour (173).   
 
In his account of Pascalian faith, Lacombe does not explore, as I do, the 
problems which arise by making faith dependent on grace.  In response to 
Lacombe’s acute criticisms of Pascal’s key assumptions, I set out to show that the 
distance between Pascal’s believer and the unbeliever is not simply attitudinal as 
Lacombe generally thought: Pascal began, I believe, to sketch a doctrine of 
‘orders’ implying that the gap was often between discrete forms of life.  
 
The experience of conversion 
Henri Gouhier– in his Blaise Pascal: Conversion et Apologétique1055 – 
contests Goldmann’s view that Pascal believes that no rational person could be 
certain of God’s existence.  Gouhier says that Pascal aspires to replace failed 
philosophical arguments for religion with an apology which flows from his own 
experience of ‘conversion’ to a more intense form of Christian faith.  The apology 
will emphasise everyone’s need to prepare intellectually and morally for faith but 
the apologist has no means to convert an unbeliever to the faith (35).  Gouhier 
thus identifies Pascal’s own experience as the basis of the projected apology, not 
any philosophical system.  This was not a mystical experience1056.  The 
‘conversion’ was Pascal’s act of submission and his resolve to change his way of 
life.   
 
Gouhier argues that for Pascal faith springs from the believer’s personal 
commitment not from a series of philosophical worries: Pascal criticises 
‘modernist’, i.e. mostly humanist, theologians (113), Stoicism (85-9), Montaigne’s 
sceptical neo-Epicureanism (120-6) and some aspects of Descartes’s works 
(167ff.) but builds no philosophical system (14).  He may think that theology can 
in some way supersede philosophical ethics.  But he would never have been able 
to dispense with a series of philosophical assumptions.  Against Gouhier, it should 
be noted that Pascal never applies the term ‘conversion’ to his own case and uses 
                                                          
1055 Gouhier (1986). See also Béra (1956), pp 138-41. 
1056 Gouhier 2005, pp 49-57. 
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it very rarely in the Pensées.  Gouhier’s approach illustrates the hazards of using 
biographical data to explain a philosophical position: in fact, Pascal’s successive 
‘conversions’ came unstuck sooner or later: he could not, as I mention in the 
Introduction, adhere to his resolve to forsake the world1057.   These moments of 
worldliness were significant enough for Pascal’s sister to gloss over them, or 
distort chronology, in her biography of her brother1058.    
 
As Gouhier rightly stresses, Pascal sees conversion as a radical and 
comprehensive revolution in the subject’s values (34-5).    But religious 
experience is not, for Pascal, the only route to faith: his project has several 
starting points.  He had clear philosophical interests of his own, especially in 
moral psychology1059 (even though he was not a systematic thinker – deliberately 
not so), as well as a felt need to convey the benefits of Christian belief to the 
doubters and lukewarm believers.  
  
Gouhier seems to suggest (58-9 & 80-1) that Pascal believes that a 
recipient of grace can be certain that she has received it and therefore that her 
‘conversion’ is genuine.  But Pascal’s Écrits sur la Grâce follow Augustine in 
denying that we can know on whom God has bestowed grace: a record of virtuous 
behaviour is no guide because we are all stained by Original Sin, and God’s 
judgments are impenetrable1060.  The bestowal of grace is instantaneous and has 
to be renewed at every instant: one is constantly in fear of losing God’s vital 
support.  So, if we can never know on whom grace has been bestowed, then we 
cannot know whether our own conversion is genuine and durable.   
 
The sadness of the aspirant to faith 
Although it does not aim to give a comprehensive account of Pascal’s 
apologetics (its first half focuses on the Jansenist doctrine of grace), a fifth study 
                                                          
1057 Mesnard says: ‘il n’est pas impossible de trouver dans la vie de Pascal la trace de nouvelles 
périodes de léger relâchement’ (Mesnard 1965, p 19).  
1058 See e.g. OCG I 1020-1, OCM I 566-7 and Koyré in Béra (1956), p 267. 
1059 As Gouhier himself seems to suggest in another study (which is largely textual): Blaise Pascal: 
Commentaires, e.g. p 167. 
1060 OCG II 262 & 254.  See also pensée 975:739.  
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deserves mention: Leszek Kołakowski’s Dieu ne nous doit rien1061.  This work 
identifies the key principles of Pascal’s apology: God is absolutely sovereign and 
man is wholly corrupt (167): this is the result of the Fall which also led God to 
hide Himself (169): we can do nothing to persuade Him to save us (212).  This 
doctrine explains both why we routinely evade thoughts of death and why there 
are so few true believers (171-8).  Pascal uses scepticism as an ally in his 
debunking of our confidence in science but he cannot in the end dispel scepticism 
(252). 
 
The Fall has not wholly corrupted human reason.  We can still use it to see 
the evidence for Christianity: the history of the religion, especially the prophecies 
and miracles (187).  But the doctrine of the hidden God entails that only the elect 
can see the truth of prophecies and miracles (199).  This leads Pascal to argue 
that standards of proof differ according to context: religion and secular belief do 
not share criteria of truth and validity (202-5).  In this sense, faith and reason 
(secular, scientific knowledge) cannot contradict each other (210-11).  Pascal’s 
doctrine of the three orders implies an ontological chasm between each level 
(223-4): we have no way of ascending from purely secular systems of belief to 
real faith: hence the uselessness of the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence 
(227-8).   
 
Kołakowski argues that for Pascal the Wager is the only way out for the 
unbeliever: he cannot be sure he will be saved but, on the other hand, he might at 
least act as if God existed (212-8).   Yet this would be to enter a fundamentally 
meaningless universe: Pascal concedes that we can never understand why we 
should inherit guilt from Adam nor do we comprehend God’s justice (258).  
Pascal’s religion is profoundly sad rather than tragic: our sinfulness is inescapable 
unless God saves us; but we have no way of knowing that we shall ever receive 
God’s help to escape from it.  Faith arises from a direct, personal yet passive 
relationship with God.  There are no moves one can go through to achieve it.  In 
contrast the Jesuits, as Christian humanists, offered their flock procedures to help 
                                                          
1061 Kołakowski 1997; English version: God owes us nothing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). 
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them become virtuous and join the faith.  Pascal’s religion is a creed for unhappy 
people and doomed to make them unhappier (259). 
 
 
Other Works 
Carraud’s Pascal et la Philosophie stresses Pascal’s indebtedness to 
Descartes but also his rejection of Descartes’s use of metaphysical proofs to 
support faith, a rejection he describes as ‘la subversion de la métaphysique’. ‘À 
partir d’une adhésion initiale à la métaphysique cartésienne, Pascal en 
déconceptualise les concepts...’1062.  If this means that Pascal abandons Descartes’s 
conceptual scheme to suit his apologetic purposes, this is only partly true; his 
own metaphysical assumptions are often close to Descartes’s.  I cite multiple 
affinities between the two thinkers throughout this study. 
 
Two important studies on Pascal in English appeared in 2013.  Wood’s 
Blaise Pascal on Duplicity, Sin, and the Fall accurately describes Pascal’s thought 
with the aim of showing what elements can be kept and what revised in the light 
of theological thought today.  The Canadian philosopher Graeme Hunter’s Pascal 
the Philosopher shows how much Pascal focussed on philosophical failure and 
invokes the notion of therapy to describe aspects of Pascal’s project.  Hunter 
places the Wager at the centre of Pascal’s thought, a judgment which I contest on 
historical and philosophical grounds1063. 
 
Last but not Least 
  Jean Mesnard has devoted his long life to producing the most accurate 
versions of Pascal’s writings and to their historical and biographical context.   As 
such, his work is indispensable to other scholars.  He has not sought to produce 
an original and analytical overview of Pascal’s work.  His interpretative aim is 
usually to give the most convincing account of the meaning of each text and, 
where this fails, sometimes to suggest that Pascal would have modified his 
expression of his thought had he lived to finish his Apology.  He tends to 
                                                          
1062 Carraud 2007, p 451. 
1063 See my review of this book in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22.1 (2014), pp 
181-3 and Appendix II above. 
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exaggerate the rigour of Pascal’s argumentation but he is sternly critical of 
Pascal’s biblical exegesis1064. 
 
                                                          
1064 See e.g. Mesnard 1965, p 86, Mesnard 1962, p 137: ‘une argumentation […] toujours rigoureuse’ 
and, on Pascal’s exegetical efforts, Mesnard 1992, pp 426-453. 
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